1.
Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book V.
When something
payable every year is bequeathed without adding the place where this
is to be done the heir should pay it wherever it may be demanded,
just as a demand can be made in the case of a stipulation, or a note.
2. The Same,
On Sabinus, Book VI.
Where an heir
is charged to permit me to enjoy the use of certain land by the year,
and he is guilty of default at the beginning of the year, when I ought
to cultivate the land, he will be liable to me for the entire year,
even though he should afterwards permit me to cultivate it, because
I have been excluded from putting in the crops; just as where he is
charged with furnishing me the daily labor of Stichus, and he sends
him to me, not in the morning but at the sixth hour of the day, he
will be liable to me for the value of the entire day's work of the
slave.
3. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XXIV.
Where a legacy,
for instance of thirty aurei, is left to me payable in one,
two, and three years, ten aurei will be due each year, even
though the words "in equal payments" were not added.
(1) Hence, if
the words "in payments" were employed, even though "equal"
was not added, it must be said that equal payments must be made, just
as if the word "equal" was written, and the word "payments"
had not been added.
(2) But if the
words, "In unequal payments," are added, unequal payments
must be made. But let us consider in what way they ought to be made.
I think that they ought to be made in accordance with the judgment
of a good citizen (unless the testator expressly left it to the choice
of the heir), dependent upon the means of the deceased, and the place
where his estate is situated.
(3) If, however,
it was stated that payment should be made in accordance with the judgment
of a good citizen, we infer from this that it must be made with reference
to the situation of the estate, and without any trouble or annoyance
to the heir.
(4) But if the
testator directed that payment should be made in the way that the
legatee might select; let us see whether the entire amount can be
demanded at once. I think that this cannot be done, just as in the
case of the choice of the heir; for the testator intended that several
payments should be made, and that the amounts of the same should depend
upon the judgment of the heir, or of the legatee.
(5) Where, however,
a legacy has been bequeathed as follows, "Let my heir pay Titius
ten aurei in three years," will the amount be payable
in three annual instalments, or at the expiration of three years?
I think that this should be understood as if the testator had intended
the payments to be made in one, two, and three years.
(6) Where a certain
sum of money is bequeathed to anyone, and it is stated that, until
it is paid, something shall be given to the legatee every year, as,
for example, interest, the legacy will be valid; but in order to make
the payment of the interest valid, the sum to be paid annually must
not exceed the ordinary rate of interest.
4. Paulus,
On the Edict, Book LXII.
Where anything
is bequeathed to a person to be paid annually, Sabinus says (and his
opinion is correct), there are several legacies, and that the one
for the first year is absolute, and the other conditional; for the
condition, "If he should live," seems to be implied, and
therefore, if the legatee dies, the legacy will not pass to his heir.
5. Modestinus,
Opinions, Book X.
"I also charge
my other heirs to pay to my wife ten aurei every year, as long
as she lives." The wife survived her husband five years and four
months. I ask whether her heirs will be entitled to the entire legacy
for the sixth year. Modestinus answers that they will be entitled
to it.
6. The Same,
Opinions, Book XI.
A testator left
a certain sum of money to be paid annually for the maintenance of
the public games of the city, over which he expressed a wish that
his heirs should preside. The successors of his heirs denied that
they were liable for the legacy, alleging that the testator only intended
it should be paid as long as his heirs could preside over the games.
Therefore, when he mentioned their presiding, I ask whether he intended
payment to be made during the duration of the trust, or perpetually.
Modestinus answers that the legacy should be paid to the city annually
in perpetuity.
7. Pomponius,
On Quintus Mucius, Book VIII.
Quintus Mucius
says that if anyone makes the following provision in his will, "Let
my sons and daughters live wherever their mother may desire, and let
my heir pay, every year, to each boy and girl among them ten aurei,
for his or her support." If the guardians who had charge
of the children were unwilling to pay the said sum of money, no action
can be brought by anyone under the terms of the will; for the provision
of the testator was only intended to inform the guardians what he
desired, so that they could pay the money without any risk. Pomponius
says that where anything is included in the will which merely has
reference to the wishes of the testator, it does not create any obligation.
The following is an instance of this. If I should appoint you my sole
heir, and direct you to erect a monument to me with a certain sum
of money, this statement does not place you under any obligation,
but you can erect a monument in order to comply with my wishes, if
you desire to do so. It would, however, be otherwise, when I made
the same provision after I had given you a co-heir, for if I charged
you alone to erect the monument, your co-heir could bring an action
in partition against you to compel you to do so, as it is to his interest.
If, however, both of you should be ordered to do this, you will be
entitled to actions against one another. The following also has reference
to the wishes of the testator, for instance, where anyone directs
statues to be placed in a town, for if he did not do this for the
purpose of honoring the town, but to perpetuate his own memory, no
one will be entitled to bring an action on this ground. Therefore
the testamentary disposition mentioned by Quintus Mucius, "Let
my children reside where their mother may desire," creates no
obligation, but merely has reference to compliance with the wishes
of the deceased; so that the children may live where their mother
may direct. Nor must the will or the order of the testator always
be observed; for example, if the Praetor should decide that it was
not expedient for a minor to reside where his father ordered him to,
on account of the bad character of persons with whom he directed them
to associate, of which fact the father was ignorant. Where, however,
ten aurei, payable annually, are left for their support, the
legacy will be valid, whether this clause had reference to the parties
with whom a mother might wish the children to reside, or whether we
should understand by it that the children themselves were entitled
to the legacy. The better opinion is, that the testator should be
considered to have made this bequest in order to provide for his children.
And, in all cases where only the wishes of the testator are concerned,
they must neither be always rejected nor always observed, but such
matters must be determined by the judge, and carried into effect if
they do not relate to anything dishonorable.
8. Gaius, On
the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V.
Where a legacy
payable annually is bequeathed, it resembles an usufruct, as it is
terminated by the death of the legatee. It is not, however, terminated
by the loss of civil rights, as is the case of an usufruct, which
can be bequeathed as follows: "I bequeath to Titius the usufruct
of such-and-such a tract of land, and every time that he loses his
civil rights, I bequeath to him the same usufruct." The legacy
is, in this respect, certainly more beneficial, because if the legatee
should die at the beginning of any year, he leaves the legacy for
that year to his heir. This does not apply to an usufruct, for if
the usufructuary should die at the time that the crops are ripe, but
before they have been gathered, he will not leave them to his heir.
9. Papinianus,
Opinions, Book VII.
A tract
of land, which a testator desired to be hypothecated to secure legacies
payable annually to his freedman, can be lawfully claimed by them
on the ground of a trust, for the purpose of preserving the land.
Paulus states that this rule also applies to other property belonging
to an estate, to enable the legatee to be placed in possession of
the same.
10. The Same,
Opinions, Book VIII.
"I wish my
faithful friend, Seius, to receive six aurei every year, and
the house in which he lives, if he should be willing to take charge
of the business affairs of my children, just as he has taken charge
of mine." It was held that the surviving daughter of the testator
was, none the less, obliged to pay the annual legacy to Seius, in
proportion to her share of the estate, because two of the three children
of the testator had died, and other heirs had been appointed, as the
labor as well as the money was susceptible of division.
(1) "I wish
my physician, Sempronius, to receive the same that I have paid him
during my lifetime." The sums held to have "been left by
this bequest were certain annual payments made by the testatrix, so
that, as far as her liberality was concerned, no doubt of her intention
could arise.
(2) "I desire
a hundred aurei to be paid to my wife in addition to what she
received from me as an annual allowance during my lifetime."
It is understood that the amount should be payable annually, and that
the testator also left her a hundred aurei.
(3) "I wish
to be given to my freedmen whatever I furnished them during my lifetime."
Their lodging must be provided, but the heir will not be required
to allow the steward the expense of beasts of burden, which his mistress
was accustomed to grant him for his own convenience. Again, where
the freedman is a physician, he cannot legally demand money which
he was accustomed to receive from his mistress for the purchase of
medicines to be administered to his patroness and her family.
11. Paulus,
Questions, Book XXI.
It is established
that where legacies are payable annually, they are multiple, and the
right of the legatee to each bequest should be regularly investigated.
Where the legacy is left to a slave, the capacity of his master to
take it, should also be inquired into.
12. The Same,
Opinions, Book XIII.
Gaius Seius devised
to Maevius and Seia certain tracts of land in different localities,
and provided as follows, "I wish three hundred thousand reeds
to be furnished annually by the Potician to the Lutatien Estate, together
with a thousand pounds of well-cleaned osier, also, every year."
I ask whether this legacy will be extinguished by the death of the
legatee. Paulus answered that a servitude, either personal or real,
does not seem to have been created in accordance with law; but that
an action on the ground of a trust will lie in favor of the party
to whom the Lutatian Estate was devised. Therefore, as the legacy
was to be paid annually, it is considered to terminate with the death
of the legatee.
13. Scaevola,
Opinions, Book IV.
Maevia appointed
her grandson, who was born to Maevius and had reached the age of puberty,
her heir, and made a bequest to Lucius Titius, as follows: "I
desire ten aurei to be paid to Lucius Titius, a good man, to
whom I am indebted for favors which he has done me, as long as he
lives; if he should take charge of the business of my grandson, and
conduct the administration of all his affairs." I ask, if Lucius
Titius had, at some time or other, transacted the business of Maevius,
and the latter had objected to his doing so any longer, whether he
would be obliged to execute the trust. I answered that, if Lucius
Titius had been deprived of the right to transact the business of
Maevius, not on account of any fraudulent act, and no other just reason
had existed for rejecting his services, and he was willing to continue
to conduct his affairs, he would be entitled to the legacy.
(1) A man, having
appointed his wife his heir, provided as follows, in his will: "I
wish twelve denarii to be paid every year by my heir to each
of my freedmen for his support, if they do not abandon my wife."
As the testator very seldom left the town, and his wife frequently
did so, I ask whether the freedmen should accompany her on her journey.
I answer that a positive opinion cannot be given on this point, as
many things might arise which it would be well to take into consideration;
and therefore a case of this kind should be submitted to the judgment
of a good citizen. It was also asked, as when the woman went on her
journeys she never offered to pay anything additional to her freedmen,
and for this reason they did not accompany her, whether they would
be entitled to their legacies. The answer was that this should be
determined by taking into account the length, or the shortness of
the journeys, and the amount of the legacies.
14. Ulpianus,
Trusts, Book II.
Mela says that
if a legacy payable annually would be left to anyone without mentioning
the amount, the bequest is void. The opinion of Nerva, however, is
better, namely, that the testator is considered to have bequeathed
what he was accustomed to give during his lifetime; but that, in every
instance, the rank of the parties must be taken into consideration.
15. Valens,
Trusts, Book VII.
Javolenus gave
it as his opinion, with reference to an heir who having been charged
to pay a certain sum of money after the lapse of ten years paid it
before the expiration of the time, that, if it could be proved that
the trust had been left for the said period to benefit the party entitled
to it, because he could not take care of the property, and the heir
paid him the money before the time, knowing that he would squander
it, he will, under no circumstances, be released from liability. If,
however, the time had been fixed on account of the heir, in order
that he might profit by the delay, it is understood that he will be
released; and, indeed, it may be said that he paid more than he should
have done.
16. Paulus,
On Neratius, Book III.
A slave was ordered
to be free after the expiration of ten years, and a legacy was bequeathed
to him payable annually from the day of his master's death. The legacy
will be due for the years when he shall have begun to be free, and,
in the meantime, the heir will be compelled to furnish him with subsistence.
17. Labeo,
On the Last Epitomes of Javolenus, Book II.
A legacy was bequeathed
as follows, "Let my heir give to Attia fifty aurei until
she marries." It was not stated that the money was to be paid
annually. Labeo and Trebatius think that the entire sum is immediately
due. It is, however, more equitable to hold that the legacy is payable
annually.
(1) "Let
my heir give to Attius, every year, two measures of Falernian wine
which are to be taken from my estate." It was held that the two
measures of wine should be furnished even for a year when no wine
was made, provided they could be obtained from the vintage of former
years.
18. Scaevola,
Digest, Book XIV.
A testator, having
confirmed his codicil by his will, devised a tract of land to his
freedmen, and forbade it to be alienated, but desired it to belong
to the children and grandchildren of his freedmen. He afterwards added
the following words: "I wish to be paid by them to my heir, out
of the profits of said land, ten aurei every year, for the
term of thirty-five years after my death." As the heir appointed
by Titius died before the expiration of the term of thirty-five years,
the question arose whether the heir of the heir would, by the words
above quoted, be entitled to the benefit of the trust for the remainder
of the time. I answered that he would, unless it could be proved by
the freedmen that the testator had in view the thirty-fifth year of
the heir as the time for the extinction of the legacy.
(1) A testator
left to Stichus, whom he had brought up, a hundred aurei, and
ten aurei payable every month in addition, and then, after
appointing Sempronia heir to a third of his estate, charged her as
follows: "I request you, Sempronia, my sister, to take from the
bulk of my estate the legacies which I have left to my foster-children,
and keep them until they are entitled to the same." The question
was asked if Sempronia, who was charged with the trust, should refuse
to accept the estate before having taken possession of the money left
to the foster-children, in accordance with the will of the deceased,
whether she would be liable to an action on account of the legacy
brought by Stichus before he reached the age of twenty-five years?
The answer was that such an action would lie.
19. The Same,
Digest, Book XVII.
Titia, having
appointed Seia her heir, bequeathed the usufruct of a certain tract
of land to Maevius, and charged him with a trust as follows: "I
request you, Maevius, to pay to Arrius Pamphilus and Arrius Stichus,
out of the income of the Speratian Estate, six hundred aurei every
year from the day of my death, as long as they live." The question
arose if Maevius should pay the annual sum for their support, and,
after his death, the land should revert to the heir of Titia by operation
of law, whether the provision for support under the terms of the trust
would be due to Pamphilus and Stichus. I answered that there was nothing
in the case stated to compel payment by the heirs of Titia, as the
usufructuary was only charged with it. The question was also asked,
whether payment of the legacy should be made by the heirs of the legatee,
Maevius. The answer was that nothing was due from the heirs of the
legatee, unless it should be clearly proved that the testator intended
payment to be made after the extinction of the usufruct, provided
the receipts from the usufruct were sufficient to continue it.
(1) A certain
individual who had paid an annual sum to a learned man, named Marcus,
inserted the following provision into his will: "My dear wife,
I know that you will take care of my friends, and allow them to want
for nothing, still, I wish eighty aurei to be given to Marcus."
The question arose whether Marcus, having received the legacy of eighty
aurei, could also claim the aforesaid annual payments? The
answer was that there was nothing in the case stated why the annual
payments concerning which advice was asked should not be made.
(2) "I bequeath
to Lucius Titius three pounds of gold, which I was accustomed to give
him during my lifetime." Inasmuch as the testatrix gave Titius
every year forty aurei by way of annual salary, and a certain
quantity of silver in addition, as a gift for festivals, or the value
of the same, I ask whether the trust for the benefit of Titius must
be executed by the heirs, or the money be paid as a legacy. The answer
was that there was nothing in the case stated to prevent the money
from being paid.
20. The Same,
Digest, Book XVIII.
A testator
bequeathed an annual pension under the following condition : "If
they should reside with my mother, whom I have appointed heir to a
portion of my estate." The question arose whether, after the
death of the mother, the condition which was imposed would be considered
to have failed, and for this reason neither food nor clothing should
be given to the legatees. The answer was that, according to the facts
stated, they should be given.
(1) Attius left
a trust in the following terms, "I charge whoever shall be my
heir to pay, after my death, out of the income of my apartment and
my warehouse the sum of ten denarii to the priest, the sacristan,
and the freedmen attached to the temple, on the festival day which
I have established." I ask whether this legacy was only due to
those who were living and in office at the time that it was bequeathed,
or whether it should also be paid to those who succeed them. The answer
was that, in accordance with the facts stated, although the officers
had been mentioned, the legacy was bequeathed to the temple. I also
ask whether the ten aurei were only due for one year under
the terms of the trust, or whether they should be paid in perpetuity.
The answer was that they should be paid in perpetuity.
21. The Same,
Digest, Book XXII.
A certain person
left the following bequest to his freedman: "I desire the fiftieth
of my entire income derived from the tenants of my lands and the purchasers
of the crops, according to the custom of my household, to be paid
to Philo, as long as he lives." The heirs sold the land from
which the said fiftieth of the income was derived. The question arose
whether the fiftieth of the interest on the price, which, according
to the custom of the province, was ordinarily collected, was due?
The answer was that, although the land had been sold, only the fiftieth
of the income thereof was bequeathed.
(1) A testator
charged his freedman, to whom he had left a tract of land that returned
an income of sixty aurei a year, with the payment of ten denarii
to Pamphila annually, under the terms of a trust. The question
arose, if the Falcidian Law should diminish the legacy of the freedman,
whether the annual allowance bequeathed to Pamphila under the trust
would also be considered to be diminished; as the bequest to Pamphila
was derived from income which would have to be paid, even if the Falcidian
Law reduced the tract of land by half. The answer was that, in accordance
with the facts stated, the bequest to Pamphila would not be diminished,
unless the intention of the testator was proved to be otherwise.
(2) A certain
testator having appointed his son heir to three-fourths of his estate,
and his wife to one-fourth, charged his son to deliver his estate
to his stepmother, and requested her "to take good care of his
young son, and pay him ten aurei until he reached his twenty-fifth
year, and, after he had attained that age, to transfer to him half
of the estate." The son having deducted the fourth part of the
estate to which he had been appointed heir, delivered her share to
his stepmother, and afterwards reached the age of twenty-five years.
As the stepmother was entitled to the three-fourths, and one twenty-fourth,
and one forty-eighth of the entire estate, the question arose whether
she should surrender half of this share to her stepson? I answered
that, according to the facts stated, she would have to deliver to
him enough to make up half the estate; in addition to what the son
had deducted by reason of the Falcidian Law. Since the father seemed
to have had in view the tender age of his son, inquiry was also made
whether the stepmother would be required to deliver to him the profits
for the intermediate time. The answer was that, in accordance with
the facts stated, she would be required to do so.
(3) Lucius Titius,
by his will, bequeathed a hundred aurei to the city of Sebasta,
his birthplace, in order that athletic contests might be celebrated
there every other year in his name, with the interest of said sum,
and added the following words: "If the city of Sebasta is unwilling
to accept the money which I have bequeathed under the above-mentioned
condition, I desire that my heirs shall, under no circumstances, be
liable for the same, but that they keep it for themselves." The
Governor of the province afterwards selected certain good notes from
the assets of the estate, and delivered them to the city as its legacy,
and, after his decision, the city collected the money due on most
of the claims. The question arose, if the city should not subsequently
comply with the conditions of the will, whether the legacy would belong
to the sons who were the heirs of the deceased. I answered that the
city could be compelled to obey the wishes of the testator, and if
it did not do so, the heirs could demand the amounts which had been
settled by the debtors either in cash or by renewal, and so far as
those claims which were not paid to the city, and of which the former
obligation was not released by renewal were concerned, the heirs were
not prevented from demanding from the debtors what they owed.
(4) Largius Euripianus
rendered an opinion, after his advice had been requested in a case
where a patron had left a certain sum of money to his foster-child,
and afterwards made the following provision with reference to it in
his will: "I wish the money which I have bequeathed to my freedman
and foster-child, Titius, to remain in the hands of Publius Maevius,
until he reaches the age of twenty-five years, and that, for the use
of the same, interest shall be collected at the rate of three per
cent. As for the amount of the expenses to be paid to him, Publius
Maevius will estimate them, for he should entertain for him the affection
of a father." The question arose whether the heirs, when they
paid Publius Maevius the money, should require him to give security.
The answer was since no mention of security being required was made
in the will, the heirs would be sufficiently safe if they paid the
money to Publius Maevius, in accordance with the wishes of the deceased.
