The wisdom of ancient legislators, as well as Imperial Majesty, has promulgated many laws with reference to property in litigation. Judges have frequently petitioned Us to resolve doubts which have arisen among them on subjects of this kind, and to explain in a lucid manner the laws and constitutions applicable to the same, in order that it may hereafter be perfectly clear what things can properly be styled litigious.

  Therefore We decree that where a lawsuit is pending between a plaintiff and a possessor with reference to the ownership of any movable property which is capable of moving itself, either by judicial assignment or by petitions addressed to the Emperor which have been recorded in court, and communicated to the defendant by the petitioner ; or whether an appeal has been taken and the property decided to be litigious; under such circumstances, the preceding Constitution promulgated by Ourselves shall remain in full force; which said Constitution establishes a distinction between purchasers who are aware that the property which they purchased is litigious, and those who are not. We think that it should be added that when, during the course of the trial for the possession of a litigious article, the defendant dies, and his heirs wish to divide his estate, they shall be permitted to do so without any hindrance; for when property subject to litigation passes by succession to heirs, the division of it made between them should not be considered as an alienation. But when it happens that when one of the parties to an action to recover such property dies, after bequeathing the ownership of the same, which is still uncertain, to anyone by his last will as a legacy, We order by Our present law that the legatee shall have a right to profit by the bequest, where the heir has been decided to be the owner of it, under the terms of a judicial decision; but when the heir loses his case in court, the legatee cannot demand of him other property in the place of the legacy, because, as the testator was aware that the object bequeathed was litigious, he, by that very fact, subjected the legatee to the result of the suit. For this reason We grant the legatee (provided he thinks that this will be advantageous to him) the privilege of being represented in the case, in order that he may not afterwards be able to charge the heir with negligence or fraud. We decree that hypothecated articles shall not be called litigious, and that this distinction shall be made whether the property specified is movable, immovable, or capable of moving itself. Where it is expressly subjected to hypothecation, the debtor is hereby authorized to sell it to anyone whenever he thinks it advisable to do so, provided, however, that he pays the creditor the amount of the debt out of the purchase-money; but if he should not pay him, the creditor who has preserved his lien upon the property sold can recover it for the purpose of satisfying his claim. We order that this rule shall be observed, unless the said property has previously been encumbered to other creditors by a general or special hypothecation; for then, in accordance with the terms of Our Imperial Law, We direct that the privileges resulting from priority of obligations shall be observed for the benefit of each of the creditors. The necessary consequence of this is that We do not understand general hypothecation to be included in the term litigious, but desire that hypothecary actions shall be decided in conformity to the provisions of former laws, whose force We order shall continue to be maintained. We promulgate the present provisions with reference to property subject to litigation, as well as to special and general hypothecations, in order that hereafter no doubt may arise in court on these subjects, and that suits may be determined in accordance with the distinction which We have established.

  Our foresight has devised another method of excluding the claims of those who institute malicious prosecutions, and of suppressing the frauds of those who make a business of doing so. For We order all judges, whenever any persons appear or are summoned before them, to add to their decrees that notice of the filing of complaints shall not be given to defendants, or fees be collected by bailiffs, unless the plaintiff signs the complaint himself or by notaries, and if he does not furnish a surety for whose solvency the court shall be responsible, and state that he will prosecute the case to the end, using every effort to do so either in person or by a lawful attorney, and he is afterwards proved to have brought suit unjustly, he shall pay the defendant, by way of costs and expenses, the tenth part of the value of the property mentioned in the complaint. When the plaintiff says that he cannot furnish a surety, We order him to swear to this on the Holy Gospels, in the presence of the judge who is to hear the case, and he must also give a juratory bond by which he promises what is above set forth.
  (1) But when what We have previously stated is not observed in the manner prescribed, We do not require the defendant to answer him who has instituted the proceedings. If a magistrate, his court, or any of his executive officers should presume to sue anyone without complying with the aforesaid formalities, the magistrate and his court shall be fined ten pounds of gold, and the party responsible for the affair shall be sentenced to the confiscation of his property and to exile for five years. The Magnificent Count of Private Affairs in office at the time shall be responsible for the collection and payment into the Treasury of the fine prescribed by this law. All the expenses incurred by the defendant on account of a citation made in violation to the terms of Our law shall be reimbursed him by the plaintiff at the risk of the judge before whom the plaintiff brought suit, as well as of the officials who execute his commands, in order that those who have absolute confidence in Our government and the majesty of the Most High may profit by this indemnity. We, however, order that where any cases are brought in court by common consent, the penalty prescribed by this constitution shall not be incurred, and they shall be disposed of as directed by Our other laws.

