THE ENACTMENTS OF JUSTINIAN.
  
THE NOVELS.
~  XCVII  ~
CONCERNING THE EQUALITY OF THE DOWRY AND THE ANTE-NUPTIAL DONATION, AS WELL AS THE INCREASE OF THE DOWRY AND ANTE-NUPTIAL DONATION, AND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE DOWRY WHICH TAKES PRECEDENCE OF OTHER PRIVILEGES ; AND HOW CREDITORS ARE EXCEPTED FROM THIS PRIVILEGE WHEN THEY HAVE FURNISHED MONEY FOR THE PURCHASE OF AN OFFICE ; AND CONCERNING THE RETURN OF THE DOWRY TO THE FATHER, AND ITS GIFT A SECOND TIME IN BEHALF OF THE SAME DAUGHTER ON HER MARRIAGE TO ANOTHER HUSBAND ; AND CONCERNING THE COLLATION OF THE DOWRY WHEN THE HUSBAND DIES INSOLVENT.



 
S. P. Scott, The Civil Law, XVI, Cincinnati, 1932 ).
 

 
  The Emperor Justinian to John, Most Glorious Praetorian Prefect of the East, Twice Consul and Patrician.
PREFACE.
  As We see that many questions with reference to our original birth (that is to say, concerning marriage and the procreation of children), as well as respecting the end of life and what relates to the last wills and testaments of dying persons are discussed in the laws, We have resolved closely to examine what an ancient law prescribes with reference to dotal instruments, which provides that the nuptial contracts between both parties to a marriage shall transfer property of equal value; that, for example, one of them shall not stipulate for half, and the other for a third or a fourth of a certain sum, but an equitable course must be pursued, as prescribed by the law which provides that the agreement made by each shall be equal, that is to say, that the profit obtained. by the parties severally shall be the half, the third, the quarter, or any other share whatsoever; but it does not require that the articles given should be the same in number, for it permits one of the spouses to stipulate for one or two thousand aurei, or more, and the other to stipulate for less, in such a way that the equality consists rather in the words or letters alone than in the articles themselves.
CHAPTER I.
   
CONCERNING THE EQUALITY OF THE DOWRY AND THE ANTE-NUPTIAL DONATION.
  Therefore, when correcting all these matters, We desire above all things that whatever is given by these contracts shall be equal, so far as both the dowries and ante-nuptial donations are concerned; that the husband shall stipulate for an advantage as great as the wife; that this advantage shall be of as great a value as the parties desire, but the amounts must be equal. For the principles of justice and equity cannot be observed if the parties to the marriage deceive one another in a business transaction, where they seem to make equal stipulations, but the effect of the latter is unequal, and articles are not furnished by both of them in the same quantity. Thus, for instance, the law would be held to have been entirely evaded if the husband should agree to give two thousand aurei, and his wife agreed to bring him six thousand; or if the parties to the contract should stipulate to receive the fourth of what they consented to give, for in this instance the wife would only obtain five hundred aurei, that is to say, the fourth of what her husband had promised, while the latter would obtain fifteen hundred, which also is the fourth of the sum promised by his wife. In consequence of this, the fourth of one of the parties would be much larger than that of the other, and from this fictitious uniformity a great inequality would result. Dotal contracts which have already been drawn up shall retain the form which has already been given them, as it is impossible for what has already taken place to be considered as not having been accomplished; but We desire that hereafter, in every donation, the stipulation for advantages shall be uniform on both sides, and that the husband and wife shall agree upon equal profits, which We decree in order that We may, in every respect, honor justice and equity. Where one of the parties is more wealthy than the other, he or she will be allowed to favor his or her consort by employing a different method, which is lawful and acknowledged by Our laws, but whoever does this is forbidden to grant his or her spouse a greater advantage by means of a stipulation, which, though appearing to be equitable, will in fact result in inequality. These are the provisions prescribed by the present law with reference to this subject for the purpose of treating all persons with justice.
CHAPTER II.
   