Therefore neither Titius, the foster-child, nor his heirs should be
heard, if they brought an action against the heirs of the patron on
the ground that they did not exact security for, by the payment of
the money; and the above-mentioned heirs will be released from liability
to Titius, as well as to his heirs, unless Publius Maevius should
cease to be solvent during the lifetime of the testator, for, in this
case, security must be required of him.
(5) A father appointed
his two sons his heirs to equal portions of his estate, an older one,
and a younger who was still under the age of puberty, and he left
to the latter certain lands as his share, and also bequeathed him
a certain sum of money payable when he reached the age of fourteen
years, which he placed in the hands of his brother, as trustee, in
the following words: "I charge you, Seius, to give to your mother
a certain sum of money annually, to enable your brother to pursue
his studies from his twelfth to his fourteenth year, and, in addition
to this, to pay the taxes assessed against him until you deliver him
the property; and I desire that the income of said lands shall belong
to you, until your brother reaches the age of fourteen years."
The elder brother having died and left a foreign heir, the question
arises whether the condition of receiving the income every year, as
well as the charge of paying the annual allowance which, if Seius
had lived, he would have been compelled to pay, will be transmitted
to his heir; or whether the entire amount of the legacy must be immediately
delivered to the minor and his guardians. The answer was that, according
to the facts stated, the testator is understood to have, as it were,
addressed the guardian, so that, at the expiration of the guardianship,
the allowance which he had ordered to be paid, and the income which
was to be collected, should terminate; but as the elder brother was
overtaken by death, everything that had been left by the testator
would, at the time when his brother died, immediately pass to the
minor and his guardians.
22. Alfenus
Verus, Epitomes of the Digest by Paulus, Book II.
"Let my heir
pay a hundred aurei annually to my daughter every time that
she becomes a widow." The question arose, if the daughter should
become a widow in less than a year, whether she would be entitled
to less than a hundred aurei. The answer was that, although
the entire year had not yet elapsed, the whole amount would be due
to her.
23. Marciamis,
Institutes, Book VI.
When a certain
man desired a distribution of his estate to be made to the Decurions
on his birthday, the Divine Severus and Antoninus stated in a Rescript,
that it was not probable that the testator had in his mind payment
during only one year, but intended to leave a legacy in perpetuity.
24. The Same,
Institutes, Book VIII.
Where a certain
sum of money, for instance, a hundred aurei, was left to the
city of Sardis for the purpose of celebrating games in honor of Apollo
in four years, the Divine Severus and Antoninus stated in a Rescript
that the testator appeared to have left a perpetual income, due every
four years, and not merely a gross sum for payment at the end of the
first term of four years.
25. Valens,
Trusts, Book II.
Ten aurei can
be left to be paid annually to a son under paternal control, as long
as he is in the power of his father.
Tit. 2.
Concerning use, usufruct, income, lodging, and services left by legacies
or trusts.
1. Paulus, On Sabinus, Book III.
Neither the use
nor the usufruct of the right to traverse a path, a drive-way or a
road, or to convey water by means of an aqueduct, can be left by will,
because the servitude of a servitude cannot exist. Nor can such a
bequest be rendered legal under the Decree of the Senate by which
it is provided that the usufruct of everything included in property
may be bequeathed, for the reason that this is neither included in
property or excluded from it, but an action for an indeterminate amount
will lie against the heir, and in favor of the legatee, as long as
he lives, in order to compel the former to permit him to walk, ride,
or drive through the property or the servitude may be granted, if
security is furnished to return it in case the legatee should die,
or forfeit his civil rights for some serious offence.
2. Papinianus,
Questions, Book XVII.
Where the services
of a slave are bequeathed, they are not lost by forfeiture of civil
rights, or by non-user; and, as the legatee can profit by the labors
of the slave, he can also lease them. If the heir should prevent him
from making use of his services, he will be liable. The same rule
applies where the slave leases himself. And, for the reason that the
legatee is not considered an usufructuary, he will transmit the legacy
of the slave's services to his heir, but where the title to the slave
is obtained by usucaption the legacy will be extinguished.
3. Paulus,
On Sabinus, Book III.
The services of
a freeman can also be bequeathed, just as he can be hired under a
contract, or be made the subject of a stipulation.
4. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XVIII.
Where the ownership
of land is left absolutely, it will pass to the legatee, even though
the usufructuary may be appointed heir.
5. Paulus,
On Sabinus, Book XVIII.
If I promise the
enjoyment of an usufruct "at the time of my death," the
disposition will be void; and the same rule applies to a legacy, for
when an usufruct is created, it is usual for it to be extinguished
by death.
6. Pomponius,
On Sabinus, Book XV.
If an usufruct
should be bequeathed to me to be enjoyed for two years after the death
of the testator, and, I am prevented from enjoying it through the
fault of the heir, he will still be liable after the two years have
elapsed; just as anyone will be liable where property due under a
legacy is destroyed, and he was in default in delivering the same.
Hence this usufruct cannot be claimed, because it is different from
the one which was bequeathed, but its value for two years should be
computed, and paid to the usufructuary.
7. Ulpianus,
On the Edict, Book XXVI.
Where services
were left by will, when should they begin to be available, from the
day when the legatee demands them, or from the time when the estate
is entered upon? And who must bear the loss while the slave is ill
? I think that the services are due from the time when they are demanded,
and therefore if the slave should begin to be sick after that date,
the loss must be borne by the legatee.
8. Gaius, On
the Edict of the Praetor Concerning Legacies, Book III.
Where an usufruct
is bequeathed to a municipality, the question arises how long it shall
be entitled to the same, for if anyone should say that it was entitled
to it in perpetuity, the mere ownership, if the usufruct should be
perpetually separated from it, would be worthless; hence it is established
that the municipality can hold it for a hundred years, which is the
longest term of life.
9. Ulpianus,
Disputations, Book VIII.
If anyone to whom
an usufruct has been bequeathed is charged with a trust, and the usufruct
should not come into the hands of the legatee, the heir in whom the
said usufruct remains, must execute the trust. This rule also applies
to a military will, if the legatee charged with the trust should reject
the legacy, or should die during the lifetime of the testator.
10. Julianus,
Digest, Book LXX.
If a tract of
land and the usufruct of the same should be left to Titius, he will
have the right to claim either the land or the usufruct; and if he
selects the land, he will necessarily be entitled to the full ownership
of the same, even though he has rejected the usufruct. Where, however,
he prefers to have the usufruct, and rejects the ownership of the
land, he will only be entitled to the usufruct.
11. The Same,
On Minicius, Book I.
It is established
that the legacy of an annual lodging is due from the beginning of
each year.
12. Alfenus
Verus, Epitomes of the Digest by Paulus, Book II.
An heir built
a country-house on land, the usufruct of which had been bequeathed.
He cannot demolish the building without the consent of the usufructuary,
any more than he can remove a tree from the land which he had planted
there; but if he should demolish the house before the usufructuary
forbids him, he can do so with impunity.
13. Paulus,
On Plautius, Book XIII.
Where an usufruct
is left to be enjoyed for alternate years, not only one, but several
legacies are bequeathed. The case is different, however, where a servitude
to conduct water and use a right of way is left; for the servitude
of a right of way is distinct, since by its nature it is subject to
interruption.
14. Celsus,
Digest, Book XVIII.
Where an heir
was charged to permit two persons to separately enjoy the usufruct
of a tract of land, and he suffered them to enjoy it in common, the
question arose whether, under the terms of the will, he would be liable
to both. I held that he would be liable, if the testator had intended
that each should enjoy the entire usufruct individually; for, in this
instance, he would be required to deliver the entire legacy to each
one of them. Therefore, if the heir should permit one of the legatees
to use part of the usufruct, he could not permit the other to use
the same part. Hence, he would be compelled to give to each of them
the appraised value of that of which he was deprived.
15. Marcellus,
Digest, Book XIII.
"Let my heir
be charged to permit Titius to reside in such-and-such a house, as
long as he lives." This is held to be a single legacy.
(1) Where a testator
had two tracts of land, and devised one of them, and then conveyed
it to one person and the usufruct of it to another, I ask, if the
usufructuary did not have access to the said land by any other way
than through the tract which had been devised, whether the servitude
would be due to him. The answer that the rule was the same as if the
land had belonged to an estate through which a right of way could
be granted to the usufructuary, and, according to the will of the
deceased, it appeared that this was required from the heir; for in
this instance, the legatee would not be permitted to claim the land,
unless he had first granted the right of way through it to the usufructuary,
in order that the same condition which was obtained during the lifetime
of the testator might be preserved either as long as the usufruct
continued to exist, or until it was reunited with the land.
16. Modestinus,
Opinions, Book IX.
A legacy was bequeathed
to a town, so that from its income an exhibition might be given there
every year for the purpose of preserving the memory of the deceased.
It was not lawful for the exhibition to take place there, and I ask
what opinion should be given with reference to the legacy. Modestinus
answered that, as the testator intended the spectacle to be exhibited
in the town, but it was of such a character that this could not be
done, it would be unjust for the heir to profit by such a large sum
of money as the deceased had destined for this purpose. Therefore,
the heirs as well as the first citizens of the place should be called
together in order to determine how the trust could be changed so that
the memory of the testator might be celebrated in another and a lawful
manner.
17. Scaevola,
Opinions, Book III.
A man left certain
lands to a town, and desired the income of the same to be devoted
to the celebration of public games every year, and added the following:
"I request the Decurions, and I desire that they shall not change
the character of the legacy, or employ it for any other use."
The town did not celebrate the games for the period of four continuous
years. I ask whether the income which it obtained during the said
four years should be refunded to the heir, or whether it should be
set off against a legacy of another kind bequeathed by the same will.
The answer was that if possession of the land had been taken contrary
to the will of the heirs, any profits which had been acquired must
be given up, and compensation should be made for what was not expended
in accordance with the will of the deceased by the surrender of any
other property which was due.
18. Modestinus,
Opinions, Book IX.
A testator, who
had several freedmen, said in his will that he left lodging to those
whom he designated in a codicil. As he did not afterwards designate
anyone, I ask whether all of them would be admitted to share in the
legacy. The answer was that, since the patron promised to designate
certain of his freedmen, and did not afterwards designate any, the
legacy with reference to the lodging was held to be imperfect, as
there was no one in existence to whom it could be understood that
it was given.
19. The Same,
Concerning Inventions.
If a testator
should leave a tract of land to one person, and the usufruct of the
same to another; and he did this on purpose in order that the former
should only have the mere ownership, he committed an error, for he
ought to have left the ownership of the property, with the reservation
of the usufruct, as follows, "I devise such-and-such a tract
of land to Titius, with the reservation of the usufruct;" or
"Let my heir give the usufruct of said land to Seius;" as
unless he expressed himself in this way the usufruct will be shared
between them, for the reason that sometimes what is written is of
more effect than what is intended.
20. Pomponius,
On Quintus Mucius, Book VIII.
If I order a slave
to be free under a certain condition, and bequeath to you the usufruct
in said slave, the legacy will be valid.
21. Paulus,
On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book VII.
"I bequeath
to Titius the usufruct of Stichus," or, "if a ship should
come from Asia, I bequeath the sum of ten aurei." The
legatee cannot demand the usufruct before the condition relating to
the ten aurei is fulfilled, or has failed, in order that the
heir may not be deprived of the power of giving whichever he chooses.
22. Ulpianus,
On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XV.
"I desire
the income of my estate to be paid every year to my wife." Aristo
gives as his opinion that this legacy will not pass to the heir of
the wife, because it resembles either an usufruct, or a legacy to
be paid annually.
23. Julius
Mauricianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II.
A testator
is allowed to repeat the legacy of an usufruct, so that it may be
payable after the forfeiture of civil rights. This the Emperor Antoninus
recently stated in a Rescript, for under such circumstances there
is only ground for the application of this decision where a legacy
is left to be paid annually.
24. Papinianus,
Opinions, Book VII.
Where a legacy
of the usufruct of property is bequeathed to a wife, the principal,
as well as the interest which the deceased loaned, must be paid after
security has been furnished in accordance with the terms of the Decree
of the Senate. Therefore, it will be necessary for the interest of
the notes which formed part of the assets of the estate, and were
due before security was given, to be deducted from the bond. The same
rule, however, will not be observed where the money was loaned on
the notes by the heir himself; for in this case, only the principal
must be paid to the legatee, or whatever interest is found to be due
on account of default of payment, and with reference to which no security
will be required.
(1) "I wish
my slave, Scorpus, to serve my concubine Sempronia." In this
instance, not the ownership, but the usufruct of the slave is held
to have been bequeathed.
25. The Same,
Opinions, Book VIII.
A testator
left his wife the usufruct of certain lands, and desired that after
his death the said lands with their revenues should revert to his
heirs; and by doing so he committed an error. The owner did not create
a trust in favor of the heirs, either with reference to the ownership
or the usufruct of the property, for the future revenues, and not
those of time which had passed, seemed to have been referred to.
26. Paulus,
Questions, Book X.
Sempronius Attilus
charged his heir after the expiration of ten years to give to Gaius
his tract of land in Italy, with the reservation of the usufruct.
I ask, if the heir should die before the ten years have elapsed whether,
after that time, the entire tract of land will belong to the legatee.
I am convinced that the time of this legacy, or that of the execution
of the trust has arrived, and for this reason that it should belong
to the heir of the legatee. Therefore, since the legacy was already
due at the time of the death of the heir, the usufruct is extinguished
and cannot belong to the successor of the latter. I gave it as my
opinion that if the heir should be requested or ordered to deliver
certain property, the time for the execution of the trust or for the
delivery of the legacy will be when the testator dies, but the usufruct
will not belong to the heir until he delivers the ownership after
reserving the usufruct. Hence the usufruct cannot be lost by the forfeiture
of civil rights, or the death of the heir, for the reason that he
does not yet possess it. The same thing takes place where the ownership
of property is bequeathed under a certain condition, after the reservation
of the usufruct, and the heir dies before the condition has been fulfilled;
for then the usufruct, which terminates with his life, begins to vest
in the heir of the heir. In these instances, however, the intention
of the testator must be ascertained, that is if he, at the time of
reserving the usufruct, had someone in his mind who was to be joined
with his heir, so that, at the death of the former, he intended the
entire ownership to belong to the legatee; because no more could be
transmitted to his successor, who had not yet acquired the usufruct,
than if he had already begun to enjoy it.
(1) Where a tract
of land is devised to two persons, and the usufruct is left to another,
they all three of them do not enjoy the usufruct in common, if it
is divided into two parts. On the other hand, the same rule will apply
where there are two usufructuaries, and the ownership of the property
is left to a third party. The right of accrual only exists between
them.
27. Scaevola,
Opinions, Book I.
A husband left
to his wife the usufruct of certain lands and other property and her
dowry under a trust. The heirs delivered to her the usufruct in the
land. Two years afterwards the marriage was declared to be null and
void. The question arose whether what she had collected during that
time could be recovered from her. I answered that what she had collected
by way of profit could be recovered.
28. Paulus,
Opinions, Book XIII.
I ask, where the
usufruct of land is left and the said land becomes subject to temporary
taxes, what will be the law in this case? Paulus answered that it
would be the same in this instance as where ordinary taxes are imposed;
and therefore that this burden must be sustained by the usufructuary.
29. Gaius,
Trusts, Book I.
When anyone is
requested to transfer to another an usufruct which was left to himself,
and he has united it to the land for the purpose of enjoying the same;
although the usufruct may be extinguished by operation of law, at
the death, or by the forfeiture of civil rights by the legatee who
acquired it under this title, the Praetor, nevertheless, should exert
his authority in order that the right may be preserved if it was left
to him under a trust, just as if it had been bequeathed as a legacy.
30. Javolenus,
On the Last Works of Labeo, Book II.
Where an usufruct
is bequeathed to a woman until her dowry has been entirely paid, and
one of the heirs gives her security for his share of the estate but
the others do not; Labeo says that the woman will cease to enjoy the
usufruct to the extent of said share. The same will take place where
the woman is in default in accepting the security.
(1) An owner left
to his tenant the usufruct of certain land which he cultivated. The
tenant will have a right of action against the heir, in order that
the judge may compel the latter to release him from liability under
his contract.
31. Labeo,
On the Last Epitomes of Javolenas, Book II.
Where anyone has
a tract of land in common with you, and leaves the usufruct of said
land to his wife, and, after his death, his heir applies to the court
for partition of the land; Blaesus says that it was held by Trebatius
that, if the judge should divide the land into different portions,
the usufruct of the part allotted to you would not, under any circumstances,
be due to the woman, but she would be entitled to the usufruct of
the entire share assigned to the heir. I think this opinion is incorrect,
for if, before the judgment was rendered, the woman was entitled to
the usufruct of the undivided half of the entire tract of land, the
judge could not, in deciding between the parties, prejudice the rights
of the third. This last decision is the one adopted.
32. Scaevola,
Digest, Book XV.
A certain man
having stated his intentions in general terms, added the following
in his will: "I bequeath to Felix, whom I have directed to be
free, the usufruct of the Vestigian Estate, as I think that he will
be entitled to the property if he does not enter into a contest with
my heir, but remains on good terms with him. I ask my heir to act
in such a way that he and Felix may continue to be friends, for this
will be of advantage to both of them." The question arose whether
Felix could during the lifetime of the heir exact the ownership of
the land. The answer was that there was nothing in the facts stated
which showed that the ownership of the land was left to Felix.
(1) A testatrix
appointed her children by Seius, and her daughter by another husband,
her heirs to equal shares of her estate, and made the following bequest
to her mother: "I desire that the usufruct of my property be
given to aelia Dorcas, my mother, as long as she lives, and that,
at her death, it shall go to my children, or to the survivor of them."
The children of Seius died after entering upon the estate, and after
the death of the mother, who was survived by the daughter of the testatrix,
the question arose whether the usufruct would belong entirely to the
daughter, or only in proportion to her share of the estate. The answer
was that it would revert to those in whom the ownership of the land
was vested. Claudius: Scaevola believed that after the death of their
grandmother, the usufruct itself would revert to the children in proportion
to their shares of the estate, especially because they were appointed
heirs to equal portions of the same.
(2) Where a husband
left to his wife the usufruct of his houses and everything contained
therein, except the silver plate, and, in addition, that of his lands
and salt-pits; the question arose whether the usufruct of wools of
different colors which were intended for commerce, as well as of the
purple which was in the houses, were also due to the wife. The answer
was that, with the exception of the silver plate and the articles
which would be classed as merchandise, the legatee would be entitled
to the usufruct of all the other property.
(3) It was also
asked, as a considerable amount of salt had been found in the salt-pits,
the usufruct of which was bequeathed, whether it also would belong
to the wife, under the terms of the trust. The answer was that the
testator had not intended to bequeath any property which was for the
purpose of sale.
(4) The question
was also asked, if the testator should have made the following provision
in the same will, namely, "I ask you, my wife, to be content
with the sum of four hundred aurei a year, which I desire you
to receive for the term of fifteen years, out of the usufruct, and
that you pay to my heirs anything in excess of said sum which may
be derived from the said usufruct," whether it should not be
held that the testator had changed his mind with reference to the
former bequest, and therefore that the wife would not be entitled
to more than four hundred aurei a year out of the usufruct.
The answer was that the inquiry was clearly explained by the words
which were quoted.
(5) Lucius Titius,
by his will, left the Tusculan Estate to Publius Maevius, and charged
him to give half of the usufruct of the same to Titia. Publius Maevius
rebuilt an old country-house which had fallen into decay through age,
and which was required for the collection and preservation of the
crops. I ask whether Titia should contribute to the payment of the
expense of this, in proportion to her share of the usufruct. The answer
was that if the legatee had rebuilt the house before he delivered
the legacy of the usufruct to Titia, he could not be compelled to
deliver it until she had paid her share of the expense.
