Human affairs are changeable, and what can not remain the same will never be characterized by stability, and constantly introduces confusion into legislation, and perplexity into matters which seem to have been justly and permanently disposed of; and those things whose observance has been carefully provided for, for the most part, subject to the disturbing influence of various contingencies. For We remember that We recently corrected certain abuses which affected appeals in an evil and fraudulent manner, for the appellants were content merely to appeal, and furnish security to appear in court, and then after having taken the first steps against the other party, or having contradicted his allegations (for this is perfectly indifferent), they abandoned the case, so that the victory obtained by the other party was unavailable, as he could neither enjoy the advantage of the judgment, as execution was suspended by filing the appeal, and it could not be heard on account of the absence of the appellant.
  (1) We have already provided for the correction of this abuse by allowing the appellant, whether he made the application in person or by an attorney, a year in which to proceed and obtain judgment, and not leave the matter in abeyance. If, after this time, he, through indulgence, by an order of court, or for any other good reason should cause further delay, and have the decision of the appeal prolonged for another year, We have decreed that when the litigation was not ended after this second postponement, the first decision in favor of the other party shall be affirmed.
  (2) A great many litigants have applied to Us, alleging that after having notified appellants that they wish to have the case tried and disposed of, they have been unable to obtain a hearing from the magistrates on account of, for instance, a press of business. Others have alleged that violent storms or contrary winds have not permitted them to travel by sea to their provinces; and that they have been prevented by extreme poverty from making the journey by land; or, indeed, because, residing on an island, they could not travel in any other way than by sea, and that, for these reasons, they were not able to proceed with the case during the second year; others have stated as an excuse the severity of the weather, and others again have pleaded a dangerous illness. We have been justly influenced by all these excuses, and, without desiring to violate the present law, We intend as far as possible to come to the relief of those who are injured by such unfortunate occurrences.

  What then was there to do, unless enact another law which might afford relief ? We direct that the provisions of the preceding law shall (as We have previously stated) in every respect, remain in force. If, however, through some inevitable accident, the litigant who took an appeal does not appear when a certain day, which was final, has been assigned to hear it, and the expiration of the two years was approaching, We direct that the first decision shall, under certain circumstances, be confirmed; as was provided in Our former law, to which We now make certain additions. For as We have come to the relief of defendants on appeal, by granting them delay in opposition to those who, after having a time appointed for a hearing, are still unwilling to proceed with the case, or abandon it during the argument, We desire to modify to a slight extent the right which We have granted them while taking into consideration what is proper. For We direct that if the party who has obtained the first decision in his favor should, in case the appellant does not appear, wish this decision to be confirmed, not under any convenient pretext, or through lapse of time, but actually and definitely, let him give notice of his intention, and seek out the appellant, and whether he finds him or not, he can take measures in the meantime, and if all the two years but one month have expired, and it is decided that he is right, the first decision shall be affirmed; for if it is not founded in justice, judgment should be rendered against him, even though the appellant who appointed a fixed day for the case to be heard may not have appeared. We add that whether the defendant gains or loses the case taken up on appeal, the appellant who did not appear, shall be liable for all the costs incurred since the appeal was taken; for if the defendant should gain the case, for the very reason that he is successful, it is only proper that his costs should be paid. If, on the contrary, he should lose it, and the appellant should gain it without having put in an appearance, it is still no more than right that he should pay the costs, as he did not appear; but he will enjoy the benefit of the decision on appeal, for which he should thank God and the present law, which treats him with justice and only makes him liable for the costs, for the payment of which his absence and not the said law is responsible. But where neither of the parties to the action, that is to say, the defendant or the appellant who has appointed the day for the hearing, appears, the first decision in favor of the defendant shall remain in full force. In addition to this, We ratify the provisions of all other laws having reference to delays, and other matters of this kind, for in enacting the present constitution, especially against litigants who, after having themselves appointed a certain day, do not appear, We do not repeal or change anything in former laws having reference to the postponement of appeals, all of which We confirm by this constitution.
  (1) It is also advisable to determine whether appellees who have already obtained a decision affirming the prior judgment shall enjoy the benefit of it; for We do not intend to take any steps with reference to matters which have already been decided. If, however, there are cases on appeal which are still pending, and the term of two years has almost but not entirely expired, and the first decision has not been ratified by a judgment, such cases shall be decided as above set forth, and the defendants on appeal shall enjoy the benefit of them if they should be affirmed.

  We have decided that the following addition should be made to the present law. We have, sometime since, drawn up a constitution forbidding the comparison of handwriting in the case of private instruments, and only authorizing this to be done with public documents; but experience has convinced Us that this law should be amended, and, as this is the case, We are going to proceed in accordance with the custom observed by litigants. For it frequently happens that the plaintiff produces an instrument in someone's handwriting by which he can establish either the title to property, or the proof of his allegations; and the defendant produces other instruments written in the same hand, by means of which he desires to contradict what has been offered by his antagonist, and then the plaintiff avails himself of the law which, while authorizing the comparison of the handwriting of public documents, on the other hand, prohibits that of private ones.
  (1) We order that if anything of this kind should occur, and someone should desire an examination to be made of any documents presented by his adversary, this proceeding shall not be considered improper. For the plaintiff cannot discredit the document upon which he depends to establish his title, and which he has produced; and he should not prevent its comparison with one in other handwriting, even though the latter be that of a private individual. Nor should he contradict himself, and deny the statements which he has already made.
  (2) Where, however, a document taken from the public archives is produced, for instance, a receipt issued by the Bureau of the Most Glorious Prefecture (for a question of this kind has been suggested), as an instrument of this description is based upon public evidence, We decree that it can be admitted in a comparison of handwriting. For, as We entertain hatred for the crime of forgery, We order that the experts charged with the comparison of the handwriting of public documents shall be sworn before any private instruments are placed in their hands for this purpose. Wherefore this law, as well as the present modification of the same, shall remain in full force, and the experts aforesaid shall by all means be sworn.

  Therefore in order to preserve honor among litigants, We direct that they should make oath at the beginning of the suit, that is to say, that the plaintiffs shall swear that they are not proceeding for the purpose of causing annoyance, and the defendants that they believe the plaintiffs to have been satisfied, and are not actuated with the desire of encouraging strife; and We render this law applicable to all persons, without any exception whatsoever. We also add that if anyone should demand proof of the statements of the plaintiff, or the acknowledgment of any of his documents, instruments, or letters, he must first swear that this is not done for the sake of delay. For there are many persons who, on account of trifling injury (and this is especially the case where noble women are concerned, or the proof of documents is called for, or for some other reason), have recourse to this oath, so that it is frequently taken in one and the same transaction.
  (1) Hence, in order to remedy this evil, and being unwilling that the oath should be exacted repeatedly in the same action, We order that both parties, the plaintiff, when he takes the oath of calumny, and the defendant, when he swears that he has ground to dispute the claim, shall add that during the entire course of the proceedings, no matter what evidence he may demand from his adversary, he will not do this to cause delay, but only in order to establish the truth, and when he thinks it is necessary that the said evidence should be produced by him. Where either party takes this oath, his opponent can, by no means, exact another from him, even though proof may frequently be demanded ; but the testimony shall be given, and no one will be required to be sworn several times, and, generally speaking, an oath of this kind can only be taken once.

  Your Highness will cause what has been enacted by Us and published by means of this Imperial law to be brought to the attention of all persons, by means of direct edicts, so that everyone may be aware of what We have decreed.