THE NEW CONSTITUTIONS OF THE EMPEROR LEO.
~  XCVIII  ~
CONCERNING THE PENALTY TO BE INFLICTED UPON EUNUCHS IF THEY SHOULD MARRY.



 
S. P. Scott, The Civil Law, XVII, Cincinnati, 1932 ).
 

 
The Same Emperor to the Same Stylianus.

  The object of the laws is the establishment and maintenance of good government, as well as at times to offer assistance to Nature when it suffers injury. Therefore, it now becomes advisable for a law to be enacted on the subject as to whether eunuchs can marry. But before We discuss this point, a careful examination should be made, and it be ascertained whether an union of this kind can properly be called a marriage; and also whether the various matrimonial ceremonies (that is to say the prayers, the communion, the carnal pleasure, and the other matters which form part of the matrimonial condition) should take place in this instance. The priest, in imitation of the Creator, pronounces the sacred words of benediction when he unites persons of different sexes for the purpose of perpetuating the human race. The pleasure and joy of the human heart is manifested in the nuptial embraces, and are increased with the hope of offspring. The parents of those who are married looking forward to grandchildren, and the newly made husband and wife entertaining the hope of successors, are overwhelmed with the greatest delight. Under these circumstances, however, nothing of the kind occurs, for how can they experience any satisfaction, and what sacrifice can render their union permanent? For as it is devoid of all pleasure, and is not capable of consecration, communion, or benediction, how can the name of marriage be applicable to it? Why should it not be considered a crime, and therefore punishable by law? Thus it may succinctly be stated that such a condition can not, even in the first place, be designated as a matrimonial one, and further discussion renders its indignity still more apparent. When the Creator of all things united the male and female, He did so for the purpose of increasing the numbers of the human race. Moreover, the object of Nature — which, as His slave, observes the precepts promulgated by Him, as far as it is able to do so — is that persons are married in order to have offspring, and as far as God permits this to be done, it makes use of His agency for that purpose. If, then, the marriage of eunuchs accomplishes the ends of the Author of Nature and of Nature itself, what We have thought should be prohibited ought not to be forbidden; but if, on the contrary, and this is certain, it offers no means of accomplishing the will of God (and is not acknowledged by Nature), why should We not absolutely prohibit it? If some contentious person should state that if eunuchs are excluded from marriage on account of their impotence, a large number of other persons should also be excluded for the reason that all those who marry are not capable of generation, We would immediately reply that whenever the latter have no children, they did not marry in order to be childless; but, on the other hand, there is no doubt that they were impelled by the desire of having progeny, and their hopes have not been realized. But the same thing cannot be said with reference to eunuchs, who, being well aware of their incapacity, marry with the certainty of not being able to have issue, hence are, to a certain extent, plotting against Nature. And, indeed, in cases of this kind, both husband and wife are worthy of aversion; the wife, for having selected a man who is impotent when she. could have obtained one who was virile, if she wished to be married; and the husband, for the reason that his weakness rendered the blessing of God of no effect. Moreover, where anyone devastates and leaves uncultivated a tract of land on which another could reap a harvest, should We not entertain a feeling of detestation for such a malevolent person, and should We not suppress an abuse of this kind if it can be done? For why should We permit him to keep land unproductive, and render it of no use, when, with proper tillage, it would prove fertile, just as if he had committed nothing improper? And why, indeed, should anyone object? But it may be remarked that St. Paul thought that it is wiser to marry than to burn; and hence, taking into consideration the tortures endured under such circumstances, marriage should not be forbidden. You, however, who praise St. Paul, listen to the words he utters. When he speaks of marriage in the place referred to, he has in mind sexual intercourse with a wife. If, then, union with a woman is worthy of the blessing to which persons who enter the matrimonial condition are entitled, call it marriage; but if it does not deserve even the slightest benediction (for how can an act contrary to the law of God and which thwarts the intention of Nature be blessed or consecrated?), who do you invoke the authority of St. Paul for the purpose of supporting an unfruitful and extraordinary marriage of this description? So far as those who deprive themselves of the power of procreation are concerned, for the purpose (which God condemns, and is a species of rebellion against him) of being no longer able to show themselves to be men, but hereafter not to be susceptible of sensual pleasure, and to become faithful guardians upon whom no suspicion can fall (which, indeed, the sound of their voices seems to disclose), why should not this arouse indignation against them not only because it is unnatural, but also for the reason that they are hostile to persons who desire to render them useful, as it seemed to them, even though it was maliciously done; and, finally, because in their new and strange sex they did not accomplish the object of the one to which they formerly belonged, nor of the latter which they themselves adopted? Hence We decree that, if an eunuch is convicted of contracting a marriage, he will be liable to the penalty prescribed for rape, and any priest who dares to perform a ceremony of this kind by a profane sacrifice shall be divested of his sacerdotal dignity.