(6) A man appointed
his two daughters and his son, who was not of sound mind, his heirs,
and bequeathed the usufruct of the share of his imbecile son to one
of his daughters, in the following terms: "In addition to this,
let Publia Clementiana take, by way of preferred legacy, the usufruct
of the fourth part of my estate, to which I have appointed my son,
Julius Justus, my heir; and I ask you, Publia Clementiana, in consideration
of the usufruct of his share which I have bequeathed to you, to support
and take care of him until he becomes of sound mind and recovers."
As the son continued in the same condition until the time of his death,
the question arose whether the usufruct would be extinguished. The
answer was that, according to the case stated, the legacy would continue
to exist, unless it was clearly proved that the testator intended
otherwise.
(7) A testatrix
charged her appointed heir to pay ten aurei to her son every
year, or to purchase land which would return a revenue of ten aurei
annually, and assign the usufruct of the same to him; and the
son, having received the land from the heir, rented it in compliance
with the will of his mother. After his death the question arose, whether
the amount remaining due from the tenants would belong to the heir
of the son, who was the usufructuary, or to the heir of Seia, the
testatrix? The answer was that there was nothing in the case stated
which would prevent the balance of the rent from belonging to the
heir of Seia.
(8) A certain
man left the usufruct of a third part of his estate to one of his
heirs, and the question arose whether the third of the money to which
the property, after having been divided, amounted to according to
the appraisement, should be paid to the usufructuary. The answer was
that the heir had the choice of delivering either the usufruct of
the property itself, or that of the appraised valuation of the same.
(9) It was also
asked whether the taxes, in addition to what was due and required
to be paid on the land or personal property might be deducted from
the amount, so that payment would only be made of the remainder, if
the heir should prefer to do this? The answer was that the third of
the remaining sum could be paid.
33. The Same,
Digest, Book XVII.
"I desire
that there should be given to Sempronius what I was accustomed to
give him during my lifetime." Sempronius lived in the testator's
house, which was bequeathed to one of the heirs as a preferred legacy.
The question arose whether he was also entitled to his lodging therein.
The answer was that there was nothing in the case stated to prevent
him from being entitled to it.
(1) The question
arose with reference to the following words of a will: "I desire
to be given to those of my freedmen, to whom I have left nothing,
what I was accustomed to give them during my lifetime." The question
arose whether lodging was intended to be left to those freedmen who
lived with their patron until the time of his death? The answer was
that it appeared to have been left to them.
(2) A testatrix
inserted in a codicil: "I ask you to permit Nigidius, Titius,
and Dion, my old and infirm freedmen, to pass their lives where they
now are." I ask whether the above-mentioned freedmen will, under
the terms of the trust, be entitled to receive the profits of the
land on which they reside; inasmuch as they have obtained, without
controversy, other legacies which were bequeathed to them. The answer
was that, according to the case stated, the charge was that the heirs
should permit them to remain where they were, in the same way as she
herself had allowed them to do.
34. The Same,
Digest, Book XVIII.
A man inserted
a trust in his codicil in the following terms: "I desire that
there shall be given to the men and women whom I have enfranchised
by my codicil the tract of land where I have expressed my wish to
be buried; and that, when one of them dies, his share may accrue to
the remainder; so that, at last, it will all belong to the survivor,
and I desire that, after the death of the survivor, the property shall
go to the City of Aries. Moreover, I leave lodgings in my house to
my freedmen and freedwomen as long as they may live. Pactia and Trophina
shall occupy all the rooms which I was accustomed to use, and when
they die I wish the house to belong to the said city." The question
arose whether the heirs of the freedmen were charged with the trust
for the benefit of the city? The answer was that, according to the
facts stated, the words might be held to mean that the last survivor
of the legatees appeared to be charged with the trust. It was also
asked, after certain of the freedmen to whom a lodging was left had
died whether those parts of the house in which they dwelt would immediately
belong to the city. The answer was that, as long as any of the freedmen
lived, the trust would not be due to the city.
(1) A certain
party who had appointed Sempronia heir to a tenth of his estate, Maevia
to another tenth, and a foster-child to the remainder of the same,
appointed a curator for the latter, thinking that he had a right to
do so by law, and charged the curator not to suffer the land to be
sold, and to permit his foster-child to enjoy the income of the property
with Sempronia and Maevia, his nurses; and, at the end of his will,
he added, "I charge all my heirs with the execution of this,
my testament." The question arose whether the nurses could claim
the third part of the usufruct of the land under the terms of the
trust, even though the curator, whom the testator could not legally
appoint for his foster-child, had been charged with the execution
of the same. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated,
the testator had properly legally intimated his wishes by the creation
of the trust, and therefore the nurses could enjoy the income of the
land, along with his foster-child, in accordance to what he had given
to each one of them.
35. The Same,
Digest, Book XXII.
A man left to
his wife the usufruct of his country-house for the term of five years
after his death, then he added the following words, "After the
said term of five years has elapsed, and the usufruct is extinguished,
I wish the said land to belong to So-and-So and So-and-So, my freedmen."
The wife having died within the five years, the question arose whether
the said freedmen were entitled to claim the ownership of the property
immediately, or after the expiration of the five years, because the
testator had left it at the expiration of that time. The answer was
that the land would belong to the freedmen after the expiration of
the five years.
36. The Same,
Digest, Book XXV.
The usufruct of
a tract of land was left to Stichus, who was manumitted by the will,
and after he had ceased to enjoy it, the testator left it to his heirs
in trust, to be delivered to Lucius Titius. Stichus, however, by his
will, left the ownership of said land to his grandchildren, and the
heirs of Stichus, in accordance with the terms of his will, transferred
the said land to his grandchildren, who were his legatees. The said
grandchildren, not being aware of the condition under which the land
was devised by the former will, and having possessed it for a longer
time than that provided by law to give title by prescription, the
question arose whether they acquired the ownership of the land for
themselves. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated,
the legatees had acquired it.
(1) It was also
asked, if, in any event, the legatees should be deprived of the land,
whether an action in favor of the grandsons would lie for the recovery
of the same against the heirs of Stichus. The answer was that, according
to the opinion previously rendered where the property for some reason
had not been acquired, if Stichus had made a will after the death
of those to whom it was left, he would have been held to have intended
to bequeath something which he thought belonged to him, rather than
to have burdened his heirs.
37. The Same,
Digest, Book XXXIII.
"I give to
my wife the usufruct of my estate until my daughter arrives at the
age of eighteen years." The question arose whether the wife should
be entitled to the usufruct of both the land in the country and in
the city, as well as to that of the slaves, the furniture, and the
funds belonging to the estate. The answer was that, in accordance
with the facts stated, she would be entitled to the usufruct of everything.
38. The Same,
Opinions, Book III.
"I wish
the income of the aebutian Estate to be paid to my wife as long as
she lives." I ask whether the guardian of the heir can sell the
land and tender to the legatee, annually a sum equal to that which
the testator was, during his lifetime, accustomed to obtain from the
lease of the property in question ? The answer was that he can do
so. I also ask whether the legatee can with impunity be prevented
from living on the said land. The answer was that the heir is not
required to furnish him lodging. I also ask whether the heir can be
compelled to make repairs on the land. The answer was that if, through
the acts of the heir, the income has been reduced, the legatee can
lawfully claim the amount of the diminution. I also ask in what way
a legacy of this kind differs from an usufruct. The answer was that
the difference can be ascertained from the opinions previously given.
39. The Same,
Opinions, Book IX.
A certain man
appointed his sons his heirs, and bequeathed to his wife her clothing,
her jewels, wool, flax and other articles, and added: "I wish
the ownership of the articles above mentioned to pass to my daughters,
or to any of them who may survive." The question arose whether
the usufruct, or the ownership of said property was bequeathed. The
answer was that the ownership seemed to have been bequeathed.
40. Alfenus
Verus, Epitomes of the Digest of Paulus, Book VIII.
"I bequeath
lodging for So-and-So along with So-and-So." This is just the
same as if the testator had left it "To So-and-So and So-and-So."
41. Javolenus,
On the Last Works of Labeo, Book II.
When a bequest
is made as follows, "I give and bequeath to Publius Maevius all
the annual crops of the Cornelian Estate," Labeo thinks this
should be understood to be the same as if the usufruct of the land
had been left, because this seems to have been the intention of the
testator.
42. The Same,
On the Last Works of Labeo, Book V.
Among the crops
of land is understood to be included everything which can be used
by a man. For it is not necessary in this place to consider the time
when they naturally mature, but the time when it is most advantageous
for the tenant or the owner to gather them. Therefore, as olives which
are not ripe are more valuable than they are after maturity, it cannot
be held that they did not form part of the crops, where they are gathered
before they are ripe.
43. Venuleius,
Actions, Book X.
It makes no difference
whether the testator bequeaths the usufruct of the third part of property,
or the usufruct of the third part of certain property, for where the
usufruct of property in general is left, the debts are deducted from
it, and any accounts which may be due are credited. Where the usufruct
of certain property is bequeathed, the same rule is not observed.
Tit. 3.
Concerning the legacy of servitudes.
1. Julianus, On Minicius, Book I.
A testator who
had two adjoining shops left them to different persons. If either
one of the buildings projected over the other, the question might
arise whether the one underneath would be obliged to pay the expense
of keeping up the other. I was of the opinion that the servitude appeared
to be imposed, and Julianus says with reference to this: "Let
us see whether this is only true where the servitude has been expressly
imposed, or where the legacy was granted as follows: "I give
and bequeath my shop in the condition in which it is at present."
2. Marcellus,
Digest, Book XIII.
A right of way
can be bequeathed to persons holding a tract of land in common, just
as a slave held in joint ownership can legally stipulate for a right
of way, and the stipulation will not be annulled where two heirs are
left by him who stipulated for the right of way.
3. The Same,
Digest, Book XXIX.
If anyone should
devise a tract of land to Maevius, and a right of way to give access
to the same through other land, and then should leave the same tract
of land to Titius without the right of way, and both of them should
claim the land; the latter should be delivered without the right of
way, because a servitude cannot be partially acquired. If, however,
Maevius should be the first to claim the land, while the other is
deliberating as to whether or not he will accept it, if Titius should
afterwards reject the estate, it may be doubted whether the right
of way which was bequeathed will continue to exist. This has been
held to be the better opinion. But if anyone should devise a tract
of land under some condition, and the right of way absolutely; or
a part of the land absolutely, and a part of the same under a condition,
and the right of way absolutely; and the devise should become due
before the condition was fulfilled, the bequest of the right of way
will be annulled. The rule is the same where two neighbors of the
testator owned a tract of land in common, and he left a right of way
to one of them conditionally, and to the other absolutely, and before
the condition was fulfilled he died; and this is the case because
one of the legatees prevents the other from claiming the entire premises
together with a right of way.
4. Javolenus,
Epistles, Book IX.
Where a man who
had two houses left one of them to me and the other to you, and there
was a party-wall which separated the buildings, I think that the said
wall will belong to us in common, just as if it had been left to us
both jointly, and therefore neither you nor I will have any right
to prevent the other from inserting a beam into said wall; for it
has been established that whenever a joint-owner holds any property
he is entitled to all the rights appurtenant to the same. Therefore,
in a case of this kind an arbiter must be appointed for the purpose
of dividing the common property, if this should become necessary.
5. Papinianus,
Questions, Book XVI.
Although the execution
of a will for the benefit of the slaves of others especially depends
for its validity upon the testamentary capacity of their masters,
still, any bequests made to slaves are just as valid as when left
to persons who are free. Hence a right of way to obtain access to
the land of his master, cannot legally be bequeathed to a slave.
6. The Same,
Opinions, Book VII.
A father left
a house to his daughter, and gave her access to it through other buildings
belonging to the estate. If the daughter resides in the house, the
right of access will also be granted to her husband ; otherwise, it
will not be considered as granted to her. If, however, anyone should
assert that this right is not merely a personal privilege, but a complete
bequest of a servitude, then the right can only be transmitted to
the heir. But, in this instance, such a conclusion can, under no circumstances,
be admitted, lest what was granted through affection for his daughter
might seem to be transmitted to foreign heirs.
7. Paulus,
Questions, Book XXI.
Where several
appointed heirs are charged with a right of way, each of them can
be sued for the entire right, because the servitude cannot be divided,
for each can claim his legacy, even where only one of the heirs enters
upon the estate.
Tit. 4.
Concerning the preferred legacy of a dowry.
1. Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XIX.
Where a dowry
is bequeathed, it is certain that everything is included in it which
is embraced in the dotal action.
(1) Therefore,
where an agreement has been made between husband and wife, that, if
the marriage should be dissolved by the death of the husband, and
a son should be born, the dowry shall remain in the hands of the heir
of the husband, and the latter, at his death, shall bequeath the dowry,
the agreement will not stand, because the dowry was bequeathed. It
should, however, be executed if the dowry was not bequeathed; for
the established rule that the condition of the dowry cannot become
worse through the intervention of children becomes applicable whenever
the woman dies during marriage, or a divorce takes place.
(2) It is true
that there is the advantage of payment where a dowry is bequeathed,
as otherwise it would only be payable annually.
(3) There is also
the advantage that, according to the Decree of the Senate, no demand
can be made for property donated, provided the testator did not change
his mind.
(4) Moreover,
expenses which have been incurred diminish the dowry to that extent
by operation of law, and what we have said concerning this does not
refer to separate articles, but to the entire dowry.
(5) The bequest
of a dowry includes also the dotal action, so that if the husband,
while living, restored it to his wife, as is permitted in certain
cases, the legacy will be annulled.
(6) But if slaves,
whose value had not been appraised, should be included in the dowry,
and they should be dead, the legacy of the dowry, so far as they are
concerned, will be void.
(7) If the wife
promised a dowry, but did not give it, and the husband, at his death,
should leave it as a preferred legacy to his wife; she will be entitled
to nothing more than a release from liability. For if anyone should
make a bequest as follows: "I bequeath a hundred aurei, which
I have in my chest," or "Which So-and-So has deposited with
me;" and there should be no such sum, it is established that
nothing will be due, because the property in question was not in existence.
(8) If anyone
should bequeath the Titian Estate to his wife, as follows, "Since
the said land has come into my hands through her;" the land will
undoubtedly be due; for where anything is added for the purpose of
pointing out something which has already been designated, it is superfluous.
(9) Celsus in
the Twentieth Book of the Digest says that if a father-in-law bequeaths
her dowry to his daughter-in-law, and he intends to leave a right
of action with reference to the dowry, the legacy will be of no force
or effect, as she is already married; but if he wished her to receive
the money which she brought as dowry, he says that the legacy will
be valid. When, however, she has received her dowry, the husband will,
nevertheless, have the right to claim it by means of a praetorian
action, whether an heir has been appointed in a suit for partition,
or not. I think that, as the father-in-law did not intend his heir
to pay the dowry twice, if the woman should bring an action under
the will, she should furnish him security to defend the heir against
the husband. Therefore, the husband also should furnish security to
defend him against his wife, if he should be the first to institute
proceedings.
(10) On the other
hand, it is stated by Julianus in the Thirty-seventh Book, that if
a father-in-law should bequeath the dowry of his daughter-in-law to
his disinherited son, while she cannot bring the dotal action against
her disinherited husband, he himself can claim the dowry, on the ground
of a legacy; but he cannot obtain it unless he furnishes security
to defend the heir against the woman. He makes this difference between
the person to whom the dowry is bequeathed, and a freedman liberated
by the will, and to whom his peculium was bequeathed; for he
says that the heir cannot be sued on account of the peculium for
the reason that it is no longer in his possession, but the dotal action
can, nevertheless, be brought against him, even though he has ceased
to have control of the dowry.
(11) Julianus
also asks, where the father-in-law bequeathed the dowry to the husband,
and it has been paid to the wife, whether the legacy of the husband
will be extinguished. He says that it will be extinguished, because
there is nothing more which the heir can pay to the husband.
(12) He also asks,
in case the dowry should be bequeathed to someone else who is charged
to return it to the woman, whether the Falcidian Law will apply to
the legacy. He says that it will apply, but that she can by the dotal
action recover any deficiency which the trust may have suffered on
this account. I ask whether the benefit of payment should be taken
into consideration in this legacy, as if the dowry had been paid directly
to the wife herself. I think that this ought to be done.
(13) Julianus
also asks, if a dowry is bequeathed to a wife, and she is asked to
pay it to another, whether the Falcidian Law will apply, and he says
that it will not, as the trust is invalid. He thinks, however, that
where anything, in addition, is bequeathed to the wife, the residue
of the trust should be discharged and therefore what is paid her will
be subject to the operation of the Falcidian Law. Where, however,
the husband is appointed heir to a portion of the father-in-law's
estate, and the dowry is bequeathed by the latter as a preferred legacy,
the bequest of the dowry will be subject to the Falcidian Law, for
the reason that, as the marriage still exists, the dowry is considered
not to be due to the woman. But whatever has been deducted through
the operation of the Falcidian Law can be recovered by the husband
in an action for partition, just as he could recover the entire dowry
if it had not been bequeathed to his wife.
(14) Mela says
that if a tract of land forming part of the dowry has been especially
bequeathed, and after the dowry has been bequeathed in general terms,
the land will be due not twice, but only once.
(15) Mela adds,
in the same place, that where land forming a part of a dowry has been
leased by the husband for a certain time, the wife cannot obtain it
under the bequest, unless she furnishes security to permit the tenant
to enjoy it, provided she herself receives the rent.
2. Ulpianus,
Disputations, Book V.
Where a husband
bequeaths a dowry to his wife, and charges her with a trust, the trust
shall be estimated in proportion to the benefit which the woman will
receive from immediate payment of her dowry. Celsus also says the
same in the Twentieth Book of the Digest. But if certain necessary
expenses were incurred, which, by operation of law, diminished the
dowry, and all of it which the husband received is bequeathed to her,
it should be held that the entire amount of the expense which diminished
the dowry by law must be deducted from the trust, for no one can doubt
that the woman is the legatee. If, however, not the dowry, but something
in lieu thereof was bequeathed to the wife, this will be understood
to be the same as if the dowry was the subject of the bequest. Julianus
goes still farther, for he says that even if it should not be stated
that the property was bequeathed in lieu of the dowry, it still will
be considered to have been left with that intention. Therefore, if
the wife was requested to give up either the dowry or something which
was left to her in lieu of it, she will not be compelled to do so,
except to the extent which we have stated. Hence if she was appointed
heir, and charged with the transfer of a certain portion of the estate,
she would only be compelled to deliver what was in excess of her dowry,
and the value of the benefit which he received from immediate payment.
For if anyone who has received a dowry from his daughter-in-law should
appoint his son his heir, and ask him to deliver to someone else all
of the estate which might come into his hands, and he should afterwards
obtain the benefit of the dowry through the death of his wife, he
will not be compelled to give up the dowry which he had received,
for the reason that he profited by it on account of his marriage,
and not through the will of his father.
(1) A woman promised
a dowry of four hundred aurei, and gave two tracts of land
for two hundred of it, and afterwards gave the other two hundred in
notes of debtors. Her husband, dying afterwards, left to her, instead
of her dowry, two tracts of land which were not the same ones which
he had received as part of her dowry; and, in addition to them, the
two dotal tracts of land whose value had been appraised; and he charged
her by a trust that she would, at the time of her death, deliver to
Seius all of his estate which might come into her hands. The question
arose, what would be the amount of the trust after the death of the
woman? I said that the wife, who was charged to deliver everything
which came into her hands under the will, was in a position to be
asked to transfer only what she had received after the deduction of
the amount of her dowry; for she was entitled to the dowry rather
because it was due to her, than as having received it as a legacy,
with the exception of what could be claimed under the trust as constituting
the benefit resulting from immediate payment. Hence, she will not
be compelled to deliver the land which her husband left to her in
lieu of her dowry, unless it was of greater value or extent than that
which she had brought as such. She, however, will be obliged to give
up any excess, together with the profits over and above what had been
left to her. Therefore he will be entitled to the dowry with its profits,
and anything which was left to her outside of this she must surrender,
along with the profits which she obtained from the same.
