Those who formerly exerted themselves for the purpose of directing human affairs in a proper manner by the promulgation of laws, and have left abundant evidence of their good will in the measures which they adopted for the purpose of preserving order in the State, I do not know for what reason, when treating the subject of captives, did not manifest the same indulgence by authorizing them to dispose of their estates. The legislation relating to wills contains a clause of an excellent and beneficial character, for it was provided that whenever there was a lack of witnesses the will could be signed by a smaller number, and that, even where there were no witnesses present at all, a will was frequently considered valid, like that of a soldier who had fallen in battle, which is a conclusive proof of benevolence. Nothing of this kind, however, was enacted with reference to captives, nor is there any indulgence manifested in this respect, for they are not allowed to dispose of their property, and are not shown any commiseration whatever, but their captivity is treated in an entirely different way. For are they not captives in a double sense? Why should their misfortune and profound sadness be increased, and as they did not die of sorrow, why should they not only be condemned to expire in captivity, but also, if they had any property at home, should it be taken from them as if it was not theirs, and they be deprived of what they have obtained by their labor, and for the increase of which they have exposed themselves to the perils which resulted in their captivity? Why, when a captive has relatives, for instance, children, a wife, brothers, or others whom the law calls to his succession, should they, perceiving that they can obtain his property on the ground of intestacy, make attempts to have him released when they expect to be his heirs? We are acquainted with the dispositions of men, and are well aware that if there are very few persons who entertain any true affection for those who are unfortunate, and desire to assist them solely for the pleasure of doing so; on the other hand, there are many who are inclined to go to their relief through hope of reward. Therefore, what would induce a husband, or anyone else, to undertake something for the benefit of a captive? If the latter had the power to dispose of his property, such persons, convinced that any steps that they took could not cause him any loss, would not then manifest indifference, for they would think that if their efforts were successful, and the captive recovered his liberty, they would be rewarded for their care and labor, or if death would put an end to their exertions, the captive would bequeath by his will a much greater share of his estate to one who had exerted himself to release him than to another who had neglected to do so, for he would not forget him, nor would his efforts be considered of no value. The result of this would be, as I have already stated, that certain persons would zealously devote themselves to the ransom of captives. But where the latter have no power to make a will, and their heirs can obtain their estates ab intestato, I do not know where anyone can be found who would be willing to exert himself for their liberation, as the hope of obtaining the captive's estates on the ground of intestacy, and the fear of laboring ineffectually for their release, in case, for instance, they died before it was obtained, would cause them to be slow in acting, or in other words, they would have no inclination to take the necessary steps for this purpose; which, however, would not occur if the law did not declare the testaments of captives to be void. And, indeed, if everyone could make use of his property in order to purchase his freedom, would not a captive be subjected to gross injustice, when, in forbidding him to dispose of his property, he is precluded from using a part of it to secure his release? Moreover, if the law is absurd in this respect, it is still more so in another, inasmuch as it deprives captives of testamentary capacity, and, by so doing, frequently transfers their estates to their worst enemies, and to men upon whom, if they were living, they could not even bear to look. Can anything more detestable be imagined? Therefore We, being convinced that matters should no longer be left in this condition, have determined to correct these regulations in the interests of good government as We have done in other instances, so far as God has given Us ability. Hence We decree that captives who have been forbidden to make wills shall no longer be subject to this restriction, and that they shall be allowed to make their testamentary dispositions either orally or in writing, in the presence of five witnesses, if this is possible, or, at least, in the presence of three; on condition that the latter make oath that this is really the will of the testator, and that the latter, if he had any children, called them to his succession, or if he had none, that he appointed other heirs. We do not think that it is just for all those who bear the name of citizens of the same state, and are judged to belong to the same nation, not to enjoy these rights under its laws; for example, that such as are free should have the power to dispose of their property, and, on the other hand, that those who are in captivity should not enjoy the same privilege, just as if they had been guilty of crime by having lost their freedom while fighting for their compatriots. But if a captive, either of his own accord, or compelled by those to whose authority he is subject, should make a will in favor of enemies, it should not be confirmed, and shall be declared void, as not being in accordance with the proprieties which should be observed in the execution of testaments under a Christian government. These provisions are hereby ordered to be applicable to such captives as have executed wills before their death. But when the last moment of life comes suddenly upon a man and he dies intestate, then, where there are any ascendants or descendants entitled to his estate, it shall pass to them. But if there are no relatives of the dead captive, who are entitled to the succession (I refer to such as are neither ascendants nor descendants recognized as such by the family of the deceased), it must first be determined what he owes, and then a sum sufficient to satisfy the indebtedness having been set apart, the remainder shall be divided into two parts, one equal to one-third, and the other to two-thirds of the same; the first of which shall be devoted to prayers for the deceased, and the second shall be transferred to the Treasury without, however, any slaves being included in either; for We wish all of them to obtain their freedom, unless there are not enough assets to discharge the indebtedness. The same distribution shall take place when there are no debts, or where the deceased left no heirs, as has already been stated. We have, by means of this law, effected the amendment which We had in mind with reference to the legislation imposing restraints upon captives. Your Magnificence will communicate it to Our subjects, in order that as soon as what We have decreed becomes known to all, including such as are in captivity, they will have power to dispose of their property in any way they may desire.