THE
ENACTMENTS OF JUSTINIAN. THE NOVELS. |
~ XCVII ~ |
CONCERNING
THE EQUALITY OF THE DOWRY AND THE ANTE-NUPTIAL DONATION, AS WELL AS
THE INCREASE OF THE DOWRY AND ANTE-NUPTIAL DONATION, AND THE PRIVILEGE
OF THE DOWRY WHICH TAKES PRECEDENCE OF OTHER PRIVILEGES ; AND HOW
CREDITORS ARE EXCEPTED FROM THIS PRIVILEGE WHEN THEY HAVE FURNISHED
MONEY FOR THE PURCHASE OF AN OFFICE ; AND CONCERNING THE RETURN
OF THE DOWRY TO THE FATHER, AND ITS GIFT A SECOND TIME IN BEHALF OF
THE SAME DAUGHTER ON HER MARRIAGE TO ANOTHER HUSBAND ; AND CONCERNING
THE COLLATION OF THE DOWRY WHEN THE HUSBAND DIES INSOLVENT. |
|
( S. P. Scott, The Civil Law, XVI, Cincinnati, 1932 ). |
The
Emperor Justinian to John, Most Glorious Praetorian Prefect of the East,
Twice Consul and Patrician. |
PREFACE. |
As We see that
many questions with reference to our original birth (that is to say,
concerning marriage and the procreation of children), as well as respecting
the end of life and what relates to the last wills and testaments of
dying persons are discussed in the laws, We have resolved closely to
examine what an ancient law prescribes with reference to dotal instruments,
which provides that the nuptial contracts between both parties to a
marriage shall transfer property of equal value; that, for example,
one of them shall not stipulate for half, and the other for a third
or a fourth of a certain sum, but an equitable course must be pursued,
as prescribed by the law which provides that the agreement made by each
shall be equal, that is to say, that the profit obtained. by the parties
severally shall be the half, the third, the quarter, or any other share
whatsoever; but it does not require that the articles given should be
the same in number, for it permits one of the spouses to stipulate for
one or two thousand aurei, or more, and the other to stipulate
for less, in such a way that the equality consists rather in the words
or letters alone than in the articles themselves. |
CHAPTER
I. CONCERNING THE EQUALITY OF THE DOWRY AND THE ANTE-NUPTIAL DONATION. |
Therefore,
when correcting all these matters, We desire above all things that whatever
is given by these contracts shall be equal, so far as both the dowries
and ante-nuptial donations are concerned; that the husband shall stipulate
for an advantage as great as the wife; that this advantage shall be
of as great a value as the parties desire, but the amounts must be equal.
For the principles of justice and equity cannot be observed if the parties
to the marriage deceive one another in a business transaction, where
they seem to make equal stipulations, but the effect of the latter is
unequal, and articles are not furnished by both of them in the same
quantity. Thus, for instance, the law would be held to have been entirely
evaded if the husband should agree to give two thousand aurei, and his
wife agreed to bring him six thousand; or if the parties to the contract
should stipulate to receive the fourth of what they consented to give,
for in this instance the wife would only obtain five hundred aurei,
that is to say, the fourth of what her husband had promised, while the
latter would obtain fifteen hundred, which also is the fourth of the
sum promised by his wife. In consequence of this, the fourth of one
of the parties would be much larger than that of the other, and from
this fictitious uniformity a great inequality would result. Dotal
contracts which have already been drawn up shall retain the form which
has already been given them, as it is impossible for what has already
taken place to be considered as not having been accomplished; but We
desire that hereafter, in every donation, the stipulation for advantages
shall be uniform on both sides, and that the husband and wife shall
agree upon equal profits, which We decree in order that We may, in every
respect, honor justice and equity. Where one of the parties is more
wealthy than the other, he or she will be allowed to favor his or her
consort by employing a different method, which is lawful and acknowledged
by Our laws, but whoever does this is forbidden to grant his or her
spouse a greater advantage by means of a stipulation, which, though
appearing to be equitable, will in fact result in inequality. These
are the provisions prescribed by the present law with reference to this
subject for the purpose of treating all persons with justice. |
CHAPTER
II. CONCERNING THE INCREASE OF THE DOWRY AND THE ANTE-NUPTIAL DONATION. |
We
have examined and carefully considered matters relating to ante-nuptial
donations, and We shall now treat of their increase. For, as preceding
legislators as well as Ourselves have already discussed this subject,
We have made use of many philosophical precepts which it
would be difficult to enumerate, by means of which We repress and correct
frauds perpetrated by some persons under such circumstances, the justice
of which precepts We now confirm. For We have granted to dowries the
privilege of being preferred to hypothecations of older date, for the
reason that when creditors have made contracts with their debtors, they