3. Julianus,
Digest, Book XXXIV.
Where anyone bequeaths
a legacy to his wife, as follows: "Let my heir give so many aurei
to Titia in addition to her dowry," it is clear that he also
intended to leave her the dowry.
4. Africanus,
Questions, Book V.
Where certain
dates are fixed for the payment of legacies, as is customary, Africanus
says that this does not refer to the legacy of a dowry, because it
has its own time of payment.
5. Marcianus,
Rules, Book III.
Where a dowry
has been bequeathed, the heir should not be heard, if he wishes to
defer payment of it to the woman on account of donations which have
been made to her by her husband, or because of other expenses than
those which, by operation of law, diminish a dowry, for it is one
thing for a dowry to be diminished by necessary expenses, and another
where it is retained because of a pledge; since it is but just that
the woman should contribute her share of the indebtedness for which
it was given as security.
6. Labeo, On
the Last Epitomes by Javolenus, Book II.
Where the following
was inserted into a will, "Let my heir give to my wife the sum
of fifty aurei, which came into my hands through her and as
much more in lieu of her dowry," Alfenus Verus says that Servius
was of the opinion that, although the dowry was only composed of forty
aurei, fifty were, nevertheless, due, because an additional
sum of fifty was added.
(1) Likewise,
where a husband made a bequest to his wife, who had not brought him
any dowry, in the following terms, "Let my heir give the sum
of fifty aurei, instead of the money which I received from
my wife by way of dowry," Ofilius, Cascellius, and the pupils
of Servius assert that the legacy is due to her; and hence it must
be considered similar to the case where a slave, who is dead, has
been bequeathed to someone, or a hundred aurei has been left
in his stead. This is correct, because by these words not the dowry
itself, but money in lieu of it is held to have been bequeathed.
7. Papinianus,
Questions, Book XVIII.
A father bequeathed
to his disinherited son the dowry which he had received from his daughter-in-law.
If the heir of the father should file an exception on the ground of
bad faith, he will not be compelled to pay the legacy, unless security
is given him that he will be indemnified in case the marriage is dissolved.
(1) But if, before
the legacy has been paid to the son, the woman should recover her
dowry, the son will in vain bring an action to recover the legacy.
(2) If, however,
the Falcidian Law is applicable to the legacy of the dowry against
the disinherited son, and the woman should have ratified the payment,
she will be granted a dotal equitable action, based on the amount
of the legacy which the heir retained. But if she should not ratify
it, the heir must be defended against her by the husband, who promised
that he would do so, but if the latter should alone be compelled to
undertake the defence, an action on the judgment for the amount claimed
under the Falcidian Law will be granted against the heir, if security
is not furnished.
(3) But if the
wife should obtain a divorce from the son before the legacy is paid,
although she cannot yet secure her dowry, the action of the son will,
nevertheless, not be deferred for that reason; because when it was
decided that the dowry should be paid to him at that time, it was
also held that this should not be done unless he became the heir to
a portion of his father's estate, and that, after the marriage was
dissolved, and he had accepted the estate, would have been admitted
to receive the dowry before distribution.
(4) If security
for the defence of the heir should have been neglected through mistake,
and the son should receive the dowry under a trust, the trust cannot
be claimed again as not having been due; for the necessity of furnishing
security causes delay, and does not render that not due, which actually
was due. Hence it will not be inequitable to grant relief to the heir.
(5) But what if
the heir of the father was not solvent ? Could not a praetorian dotal
action legally be granted to the woman against her husband; for her
dowry should not be lost merely because the heir failed to give security
through mistake?
8. The Same,
Opinions, Book VII.
A man bequeathed
a sum of money, in lieu of her dowry, to his wife, who had brought
him her dowry in slaves. The slaves having died during the lifetime
of the husband, his wife died after he did. The right of action to
recover the legacy will pass by law to her heir, as the will of the
husband must be executed.
9. The Same,
Opinions, Book VIII.
"I desire
that the Cornelian Estate, and whatever property my wife brought me
at the time of her marriage, and which was appraised, be returned
to her in kind." I held that the said tract of land which had
formed part of the dowry, but had not been appraised, did not appear
to have been excepted, but that the entire dowry had been bequeathed,
and that not the value of the appraised property, but the property
itself had been left in the condition in which it might be found.
10. Scaevola,
Questions, Book VIII.
If a tract of
land of the value of a hundred aurei should be left to Seia,
in lieu of her dowry, and the same should be devised to Maevius, the
woman can recover, in addition, the amount which the Falcidian Law
will take from Maevius, because they are not, so to speak, joint legatees
of the same, as there is more included in the dowry of the woman than
in the remainder of the land.
11. Paulus,
Opinions, Book VII.
Seia, when she
married Lucius Titius, gave him a hundred aurei by way of dowry,
and called in Quintus Mucius, who did not pay anything, but stipulated
for the return of the dowry, if the marriage should be dissolved by
the death of the wife. Seia, at the time of her death, provided as
follows by her will: "I wish the sum of so many aurei to
be given to my husband, Lucius Titius, to whom I am under many obligations,
in addition to what I have given him as my dowry." I ask, if
when Quintus Mucius instituted proceedings against Lucius Titius by
an action founded on the stipulation, could the husband defeat him
by setting out the terms of the will? The answer was that, if Quintus
Mucius made the stipulation under the direction of Seia, and not for
the purpose of making a donation, he will be liable to the heirs of
the woman, and therefore Quintus Mucius will be barred by an exception.
If, however, Seia permitted him to make the stipulation as a donation,
he will be in the same position as one who had stipulated mortis
causa, and therefore it must be said that in this instance he
could have been charged with the execution of the trust.
12. Scaevola,
Opinions, Book III.
Where a husband
who had received a dowry from his wife in money, and other property
which had been appraised, made a bequest to her as follows: "If
my wife, Seia, should be able to show to my heir all the property
contained in her dotal contract, and pay to him the amount which her
father gave me for her, by way of dowry, I wish ten denarii over
and above this sum to be paid to her." As there was considerable
property belonging to the dowry which was worn out by use and which
did not exist at the time of the death of the husband, the question
arose whether the legacy should be paid under an apparently impossible
condition. I answered that the condition would seem to have been complied
with, if what remained of the property given as dowry had come into
the hands of the heir.
13. Labeo,
Abridgment of Probabilities by Paulus, Book I.
Paulus: If a son
under paternal control, who had a wife from whom he had received a
dowry, should afterwards become the head of a household, and, as is
customary, bequeath the dowry to her, the legacy will still be due,
even though he did not become the heir of his father.
14. Scaevola,
Digest, Book XV.
Theopompus, having
made a will, appointed his two daughters and his son equal heirs to
his estate, and inserted the following provision in a codicil: "I
wish my daughter, Crispina, to be married to someone of whom my friends
and relatives will approve; and Pollianus, who knows my intentions,
will provide for her dowry, in proportion to the equal shares of my
estate which I have left to her and her sister." Pollianus, having
been sworn at the instance of the husband of the girl, stated that
her father had intended the young daughter to receive as much, by
way of dowry, as the elder one. I ask whether the co-heirs will be
required to give the same sum to the younger daughter, over and above
her share of the estate. The answer was that the magistrate, who had
jurisdiction of the case, should decide that the same amount, after
having been taken from the bulk of the estate, shall be given to the
younger daughter, by way of dowry.
15. Gaius,
Concerning Legacies under the Praetorian Edict, Book II.
Although it is
established that property which the heir is ordered to deliver, and
which has been pledged or publicly hypothecated, must be released,
still, where a husband has received property of this kind by way of
dowry, and bequeaths it, his heir will not be compelled to release
it, unless the testator specially desired this to be done.
16. Paulus,
On Vitellius, Book II.
A certain man
received a dowry from the mother of his wife, and, after having entered
into a stipulation with her, left the dowry to his wife by his will.
The question having arisen whether the wife could recover the amount
of the dowry, Scaevola was of the opinion that it did not seem to
be necessary to return to the mother what had been given to the wife;
or in other words, he held that unless the wife could clearly prove
that this was the wish of the testator, it did not appear that he
intended to burden the heirs with a double payment of the dowry.
17. Scaevola,
Opinions, Book III.
A man made a bequest
to his wife as follows: "Let my wife take from the bulk of my
estate whatever I have obtained for her use, and what she has given
to me." I ask whether it should be held that a preferred legacy
of her dowry had been bequeathed. The answer was that, in accordance
with the facts stated, the legacy of the dowry should also be understood
to be meant, unless it was proved that the intention of the testator
was otherwise.
(1) "I give
to my wife Titia, the money which came into my hands as her dowry,
or has been stipulated for as such, which is evidenced by two dotal
instruments, duly sealed, and amounts to the sum of a hundred aurei."
The question arose whether the woman can recover both sums. The
answer was that there seems to be no reason why she cannot do so.
Tit. 5.
Concerning the option or choice of articles bequeathed as a legacy.
1. Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book II.
The Divine Pius
stated in a Rescript addressed to Caecilius Proculus, that, where
a choice of slaves was bequeathed, the legatee could select three.
2. The Same,
On Sabinus, Book XX.
Whenever the choice
of selection of a slave is bequeathed, the legatee can choose anyone
that he wishes.
(1) When a slave
is bequeathed in general terms, the right of selection also belongs
to the legatee.
(2) Therefore,
where an option is given, and the legatee chooses a slave belonging
to another, or a freeman, it should be considered whether he has lost
his right of selection. I think that he has not done so.
(3) Where a legatee,
to whom has been left the choice of a hundred measures of wine, selects
vinegar, he is not, by doing so, considered to have lost his right
of selection, if the testator did not include vinegar under the head
of wine.
3. The Same,
On Sabinus, Book XXIII.
This, of course,
will be the case, if he should select the vinegar before the wine
was shown to him, and before it was tasted.
4. Paulus,
On Sabinus, Book III.
Where the choice
of a cup is left as a legacy, if the legatee makes a selection before
all the cups have been shown to him, it is held that he still retains
his right; unless he intended to choose one of those which he has
seen when he knew that there were others.
5. Africanus,
Questions, Book V.
The above-mentioned
rule applies not only when this takes place through the fraud of the
heir, but also when it happens for any other reason whatsoever.
6. Pomponius,
On Sabinus, Book VI.
The choice of
several slaves is bequeathed. In order that the sale of the slaves
belonging to the estate may not be hindered while the legatee is making
his choice, it is the duty of the Praetor to decree that unless he
avails himself of his right within a certain time fixed by the latter,
he will not be entitled to an action to recover the legacy. But what
if, after the time had elapsed, and before the heir had sold the slaves,
the legatee should desire to make a selection? The Praetor is accustomed
to appoint a time, in order that the heir may not sustain any loss.
What course should be pursued, if the time prescribed by the Praetor
having expired, the heir should manumit some or all of the slaves?
Would not the Praetor be obliged to maintain their freedom? The action
must not be refused where everything remains intact. The same rule
will apply where the heir has given away some of the slaves, or sold
them, after the prescribed time has elapsed.
7. Paulus,
Questions, Book X.
Moreover, if the
heir has sold some of the slaves and kept others, the legatee should
not be heard if he wishes to make his selection out of those retained
by the heir, as the latter has already disposed of the slaves belonging
to the estate.
8. Pomponius,
On Sabinus, Book VI.
Where the choice
of a slave is left to you, and the rest of them are bequeathed to
me, it must be held by the Praetor that, unless you make a selection
within a certain time, the right of action will be lost.
(1) Where, out
of four bracelets, the two which I may choose are bequeathed to me,
or only two are left; or where, in the first place, there were only
two; the legacy is valid.
(2) Where the
choice of a single slave is bequeathed to you and myself, and I make
my selection, and do not change my mind, and you select the same slave,
he will belong to both of us in common. If, however, I should die,
or become insane, before you make your choice, the slave will not
belong to us in common, because, as I have lost my mind, I am not
considered to have given my consent. The more equitable rule, in this
instance, will be that, as I have once made my choice, the slaves
will belong to us as joint owners.
(3) If the choice
of articles deposited with someone else is bequeathed to me, I can
bring suit for the production of the same against the person with
whom it was deposited; or I can proceed against the heir to compel
him to bring an action on deposit against the party having the property,
to compel him to give me an opportunity to make my selection.
9. Julianus,
Digest, Book XXXII.
Where a bequest
is made as follows, "I give and bequeath Stichus to Titius, if
he does not select Pamphilus," it is the same as if the bequest
had been, "I do give and bequeath to Titius, either Stichus or
Pamphilus, whichever one of them he may select."
(1) If Stichus
was ordered to be free under a condition, and I was left the choice
of a slave, or one was bequeathed to me in general terms, the question
arose, what would be the law? I said that it would be more convenient
to decide that he who grants freedom to Stichus under some condition,
and then bequeaths the choice of slaves, did not have Stichus in his
mind at the time; just as it is established that he did not have him
in view on whom he bestowed freedom without delay. In accordance with
this, if I should choose or select Stichus, my act will be void, and
I will still be entitled to make my selection from the others.
(2) In the same
case, when I have been left the choice of slaves, and before I have
made my selection the condition on which the freedom of a slave depended
fails, the question arises, can I select Stichus ? I think that the
opinion of Mucianus should be adopted, by which it is held that freedom
itself, and not the mere grant of it which has been resolved upon,
annuls a legacy. Hence, if the condition upon which the grant of freedom
depended should fail either during the lifetime of the testator, or
after his death, and before the estate was entered upon, the legacy
will be valid; for freedom which is granted absolutely, as well as
where it is left under a condition, takes effect at the time when
the estate is entered upon, and therefore I can select Stichus.
10. The Same,
Digest, Book XXXIV.
Where a slave
is bequeathed in general terms to Pamphilus, the slave of Lucius Titius,
and then the master of Pamphilus manumits him after the time that
the legacy becomes due, and Titius claims the slave, the legacy of
Pamphilus is extinguished, because there is no slave belonging to
the estate who can be selected. If, however, Titius should reject
the legacy, it is established that Pamphilus can make his choice of
a slave bequeathed to him; for although by the manumission of Pamphilus
two persons, Titius and Pamphilus, are constituted legatees, still,
the bequest of one and the same thing is left to them, and if Titius
claims it, the option of Pamphilus is extinguished, and if he rejects
it, Pamphilus can make his selection.
11. The Same,
Digest, Book XXXVI.
If Eros is bequeathed
to Seius, and a tract of land to Eros, and then the option of a slave
is left to Maevius, and he chooses Eros, the land alone will belong
to Seius, since at the time when the estate was entered upon he was
the only one to whom the legacy could belong. For, where one of two
joint-owners of a slave leaves him a bequest, the entire legacy will
belong to the other joint-owner, as he is the only one who can acquire
the legacy through the slave at the time when it becomes due.
12. The Same,
On Minicius, Book I.
Where a slave
is bequeathed in general terms, the better opinion is that all the
heirs, if the choice is left to them, should give the same slave,
and if they do not agree, they will be liable under the terms of the
will.
13. Paulus,
On Plautius, Book VIII.
Where the selection
of a slave is left to me, and the testator bequeaths something to
Stichus without granting him his freedom, the second legacy will only
stand where the entire body of slaves is reduced to one individual,
that is to say, Stichus; and the legacy will be valid, just as if
it was bequeathed unconditionally. The opinion of Cato cannot be quoted
in opposition to this, if a voluntary heir has been appointed, for
the reason that the body of slaves may be diminished before the estate
is entered upon, even if the testator should die immediately. Where,
however, a necessary heir is appointed, the second legacy will be
void in accordance with the rule of Cato.
(1) Pomponius
says that where the purchaser of an estate asks that the party to
whom the choice of slaves has been bequeathed shall make his selection,
it should be considered whether the Praetor must compel the legatee
to do so, just as if the appointed heir should make such a demand,
for the reason that the purchaser can accomplish this by applying
to the heir. I do not see why it cannot be done.
14. Javolenus,
On Cassius, Book II.
Where the right
to select a slave from the entire body of those forming part of an
estate is bequeathed, and the heir manumits one of them before the
choice is made, he cannot, in the meantime, confer his freedom upon
him, but he will lose the slave whom he manumitted, because if he
is chosen by the legatee, he will belong to him, but if he is rejected,
he will then become free.
15. The Same,
Epistles, Book II.
I made a bequest
to a slave without granting him his freedom, and I then bequeathed
to Maevius his choice of my slaves. He selected the same slave, and
I ask whether what was bequeathed to the latter is also due to him.
The answer was, I do not think that the legacy left to the said slave
will belong to his master.
16. Terentius
Clemens, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XV.
It is established
that where the choice of certain articles is bequeathed, it cannot
be made before the estate is entered upon, and if it should be made,
it will be void.
17. The Same,
On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XVII.
Where the choice
of two slaves is bequeathed to Titius, and the remaining ones are
left to Maevius; if the first legatee should fail to make his selection,
all of the slaves will belong to Maevius, under the term "the
remaining one."
18. Scaevola,
Questions, Book XIII.
Where a slave
is bequeathed, Neratius says that if Pamphilus is rejected the act
will be void, and therefore the legatee will still have the right
of selection.
19. Paulus,
Opinions, Book III.
"The legatee
may select such-and-such an article, or such-and-such an article."
Where no choice was made by the legatee, and he died after the time
when the bequest was due, it was decided that the right of selection
was transmitted to his heir.
20. Labeo,
Epitomes of the Last Works of Javolenus, Book II.
It is stated in
the First Book of Aufidius, that when a bequest was made as follows,
"Let him take and have for himself any coverings for table-couches
which he may wish," if he mentioned those he wanted, and then,
before he took them, should say that he wanted others, he cannot change
his mind and take the others; because he had disposed of his entire
right of selection under the legacy by his first statement, in which
he indicated those which he would take, as the articles become his
immediately, just as if he had said that he would take them.
21. Scaevola,
Digest, Book XXII.
A testator
appointed his son and his wife his heirs, and disinherited his daughter,
but left her a legacy of a hundred aurei, payable when she
married in his family, and made the following provision in his will:
"In addition to this, I bequeath to her ten slaves, to be selected
by her mother, Sempronia, whom I wish to be selected by the said Sempronia,
my wife, immediately after my estate is entered upon. I desire the
said slaves to be given to my daughter when she marries in the family,
and if any of the slaves should die before she marries, then I wish
others, also to be selected by her mother, Sempronia, to be given
in their stead, until the full number of said slaves come into her
hands, but if her mother, Sempronia, should not select them, then
she herself can choose those whom she may desire." The mother
having made the selection, the question arose whether the offspring
of the slaves born before her marriage would belong to the girl, in
addition to the original ten. The answer was that, as the testator
had deferred the legacy of the slaves until the time of the marriage,
any of the offspring of the female slaves born in the meantime would
not belong to the daughter. It was also asked whether her mother,
Sempronia, would be entitled to the use and enjoyment of the said
slaves before the marriage of the daughter. The answer was that there
was nothing in the case stated why they should not entirely belong
to the mother.
22. The Same,
Digest, Book XVII.
A husband by a
codicil left to his wife certain lands in trust, and also four silver
dishes which she might select. The question arose whether she could
make her selection from all the dishes which were found at the time
of the death of the testator. The answer was that she could do so.
Tit. 6.
Concerning bequests of wheat, wine, and oil.
1. Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XX.
Where wine is
bequeathed, any vinegar which the head of the household kept with
his wine is also included.