  We desire all litigation to be promptly disposed of, and resist the malice of those who institute proceedings without intending to conduct them to final judgment, relying upon the law which provides that no one can, against his will, be compelled to exercise rights of action to which he is entitled. Therefore We, hastening to abolish this dishonorable practice, do hereby order that where persons bring suit against anyone, either by means of judicial notice, or through petitions addressed to the Emperor, presented to the judge, and communicated to the adversary, and a competent magistrate has begun to hear the case, they shall not take advantage of the aforesaid law; for it is unjust for him who has prepared for the action which he intends to bring, and summoned his adversary to court, to refuse to proceed, since this refusal is rather the privilege of the defendant than of the plaintiff. Hence, We direct that the plaintiff shall conduct the action which he has begun to the end. If, however, he should delay, We grant the defendant authority to compel the judge before whom proceedings were instituted to notify the plaintiff to appear before his tribunal, either in his own proper person, or by a lawful attorney. If he does not appear in response to this notice, he shall be summoned by three publications of the Edict, which shall be made at intervals of at least thirty days from one another. We desire that ordinary judges shall, not only by the voice of criers, but also by the publication of edicts, call into court any of the litigants who may be absent, for there are comparatively few persons present who can hear the voices of criers, while every one can learn of edicts published in this way at intervals of several days. We also permit all other magistrates who have cognizance of cases by Imperial order to summon, by means of edicts, parties who do not appear in court, in order that litigation may not become interminable.
  (1) But where the action has not yet actually been begun before a judge, but someone has only been sued by the filing of a complaint, or by means of a petition addressed to Our Clemency, and Our order has been communicated to the judge either in writing or by mandate, and notice has been served by the plaintiff upon his adversary, the defendant will also be permitted to appear before a competent magistrate, and through him summon the plaintiff in the manner already stated, in order that, after the latter has appeared, the suit may be tried in accordance with law and be terminated in a suitable manner.
  (2) Where the plaintiff, after having been summoned to court by the publication of three separate edicts, is unwilling to proceed either in person or by an attorney (as already stated), then We grant him the term of a year within which, if he does not go on with the case, We permit the judge to examine the allegations of the party who is present, in accordance with Our laws, even in the absence of the adversary, and, having ascertained the truth after careful investigation, to render a legal decision. If, however, he should appear within the aforesaid term of a year, and desire to try the case, We order that the judge shall, by all means, compel the plaintiff to pay to the defendant all expenses and costs which the latter has incurred on account of the litigation, until the suit was terminated in conformity with law. If he should appear, and desire, by paying the costs, to interrupt the course of the year, and withdraw from the suit, and not remain until it has been decided, We order that, after the publication of the edicts and the expiration of the year, he shall be entirely deprived of the right of action which he thought he had against the defendant; for the fraudulent conduct of one who abandons a case, the course of which has already been interrupted, is worse than that of him who only abandoned it once. Still, We permit those who have not instituted proceedings of this kind against others to enjoy the benefit of the law which does not require anyone to exercise rights of action to which he is entitled, if he is unwilling to do so.

  Our most dear and beloved relative, Theodotus, We decree that all these provisions shall become operative in suits which have not yet been disposed of by judicial decision, amicable compromise, or in any other way known to the law. Therefore Your Illustrious and Magnificent Authority will communicate this law, which We have enacted for all time, to all persons by means of edicts published in this Royal City, and by notices despatched to the provinces under Your jurisdiction, in order that Our subjects may be informed of and observe the regulations which We have established for their benefit.