Your Glory has submitted to Us certain mooted questions which have arisen among the most able advocates of the tribunal of Illyria, requesting Us to decide them, in order that they may not hereafter be the subject of controversy.

  The first point to be considered is the following. A certain woman, after the death of her husband, demanded property that he had given to her during his lifetime, but which had not been delivered; and she claimed the ownership of it not only on account of the donation, but because her husband had not revoked it while he lived. Those in possession of the said property specially excepted, on the ground that although donated, it had not been delivered to the woman, and that she could be allowed to claim it only when she had possession of the same. This is the question in controversy. In this connection We call to mind Our former Constitution, which provides that the donor is obliged to deliver the gift to the donee, even if he did not agree to do so, because it is not proper to commit a fraudulent act, and write words which have no force; as well as the ancient Lex Cintia (which the government very properly, some time ago, removed from its legislation), in which the point which is the subject of the present dispute was included and discussed.
  (1) We order (where everything relating to the donation in question corresponds with what We have just stated) that the said donation shall be perfectly valid not only so far as the value of the article given is concerned, but also with reference to the record; and We desire (in accordance with Our Constitution) that it shall take effect from the very moment when it was made; so that, if the husband has hypothecated or pledged the property after the donation, he shall not be considered as having alienated it, when he did not revoke the gift during his lifetime. And whether or not delivery was made to the woman, she can always recover the property by means of the action based on the stipulation, if one took place, or by virtue of the law, through making a demand in court for what was donated.
  (2) We also considered it just to decree that where donations have been recorded in the beginning, they shall, by all means, be confirmed when the donor remained silent concerning their revocation; but where they have not been recorded, and their value is in excess of the amount required by law, they shall be valid up to that amount. We desire that this provision shall be strictly observed, hence a donation will become operative for the share authorized by law, and will be annulled if its entire amount exceeds what can legally be given. Our preceding law prescribed this rule with reference to donations in general. These provisions shall be applicable not only to husbands and wives, but also to all other persons who are prohibited from receiving donations during marriage.

  We have been interrogated by Your Excellency with regard to another point. After the enactment of Our Constitution, which, because of the status of their mother, renders the children born of a free woman and a serf also free; should it be held, in accordance with the ancient law, that if the said children are not serfs, they are, nevertheless, born such and therefore attached to the glebe, for the reason that another of Our laws does not permit the children of serfs to abandon the soil, but declares that they remain there in a servile condition, and is there not all the more reason for this when such children are born of parents who are serfs ? This is the second point of your interrogatory. We, however, never intended to admit that a woman who is free could bring forth a serf; but, on the other hand, have desired that, in conformity with Our law, the sign and symbol of freedom should be impressed upon the offspring of a free woman. If, then, a child should be born to a free woman and a man who is a serf, it shall be entitled to its freedom, and shall not, under any consideration, be deprived of the right of free birth enjoyed by its mother. But as the law which We have enacted provides that those who inhabit the country and cultivate its fields shall continue to reside there, as if they were natives of the same, and as the very name of colonus implies this obligation, We do not allow children born of a serf and a free woman to abandon their country with the intention of residing elsewhere. Hence, it is clear that the children born of a woman who is a serf on an estate shall themselves be serfs, and be free if born of a free woman, and, having obtained their liberty, any property which they may acquire will be their own, and will not become the peculium of their masters; but having gained their freedom, they cannot abandon the estate to which they are attached, and will be required to till the soil without being able to go elsewhere, unless, when they become the owners of lands, the latter are not sufficient to keep them occupied and support them, and they are not permitted to cultivate those of their masters, or pass to the estates of others. For if this is not the case, although enjoying their freedom, they will remain attached to the estates of their masters; and this is hereby decreed.

  The point which you have submitted to Us seems to be worthy of adjudication. When a female serf marries a male serf belonging to another master, the question arose whether their children ought to belong to the owner of the man or the woman. Under such circumstances, and in order that serfs belonging to different masters may be able to marry one another — the status of their offspring not being disputed, as they were not begotten by a father who was free, and are born of parents who are both serfs — We do not give them all to their mother, or to the owner of the latter; but when there is only one, the mother will be preferred, and the child will belong to her master; where there are two children, they shall be distributed by lot; where the number is unequal, the mother will be entitled to the most of them; for instance, where there are three, she shall have two, and the father one; and where there are five, three of them shall belong to the master of the mother, and two to the master of the father; and where there are more than this, the apportionment shall be in the same ratio; so that when they can be divided equally this shall be done, and when this is not possible, the larger number shall be allotted to the mother by way of privilege; for she who has brought forth and nourished a child is undoubtedly entitled to greater consideration than he who begot it through an excess of pleasure.

  Therefore Your Glory will hasten to apply this Imperial Pragmatic Sanction to the cases to which it is adapted, for We have enacted it as a general law, believing that the matters to which it refers require amendment.