2. Pomponius,
On Sabinus, Book VI.
Where provisions
are left to one person, and wine to another, all the provisions will
belong to the first legatee, with the exception of the wine.
(1) Where a hundred
jars of wine are left to you to be selected as you may desire, you
can institute proceedings under the will in order to obtain the opportunity
to taste the wine; or you can bring suit to compel the wine to be
produced, or to recover any damages you may have sustained because
you were not permitted to taste it.
3. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XXIII.
If a hundred measures
of wine should be bequeathed to anyone, leaving none for the estate,
the heir can purchase and deliver wine, but he cannot deliver vinegar
which was found among the wine of the testator.
(1) Where wine
is bequeathed, let us see whether the legatee is also entitled to
the vessels in which it is contained. Celsus says that where wine
is bequeathed, even though the vessels may not be included in the
legacy, they are held to be bequeathed; not because they are a part
of the wine, to the same extent as the chasing constitutes a part
of a cup or a mirror, but because it is probable that the intention
of the testator was that he wished the vessels to be accessory to
the wine; and hence he says it is usual for us to say that we have
a thousand jars, referring to the quantity of the wine. I do not think
that this opinion is correct with reference to casks, so that where
wine is bequeathed, the casks will also be due; especially if they
are fastened in the wine cellar, or it is difficult to move them on
account of their size. With reference to vats, however, or small receptacles,
I think that they are included, and will be due, unless they are likewise
fixed immovably in the ground, and are there as utensils belonging
to the same. Where wine is bequeathed, I hold that neither leathern
bags nor bottles are included.
4. Paulus,
On Sabinus, Book IV.
Where a certain
quantity of oil, without mentioning the quality, is bequeathed, it
is not the practice to ask what kind of oil the testator was accustomed
to make use of, or what kind of oil men ordinarily use in that neighborhood.
Therefore the heir is at liberty to give to the legatee oil of any
kind that he may wish.
5. Julianus,
Digest, Book XV.
Where a certain
number of measures of wine out of that obtained from the Sempronian
Estate were bequeathed, and a smaller quantity was obtained, it was
decided that more was not due, and that the following words, "That
obtained," operated as a kind of limitation of the legacy.
6. Proculus,
Epistles, Book V.
Where an heir
is charged with the delivery of wine, he will be obliged to deliver
whatever is contained in vases or jars, even though no mention was
made of vessels. Moreover, although the wine may have been left with
the vases and jars, still, that which is contained in casks is held
to have also been left; just as where a testator bequeaths all his
slaves with their peculium of each of them, those who have
no peculium are considered to have likewise been bequeathed.
7. Javolenus,
On the Last Works of Labeo, Book II.
A certain individual
charged his heir to give to his wife wine, oil, grain, vinegar, honey,
and salt-fish. Trebatius said that the heir was not obliged to deliver
any more of each article to the woman than he desired, since it was
not stated how much of each article was to be given. Ofilius, Cascellius,
and Tubero think that the entire amount of the said articles which
the testator left was included in the legacy. Labeo approves of this,
and it is correct.
(1) "Let
my heir deliver to Lucius Titius a hundred measures of wheat, each
of which shall weigh a hundred pounds." Ofilius holds that nothing
is bequeathed, and Labeo agrees with him, as wheat of this kind does
not exist; which opinion I think to be true.
8. Pomponius,
Epistles, Book VI.
When an heir is
charged with the delivery of wine which is contained in casks, and
it is the fault of the legatee that he did not receive it, the heir
will assume the responsibility if he pours out the wine; and if the
legatee should bring suit to recover the wine from the heir, it was
held that he would be barred by an exception on the ground of bad
faith, if he does not pay the amount of damage sustained by the heir
on account of his delay.
9. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XXIII.
Where anyone bequeaths
wine, everything is included which, having originated from the vine,
retains the nature of wine. If, however, mead is made, it will not
properly be included in the term wine, unless the head of the household
had this intention. And, in fact, as the beverage called zythum,
which is made in some provinces from wheat, barley, or bread,
will not be included, so neither beer nor hydromeli is included.
But what would be the case with wine mixed with other substances?
I do not think that it will be included, unless the intention of the
testator was that it should be. It is clear that wine mingled with
honey, that is to say, very sweet wine, will be included; and the
drink made of raisins will also be, unless the intention was otherwise.
New wine, boiled down and spiced, is not included, because it rather
resembles a compound. Wine made of water and grapes is evidently included.
The beverage of quinces, and any other drinks not derived from the
vine, are not embraced in the term wine, likewise vinegar does not
come under that category. None of these things will be included in
the term wine, if they were not classed as such by the testator. Sabinus,
however, stated that everything will be included under the appellation
of wine which the testator considered to be such. Therefore, vinegar
which the testator considered as wine, as well as zythum, beer,
and all other beverages which, according to the taste and use of man,
are classed as wine, will be included. If all the wine which the testator
possessed had become sour, the legacy will not be extinguished.
(1) If anyone
should bequeath vinegar, that vinegar which the testator kept as wine
will not be included. Fruits preserved in vinegar will be included,
because they come under the head of vinegar.
(2) Likewise,
where anyone bequeaths wine which he had in his possession, and it
should afterwards become sour, even though it may have subsequently
been placed with the vinegar by the testator, it will be included
with the wine which was bequeathed, because that was designated which
was wine at the time when the will was executed. This also is true
unless opposed to the intention of the testator.
(3) Where wine
which came from the estate of the testator's father is bequeathed,
that only is held to have been left which the former kept as wine,
and not what his father considered to be such. Moreover, where wine
belonging to a peculium is bequeathed, that only is included
which the slaves regarded as wine. What is the reason for this distinction?
It is because the wine of the testator's father has already begun
to belong to him, but that forming part of the peculium remained
for the use of the slaves.
(4) The same rule
applies where old wine is bequeathed.
10. Hermogenianus,
Epitomes of Law, Book II.
The age of wine
when bequeathed is established according to the custom of the testator,
that is to say, how many years he considered necessary to render wine
old, that is, if this was not known.
11. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XXIII.
"Old wine"
is understood to be such as is not new, that is to say, wine of the
preceding year will be included under the term "old."
12. Paulus,
On Sabinus, Book IV.
For where persons
do not concur in this opinion, any end, or any beginning, can be taken
to designate the age of wine.
13. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XXIII.
"Let my heir
give to So-and-So, every year, ten measures of wine out of that obtained
from such-and-such an estate." Sabinus thinks that where no wine
was made during one year, the heir must furnish the amount to the
legatee from the yield of the preceding year. This opinion I also
adopt, if it is not contrary to the intention of the testator.
14. Pomponius,
On Sabinus, Book VI.
Where wine is
bequeathed, it also includes the vessels, where they are not such
as are reserved for constant use, for instance, jars and measures.
15. Proculus,
Epistles, Book II.
A man bequeathed
his wine and the vessels containing it. Trebatius denies that any
wine, which is in casks, is included; and he holds that the intention
of the testator was different from what is expressed in his words,
and, moreover, casks are not classed as wine vessels. Although casks
are not included in the term "wine vessels," still, I do
not agree with Trebatius in his opinion that the wine included in
the casks, that is to say, which is not in vessels, is not bequeathed.
I think, however, that it is true where wine is bequeathed to anyone
with the vessels, that the measures and jars into which it is drawn
are also bequeathed to the legatee; for we pour out wine into jars
and measures, in order that it may remain in them, until we require
it for use; and, again, we sell it together with said jars and measures.
We place it in casks, however, with a different intention, that is
to say, in order to draw it out of them into jars and measures, or
to sell it without the casks.
16. The Same,
On the Last Works of Labeo, Book III.
A certain
testator kept wine of Surrentum in earthen urns, and he bequeathed
it to you in jars. Labeo and Trebatius gave it as their opinion that
all the wine contained in the urns was bequeathed.
(1) Where sweetened
wines are bequeathed, and no other designation is contained in the
will, all the following are included in the legacy, namely: wine mixed
with honey, wine made of raisins, new wine boiled and spiced, and
similar beverages, including all those made of grapes, figs, dates,
and dried fruits.
(2) Where a legacy
is bequeathed as follows, "I give and bequeath the wine in my
jars, my Aminisean and Greek wine, and all my sweet beverages,"
Labeo thinks that nothing will be included under the latter term,
except the beverages which have been made by mixing other substances
with the wine contained in the jars of the testator. This opinion
I do not reject.
Tit. 7.
Concerning legacies of equipment or implements.
1. Paulus, On Sabinus, Book IV.
Where a tract
of land furnished with everything is devised, or where it is devised
with its equipment, two separate and distinct legacies are understood
to have been left.
(1) Where land
is devised with its equipment, and it has been alienated, the equipment
cannot be recovered in accordance with the will of the deceased.
2. Papinianus,
Opinions, Book VII.
Where a father,
after having appointed several of his children his heirs, bequeathed
to two of them, as a preferred legacy, the property of their grandmother,
in addition to their shares of his own estate; it was held that the
legatees would be entitled to equal shares in proportion to those
of the co-heirs.
(1) Gifts of land,
when the implements for its cultivation, called envykai
in the Greek language, are not left with it, are not delivered
to the devisee.
3. The Same,
Opinions, Book VIII.
A patron
left a tract of land, with its equipment, to his freedmen by his will,
and he afterwards requested in a codicil that the legatees, at their
death, should give their shares of the land to the survivors; but
he did not make any mention of the equipment. It was held that the
land which was devised should be considered just as if it had been
left under a trust; but that the increase of animals and slaves which
took place in the meantime, as well as the losses caused by death,
should be included in the trust.
(1) A minor of
twenty years of age desired a tract of land with all its equipment
to be given to his female cousin, and, during his lifetime, manumitted
certain slaves who were attached to said land. The manumitted slaves
should not be delivered to the legatee, although they cannot obtain
their freedom under such circumstances. The same rule of law applies
where freedom is not obtained for any other reason whatsoever.
4. Javolenus,
On the Last Works of Labeo, Book II.
A certain testator
had two adjoining tracts of land, and the oxen used on one tract,
after the work there was completed, were then removed to the other.
He bequeathed both tracts, with all the equipment. Labeo and Trebatius
think that the oxen ought to belong to the land where they worked,
and not where they were accustomed to remain. Cascellius holds the
contrary opinion. I adopt the view of Labeo.
5. Labeo, Abridgment
of Probabilities by Paulus, Book I.
If you wish to
devise to anyone a tract of land with its equipment it makes no difference
what form you use, whether you devise the land with its equipment
or the land and its equipment, or the land furnished with its equipment.
Paulus: I indeed am of the contrary opinion, for there is this difference
between legacies, namely, if the testator who made the devise should
employ the following form, "I leave the land with its equipment,"
and the land should be alienated, the devise will be of no force or
effect; but if he used either of the other forms it will be valid.
6. Scaevola,
Digest, Book XVI.
A testatrix left
to her grandson the lands which she possessed in a certain district,
as they were equipped, together with the wine, grain, and a book of
accounts; and added the following words: "Everything to be found
in that district, when I die, and all property of every description
which is there, or which may belong to me." Judgment having been
taken against one of her debtors, during the lifetime of the testatrix,
he did not satisfy it. The question arose whether what was due under
the decision of the court would belong to the grandson. The answer
was that there was nothing in the case stated to prevent his being
entitled to it.
7. The Same,
Digest, Book XXII.
A certain person
left to Pardula, whom he had manumitted by his will, a shop and an
apartment, together with the merchandise utensils and furniture contained
therein, and also a warehouse for wine, along with the wine, vessels,
utensils, and slaves in charge of the same, which he had been accustomed
to have with him. The question arose whether Pardula could claim the
entire legacy, as the house which contained the apartment that had
been devised was burned during the lifetime of the testator, and had
been rebuilt in the same place, after the lapse of two years, and
the warehouse which had been left to the same party had been disposed
of by the testator, but the sale of the wine had been deferred in
order to obtain a higher price. The answer was that that portion of
it with reference to which the testator had changed his mind was not
due.
8. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XX.
Sabinus says clearly
in his works on Vitellius that everything is included in the equipment
of land which is used for procuring, gathering, and preserving the
crops. For instance, in order to procure the latter some slaves are
employed to cultivate the soil, and others are placed in charge of
them to compel them to labor, and among the latter are the stewards
and overseers, and, in addition, are oxen, broken to work, and flocks
provided for manuring the ground, and implements and utensils for
cultivation, such as plows, hoes, weeding hooks, pruning knives, forks,
and other tools of this kind. For the purpose of gathering the crops,
implements such as presses, baskets, sickles for cutting grain, scythes
for mowing hay, baskets in which grapes are picked and carried, are
included. For preserving the crops, casks, for example, even though
they may not be buried in the ground, and vats, are used.
(1) In some districts,
for instance, if a farmhouse is of the better class, there are added,
as accessories, slaves who are porters, and floor-cleaners ; and if
there are pleasure-gardens, gardeners. If the land has woods and pastures,
droves of cattle and their shepherds and foresters are included.
9. Paulus,
On Sabinus, Book IV.
With reference
to flocks of sheep, the following distinction must be observed, namely,
that if they were kept in order to obtain the profits from them, they
will not be due under the legacy; but this will not be the case if
the profits of the woodland cannot otherwise be acquired, as these
profits are obtained therefrom by means of flocks of sheep.
10. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XX.
If the income
of the land also consists of honey, the bees and their hives will
be included.
11. Javolenus,
On Cassius, Book II.
The same rule
applies to birds which are kept in houses near the sea.
12. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XX.
The question arose
whether grain which was intended for the support of slaves who cultivated
the land would form part of the equipment of the latter. The greater
number of authorities do not think that it would, because it is to
be consumed; as the equipment in general includes everything which
is intended to remain on the land for a considerable time, and without
which the possession of it cannot be maintained. Food prepared for
the support of the slaves is considered as accessory, rather than
as something destined to promote cultivation. I think, however, that
grain and wine intended for food should be included in the equipment,
and the pupils of Servius state that this was also his opinion. Likewise,
it is held by some authorities that grain reserved for seed is included
in the equipment, and I believe this to be correct, because it has
reference to the cultivation of the soil, and is consumed in such
a way that it is always replaced. Grain reserved for seed differs
in no respect from that intended for the food of slaves.
(1) We have mentioned
granaries, for the reason that the crops are kept therein, and earthen
vessels, and bins in which they are arranged, as belonging to the
class of things used for the preservation of crops. Whatever is intended
for the transportation of the crops is also included in the equipment
of the land, for example, beasts of burden, vehicles, ships, barrels,
and sacks.
(2) Alfenus, however,
says that if the testator should make a bequest of certain slaves
who were not attached to the land, those who were attached to it will
not be included in the equipment of the same, because he is of the
opinion that no animal is an implement. This is not correct, for it
is well established that the slaves who are on the land for the purpose
of cultivating it are included in its equipment.
(3) The question
arose whether a slave who was a tenant on land is included in a devise
as an implement. Labeo and Pegasus very properly hold that he is not,
because he is not on the premises as an appurtenance to the same,
even if he were accustomed to exercise supervision over others employed
thereon.
(4) Labeo thinks
that a forester who has been appointed to see to the preservation
of the crops is included in the legacy, but that one who is charged
with the maintenance of boundaries is not. Neratius, however, holds
that he is. The latter opinion, at present, prevails, so that all
foresters are included.
(5) Trebatius
goes still farther, and thinks that the baker and the barber who are
employed for the benefit of the slaves of rustic estates are included,
as well as the mason whose duty it is to repair the buildings, and
the female slaves who bake the bread, and take care of the house,
and likewise the millers employed on the estate and the cook and stewardess,
provided they assist any male slave by their service; and also women
who are spinners and weavers, and make clothing for the slaves and
prepare their food.
(6) The question,
however, arises whether any accessories to the equipment are included
in a legacy of the latter; for slaves employed for the benefit of
the farmers, such as spinners, weavers, barbers, fullers, and cooks
do not, properly speaking, form part of the equipment of the land,
but are they accessory to the same? I think that cooks are included
as well as spinners and weavers, together with the others above enumerated,
and the pupils of Servius assert that this was also his opinion.
(7) It must be
held that the testator intended that the wives and children of those
above mentioned, and who were members of the same household, should
be included in the legacy; for it is incredible that he would have
directed such a cruel separation to take place.
(8) Where flocks
are pastured for a part of the year upon the land, and food is purchased
for them during the remainder; or where the land is cultivated for
a portion of the year by the slaves, and they are hired out for pay
during the remaining portion, they will, nevertheless, be included
in the equipment.
(9) It is well
established that the steward also (that is to say the slave who is
charged with seeing that the accounts are properly rendered), as well
as the porter and the muleteer, are also included in the equipment.
(10) The millstones,
machinery, hay, straw, the ass used to turn the wheel and all the
apparatus of the mill are included; the brazen cauldron in which the
juice of the grape is boiled and spiced, and those which contain water
intended for drinking and washing by the slaves are also part of the
equipment, as well as the hand-barrows and carts used for the transportation
of manure.
(11) Cassius says
that anything attached to the soil does not constitute any part of
the equipment of the land, as reeds and osiers before they are cut,
because the land cannot be an equipment of itself. If, however, they
should be cut, I think that they will be included, because they serve
for the production of crops. The same rule applies to stakes.
(12) If there
is game on the land, I think that the slaves who are hunters and trackers,
as well as the dogs, and everything else necessary for hunting, are
included in the equipment, especially if the land derives an income
from this source.
(13) Likewise,
if an income is derived from bird-catching, the slaves who are fowlers
and their nets, and any other apparatus used for this purpose, are
included in the equipment. This is not extraordinary, as Sabinus and
Cassius think that birds themselves are included in the equipment
of the land, for instance, such as have been domesticated.
(14) Where a man
uses the same implements on different tracts of land, the question
arises, to which one will they belong as equipment? I think that if
the intention of the testator is plain as to which tract of land he
intended them to belong, they will be accessory thereto, for the other
tracts have, as it were, borrowed the said implements from this one.
If his intention is not clear, they will be accessory to none of them,
for we cannot divide implements proportionally.
(15) Any furniture,
or other articles found on the land, which the owner intended to be
placed in better order, will not be included in the equipment of the
same.
(16) It should
be considered what comes under the head of household equipment, where
the latter is bequeathed. Pegasus says that the equipment of a house
includes everything used for protection against the weather, or for
the prevention of fire; but not what is employed for purposes of pleasure;
and therefore neither the glass screens nor awnings which are kept
in the house to provide against cold or to furnish shade are due.
This was the opinion of Cassius, who was accustomed to say that a
great difference existed between utensils and ornaments, as utensils
are articles which are employed for the protection of the house, and
ornaments are things which contribute to the pleasure of the owner,
as for instance, paintings.
(17) Cassius thinks
that the hair-cloth curtains used to prevent buildings from being
affected by wind or rain belong to the equipment of a house.
(18) Pegasus and
many other authorities say that vinegar kept for the purpose of extinguishing
fire, mops made of rags, siphons, poles, ladders, mats, sponges, buckets
and brooms are included.
(19) If the owner
should have obtained any tiles or beams for his house, they will be
included in the equipment of the same, if they were intended for this
use, and were not employed in any other. Hence, if he had a scaffold
required for this purpose, it would also be included in the equipment
of the building.
(20) Celsus says
with reference to curtains extending over the thresholds and window
sills, and also concerning such as are suspended from columns, that
they should rather be classed as furniture; and Sabinus and Cassius
are of the same opinion.
(21) Pipes and
grappling hooks are also included in the term equipment.
(22) Likewise,
long rods used for removing spider webs, sponges with which columns,
floors, and the feet of furniture are cleansed, and ladders employed
for the purpose of washing ceilings, are utensils, because they render
the house cleaner.