CONCERNING THE INCREASE OF THE DOWRY AND THE ANTE-NUPTIAL DONATION.
  We have examined and carefully considered matters relating to ante-nuptial donations, and We shall now treat of their increase. For, as preceding legislators as well as Ourselves have already discussed this subject, We have made use of many philosophical precepts which it would be difficult to enumerate, by means of which We repress and correct frauds perpetrated by some persons under such circumstances, the justice of which precepts We now confirm. For We have granted to dowries the privilege of being preferred to hypothecations of older date, for the reason that when creditors have made contracts with their debtors, they only took into account the property of the latter, and not that of their wives, which perhaps did not yet belong to them. We have likewise permitted persons to stipulate for increases (which was also done in ancient times), and We have granted this power to the husband and the wife; to both of them together if they so desire, or to one of them alone. And, at first, for fear some fraud might be perpetrated, We direct that where the increase of a dowry or a donation on account of marriage is desired to be made, one of the parties interested shall not be permitted to make it and the other confine himself or herself to the original stipulation, but both of them must agree to the increase at the same time; and compliance with this provision is not only enjoined upon each one but is required of both; and they must always keep the amount of the two increases the same, in accordance with the Constitution of Our Father. The reason which has induced Us to establish this rule is to prevent the augmentation from being simulated instead of genuine; especially on the part of the woman, who otherwise would be enabled to avail herself of her privilege, and thereby defraud her husband's creditors. When each of the parties owns land, it is preferable for the stipulation providing for the increase to be made for the same kind of property for which the stipulation was entered into at the time of the marriage, and that the increase subsequently made should be certain. Where only one of the married persons has immovable property, the addition of the wife shall be made in land, in order that the dowry and its increase may be equally privileged, so far as other creditors are concerned, and that the existence of the augmentation may not be doubtful. The increase of the husband shall consist of personal property, for no injury to anyone can result under such circumstances. But where the estate of the woman consists of land, and she stipulates that the increase shall be furnished in movables, she is hereby notified that she will not be entitled to any other privilege than that attaching to her dowry in the first place, and that the increase in this instance is only fictitious. For stipulations made in the beginning are not absolutely liable to suspicion like those which are entered into afterwards to the prejudice of creditors, and for this very reason give rise to doubt; and We do not desire creditors to be injured by the privilege which We grant to dowries. Where, however, the husband is not indebted to anyone, and hence no suspicion of fraud toward his creditors can arise, the increase may be stipulated between the parties to consist of money or anything else that they wish; provided always that this is done equally so far as each of them is concerned, and in such a way that justice may be preserved. For how can there be a suspicion of fraud when the husband is not indebted to anyone, and the increases are agreed upon without deception?
CHAPTER III.
   
CONCERNING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE DOWRY, AND THAT OF CREDITORS
WHO HAVE ADVANCED MONEY FOR THE PURCHASE OF AN OFFICE.
  The determination of matters in doubt in cases of this kind is a legitimate consequence. For We are aware that certain hypothecations, although of more recent date, are preferred to those of older creditors on account of privileges granted by the laws, and this occurs when the creditor has, by advancing money, furnished them means to either purchase, build, or repair a ship, to erect a house, to buy a field, or to do something else of this kind; and he has also a prior lien over other creditors whose claims are much older than his. The question, however, arises, if when a woman, claiming to enjoy the privilege based upon a dowry and its increase, to which this privilege also applies (as has already been stated) wishes to be preferred to prior creditors, and, on the other hand, a creditor whose claim is actually of later date, but who, because a ship, a house, or a field has been bought or repaired with the money which he loaned, demands the same privilege with respect to the property which has been purchased or repaired, whether the dowry shall be preferred to the claim of a creditor of this kind, and will be privileged so far as he is concerned ; or whether, on the contrary, his claim shall be considered preferable for the reason that the property has been increased in value by the expenditure of his money. Therefore We, having devoted much attention to this point, decree that it is not just for the woman under such circumstances to yield to a privilege of this description. For We have seen (which is a legal absurdity) some females make a profit of their own bodies, and earn a livelihood by fornication, while others, who are opposed to such practices, and deliver themselves and their property to their husbands, so far from profiting by this, have their fortunes impaired, and when their husbands are unsuccessful in business, lose all hope of recovering their dowries. Hence We decree that where a creditor has loaned money to repair a house, or to purchase a field, he cannot plead his privilege to the prejudice of a woman, for We are aware of the natural weakness of the sex, and how easily they are defrauded. Nor do We permit their dowries to be diminished, for it is sufficient for them to be deprived of their advantages (if they have obtained any) by a prior antenuptial donation, as this loss is considerable for them, and We do not wish them to run any risk of losing their dowries.
CHAPTER IV.
   
