It is not Our intention either to repeal or criticize the rule of ancient jurists by which it was established that insanity presented an impediment to marriage, but was not a proper cause for its dissolution, after it had once been celebrated; but I limit myself to the consideration of the reason which induced them to arrive at such a conclusion, which I neither assent to nor confirm, because it appears to Me unworthy of approbation. For how can the opinion be adopted that if insanity is an impediment to marriage before it takes place, it cannot afterwards have this effect, when it has once been contracted? For if the conjugal relation is for the benefit of both parties concerned, how can he who does not consent to the dissolution in the beginning, because it would not have the desired effect, be unwilling for this to be done after it had been solemnized, when the same condition exists ? Must precautions only be taken to preserve someone from affliction, and if it should come upon him subsequently, should he be refused all relief, and not be entitled to pity on account of the calamity which he suffers? It is just as if a physician should administer remedies to prevent disease, but let the patient die without assistance when he becomes ill. Still, in saying what I did, I had no intention whatever to criticize the ancient jurists, but, on the other hand, I am very far from agreeing with them, above all when I see that they have established so many other causes authorizing the dissolution of marriage, none of which can justly be compared with the evil of insanity. For how can the wastefulness of a husband, his sexual impotence, difference of religion, or any other cause sufficient to effect divorce, for example, where the woman is of a servile condition, or where she is unable to pay all that was promised in a marriage contract; how, I repeat, can these causes and others like them, by which a marriage can legally be dissolved, be compared to the misfortune of insanity? Hence We decree that if the husband should become insane, the marriage shall continue to exist for five years without power being granted to dissolve it; for if We think that it would be cruel to hold that it never can be dissolved and even though the insanity promises to be perpetual, it still seems to Us necessary to wait this time. If, however, after so long a period, the evil does not cease, and the insane person does not recover, the marriage shall be dissolved, whether this may be beneficial to one of the parties, or not. We do not enact this provision for the purpose of finding fault with the ancient legislators, but that We may discharge Our duty to Our subjects. But where insanity develops upon the very day of marriage, even after it has been confirmed by participation in the Holy Communion, it shall be dissolved, just as if the condition had manifested itself before the ceremony. Certain authorities may, perhaps, hold that it is unreasonable for marriage to be annulled after consecration, because after the sacrament uniting the two parties into one body has been administered, it is impossible to separate them; and besides, the husband is the head, that is the principal member of this new body, and when the principal members are attacked by any disease it is not customary to amputate them. Those who advance this objection arising from the intimate union of husband and wife and attempt to maintain it, seem to Me to be ignorant of the object of the nuptial benediction, for it is presumed that marriage will be a source of happiness, that it joins the parties in a species of indissoluble bond, and sanctifies marital joys and the reproduction of the human race. But, I ask, how can the condition of insanity accord with these opinions? How can modesty be preserved when reason is absent, or stifled under the weight of wretched ignorance? How can any hope be entertained that children will be born of a union where an unfortunate woman only sees in the condition of her consort, who is more unfortunate still, a horrible spectacle, and can have no sexual relations with him? Finally, how can it be said that the parties are united by love, when the husband is distracted by madness, and does not even preserve the form of humanity? And, certainly, if there should be any issue of such a marriage, as Nature always causes the fruits of everything to resemble what produces it, this will be detrimental to humanity. Therefore, taking all these things into consideration, it seems to Me only just and consonant with reason to decree that insanity shall be a cause for the dissolution of marriage, without this rule being contrary to the nuptial benediction, or having in any respect the appearance of crime. Still, if anyone should find this conclusion, to a certain extent, reprehensible, let him subject himself to the experience of a similar matrimonial union, and he will soon acknowledge to how much weight his opinion is entitled.