only took into account the property of the latter, and not that of their
wives, which perhaps did not yet belong to them. We have likewise permitted
persons to stipulate for increases (which was also done in ancient times),
and We have granted this power to the husband and the wife; to both
of them together if they so desire, or to one of them alone. And, at
first, for fear some fraud might be perpetrated, We direct that where
the increase of a dowry or a donation on account of marriage is desired
to be made, one of the parties interested shall not be permitted to
make it and the other confine himself or herself to the original stipulation,
but both of them must agree to the increase at the same time; and compliance
with this provision is not only enjoined upon each one but is required
of both; and they must always keep the amount of the two increases the
same, in accordance with the Constitution of Our Father. The reason
which has induced Us to establish this rule is to prevent the augmentation
from being simulated instead of genuine; especially on the part of the
woman, who otherwise would be enabled to avail herself of her privilege,
and thereby defraud her husband's creditors. When each of the parties
owns land, it is preferable for the stipulation providing for the increase
to be made for the same kind of property for which the stipulation was
entered into at the time of the marriage, and that the increase subsequently
made should be certain. Where only one of the married persons has immovable
property, the addition of the wife shall be made in land, in order that
the dowry and its increase may be equally privileged, so far as other
creditors are concerned, and that the existence of the augmentation
may not be doubtful. The increase of the husband shall consist of personal
property, for no injury to anyone can result under such circumstances.
But where the estate of the woman consists of land, and she stipulates
that the increase shall be furnished in movables, she is hereby notified
that she will not be entitled to any other privilege than that attaching
to her dowry in the first place, and that the increase in this instance
is only fictitious. For stipulations made in the beginning are not absolutely
liable to suspicion like those which are entered into afterwards to
the prejudice of creditors, and for this very reason give rise to doubt;
and We do not desire creditors to be injured by the privilege which
We grant to dowries. Where, however, the husband is not indebted to
anyone, and hence no suspicion of fraud toward his creditors can arise,
the increase may be stipulated between the parties to consist of money
or anything else that they wish; provided always that this is done equally
so far as each of them is concerned, and in such a way that justice
may be preserved. For how can there be a suspicion of fraud when the
husband is not indebted to anyone, and the increases are agreed upon
without deception? |
CHAPTER
III. CONCERNING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE DOWRY, AND THAT OF CREDITORS WHO HAVE ADVANCED MONEY FOR THE PURCHASE OF AN OFFICE. |
The
determination of matters in doubt in cases of this kind is a legitimate
consequence. For We are aware that certain hypothecations, although
of more recent date, are preferred to those of older creditors on account
of privileges granted by the laws, and this occurs when the creditor
has, by advancing money, furnished them means to either purchase, build,
or repair a ship, to erect a house, to buy a field, or to do something
else of this kind; and he has also a prior lien over other creditors
whose claims are much older than his. The question, however, arises,
if when a woman, claiming to enjoy the privilege based upon a dowry
and its increase, to which this privilege also applies (as has already
been stated) wishes to be preferred to prior creditors, and, on the
other hand, a creditor whose claim is actually of later date, but who,
because a ship, a house, or a field has been bought or repaired with
the money which he loaned, demands the same privilege with respect to
the property which has been purchased or repaired, whether the dowry
shall be preferred to the claim of a creditor of this kind, and will
be privileged so far as he is concerned ; or whether, on the contrary,
his claim shall be considered preferable for the reason that the property
has been increased in value by the expenditure of his money. Therefore
We, having devoted much attention to this point, decree that it is not
just for the woman under such circumstances to yield to a privilege
of this description. For We have seen (which is a legal absurdity) some
females make a profit of their own bodies, and earn a livelihood by
fornication, while others, who are opposed to such practices, and deliver
themselves and their property to their husbands, so far from profiting
by this, have their fortunes impaired, and when their husbands are unsuccessful
in business, lose all hope of recovering their dowries.