CREDITORS WHO HAVE LOANED MONEY FOR THE PURCHASE OF AN OFFICE
SHALL BE EXCEPTED FROM THIS PRIVILEGE.
  As inquiries have also been made of Us whether creditors who have loaned money for the purchase of offices shall be preferred, We direct that if anyone has loaned money for the purchase of an office or for the establishment of an institution, or for any other purpose of this kind, and the reason for the loan is expressly stated in the instrument, and it was agreed that if the object was accomplished, the person who lent the money for the purchase should have a preferred claim to all others, it will take precedence of the privilege of the woman in this instance alone; the creditor, however, will not readily be believed, even if he can produce testimony, for a written instrument bearing the signatures of witnesses and drawn up solely with this end in view will be required. If the claim is derived from an obligation contracted in this way, no suspicion will arise, and the contracting parties will not be deprived of the benefit of their own agreement, but, under all other circumstances, wives will be preferred by virtue of the privilege which We have already conceded to them.
CHAPTER V.
   
CONCERNING THE DOWRY WHICH RETURNS TO THE FATHER,
AND IS AGAIN GIVEN IN BEHALF OF THE SAME DAUGHTER TO HER SECOND HUSBAND.
  As We have already enacted a law providing that fathers who give dowries for their daughters who are under their control or independent, which return to them in case of the death of their sons-in-law; some persons have made the inquiry whether, when a son-in-law dies and the dowry returns to the father by whom it was given, he can diminish it, if he offers it again when his daughter marries a second time; or whether he has no right to do this because he has once taken it from his own property; and also, whether he should give the same amount to his daughter when she contracts another marriage, just as if she had not become a widow? A case was stated to Us where a certain father when living had given thirty pounds of gold as a dowry for his daughter, and the latter, having become a widow, and marrying again, her father did not give her thirty pounds of gold but only twenty-five, for the reason that his daughter had obtained half of the ante-nuptial donation which consisted of fifteen pounds of gold; and hence he, instead of giving her thirty pounds of gold the second time out of his own estate, had only given her fifteen, as she had also obtained fifteen from the ante-nuptial donation. We do not think that this is just, but We desire that the daughter shall, in the division of the property of her father, obtain the profit of her ante-nuptial donation, and that she shall also receive the remaining fifteen pounds of gold from her father's estate, which the latter deprived her of just as if he had intended to injure her. For what would the father have done if his son-in-law had lived, and his daughter had not contracted a second marriage; or how could he diminish the dowry which he had already given; and what right had he to appropriate the profit which belonged to his daughter; for as she had a right to include in her own possessions what she had acquired from her husband before his death, and which might obtain for her another more wealthy husband, she would not only be entitled to thirty pounds of gold — that is to say, to the fifteen forming part of the ante-nuptial donation, and those given by her father — but to forty-five pounds, namely, the profit obtained through her deceased husband, the accession to her private property, and what had been received from the estate of her father, provided she kept all that the latter had given her. We order that these rules shall be applicable where the estate of the father remains in the same condition in which it was originally, and if any accidental loss should have diminished it to the extent that, in spite of his good intentions, it would be impossible for him to give a dowry of the same value as he had done at first; and if he can prove this diminution, he shall not be compelled to bestow upon his daughter, when she marries a second time, more than his fortune will justify. The daughter, however, shall be entitled to the entire profit obtained by the first ante-nuptial donation, and when contracting a second marriage, she shall receive from her father a dowry proportionate to his means. It is clear that the father, at the time of his death, will be absolutely compelled to return to his daughter any profit which he may have obtained from the ante-nuptial donation of her first husband (of which We only grant the father the usufruct), and of which his daughter shall have the absolute ownership.
CHAPTER VI.
   
