As it was laid down by the ancient laws, which treated of nuptial contracts, that at the time of the contraction of marriage, as well as when it was dissolved by the death of either of the parties, he or she would be entitled to an equal share of the estate, I do not know for what reason other laws were subsequently enacted which contained contrary provisions. For the more ancient ones declared that when the marriage was contracted, what was mutually given by husband and wife should be of equal value, and that at its dissolution each should take what he or she had brought, unless there were children, or it was stated in the agreement that the survivor should be entitled to more. Where such an arrangement had been made, it was held that at the time of the death of either of the married persons, the survivor, having taken what he or she had given, would be entitled to whatever it was stated the survivor should receive out of the estate of the other, and that such acquisitions must be of the same value for each, that is to say, if the wife survived she would be entitled in the first place to her dowry, and afterwards to her share of the property given in consideration of marriage, or even to all of it if this had been agreed upon; and that if, on the other hand, the husband survived, he could claim the ante-nuptial donation, and could take either a part or all of the dowry of his wife, in accordance with the terms of the contract. These are the provisions of the ancient laws which were repealed by subsequent enactments. What the latter provided is unjust, for they declared that at the time of the contraction of the marriage the wife should bring a dowry of larger value than the donation made to her by her husband, and that, on the day when the marriage was celebrated, she would acquire the ownership of the articles composing said donation, even if she should contract a second marriage, as is frequently the case. The more recent laws also provide that where the woman survives, she will be entitled to the entire ante-nuptial donation, along with her dowry, and will take besides out of the remainder of her husband's estate a share equal to the fourth of the dowry and the donation combined, and if, on the other hand, she should die first, her heirs would be entitled to both the dowry and the donation without the husband being able to retain more than a fourth of the two combined; and that this rule should be enforced without regard to any agreement in this respect. These laws were extremely iniquitous, inasmuch as they provided that, where marriage was dissolved by death, they assuaged the grief of the wife for the loss of her husband by giving her part of his estate, and aggravated the husband's loss by depriving him of all of that of his wife. But is not this unfair? Does it not inflict great wrong under color of law? There is perhaps some reason that, when the husband dies first, his wife should acquire a right to his property, but when she dies first, and her heirs obtain it, the rule in every respect is unjust and outrageous. Wherefore the above-mentioned Emperor, to whom We owe Our origin and to whose power We have succeeded, very properly and wisely held that in order to preserve the authority of the ancient laws, the more modern ones by which they were annulled should be repealed. But custom is refractory and contentious, and absurd opinions are not easily extirpated when they are profoundly rooted in the minds of men, and especially where the latter are not willing to take the time and trouble to examine them. However frivolous a custom may be, people are unwilling to abandon it in order to adopt a better one. Hence, the Constitution enacted by Our Father — whose memory should always be preserved — for the purpose of renewing the ancient laws relating to marriage contracts, has been rejected as absurd, and those which he decided should be abolished are now in general use. What then should We do? As it seemed to be better that married persons should not bring equal shares of property to one another, but that the dowry should be of greater value than the ante-nuptial donation, this shall have the force of law. And if death should dissolve the marriage, and the husband should die without leaving any children, and no agreement was made with reference to this, the wife will be entitled to both the dowry and the ante-nuptial donation, but to nothing more; and if, on the other hand, death should remove the wife, her heirs will be entitled to the dowry, and the husband will not be deprived of his property, but shall have what belongs to him. For would it not be unjust for strangers to be enriched at his expense, and that, in addition to the loss of his wife, he should be deprived of his own property, or of the ante-nuptial donation which he gave?