(23) Papinianus
says, in the Seventh Book of Opinions, that ornamental plaster work,
and statues fastened to the walls, are not included in the equipment
of a house, but are part of the house itself; and, indeed, where they
are not attached to it, they are not included, for they come under
the head of furniture; with the exception of brass clocks which are
not fastened to the walls; for he thinks that these, like the cloth
curtains suspended before a house, form part of its equipment.
(24) Pipes, gutters
and basins, as well as other things required for fountains, together
with locks and keys, rather constitute a part of the house itself
than accessories thereof.
(25) Panes of
glass, attached to a house, I incline to believe belong to it, for
when a house is bought, the panes and the shelves are included in
the purchase; whether they are in the building at the time, or have
been temporarily removed. If, however, they have not been replaced,
but are, nevertheless, kept to be restored to their original position,
they will be embraced in the equipment.
(26) I think that
lattices should be included under the head of equipment.
(27) Where a tract
of land is not devised with its equipment, but in order that it may
be furnished with it, the question arose whether more is included
than if the land had been merely left together with its equipment.
Sabinus stated in his works on Vitellius, that it must be confessed
that more is left where land is devised to be provided with the means
of cultivation than where it is devised furnished with them, which
opinion we see is increasing in importance and validity every day.
Therefore let us consider in what respect this legacy is more advantageous
than the other. Sabinus lays down the rule, and Cassius, in a note
on Vitellius, says that everything that has been brought upon the
land in order that the owner of the same may be better prepared for
cultivating it is included; that is to say, whatever he has there
in order that he may be more abundantly supplied. Thus, by such a
legacy he is held to have left not the implements which belong to
the land, but those that constitute his own private property.
(28) Hence, if
land already provided with the necessary implements is devised, and
the furniture which was there for the use of the testator himself
is included, together with clothing, not only outer garments, but
also those which the testator was accustomed to wear while there,
and tables of ivory or of any other material, vessels of glass, gold,
and silver, as well as wines, if there were any intended for his own
use, and any other utensils; they will also be included.
(29) Where, however,
the testator had collected certain articles, not for his own use but
for safe-keeping, they will not be included. Wines contained in warehouses
are also not included. We have adopted this rule so that whatever
the head of the household has collected there, as, for instance, in
a granary, may not be embraced in the legacy.
(30) Celsus also
states, in the Nineteenth Book of the Digest, that where fruits are
collected on the premises in order to be sold, or for any other purpose
than for the use or benefit of the land itself, they will not be included
among the equipment of the same.
(31) Celsus also
says, in the same Book, that slaves who have care of the furniture
and other slaves of this kind are included; that is to say, household
slaves, who are employed on the land, with the exception of those
who have received their freedom, and who are accustomed to reside
in the country.
(32) If a testator
should devise land already provided with the means of cultivation,
young slaves who are being instructed in the service of the table,
and whom the testator was accustomed to have there, whenever he came,
are embraced in the legacy.
(33) The members
of the slaves' families, that is, their wives and children, are undoubtedly
included in the devise of land with its equipment.
(34) Where land
with its equipment is devised, it is well established that the library,
and any books upon the premises, which the head of the household made
use of whenever he came, are included. If, however, a warehouse should
be used for the storage of the books, the contrary opinion must be
held.
(35) Neratius,
also, in replying to Rufinus, stated, in the Fourth Book of the Epistles,
that the devise of a tract of land with its equipment includes the
furniture, the wines, and the slaves, not only those employed in the
cultivation of the soil, and the care of the same, but also those
attached to the personal service of the head of the household.
(36) Only such
pictures are considered to have been bequeathed as were used for the
adornment of the country-house.
(37) Papinianus
holds that where land is devised with its equipment those slaves are
not included who were there only temporarily, and who had not been
brought by the testator either for the purpose of being employed on
the land, or for his own service.
(38) The same
authority was of the opinion that where land was devised with its
equipment, and the steward who had charge of the same was sent back
into the province to resume his former duties, after having transacted
the business for which he came, he will be included in the devise
of the land, even though he may not yet have returned.
(39) He also says,
where a testator devised his gardens with their equipment, that even
the wines which were there for the purpose of having the table of
the owner better supplied, are included. It is otherwise, however,
if he kept the wines in warehouses, from whence he transported them
either to the city, or to other estates.
(40) He also holds
that where a house was devised by Umbrius Primus, under a trust, together
with its furniture, to Claudius Hieronianus, a most illustrious man,
that the tables and the other furniture which the head of the household,
being about to start on a journey to assume the proconsulate of a
province, had stored in warehouses in order that they might be in
a safer place, were included.
(41) He also gave
it as his opinion that a certain antidote against poison, and other
drugs, together with any clothing which he had deposited there on
account of his departure, were included in the devise of the land
with its equipment.
(42) He also held,
where a house was devised with its equipment and all the legal rights
attaching thereto, that the city slaves, as well as those who were
skilled workmen, and whose services were also employed on other tracts
of land, were not included in the bequest; but he he says that the
doorkeeper, the gardeners, those having charge of the rooms, the water-carriers,
and slaves who only worked in the house will be included. However,
what he states with reference to the skilled workmen is not true,
if they were destined for the service of the house, even though they
were lent to other estates to be employed thereon.
(43) He also gives
it as his opinion that where a house is devised with its equipment,
ivory tables and books are not included. This, however, is false,
for everything in the house by means of which the owner may be better
provided and rendered more comfortable will be included. No one doubts
that the furniture is something which contributes to the convenience
of the head of a household. Finally, Neratius, in the Fourth Book
of Epistles, informs his brother Marcellus that clothing is included
in the devise of a house with its equipment; and he says that this
is especially true in the case stated, for it was alleged that the
testator who devised the property excepted the silver plate and the
accounts, for anyone who excepted these things cannot have had in
his mind any other articles which were there. Papinianus himself,
however, says in the same Book of Opinions, that where a father who
was a merchant and a money-broker, and had two sons and as many daughters,
appointed them his heirs as follows, "I do give and bequeath
to my sons my house, furnished as it is, and I order it to be delivered
to them," the question may be asked whether the merchandise and
pledges are contained in this bequest. It would be easy for the judge
to ascertain the intention of the testator by examining his other
property.
(44) Celsus says
that where anyone bequeaths the slaves residing on the land, their
under-slaves are not included, unless it should be evident that the
testator had them also in his mind.
(45) Papinianus
also held, in the Seventh Book of Opinions, that a wife, to whom her
husband had left everything that was in his house, could not require
his daughter, who was his heir, to surrender the obligations of debtors
and the bills of sale of slaves that did not appear to have been bequeathed,
unless (he says), it is clear that the testator had had the slaves
in his mind, so that he would seem to have bequeathed to his wife
the evidences of the transfer of said slaves whom themselves, he intended
should belong to her.
(46) If anyone
should devise a tract of land "With its equipment, just as it
is," and should afterwards add, "Together with its furniture,
and its slaves, and everything else which was not expressly mentioned,"
the question arises whether, by adding this clause, he will diminish
the bequest, or not. Papinianus answers that it will not be considered
to have been diminished, but rather to have been unnecessarily increased
by this superfluous addition.
(47) Papinianus
likewise, in the Seventh Book of Opinions, says, if certain gardens
with all their equipment are devised by a mother to a son, and she
also bequeaths to her daughter her silverware intended for the use
of women, that his opinion is if the said silverware, which she kept
in her gardens, was there for her own personal convenience, it will
belong to her daughter.
13. Paulus,
On Sabinus, Book IV.
Neratius thinks
that where a tavern with its equipment is devised, even the slaves
who conduct it are included. It must, however, be considered whether
a difference does not exist between the utensils of a house used for
drinking purposes, and those of a warehouse for the storage of wine,
as only the following are utensils of the latter, namely, casks, vats,
large jars, cauldrons, pitchers for pouring out wine, and which are
ordinarily passed at supper; brazen urns, large and small measures
for liquids, and other things of this kind; but in the word "tavern,"
as it is a commercial term, slaves who transact the business are also
included.
(1) Neratius gives
it as his opinion that where a bath is devised as equipped, it also
includes the slave in charge of the same.
14. The Same,
On Vitellius, Book II.
The slave employed
in the vaults to keep up the fire is also included.
15. Pomponius,
On Sabinus, Book VI.
Where the following
clause was inserted into a will, "I do give and bequeath all
the utensils which are intended for the purpose of carrying on the
business of my shops, and for furnishing the same, and for that of
my mill and warehouse," Servius held that the horses which were
in the mills, and the slaves who were millers, as well as those employed
in the shops, the woman who cooked, and the merchandise contained
in the shop, were all considered to have been bequeathed.
(1) Where a house,
fully equipped, is devised it was decided that the furniture is included,
but not the wine; because where a house is devised ready furnished,
wines cannot be understood to be there for that purpose.
(2) A female slave
who was left constantly in charge of a country-house, and bequeathed
as belonging to the same, is included in the devise just as a forester
is, and for the same reason; since houses require guardians as well
as land, on the one hand, to prevent the neighbors from trespassing,
or appropriating the fruit, and on the other, to prevent anyone from
removing any of the property contained in the house. The building,
however, is undoubtedly considered a part of the land.
16. Alfenus,
Epitomes of the Digest by Paulus, Book II.
Where the utensils
of a country-house are bequeathed, the better opinion is that the
furniture is not included.
(1) Servius gave
it as his opinion, where a vineyard and everything appertaining to
it was left, that there were no such things as implements used for
the cultivation of a vineyard. Cornelius, when his opinion was asked
upon this point, replied that stakes, poles, and hoes are implements
which belong to a vineyard; which is correct.
(2) A certain
man left to his wife a tract of land where he himself resided, equipped
for cultivation just as it was. When advice was taken whether the
female slaves, who were spinners and weavers, were included in the
devise, the answer was that they did not, properly speaking, constitute
part of the equipment of the land; but, as the testator who devised
the property lived upon it, there could be no doubt that the female
slaves and other property which were on the premises for the use of
the head of the household should be held to be embraced in the bequest.
17. Marcianus,
Institutes, Book VII.
When the studio
of a painter is bequeathed with its equipment, the wax, the colors,
and everything of this kind is included in the legacy, as well as
the brushes, the implements for finishing encaustic tiles, and the
flasks for oil.
(1) When the equipment
of a fisherman is bequeathed, Aristo says that it includes the boats
used for catching fish. The better opinion is that it also includes
the fishermen themselves.
(2) Where the
utensils of a bath are bequeathed, it has been established that the
slave in charge of the bath is included; just as where a wood is devised,
the forester, and where a wineshop is devised, the slave in charge
of the same, are included; for baths cannot be used without the bathers.
18. Paulus,
On Vitellius, Book II.
Whenever, in the
case of the bequest of the implements of a butcher, any question arises,
after excluding the meat, we leave the tables, the weights, the cleavers,
the balances, the knives, and the axes as the equipment.
(1) Where the
equipment of anything is bequeathed, it is sometimes necessary to
take into consideration the persons of those who leave the legacy;
as, for instance, where the equipment of a mill is bequeathed, since
the slaves who are the millers will only be included when the head
of the household conducted the business of the mill himself; for it
makes a great deal of difference whether the utensils were intended
for the use of the millers, or for that of the mill.
(2) Neratius says
that the ass which turns the wheel of the mill and the millstone are
not included in the equipment which goes with the transfer of the
land.
(3) Likewise,
we say that pots and pans are included in the equipment of a tract
of land, because, without them, cooking cannot be done, nor is there
much difference between the pots and the cauldrons which are suspended
over the fire; as in the latter drinking water is heated, and in the
former food is boiled. If, however, the cauldrons are included in
the equipment, the pitchers also, with which water is poured into
the cauldrons, come under the same head; and thus one vessel follows
another in regular succession. Therefore, Pedius says that it is best
not to adhere too closely to the literal meaning of words, but above
all things to find out what the testator intended to designate, and
then ascertain the opinion of those residing in different districts
of the province.
(4) Where a question
arises with reference to a farmer who is a slave, as to whether he
is included as part of the equipment of the land, and there is any
doubt on the subject; Scaevola, having been consulted, held that the
slave should be included, where he was the confidential agent of his
master, and did not cultivate the land for a certain amount of the
income from the same.
(5) The same authority,
having been interrogated with reference to the lower millstone of
a mill, answered that it also was included, if it was operated for
the benefit of the slaves employed in the labors of the farm. The
lower part of a millstone is called meta, and the upper part
catillus.
(6) Where inquiry
was made with reference to a plowman, the answer was that, no matter
whether one who actually tilled the land, or one who fed the oxen
used in cultivating it, was meant, he was included in the legacy.
(7) He also answered
that trimmers of trees were included, if they were specially considered
to be attached to the land.
(8) Shepherds
and excavators also belong to the legatee.
(9) Likewise,
where a tract of land is devised as follows, "I give to Maevius
the Seian Estate in the very best condition in which it may be found,
together with all the implements, rustic and urban, and the slaves
who are there," the question was asked whether grain for seed
would be included. The reply was that it certainly would be, unless
the heir could prove that the intention of the testator was otherwise.
The same authority rendered a similar opinion with reference to grain
reserved for the maintenance of slaves.
(10) Cassius says
that in the equipment of a slave-physician eyewashes, plasters, and
other things of this kind are included.
(11) A testator
left certain of his slaves, whom he mentioned by name, to a person
to whom he had devised a tract of land with its equipment. The question
arose whether his remaining slaves, whom he did not enumerate, were
included in the equipment. Cassius says it was decided that, although
the slaves constituted part of the equipment of the land, only those
who were designated by name were considered to have been bequeathed,
as it is evident that the head of the household did not intend that
the others should also be classed as such.
(12) Sabinus says
that where a tract of land with everything thereon is devised, the
soil itself, and whatever is ordinarily kept there, and remains for
the greater part of the year, as well as those slaves who are accustomed
to betake themselves thither for the purpose of residing on the land,
are held to have been left, but anything which has been designedly
conveyed there for the purpose of increasing the amount of the legacy
will not be considered to have been bequeathed.
(13) Where a testator
made a bequest as follows, "I leave my country-house in the same
condition as I myself possessed it, together with the furniture, tables,
and the urban and rustic slaves which shall be sent there, and the
wines that may be in said house at the time of my death, and ten aurei
in addition," as upon the day of the testator's death he
had books, articles of glass, and a small clothes-press in the house,
the question arose whether these articles should be included among
those enumerated in the bequest. Scaevola answered that only such
articles as were specifically mentioned formed part of it.
(14) A testator
left his house furnished, together with everything attached to the
same. The question arose whether the legatee was entitled to the obligations
of debtors. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated,
he was not entitled to them.
19. Paulus,
Opinions, Book XIII.
I gave it as my
opinion that if, after the execution of the will, any slaves were
placed by the testator upon the land devised to Seia, for the purpose
of cultivating the same, they belonged to the said land and were also
included in its equipment; even though the testator enumerated the
slaves who were there at the time that he made the devise, as he mentioned
them not for the purpose of diminishing the legacy, but in order to
increase it. Moreover, there is no doubt that slaves who have been
brought on land for the purpose of cultivating it are included in
its equipment.
(1) Paulus held
that neither crops which are stored, nor a stud of horses, are included
in the devise of a country-house with its equipment, but that the
furniture forms part of it. A slave skilled in the art of building,
who pays his master a certain sum of money every year, is not included
in the equipment of the house.
20. Scaevola,
Opinions, Book III.
A testator
left Seia, whom he had appointed heir to a portion of his estate,
certain lands as a preferred legacy, together with the farmers who
cultivated them, and any rent not yet paid by tenants, if she should
become his heir; and then he made the following provision in a codicil:
"It has afterwards occurred to me to mention that I wish Seia,
to whom I devised my land, to also have all the farming implements,
furniture, cattle, farmers, rent due from tenants, and supplies."
The question arose whether those articles which were on the land and
were intended for the daily use of the head of the household, were
included in the legacy. The answer was that, in accordance with the
facts stated, property over and above the land had been bequeathed
to Seia; but that no more was due to her than the testator had specifically
mentioned in the codicil which he had drawn up after having forgotten
to clearly indicate this in his will, and which he showed he intended
to be included in the term equipment.
(1) A testator
devised to his freedman certain lands as follows: "I do give
and bequeath to my freedman, Seius, such-and-such and such-and-such
tracts of land, provided with implements as they are, together with
all dowries, and balances due from tenants, and also with the foresters,
and their wives and their children." The question arose whether
the slave, Stichus, who cultivated one of the said tracts of land
and owed a considerable sum of money, was due to Seius under the terms
of the trust. The answer was if he cultivated the land, not as a trusted
agent of his master, but for the payment of rent, as foreign tenants
are accustomed to do, Seius would not be entitled to him.
(2) "I wish
such-and-such tracts of land, provided with all implements, and the
upper house, to be given to my foster-child Gaius Seius." The
question arose whether the testator designed that the house should
be given, fully furnished. The answer was that, in accordance with
the facts stated, he seemed to have intended it to be so given, unless
the party of whom it was demanded could clearly show that his intention
was otherwise. If, however, he had bequeathed the equipment of the
lodging, that is to say, of the building, any slaves who were destined
for other purposes and whose services were employed elsewhere would
not be included in the legacy.
(3) A man left
certain lands, provided as they were with implements, together with
all property and balances due from tenants and farmers, with the slaves
and cattle, and including the peculia and the steward. The
question arose whether the balances due from tenants who, after their
lease had expired and they had given security, had left their farms,
would be included in the devise, under the words above mentioned.
The answer was that the testator did not seem to have had these claims
in his mind.
(4) With reference
to the steward who was bequeathed, the question was also asked whether
his wife and daughter were included in the legacy, as the steward
did not reside on the land, but in the city. The answer was that there
was nothing in the case stated to show that they were included.
(5) It was also
asked, if a testator, after having made his will, should go on a journey
into a province, whether those slaves who, after his departure, or
after his death, had voluntarily and without the authority of anyone,
betaken themselves to their relatives and acquaintances on the lands
which had been devised, were included in the legacy. The answer was
that those who were, so to speak, passing back and forth, were not
bequeathed.
(6) "I desire
that the Titian Estate, provided with its equipment along with everything
else that is there, be given to Pamphila, my freedwoman, when I die."
The question arose whether the slave, Stichus, who a year before the
death of the testator had been removed from the land to be educated,
and afterwards did not return, would be included in the legacy. The
answer was if the testator had sent him away merely for the purpose
of instruction, and had not transferred him from the said tract of
land to another, he would be included.
(7) "I leave
to my sister, Tyranna, my Grecian estate, together with the barn,
and all the farming implements." The question arose whether the
pastures, which the testator obtained at the same time with the said
land, and which he had always kept for the use of the same, were included
under the appellation, "Grecian estate," and were embraced
in the devise. The answer was that if he had united them with the
Grecian estate, so that they were included under one denomination,
they would form part of the devise.
(8) Where a house
was left completely furnished, a silver-gilt bedstead, having temporarily
been stored in a warehouse, was not found there at the time of the
death of the testatrix, Titia. I ask if it also should be delivered
to the legatee. The answer was that if it was ordinarily kept in the
residence, and had, in the meantime, been taken to the warehouse in
order to be in a safer place, it ought nevertheless, to be delivered
to the legatee.
(9) Where the
testator added the following phrase, "Just as I have possessed
it," does this refer to the way in which the land was equipped
at the time of his death, that is to say, with slaves, cattle, and
farming implements? The answer was that this has no reference to the
legal rights of the legatee.
21. Pomponius,
Trusts, Book I.
Where a tract
of land is devised without its equipment, the casks, olive-mills,
presses, and everything else fastened to or built upon the land, are
included in the devise; but none of these things which can be moved
are, with very few exceptions, included under the designation real-property.
Where any question arises concerning mills attached to the land, or
erected upon it, they are considered as parts of the buildings.
22. Paulus,
Opinions, Book III.
