You are aware that persons who are united by a common condition generally entertain the same sentiments. Thus those who are associated in business divide its profits and losses equally with one another, just as travelling companions, whenever they happen to find anything, even though all of them did not see it at the same moment, share with one another the ownership of the same. And companions-inarms also, even if they may not all evince the same ardor and impetuosity against the enemy, still participate equally in the rewards of victory. Hence, when an ancient legislator held that where certain persons with malicious intent combined to undertake something for which a penalty was prescribed by law (as, for instance, if a rape, or a parricide or any other kind of a homicide should be perpetrated), even though all of them did not simultaneously take part in it, they will nevertheless be liable to the same penalty. We, also, for the same reason, approving of the laws formerly enacted against those who, with a view to robbery, combine to attack men, have decreed that all of them, no matter where they may have been, shall undergo the same punishment, even though they all did not cooperate to the same extent in the commission of the offence. For if one of them did not actually exert himself for the purpose of inflicting death, he could not, on that account, be considered as immune from punishment; for if he did not use his own hands, still, he was instrumental in inducing and strengthening those of another to commit murder; for, indeed, it is well established that the act of homicide was, in this instance, instigated by the common perversity of mankind, since if the assistance of others had not been afforded, it is not certain that the crime would have been perpetrated. Therefore, as has already been stated, it frequently happens that although death resulted from the blow of one person, and others present were not actively engaged in the disturbance, We decree that all shall be liable to the same punishment.