It is right for persons who are guilty of public wrongs to suffer penalties adapted to restrain their inclinations to injure others, and to prevent such acts from being committed. But it is not right for them to be punished with excessive severity, nor for the law to pass beyond its proper bounds, and, by a species of legal vengeance, as it were, cause injustice. For when the person who perpetrates an offence is punished, the penalty imposed upon him is just; but it ceases to be so if it is out of all proportion to the crime, and I think such a provision should not be observed. Therefore Our Majesty being aware that the ancient authorities prescribed penalties which are too harsh in cases where persons have sold public property, We hereby decree that hereafter such prosecutions shall be conducted with less severity. For how can it be just to inflict an irreparable misfortune upon anyone who has caused the Treasury a trifling loss, by depriving him of life, when he sold some article of public property? For such a crime is not worthy of being punished capitally, nor do We permit those who have been convicted of it to be treated in this way. Anyone, however, who is proved to have disposed of public property, We think will be sufficiently punished if he is compelled to return fourfold his value.