CONCERNING THE COLLATION OF THE DOWRY WHEN THE HUSBAND DIES INSOLVENT.
  We have considered it necessary to decide the following question which has been raised in innumerable instances. A father or a mother constituted a dowry for his or her daughter, and she brought it to her husband; the latter died insolvent, and, after the death of the parents, a demand was made upon the daughter to surrender her dowry, or permit it to be deducted from her share of her father's estate. Where the husband dies solvent, this point is easily disposed of. But when the daughter has nothing left but the right of action against her husband, who is insolvent, and it is stated that a dowry has already been given for the daughter, and that she can only collate the right of action for its recovery, which cannot have any effect in law, this case appears to Us to be worthy of investigation. We are aware that the question has been decided with harshness in many cases, and the wife been compelled to place her dowry in the mass of the estate, or to receive that much less; the result of which was that she did not obtain anything of what was given her as dowry. We, however, come to her relief by amending Our other laws; for as We have already, where her husband had failed in business, granted her the power to recover her dowry during the existence of the marriage, and to administer it in a suitable manner in accordance with the terms of Our Constitution, she herself will be to blame if, when her husband began to squander his fortune, she did not demand her dowry, and help herself (for she would have been able to recover her own property without any diminution, and collate it with her father's estate by taking that much less).
  (1) Where, however, the daughter was under the control of her father, and could not do this without his approval; and if, after having applied to him and having informed him of the condition of affairs, it should be proved that he gave his consent for her to claim her dowry during her marriage, and retain it for the future, in this instance she will preserve all her rights as well as all her property, as We allow her to recover it, even including the ante-nuptial donation during the existence of the marriage, and to free herself from any subsequent risk. But if it should be established that the father did not either give his consent, demand the dowry, or permit his daughter to do so, We are not willing that she should be subjected to any risk on this account, and she must collate the bare right of action which she has against the property of her insolvent husband, and the result of this action will be shared by herself and her brothers, nor shall she suffer any prejudice on account of the collation; a lawful share of her father's estate shall be given her, and she shall only place in the bulk of said estate the right of action which she has for the recovery of the dowry. This action shall be brought by all the brothers, and any benefit derived therefrom shall be shared by all of them. But where the father gives the dowry under such circumstances, and the collation of it with his estate is demanded, the same rule shall apply. When the amount of the dowry is large, and the father is not willing either to demand it, or to permit his daughter to recover the same, then We desire that she herself shall proceed to do so; and if she should fail, she will not expose herself to the risk of losing anything through the insolvency of her husband. We are aware that the most learned Ulpianus has rendered a decision of this kind, thereby coming to the relief of the wife when the husband is insolvent, and that he holds that she shall not be compelled to make collation except to the extent to which her husband is able to meet his obligations.
  (2) As, however, many things have been omitted in the multitude of laws which existed before We compiled and arranged them in their proper order, and as magistrates render decrees at variance with these laws, in order to prevent abuses in this respect We have deemed it necessary to promulgate the present enactment which interprets that Constitution of Ours which comes to the relief of a wife even during the existence of the marriage; and in order that its effect may not be confined to certain private individuals, We decree that it shall be of general application. Hence collation shall be made by all those to whose succession it refers, whether they be fathers, grandfathers, mothers, grandmothers, or any other ascendants.
EPILOGUE.
  Wherefore Your Highness will hasten to communicate to all persons, and cause to be perpetually observed the provisions which it has pleased Us to promulgate by means of this Imperial Law.
  Given at Constantinople, on the fifteenth of the Kalends of December, during the thirteenth year of the reign of Our Lord the Emperor Justinian, and the Consulate of Ario.