When, a short time ago, We were hearing a case, a doubtful matter arose which requires amendment, and is not unworthy of more definite legislation. After a man had buried his wife, he obtained the dowry of another, and then died, leaving children by both marriages. The second wife, taking advantage of the privilege which We have granted, desired to collect the dowry which she had brought to her husband; the children by the first marriage, however, objected to this, at the same time claiming the dowry of their mother, and it was doubtful whether, as the first wife was no longer living, her children could be permitted to contest the payment of the dowry of the second; for We did not formerly, nor do We now grant this privilege to anyone else, even to heirs or creditors, for We confer it upon the children exclusively. This case presented many difficulties, for the second wife stated that before her husband married her, he had already squandered the dowry of the first wife, and that it was not just that, as he had only left enough to pay her own dowry, she should be compelled to lose it, and that the children by the first marriage should receive a dowry which had already been wasted. The latter, however, on the other hand, pleaded the privilege of hypothecation, and stated that as long as any property of the deceased existed, prior hypothecation of the same should take precedence of subsequent ones.

  Therefore this question being involved in doubt, in order to arrive at certainty, it was decreed by Us that where any article included in a first or second dowry was still in existence, the children of the first or second marriage should respectively be entitled to it; or when the second wife was dead, her children should be entitled to whatever they could prove belonged to them; for where dowries are still in existence, it is proper that each one should take what belongs to him without having need of any privilege. But where no article composing the dowry of either of the two women was still in existence, or if some of the articles were, and some were not, and both wives were living, for instance, where the first marriage had been dissolved by repudiation, in which case the wife would have a right to the dowry; or where both wives were dead, and had left children; or where only one of them was dead; We give preference to the older dowry, and, by way of compensation for property which is not to be found, We recognize the superior claim of the first wife, her children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and other successors, no matter who they may be; for in the case of public debts the older is preferred to the more recent, and it is actually necessary that in the case stated priority should be conceded to the first dowry over the second. We do not, however, give preference to one dowry over another, or to one hypothecation over another; but whatever is prior in point of time shall have greater force, and be entitled to privilege. We, by no means, permit hypothecations to be changed, annulled, or diminished. We establish this rule, being well aware of having already enacted it in another part of Our jurisprudence, but as this case was brought before Us, and has given rise to different questions, We promulgate the present law rather with a view to elucidating Our legislation than for the purpose of prescribing something more advantageous.

  It is also advisable to add to the law the following provision, as a question arose which has rendered it necessary for Us to do this. Where a woman owed her dowry, and she herself wished to pay it; or where someone, either a relative or a stranger, promised it for her, whether it be profectitious or adventitious (for these are the legal terms), but her husband or his father refused to accept it, and it is proved that the woman was ready to pay it, or even to do something in addition; as, for example, where she tendered the dowry, or, it consisting of movable property, she sealed it up, or deposited it in conformity with Our laws; or having herself appeared alone in court, she demanded that the dowry should be deposited, and the court officials subsequently notified her husband of the fact, and the latter was guilty of negligence; he cannot, after the marriage has been dissolved, refuse payment of the ante-nuptial donation under the pretext that he has not received the dowry. Whenever a creditor, to whom a debt is tendered, refuses to accept it, he who has been willing to discharge the obligation in some respects resembles one who has paid, and so far as a dowry is concerned, a tender is equivalent to payment. For, where anyone who has promised a dowry refuses to give it, We permit the ante-nuptial donation also to be refused; and, for the same reason, when anyone who has promised a dowry is willing to give it, and he who is entitled to receive it fraudulently declines to do so, We grant the petition for the recovery of the ante-nuptial donation, since the husband is to blame for nonpayment of the dowry.

  Your Highness will hasten to carry into effect the matters which We have been pleased to include in this Imperial Law.