If I had thought that those who formerly promulgated laws had been of the opinion that they did not need any amendment and were unwilling for them to be changed, I, perhaps, never would have changed them, for I never should have attempted to alter enactments even where they were unjust; since, although influenced by solicitude for the public welfare, I would have hesitated to amend them, in order to avoid condemning the work of former legislators. But as, if they were living at the present time, they certainly would not be displeased when an attempt was made to amend their laws, and I even think that they would return thanks to persons who believe that this should be done (for it is not only for their own glory, but also for the benefit of the public that legislation takes place), and being convinced that what is conducive to the general welfare would not be distasteful to the ancient legislators themselves, We, with God's assistance, and after careful consideration, have taken measures to provide remedies for these laws, in the same manner as medicines are administered. by physicians. In addition to other matters, when they made provision for captives, they declared that where the husband was in the hands of the enemy, but his wife was at liberty, or vice versa, there was good cause for the dissolution of the marriage; since under such circumstances, where one of the parties was in servitude, the inequality of status did not permit the equality existing at the time of the marriage to continue. We, however, being more inclined to benevolence, have decreed that so long as either the husband or the wife survives, the union shall not be considered as dissolved, nor can either of the parties marry again, unless he or she desires to be considered to have acted wantonly, and become liable to the penalty of losing either the ante-nuptial donation or the dowry. These are the rules which the ancient legislators adopted with reference to the marriage of captives. The cause does not, however, seem to Us sufficient to authorize the annulment of marriage, as it is not consonant with either reason or humanity, and, while it affords a means of dissolution, it inflicts punishment; for if, as is alleged, the inequality of their legal position does not permit the matrimonial state to continue to exist; if the captive should recover his liberty, and be restored to his former condition after the marriage had been dissolved and both parties are living in freedom, should it not again become valid? What sincere feeling of humanity can that be which causes injury by the separation of two persons who are attached to each other, and how can this be compensated for by the substitution of others? And again, while all the possessions of the captives, even to articles of trifling value, are estimated in accordance with their condition, can it be believed that the parties interested would have been willing to expose the dearest portion of themselves to the same accidents as their property, and is it not clear that it would be a great misfortune for either of them to be deserted by his companion? What then should I do? I have determined that when one of the parties is in captivity, and the other, being free, marries again, after the one who was a captive returns, he can, if he desires to do so, take back his wife with whom his marriage will always continue to exist, notwithstanding the second which may have been contracted; for if anyone should hold that the second marriage ought not to be dissolved, is it "not even more just to assert that the first ought to be reestablished? If anyone should allege that the one who married a second time ought not to be separated from his or her new consort, is it not consonant with reason to reply that, as they had been separated, he or she should be reunited to his or her former spouse? It might perhaps be added that the captive husband receives an indemnification under these circumstances, as his wife is obliged to pay him a penalty on account of the second marriage which she had the rashness to contract. I answer that, not only a reason of this kind cannot be advanced, but that it does not even appeal to the mind; for what wretchedness and penury of spirit would he not experience who exchanges his wife for a sum of money! We therefore decree that the husband or wife who remains free cannot marry again, and should be obliged to wait for his or her consort as long as he or she remains in captivity, whether they write to each other or not; and if anyone, in violation of this law, should be tempted to break his or her former ties in order to form new ones, and should do this without observing the special provisions of the One Hundred and Seventeenth Novel concerning the wives of those who are absent on military expeditions, they will render themselves liable to the penalties prescribed by this law, and, in addition, as We have already stated, the captive husband can, if he regains his freedom, claim and take back his wife.