Hence We decree that where a creditor has loaned money to repair a house,
or to purchase a field, he cannot plead his privilege to the prejudice
of a woman, for We are aware of the natural weakness of the sex, and
how easily they are defrauded. Nor do We permit their dowries to be
diminished, for it is sufficient for them to be deprived of their advantages
(if they have obtained any) by a prior antenuptial donation, as this
loss is considerable for them, and We do not wish them to run any risk
of losing their dowries. |
CHAPTER
IV. CREDITORS WHO HAVE LOANED MONEY FOR THE PURCHASE OF AN OFFICE SHALL BE EXCEPTED FROM THIS PRIVILEGE. |
As
inquiries have also been made of Us whether creditors who have loaned
money for the purchase of offices shall be preferred, We
direct that if anyone has loaned money for the purchase of an office
or for the establishment of an institution, or for any other purpose
of this kind, and the reason for the loan is expressly stated in the
instrument, and it was agreed that if the object was accomplished, the
person who lent the money for the purchase should have a preferred claim
to all others, it will take precedence of the privilege of the woman
in this instance alone; the creditor, however, will not readily be believed,
even if he can produce testimony, for a written instrument bearing the
signatures of witnesses and drawn up solely with this end in view will
be required. If the claim is derived from an obligation contracted in
this way, no suspicion will arise, and the contracting parties will
not be deprived of the benefit of their own agreement, but, under all
other circumstances, wives will be preferred by virtue of the privilege
which We have already conceded to them. |
CHAPTER
V. CONCERNING THE DOWRY WHICH RETURNS TO THE FATHER, AND IS AGAIN GIVEN IN BEHALF OF THE SAME DAUGHTER TO HER SECOND HUSBAND. |
As
We have already enacted a law providing that fathers who give dowries
for their daughters who are under their control or independent, which
return to them in case of the death of their sons-in-law; some persons
have made the inquiry whether, when a son-in-law dies and the dowry
returns to the father by whom it was given, he can diminish it, if he
offers it again when his daughter marries a second time; or whether
he has no right to do this because he has once taken it from his own
property; and also, whether he should give the same amount to his daughter
when she contracts another marriage, just as if she had not become a
widow? A case was stated to Us where a certain father when living had
given thirty pounds of gold as a dowry for his daughter, and the latter,
having become a widow, and marrying again, her father did not give her
thirty pounds of gold but only twenty-five, for the reason that his
daughter had obtained half of the ante-nuptial donation which consisted
of fifteen pounds of gold; and hence he, instead of giving her thirty
pounds of gold the second time out of his own estate, had only given
her fifteen, as she had also obtained fifteen from the ante-nuptial
donation. We do not think that this is just, but We desire that the
daughter shall, in the division of the property of her father, obtain
the profit of her ante-nuptial donation, and that she shall also receive
the remaining fifteen pounds of gold from her father's estate, which
the latter deprived her of just as if he had intended to injure her.