Where land is
devised, "In the very best condition in which it may be found,"
the nets, and all other apparatus for hunting which refers to the
equipment, are included in the devise, if the revenue of the land
is principally derived from the chase.
(1) Where a tract
of real property was devised, "Together with the slaves and cattle,
and all its rustic and urban equipment, the peculium acquired
by the steward before the death of the deceased, if it was derived
from the same land, is held by the greater number of authorities to
belong to the legatee."
23. Neratius,
Opinions, Book II.
When the question
is asked what is the equipment of a shop, it is usual to ascertain
what kind of business is transacted therein.
24. Paulus,
On Neratius, Book III.
A tract of land
which had been leased was devised with its equipment. The implements
which the tenant had on the farm are included in the legacy. Paulus:
Does this refer to what belonged to the tenant, or only to what belonged
to the testator? It must be said that the better opinion is that this
is the case, unless none of the implements belonged to the owner.
25. Javolenus,
On the Last Works of Labeo, Book II.
When the equipment
of a tract of land is devised, Tubero thinks that all the cattle which
the land can support are included in the devise. Labeo is of the contrary
opinion, for he says if, when the land could support a thousand sheep,
two thousand were kept there, how many of them should we decide ought
to be included in the devise? No inquiry should be made as to how
many sheep the testator ought to have had there for the purpose of
constituting the number to be included in the devise, but how many
he actually had on the land; for the estimate should not be made from
the number or the amount that was left. I concur in the opinion of
Labeo.
(1) A certain
individual, who had potteries on his land, employed the services of
his potters for the greater portion of the year in farm labor, and
afterwards devised the land with its equipment. Labeo and Trebatius
think that the potters should not be included in the equipment of
the land.
(2) Where all
the equipment of a tract of land was left with the exception of the
cattle, Ofilius improperly holds that the shepherds and the sheep
are included in the bequest.
26. The Same,
On the Last Works of Labeo, Book V.
Earthenware, and
leaden vessels in which earth is placed, and flowers planted in pots,
Labeo and Trebatius think constitute a part of the house. I think
this to be correct, if they are fastened to the house so as to always
remain there.
(1) Ofilius says
that hand-mills should be classed with household goods, but those
moved by animal power are appurtenant to the land. Labeo, Cascellius,
and Trebatius think that neither should be classed as household goods,
but rather as appurtenances. I think that this is true.
27. Scaevola,
Digest, Book VI.
A testator
left to the man who had reared him his land near the sea, together
with the slaves who were thereon, and all the implements and crops
belonging to the same, as well as the balances due from his tenants.
The question arose whether the slaves, who were fishermen, who were
attached to the personal service of the testator, and accustomed to
follow him everywhere, and whose names were carried on the accounts
in the city, and at the time of the death of the testator were not
found on the land which was devised, should be considered to have
been bequeathed. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts
stated, they were not bequeathed.
(1) A testatrix
made the following bequest to one of her relatives: "I desire
the Cornelian Estate, provided that everything, just as it is, together
with all the personal property and slaves, and the amounts due from
the tenants, to be given to Titius." This testatrix having come,
on account of a lawsuit, to Rome from Africa, brought with her certain
slaves belonging to the aforesaid land, in order that she might avail
herself of their services during the winter. The question arose whether
the said slaves were embraced in the trust, as some of them had been
removed from their duties on the farm at the time of the journey,
and had left their wives and children, while others had left their
fathers and mothers behind them. The answer was that, in accordance
with the facts stated, the slaves which were the subject of the inquiry
should be delivered under the terms of the trust.
(2) It was also
asked whether the crops of the same tract of land which had already
been gathered and remained there at the time of the death of the testatrix
were included in the trust; since it was evidently her intention to
display the greatest liberality towards her relative, as was proved
by her desire that the balance due from the tenants should also belong
to him. The answer was that, when a provision of this kind was made,
it should only be ascertained whether it was perfectly clear that
the deceased intended to bequeath the property with reference to which
the inquiry is made.
(3) A testator
devised a tract of land as a preferred legacy to his freedman, whom
he had appointed heir to a portion of his estate, as follows: "Pamphilus,
my freedman, I desire you to have, as a preferred legacy my Titian
Estate, together with my small Sempronian Estate, with all their appurtenances,
and the personal property which shall be there at the time of my death,
together with the slaves who reside on said land, with the exception
of those whom I shall hereafter manumit." As the testator had
a certain quantity of wine in casks on the said land, all of which
he had sold during his lifetime, and the third part of the price of
which he had received, the question arose whether the wine which remained
in the casks would belong to the freedman under the terms of the preferred
legacy. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated,
it would be included, unless the co-heirs could prove that the intention
of the testator was otherwise. The testator also left the claims in
his account-book, and the money which was on said land. The opinion
with reference to the money was the same as that above given.
(4) A devise was
made as follows: "I desire half of the Seian Estate, which came
to me from my father, to be given to my sister Septitia, just as it
is at present, and the other half in the condition in which it may
be found at the time of my death." The question arose whether,
under the words above quoted, the beams and joists already in position
and prepared to be inserted into the building, as well as the urban
and rustic equipment, and the slaves employed on the land would belong
to the legatee. The answer was that the following words, "Just
as it is," can have reference to the equipment of the land.
(5) A testator
devised certain lands as follows: "I also leave to my brother,
Sempronius, my Cassian and Novian Estates, equipped just as they are,
together with their willow-groves and woods." As the woods and
willow-groves did not form part of the aforesaid land, but were in
small tracts adjacent to the same, which the testator had purchased
at the same time and without which the former lands could not be cultivated,
the question arose whether they were included in the legacy. The answer
was that that property only formed part of the legacy which was specifically
designated by the testator.
28. The Same,
Digest, Book XXIII.
Lucius Titius
devised a tract of land with all its equipment. The question arose
how it should be delivered, whether as it was equipped at the time
of the death of the testator, so that any slaves born, or taken to
the land in the meantime should belong to the heir; or whether as
it was equipped at the time that the will was executed; or whether
it should be delivered in the condition it was when the land was claimed,
so that any of the equipment found there at the time would be for
the benefit of the legatee. The answer was that, in accordance with
the terms of the legacy, the property found on the land at the time
the devise was made, and which was in the same condition when the
will was opened, would be included in the equipment.
29. Labeo,
Probabilities, Book I.
If you purchase
a ship with its equipment, the boat belonging to it should be delivered
to you. Paulus: By no means; for a ship's boat is not part of its
equipment, as the boat differs from it in size, but not in kind. It
is necessary for the equipment of anything to be of a different description,
no matter what it may be. This opinion is adopted by Pomponius, in
the Seventh Book of the Epistles.
Tit. 8.
Concerning legacies of peculium.
1. Paulus, On Sabinus, Book IV.
Where a slave
is bequeathed with his peculium, and he is either alienated
or manumitted, or dies, the legacy of the peculium is also
extinguished.
2. Gaius, On
the Provincial Edict, Book XVIII.
For those things
which occupy the place of accessories are extinguished when the principal
property is destroyed.
3. Paulus,
On Sabinus, Book IV.
Where, however,
a female slave is bequeathed with her children, and either dies, or
is alienated or manumitted, her children will belong to the legatee,
because there are two distinct legacies.
4. Gaius, On
the Provincial Edict, Book XVIII.
When, however,
a slave is bequeathed with his sub-slaves, the legacy of the sub-slaves
will continue to exist, if the slave dies, or is alienated or manumitted.
5. Paulus,
On Sabinus, Book IV.
When peculium
is bequeathed, it is well established that the heir can collect
any debts due to the peculium, and be required to pay them
to the legatee, over and above anything which he himself may owe to
the slave.
6. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XXV.
Where a peculium
is bequeathed which consists of tangible property (as, for instance,
lands or houses), it can be claimed in its entirety, if the slave
is not indebted to his master, to his fellow-slaves, or to the children
of his master. If, however, he owes anything to the latter, or to
the other persons above mentioned, the property should be diminished
pro rata. Julianus and Celsus are of the same opinion.
(1) If a peculium
should be bequeathed without the deduction of the indebtedness
of the slave, it is to be apprehended that the legacy will be void,
because what is added is contrary to the nature of the legacy. I think,
however, that it is true that the validity of the legacy is not impaired
by this addition, but the testator has also added nothing of the amount
of it, as the claim to the peculium cannot be increased in
this manner. It is clear that if you suppose that the legatee has
obtained possession of the property, he can avail himself of an exception
on the ground of bad faith against the heir, if he brings an action
against him; for he is protected by the will of the testator, who
directed that the debt should not be deducted. If, however, the master
had stated that what the slave owed should be given to him, or indicated
that the latter did not owe him anything, the addition above mentioned
will be valid; because a master can, by the mere expression of his
wishes, give to the slave what the latter owes him.
(2) However, where
my sub-slave has been bequeathed to me, the question arises whether
the peculium of said sub-slave will be mine. We think that
his peculium is included in the legacy of the sub-slave, unless
this is contrary to the intention of the testator.
(3) Where a slave
and his sub-slave are directed to be free by a will, and their peculia
are bequeathed to them, the words of the bequest ought to be interpreted
in accordance with the intention of the testator, as if the latter
referred to separate and distinct peculia. In accordance with
this, a sub-slave will not be held in common where there are two freedmen,
unless such was the intention of the testator.
(4) As on the
one hand, the debt of the slave, that is to say what is due to his
master, diminishes the legacy of the peculium; so, on the other,
what the master owes to the slave should increase it. A Rescript of
Our Emperor and his father, which is as follows, is however, opposed
to this opinion: "Where a peculium is bequeathed to a
slave, the right is not granted to the latter to recover from the
heir any money which he may say he has expended on his master's account."
But what if this was the intention of the testator, could he not then
recover it? What he has expended for this purpose should certainly
be subject to set-off against that which was due to his master. Will
what his master stated in writing was due from him to the slave be
included in the legacy of the peculium? Both Pegasus and Nerva
say that it will not. When Gneus Domitius bequeathed his daughter
her peculium, but he had not paid her, for two years, the allowance
which he was accustomed to give her, but retained it for his own purposes
and stated that he owed his daughter fifty aurei, Atilicinus
held that this was not included in the legacy. This opinion is correct,
for the reason that it agrees with the Rescript.
(5) Not only what
is due to the master is deducted from the peculium bequeathed,
but also anything that may be due to the heir.
7. Pomponius,
On Sabinus, Book VII.
If anyone should
give himself to his creditor to be arrogated, and proceedings based
on the peculium are instituted against the arrogator, I think
that the same rule will apply with reference to the heir.
8. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XXV.
Finally, Pegasus
gives it as his opinion that if an heir should lend money to a slave,
who is to be free under a certain condition, before the condition
is fulfilled, the amount will be deducted by operation of law, and
each individual part of the peculium will be diminished by
this debt.
(1) Hence, if
a slave should receive his freedom unconditionally, and the heir should
lend him money, either during the lifetime of the master, or before
the estate was entered upon, a legacy of the peculium will
be diminished, according to the opinion of Julianus, although the
heir may never have become the master of the slave.
(2) Where a testator
owned the slaves, Stichus and Pamphilus, and, having manumitted them
by his will, bequeathed to each of them his peculium, it was
decided that what one of the slaves owed to his fellow-bondman should
be taken from his peculium, and be added to the legacy of the
other.
(3) Where freedom
was granted to a slave if he should pay the heir ten aurei, and
his peculium was bequeathed to him, it was also asked whether
the ten aurei which he had paid to the heir should be deducted
from the peculium. Sabinus holds, and this is correct, that
the legacy of the peculium is diminished to this extent.
(4) Sabinus goes
still farther, and says that if a slave to be free upon a condition
should sell to the heir one of his own slaves, the latter must be
deducted from the peculium just as if he had been sold to a
stranger.
(5) Consequently,
the question is asked if, where a slave has made an agreement with
his master with reference to the price of his freedom, and he pays
a portion of the money, and before he pays the remainder his master
should die, and the latter, by his will, directs that the said slave
shall be free and receive the legacy of his peculium, must
what he paid to his master be included in his peculium? Labeo
says it should be deducted from it. It is evident, if he has not yet
paid it but has kept it in his hands as a deposit until he could pay
the entire amount, that it should be included in his peculium.
(6) Likewise,
where his peculium is bequeathed to a slave, and the heir has
been forbidden to collect from a debtor to said peculium a
claim which was due; it is a fact that this should be deducted from
the peculium bequeathed, that is to say, that what was left
to the said debtor should be taken from the peculium.
(7) Sometimes,
where the peculium is not bequeathed, this is understood to
have been done, as appears from the following example. A certain man
granted a slave freedom if he should render his accounts, and pay
a hundred aurei to his heirs. With reference to this Our Emperor,
together with his lather, stated in a Rescript that while the peculium
was not due unless it was bequeathed, still, he said, if the slave
complied with the conditions prescribed, he concluded that it was
the intention of the testator that he should keep his peculium,
especially as he had directed him to pay a hundred aurei out
of his peculium to his heirs.
(8) Moreover,
shall we understand the peculium to be the amount of the latter
at the time of death, or shall we add to it any subsequent accessions,
or subtract from it any subsequent diminutions? Julianus says that
where the peculium is bequeathed, a difference should be understood
to exist when it was left to the slave himself, and when it was left
to others. If it was left to himself, the time of the vesting of the
legacy must be considered, but if it was left to a stranger, the time
of death should be taken into account; but in such a way that the
increase of the property composing the peculium may come into
the hands of the legatee; as, for instance, the offspring of female
slaves, or the increase of cattle. Any accession, however, derived
from the labor of the slaves or from any other source, will be due
to no one else than the slave to whom the peculium was bequeathed.
Julianus says that both of these cases should be decided in accordance
with the intention of the testator; for, when his own peculium
is bequeathed to the slave, it is probable that the testator intended
the entire increase of the same to belong to him, in whom, after his
manumission, his patrimony would vest. This is not the case where
the peculium is bequeathed to another; still, you may say that
the rule will apply if it is evident that the testator had the same
intention with reference to the other party.
9. Paulus,
On Sabinus, Book IV.
Anything which
is due from one slave to another to whom the former is bequeathed
with his own peculium, of which the legatee forms a part, is
not deducted from the legacy, even though the legatee may be his fellow-slave.
(1) If one slave
should wound one of his fellow-slaves, and, by doing so, depreciate
his value, Marcellus says that there is no doubt that the amount due
to the master as damages should be deducted from the peculium of
the slave. For what difference is there if one slave should wound
his fellow-slave, or should cut to pieces, break, or steal any other
property? In this instance, his peculium will undoubtedly be
diminished, but not to a greater extent than the actual amount of
the injury.
(2) If, however,
the slave should wound himself, or even commit suicide, nothing ought
to be deducted from the peculium on this account. We would
be of a different opinion if he should take to flight, for the amount
of depreciation of his value, in consequence, should be deducted from
his peculium.
10. Pomponius,
On Sabinus, Book VII.
If you wish to
bequeath his peculium to your slave, or to your son as a preferred
legacy, the property included in the peculium must be specially
bequeathed, to prevent what he owes you from being deducted from the
same.
11. Ulpianus,
On the Edict, Book XXIX.
A peculium
can also be bequeathed to someone who has none, for such a bequest
can be made not only of peculium owned at the present time,
but also of any which may subsequently be acquired.
12. Julianus,
Digest, Book XXXVII.
A bequest of peculium
is void where the slave dies during the lifetime of the testator,
but if he should be living at the time of his death, the peculium
will be included in the legacy.
13. Celsus,
Digest, Book XIX.
The rule is different
where the slave is bequeathed with his clothing.
14. Alfenus
Verus, Digest, Book V.
A certain individual
inserted the following provision into his will: "When I die,
let my slave Pamphilus have for himself his own peculium and
let him be free." It was asked whether or not the peculium
should be held to have been legally bequeathed to Pamphilus, for
the reason that he was directed to take the peculium before
he became free. The answer was that there was no order to be observed
in the two provisions, which in this instance were joined, and that
it did not make any difference which of the two was mentioned or written
first; and therefore that the peculium was held to have been
legally bequeathed, just as if the slave had been directed to be free
first, and to receive the peculium afterwards.
15. The Same,
Epitomes of the Digest by Paulus, Book II.
His own peculium
was bequeathed to a manumitted slave. By another clause of the
will the testator left all his female slaves to his wife. One of these
formed part of the peculium of the slave who had been manumitted,
and it was decided that she belonged to the said slave, and that it
did not make any difference which bequest had been made first.
16. Africanus,
Questions, Book V.
Stichus had Pamphilus
in his peculium, and the master defended him in a noxal action,
and, having lost the case, paid the amount of the damages assessed.
Then he manumitted Stichus by will, and bequeathed to him his peculium.
The question arose whether what had been paid on account of Pamphilus,
as damages, should be deducted from the peculium of Pamphilus
himself, or from that of Stichus. The answer was that the deduction
must be made from the peculium of Pamphilus, no matter what
the sum might be; that is to say, even if it should be expedient to
surrender him in satisfaction of the damage committed, for everything
that is paid out by the master on account of a slave makes him a debtor
to his master. If the peculium of Pamphilus was not sufficient,
an amount not more than the value of Pamphilus should be deducted
from the peculium of Stichus.
(1) The question
arose if Pamphilus, for some other reason, owed a sum of money to
his master, and this could not be obtained from his peculium, whether
an amount to the extent of his value could be deducted from the peculium
of Stichus. This was denied, for the case is not similar to the
former one. The reason why the price of the sub-slave should be deducted
is because Stichus himself became the debtor to his master on account
of the defence of the sub-slave by the latter. But, in the instance
proposed, nothing can be deducted from his peculium, because
Stichus owes nothing, but the deduction must only be made for the
peculium of Pamphilus, who certainly cannot himself be understood
to form part of his own peculium.
17. Javolenus,
On Cassius, Book II.
A certain individual
who had bequeathed the peculium of his slave undertook to defend
him in court, and afterwards died. It was decided that the heir was
not compelled to deliver the peculium on account of the legacy,
unless security to indemnify him for any loss arising from the defence
of the slave was furnished.
18. Marcianus,
Institutes, Book VI.
If his own peculium
should be bequeathed to a manumitted slave, there is no doubt
that no action will lie against him in favor of the creditors of his
peculium, but the heir will not be obliged to deliver it, unless
security is furnished to defend him against the said creditors.
19. Papinianus,
Opinions, Book VII.
Where a master
wishes to manumit his slave, and directs him to furnish him with a
list of the property of which his peculium is composed, and,
after doing so, the slave receives his freedom, it is evident that
any property belonging to the peculium which the slave had
withheld from his statement will not have been tacitly given to him
when he was manumitted.
(1) Where freedom
is granted by a will, and the testator also bequeaths the peculium,
and afterwards manumits the slave, the freedman can, under the
terms of the will, demand that the rights of action for claims belonging
to the peculium shall be assigned to him.
(2) A son under
paternal control, to whom his father bequeathed his peculium, manumitted
a slave who formed part of the same, during the lifetime of his father.
This slave became the common property of all the heirs, and was removed
from the peculium on account of the intention of the son, because
that part of the peculium only belongs to the legatee which
is found to be included in it at the time of the father's death.
20. Marcianus,
Institutes, Book VII.
In a case of this
kind, it makes no difference whether the bequest of the peculium
was made first, and the illegal manumission was granted afterwards;
or vice versa.
21. Scaevola,
Questions, Book VIII.
If, after Stichus
has been manumitted, his peculium should be left to him, and
a slave belonging to said peculium is bequeathed to Titius,
Julianus says that the amount deducted from the peculium on
account of the debt due to the master will be added to that received
by him to whom the sub-slave was bequeathed.
22. Labeo,
Last Epitomes by Javolenus, Book II.
A master
manumitted his slave by his will, and left him his peculium. The
slave owed his master a thousand sesterces, and paid them to
the heir. I rendered the opinion that all the property composing the
peculium was due to the enfranchised slave, if he had paid
the money which he owed.
(1) A master manumitted
his slave, who held a sub-slave in common with him, left the former
his peculium, and then bequeathed specifically the sub-slave
himself, who was held in common by them, to him and to his freedwoman.
I held that a fourth part of the slave would belong to the freedwoman,
and that the remaining three-fourths would belong to the freedman;
which is also the opinion of Trebatius.
23. Scaevola,
Digest, Book XV.
A master, by his
will, bequeathed freedom to his slave Stichus, who transacted the
business of one of his freedmen, to half of whose estate the master
was the testamentary heir; a list of claims being included among the
assets. The bequest of freedom was dependent upon the condition that
he should render an account; and he left him his peculium under
a trust. Stichus rendered an account of the sums of money which he
had collected from the claims, as well as those which he had obtained
from other sources, the debtors in whose behalf he himself had paid
the heirs of his patron still remaining liable for their obligations;
and having obtained his freedom, he died. The question arose whether,
by virtue of the trust, the heirs of the patron could be compelled
to assign to the heirs of Stichus their rights of action against the
debtors for whom Stichus had made payment, when there was nothing
else due from Stichus to the patron. The answer was that they could
be compelled to do so.
(1) A certain
testator manumitted his slaves by his will and a codicil, bequeathed
them their peculium, and made the following provision with
reference to Stichus: "I wish my slave Stichus to be free, and
that ten aurei be given to him, together with whatever money
he may have in my purse, and I desire that he render an account to
my heirs. I also wish the peculium of all the slaves whom I
have manumitted to be given to them." The question arose whether
Stichus should receive from the heirs any excess over and above the
contents of his master's purse, which he had expended for his benefit
at the time of his death, as it was the custom of the household that,
where he expended anything more than the contents of the purse, for
him to be reimbursed for the same by his master. The answer was that,
according to the facts stated with reference to the custom of the
household, that also was included in the peculium bequeathed
which was due to him from his master, and which the latter was accustomed
to return to him.
(2) A testator
granted freedom to his slaves, left them certain legacies, and then
prescribed the following condition: "I desire that no accounts
be required from the slaves whom I have manumitted, and to whom I
have bequeathed legacies." The question arose whether their peculium
should be considered to have been bequeathed to them by this clause.
The answer was that, according to the facts stated, the peculium
was not considered to have been bequeathed.
(3) It was also
asked whether, under this provision, the slaves could retain as part
of their legacies anything that remained due to them from their master,
either if they had any of his property in their hands, or if, where
they were his tenants, they owed him rent. The reply was that the
answer has already been given.
24. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XLIII.
Where a slave
is bequeathed, it is unnecessary to except his peculium, because,
unless expressly specified, it is not included in the legacy.
25. Celsus,
Digest, Book XIX.
When a slave is
ordered to be free by a testator, and his peculium is left
to him, the sub-slaves of his sub-slaves are embraced in three legacies.
26. Scaevola,
Opinions, Book III.
"Let my son
Titius take from the assets of my estate, as a preferred legacy, such-and-such
a house, and a hundred aurei." Then, under another article,
the testator left to his children their peculia as preferred
legacies. The question arose, whether the hundred aurei and
the interest on the same would be included in the preferred legacy
of the peculium, together with the account-books containing
the amounts due, both principal and interest, to the other creditors.
The answer was if the father had lent money in the name of his son,
and had credited the latter with interest on the same, as might be
suggested, this also would be included in the legacy of the peculium.
Tit. 9.
Concerning legacies of provisions.
1. Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXIV.
An heir was ordered
by the testator to furnish the wife of the latter with a certain quantity
of provisions every year, and in case he should not do so, he charged
him to pay her a sum of money. The question arose whether she could
bring an action to recover the provisions bequeathed, or whether the
delivery was merely voluntary, and if the provisions were not furnished,
whether they could be demanded. And, indeed, if such a legacy was
only bequeathed once, and not payable annually, there is no doubt
(as Marcellus observes in the Thirty-ninth Book of the Digest on Julianus)
that the delivery of the articles themselves is not required, but
that suit can be brought to recover the amount in money. Therefore,
the heir will have the right to tender the provisions, or the cash,
until issue is joined in an action to recover their value in money;
unless the testator, either by implication, or expressly, indicated
some other time for payment. Where, however, the legacy of provisions
was to be paid annually, it must still be furnished in kind every
year, or, if it is not, suit for the amount due can be brought annually.
But what if a single sum of money was bequeathed, and the provisions
were not furnished at the end of the first year? Can it be doubted
that the whole sum would be payable, just as if the entire amount
of the legacy of the provisions was due; or should the estimated value
of the provisions to be furnished during the first year merely be
taken into consideration? I think that the intention of the testator
should be followed, and the entire sum ought to be paid at once, after
the heir has failed to furnish the provisions to the wife, and that
he should be punished for his want of filial piety.
2. Marcianus,
Rules, Book III.
Where a certain
kind of provisions is bequeathed, together with the vessels in which
they are contained, and they have been consumed, the vessels are not
included in the legacy, as in the case of the peculium.
3. Ulpianus,
On Sabinus, Book XXII.
Where anyone bequeaths
provisions, let us see what is embraced in the legacy. Quintus Mucius
says, in the Second Book of the Civil Law, that whatever can be eaten
or drunk is considered as forming part of a legacy of provisions.
Sabinus also says, in his Books on Vitellius, that everything is included
in such a legacy that is ordinarily consumed by the head of the household,
his wife, his children, or his slaves, and that this also applies
to such beasts of burden as are destined for the use of the testator.
(1) Aristo, however,
remarks, that some things which are not eaten or drunk are included
in the legacy; for instance, those that we are accustomed to use with
them, as oil, sauce made from fish, brine, honey, and other articles
of this kind.
(2) If articles
used with food are bequeathed, it is clear (as Labeo says in the Ninth
Book of his Last Works) that none of them should be embraced in the
legacy, because we do not eat these things, but, by means of them,
we are accustomed to eat others. Trebatius is of a different opinion
so far as honey is concerned, and with good reason, because we are
in the habit of eating honey. Proculus, however, very properly holds
that all articles of this kind are included in the legacy, unless
it is evident that this was not the intention of the testator.
(3) Where a bequest
is made of provisions, does this include articles which we are accustomed
to eat, or those by means of which we eat others? It should be held
that the latter are also included in the legacy, unless the intention
of the testator is shown to be otherwise. It is certain that honey
is always classed among provisions. Labeo himself does not deny that
fish, together with the brine in which they are pickled, are also
included.
(4) All drinkables
which the head of the household considered as wine are classed as
provisions, but none of those above mentioned are included.
(5) No one doubts
that vinegar is also included in the term "provisions,"
unless it was kept for the purpose of extinguishing fire, for then
it cannot be eaten or drunk. This Ofilius stated in the Sixteenth
Book of Actions.
(6) What we have
said with reference to the clause, "Destined for the use of the
testator," should be understood to apply to his friends, his
clients, and all the persons whom he has about him, but not to his
slaves, or to those who are not attendant upon him or his people;
for example, the slaves who are employed upon his estates; and Quintus
Mucius thinks that those only are included in bequests of provisions
who do not perform any labor. This gives occasion to Servius to remark
that food for the maintenance of male and female weavers is embraced
in such a legacy. Mucius, however, only intended to designate those
who are in attendance upon the testator.
(7) Likewise,
food intended for the subsistence of beasts of burden is included
in the legacy; but this does not apply to such beasts of burden as
are used by the testator himself and his friends. Food for such animals
as are employed in farm labor, or are hired out, are not included
in this legacy.
(8) Any grain
or vegetables which the testator kept in a storehouse are included
in a legacy of provisions, as well as any barley for the subsistence
of his slaves, or his beasts of burden; as Ofilius stated in the Sixteenth
Book on Actions.
(9) The question
arises whether firewood, charcoal, and other combustibles by which
food is prepared, are embraced in a legacy of provisions. Quintus
Mucius and Ofilius deny that this is the case, and they say that these
are not included, any more than millstones are. They also deny that
either incense or wax is included. Tutilius, however, holds that both
firewood and charcoal, if they are not kept for the purpose of sale,
come under this head. Sextus and Caecilius also state that incense
and wax tapers, kept for domestic use, are included.
(10) Servius,
On Mela, says that perfumes and papyrus for letters also should be
classed as provisions. The better opinion is that all these articles,
including perfumes, should be included, and that sheets of papyrus
intended for the daily accounts of the testator belong to the same
category.
(11) There is
no doubt that vessels for table-service are also included. Aristo,
however, says that casks are not, and this is correct, in accordance
with the distinction which we previously made with reference to wine.
Nor are receptacles for grain or vegetables, or boxes, or baskets,
or anything else of this kind, which is kept to be used in warehouses
or cellars, where provisions are stored, included, but only those
articles without which provisions cannot properly be made use of.
4. Paulus,
On Sabinus, Book IV.
As liquids cannot
be kept without receptacles, they take with them as accessories any
articles without which they cannot be preserved. Vessels, however,
which are accessories of the legacy of provisions, are not bequeathed.
Finally, after the provisions have been consumed, the vessels which
contained them will no longer be due. But even if the provisions were
expressly bequeathed with the vessels, the latter will not be due
after the provisions have been consumed, or the legatee has been deprived
of them.
(1) Where provisions
contained in a storehouse are left to anyone, all the provisions of
the testator are not the subject of the legacy.
(2) Likewise,
if anyone who is accustomed to sell his crops should bequeath provisions,
he is not held to have left everything which he had in his hands as
merchandise, but only what he had set apart as supplies for himself.
But if he was accustomed to make use of what he had indiscriminately,
only the quantity which would be sufficient for the annual consumption
of himself, his slaves, and the other persons whom he had about him,
will be embraced in the legacy. Sabinus says that this usually occurs
in the case of merchants, or when a warehouse containing oil or wine
which was accustomed to be sold, forms part of an estate.
(3) I have been
informed that the term "provisions" is applicable to every
kind of food.
(4) Where a bequest
is made of provisions which are at Rome, are those bequeathed which
are situated in the suburbs, or only such as are within the walls
? While, indeed, almost all towns are enclosed by walls, Rome is enclosed
by its suburbs, and the City of Rome is bounded by its suburbs.
(5) Where a legacy
of provisions in a city is left, Labeo says that everything of the
kind to be found anywhere should be considered as bequeathed, even
articles which are at a country-seat, but are destined for urban consumption;
just as we call those slaves "urban" whose services we are
accustomed to make use of outside of the city. If, however, the provisions
are situated outside of the City, they will, nevertheless, be considered
to be at Rome, and if they are in the gardens adjoining the City,
the same rule will apply.
(6) Where provisions,
with the exception of wine, are bequeathed to anyone, all the provisions
except the wine will be considered as included in the legacy. Where,
however, it was set forth explicitly in a will that all provisions,
except the wine which was at Rome, were bequeathed, only the provisions
which were at Rome were held to be embraced in the legacy. This was
stated by Pomponius in the Sixth Book on Sabinus.
5. The Same,
On Sabinus, Book IV.
Everything which
can be drunk is not included in the term "provisions," otherwise,
it would be necessary for all medicines which are fluids to be included
in the legacy. Hence, only such are included as are drunk for the
purpose of nourishment, and antidotes do not belong to this category;
as Cassius very properly remarks.
(1) Certain authorities
deny that pepper, lovage, caraway seed, assafœdita, and other
articles of this kind, are included in provisions, but this opinion
is not accepted.
6. The Same,
On Sabinus, Book X.
The utensils of
a bakery, and all the vessels used for cooking, are not included in
a bequest of provisions.
7. Scaevola,
Opinions, Book III.
"I wish all
my provisions to go to my mother, or to my children who are with her."
I ask, if the guardians of a ward should say that only the provisions
contained in his residence were bequeathed, and certain jars of wine
were found in his storehouses, whether these are included in the legacy.
The answer was that any provisions which he had anywhere for his own
use were included.
Tit. 10.
Concerning bequests of household goods.
1. Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book VI.
Furniture, or
any domestic utensils belonging to the head of a family, but not including
articles of silver or gold, or clothing,
2. Florentinus,
Institutes, Book XI.
That is to say,
movable property, but not animals, is classed under this head.
3. Paulus,
On Sabinus, Book IV.
The following
are embraced in bequests of household goods, namely: cupboards, benches,
bedsteads, beds, even such as are inlaid with silver, mattresses,
coverlets, pillows, vases for water, basins, candelabra, lamps, and
ladles.
(1) Ordinarily,
brazen vessels, for example, those which are not fastened to any certain
place, are included.
(2) In addition
to these are strong boxes and coffers. Some authorities very properly
hold that wardrobes and chests of drawers, if intended for the storage
of clothes or books, should not be classed as household goods, because
the articles for which they are designed are not included in that
category.
(3) Glass vessels
for the table, used both for eating and drinking, are included among
household goods, as well as earthenware vessels, not only common ones,
but also such as are of great value. For there is no doubt that silver
basins and bowls, tables and bedsteads inlaid with gold or silver
and set with jewels, are included in the term household goods, even
to the extent that the same rule applies where they are entirely made
of these precious metals.
(4) There is some
doubt with reference to vases of iridescent glass, and of crystal,
whether they form part of the household goods on account of their
rarity and value, but the same rule must be said to also apply to
them.
(5) Nor does it
make any difference of what material the articles composing the household
goods are made, but neither silver cups, nor silver vases are included,
on account of the severity of the age, which does not admit of silver
furniture. At present, however, if a silver candlestick is placed
among silver-ware, on account of a misconception of ignorant persons,
it will be considered to form part of it, and the error will establish
the right.
4. The Same,
Concerning the Meaning of Equipment.
A four-wheeled
chariot and its cushions are included in the term household goods.
5. The Same,
On Sabinus, Book IV.
With reference
to tapestry, and the other coverings of seats and chairs, it may be
asked whether they are included under the head of clothing, as coverlets,
or under that of household goods, as pillows, which, properly speaking,
are not coverlets. I think that the better opinion is that they should
be classed as household goods. So far as cloths or linen coverings
which are placed over vehicles are concerned, is there any doubt whether
they should be included among household goods? It must be said that
they ought rather to be classed as baggage for a journey, just as
skins in which clothing is wrapped up and with the straps with which
the said skins are usually fastened.
6. Alfenus,
Epitomes of the Digest by Paulus, Book III.
I think that such
things as are intended for the ordinary use of the head of the family
should be included among household goods, where they have no distinct
name peculiar to them. Therefore, articles which are employed in some
trade, and are not adapted to the ordinary use of the head of the
family, are not embraced in the term household goods.
(1) Small writing
tablets and memorandum books are not classed as household goods.
7. Celsus,
Digest, Book XIX.
Labeo says that
the term "supellex" is derived from the custom of
persons who, when about to start on a journey, were accustomed to
place in skins such articles as would be of use to them.
(1) Tubero attempts
to explain the term household goods as utensils destined for the daily
use of the head of the family, which do not come under some other
designation, as, for example, provisions, silver plate, clothing,
ornaments, implements intended for farming or for a house. It is not
strange that the name has changed with the manners of the citizens,
and their use of different articles; for, in former times, household
goods were composed of earthenware, wood, glass, or copper, and afterwards
they were made of ivory, tortoise-shell, and silver, and, at present,
gold and even jewels are employed as material for such things. Hence,
it is necessary to consider the nature of the articles, rather than
the material of which they are composed, in order to determine whether
they should be classed as household goods, silver plate, or clothing.
(2) Servius admits
that it is necessary to ascertain the intention of the person who
made the bequest, and the category in which he was in the habit of
placing the articles bequeathed. If, however, anyone is accustomed
to designate as household goods things which there is no doubt should
be classed otherwise (as, for instance, silver plate for the table,
cloaks, and togas), it should not, for that reason, be held that the
articles which he left are also included among his household goods;
for the names should not be derived from the opinions of individuals,
but from the custom of people in general. Tubero says that this does
not seem to be clear to him, for he asks of what value are names unless
to show the intention of the person who uses them. And, indeed, I
do not think that anyone would say something which he did not intend,
especially if he used the term by which the article was commonly designated;
for we make use of speech, and no one should be presumed to have said
what he did not have in his mind. However, although the judgment and
the authority of Tubero has great weight with me, still, I do not
dissent from the opinion of Servius, that a man should not be considered
to have said anything because he did not make use of the name by which
it is indicated. For although the intention of the person speaking
is preferable, and more important than his words, still, no one is
held to have said anything without speech, unless indeed, those who
cannot talk, and by their gestures and the utterance of certain sounds,
that is to say, by inarticulate expressions, are considered to have
spoken.
8. Modestinus,
Opinions, Book IX.
A husband
having devised to his wife a house with all its appurtenances, its
utensils, and its furniture, the question was asked whether the silver
table service, both for eating and drinking, was included in the legacy.
The answer was that if anything made of silver was found among the
furniture, it would be included, but that the silver for table service
would not be, unless the legatee could prove that the testator had
the intention of bequeathing it also.
9. Papinianus,
Opinions, Book VII.
Where a bequest
of household goods is made, and the description of the articles is,
through ignorance, set forth with unnecessary minuteness, it does
not affect the general legacy. If, however, the number of the articles
specified is stated, the amount is understood to have been reduced
with reference to the kind of household goods referred to. The same
rule shall be observed where land with all its equipment is devised,
and a certain number of different kinds of implements are mentioned.
(1) It is well
established that tables of every kind of material (for instance, those
of silver or inlaid with silver) are included in household goods.
The custom of the present age classes silver bedsteads and silver
candelabra among household goods; for, as Homer says, Ulysses ornamented
with gold and silver a bedstead made of the trunk of a green tree,
by which Penelope recognized her husband.
(2) Where a testator
bequeathed all of his household goods, certain silver plate which
had been received by way of pledge was not held to be included, because
he only bequeathed his own effects, especially as the said silver
plate had not been used by the creditor, with the debtor's consent,
but he had put it aside as security for the payment of the obligation,
to be returned when the latter was discharged.
10. Javolenus,
On the Last Works of Labeo, Book III.
A certain
man who was accustomed to set down in his expense account all his
clothing, as well as articles of different kinds, as "furniture,"
bequeathed his household goods to his wife. Labeo, Ofilius, and Cascellius
very properly deny that the clothing was embraced in the legacy, because
it cannot be said that clothing is classed as furniture.
11. The Same,
On the Last Works of Labeo, Book X.
Labeo and Trebatus
think that brass vases placed under jets of water, and also other
articles designed for pleasure rather than for use, are not included
among household goods. Vessels of iridescent glass and of crystal,
which are to be used for drinking purposes, it is said, should be
classed as household goods.
12. Labeo,
Epitomes of Probabilities by Paulus, Book IV.
Just as urban
and rustic slaves are distinguished, not by the place in which they
are, but by the nature of their employment, so, likewise, urban provisions
and household goods should be classified according to their use in
a city, and not from the mere fact of their being situated there,
or elsewhere; and it makes a great deal of difference whether provisions
and household goods which are in the city are bequeathed, or where
they are bequeathed as belonging to the city.
13. Modestinus,
Opinions, Book IX.
He gives it as
his opinion that where a husband bequeaths his household goods to
his wife by will, he should never be considered to have devised to
her the residence in which the said household goods were situated;
and therefore there is no doubt whatever, if the woman should claim
the residence for herself, that this would be contrary to the intention
of the deceased.
14. Callistratus,
On Judicial Inquiries, Book III.
When a tract of
land is devised, its equipment will not be embraced in the legacy,
unless this was expressly mentioned; for where a house is devised,
neither its utensils nor its furniture are included, unless this was
explicitly stated by the testator.