For what would the father have done if his son-in-law had lived, and
his daughter had not contracted a second marriage; or how could he diminish
the dowry which he had already given; and what right had he to appropriate
the profit which belonged to his daughter; for as she had a right to
include in her own possessions what she had acquired from her husband
before his death,
and which might obtain for her another more wealthy husband, she would
not only be entitled to thirty pounds of gold — that is to say, to the
fifteen forming part of the ante-nuptial donation, and those given by
her father — but to forty-five pounds, namely, the profit obtained through
her deceased husband, the accession to her private property, and what
had been received from the estate of her father, provided she kept all
that the latter had given her. We order that these rules shall be applicable
where the estate of the father remains in the same condition in which
it was originally, and if any accidental loss should have diminished
it to the extent that, in spite of his good intentions, it would be
impossible for him to give a dowry of the same value as he had done
at first; and if he can prove this diminution, he shall not be compelled
to bestow upon his daughter, when she marries a second time, more than
his fortune will justify. The daughter, however, shall be entitled to
the entire profit obtained by the first ante-nuptial donation, and when
contracting a second marriage, she shall receive from her father a dowry
proportionate to his means. It is clear that the father, at the time
of his death, will be absolutely compelled to return to his daughter
any profit which he may have obtained from the ante-nuptial donation
of her first husband (of which We only grant the father the usufruct),
and of which his daughter shall have the absolute ownership. |
CHAPTER
VI. CONCERNING THE COLLATION OF THE DOWRY WHEN THE HUSBAND DIES INSOLVENT. |
We
have considered it necessary to decide the following question which
has been raised in innumerable instances. A father or a mother constituted
a dowry for his or her daughter, and she brought it to her husband;
the latter died insolvent, and, after the death of the parents, a demand
was made upon the daughter to surrender her dowry, or permit it to be
deducted from her share of her father's estate. Where the husband dies
solvent, this point is easily disposed of. But when the daughter has
nothing left but the right of action against her husband, who is insolvent,
and it is stated that a dowry has already been given for the daughter,
and that she can only collate the right of action for its recovery,
which cannot have any effect in law, this case appears to Us to be worthy
of investigation. We are aware that the question has been decided with
harshness in many cases, and the wife been compelled to place her dowry
in the mass of the estate, or to receive that much less; the result
of which was that she did not obtain anything of what was given her
as dowry. We, however, come to her relief by amending Our other laws;
for as We have already, where her husband had failed in business, granted
her the power to recover her dowry during the existence of the marriage,
and to administer it in a
suitable manner in accordance with the terms of Our Constitution, she
herself will be to blame if, when her husband began to squander his
fortune, she did not demand her dowry, and help herself (for she would
have been able to recover her own property without any diminution, and
collate it with her father's estate by taking that much less). (1) Where, however, the daughter was under the control of her father, and could not do this without his approval; and if, after having applied to him and having informed him of the condition of affairs, it should be proved that he gave his consent for her to claim her dowry during her marriage, and retain it for the future, in this instance she will preserve all her rights as well as all her property, as We allow her to recover it, even including the ante-nuptial donation during the existence of the marriage, and to free herself from any subsequent risk. But if it should be established that the father did not either give his consent, demand the dowry, or permit his daughter to do so, We are not willing that she should be subjected to any risk on this account, and she must collate the bare right of action which she has against the property of her insolvent husband, and the result of this action will be shared by herself and her brothers, nor shall she suffer any prejudice on account of the collation; a lawful share of her father's estate shall be given her, and she shall only place in the bulk of said estate the right of action which she has for the recovery of the dowry. This action shall be brought by all the brothers, and any benefit derived therefrom shall be shared by all of them. But where the father gives the dowry under such circumstances, and the collation of it with his estate is demanded, the same rule shall apply. When the amount of the dowry is large, and the father is not willing either to demand it, or to permit his daughter to recover the same, then We desire that she herself shall proceed to do so; and if she should fail, she will not expose herself to the risk of losing anything through the insolvency of her husband. We are aware that the most learned Ulpianus has rendered a decision of this kind, thereby coming to the relief of the wife when the husband is insolvent, and that he holds that she shall not be compelled to make collation except to the extent to which her husband is able to meet his obligations. (2) As, however, many things have been omitted in the multitude of laws which existed before We compiled and arranged them in their proper order, and as magistrates render decrees at variance with these laws, in order to prevent abuses in this respect We have deemed it necessary to promulgate the present enactment which interprets that Constitution of Ours which comes to the relief of a wife even during the existence of the marriage; and in order that its effect may not be confined to certain private individuals, We decree that it shall be of general application. Hence collation shall be made by all those to whose succession it refers, whether they be fathers, grandfathers, mothers, grandmothers, or any other ascendants. |
EPILOGUE. |
Wherefore
Your Highness will hasten to communicate to all persons, and cause to
be perpetually observed the provisions which it has pleased Us to promulgate
by means of this Imperial Law. |
Given
at Constantinople, on the fifteenth of the Kalends of December,
during the thirteenth year of the reign of Our Lord the Emperor Justinian,
and the Consulate of Ario. |
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