1.
Ulpianus, Book I, Institutes.
Those
who apply themselves to the study of law should know, in the first
place, from whence the science is derived. The law obtains its name
from justice; for (as Celsus elegantly says), law is the art of knowing
what is good and just.
(1)
Anyone may properly call us the priests of this art, for we cultivate
justice and profess to know what is good and equitable, dividing right
from wrong, and distinguishing what is lawful from what is unlawful;
desiring to make men good through fear of punishment, but also by
the encouragement of reward; aiming (if I am not mistaken) at a true,
and not a pretended philosophy.
(2)
Of this subject there are two divisions, public and private law. Public
law is that which has reference to the administration of the Roman
government; private law is that which concerns the interests of individuals;
for there are some things which are useful to the public, and others
which are of benefit to private persons. Public law has reference
to sacred ceremonies, and to the duties of priests and magistrates.
Private law is threefold in its nature, for it is derived either from
natural precepts, from those of nations, or from those of the Civil
Law.
(3)
Natural law is that which nature teaches to all animals, for this
law is not peculiar to the human race, but affects all creatures which
deduce their origin from the sea or the land, and it is also common
to birds. From it proceeds the union of male and female which we designate
as marriage; hence also arises the procreation of children and the
bringing up of the same; for we see that all animals, and even wild
beasts, appear to be acquainted with this law.
(4)
The Law of Nations is that used by the human race, and it is easy
to understand that it differs from natural law, for the reason that
me latter is common to all animals, while the former only concerns
men in their relations to one another:
2.
Pomponius, Enchiridion, For instance, reverence towards God,
and the obedience we owe to parents and country:
3.
Florentinus, Institutes, Book I, As we resist violence and
injury.
For,
indeed, it happens under this law what whatever anyone does for the
protection of his body is considered to have been done legally; and
as Nature has established a certain relationship among us, it follows
that it is abominable for one man to lie in ambush for another.
4.
Ulpianus, Institutes, Book I.
Manumissions
also, are part of the Law of Nations, for manumission is dismissal
by the hand, that is to say the bestowal of freedom; for as long as
anyone is in servitude he is subject to the hand and to authority,
but, once manumitted, he is liberated from that authority. This takes
its origin from the Law of Nations; since, according to natural law
all persons were born free, and manumission was not known, as slavery
itself was unknown; but after slavery was admitted by the Law of Nations,
the benefit of manumission followed, and while men were designated
by one natural name there arose three different kinds under the Law
of Nations, that is to say freemen, and, in distinction to them, slaves,
and as a third class, freedmen, or those who had ceased to be slaves.
5.
Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book I.
By
this Law of Nations wars were introduced; races were distinguished;
kingdoms founded; rights of property ascertained; boundaries of land
established; buildings constructed; commerce, purchases, sales, leases,
rents, obligations created, such being excepted as were introduced
by the Civil Law.
6.
Ulpianus, Institutes, Book I.
The
Civil Law is something which is not entirely different from natural
law or that of Nations, nor is it in everything subservient to it;
and therefore when we add or take anything from the Common Law we
constitute a separate law, that is the Civil Law.
(1)
This our law then is established either by writing, or without it,
as among the Greeks "twn nomwn oi men eggrafoi oi de agrafoi",
that is to say, some laws are in writing and others are not.
7.
Papinianus, Definitions, Book II.
The
Civil Law is that which is derived from statutory enactments, plebiscites,
decrees of the Senate, edicts of the Emperors, and the authority of
learned men.
(1)
The Praetorian Law is that which the Praetors introduced for the purpose
of aiding, supplementing, or amending, the Civil Law, for the public
welfare; which is also designated honorary law, being so called after
the "honor" of the Praetors.
8.
Marcianus, Institutes, Book I.
For
honorary law itself is the living voice of the Civil Law.
9.
Gaius, Institutes, Book I.
All
nations who are ruled by law and customs make use partly of their
own law, and partly of that which is common to all men. For whatever
law any people has established for itself is peculiar to that State,
and is called the Civil Law, as being the particular law of that State.
But whatever natural reason has established among all men is equally
observed by all mankind, and is called the Law of Nations, because
it is the law which all nations employ.
10.
Ulpianus, Rules, Book I.
Justice
is the constant and perpetual desire to give to every one that to
which he is entitled.
(1)
The precepts of the law are the following: to live honorably, to injure
no one, to give to every one his due.
(2)
The science of the law is the acquaintance with Divine and human affairs,
the knowledge of what is just and what is unjust.
11.
Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XIV.
The
term "law" is used in several ways. First, whatever is just
and good is called law, as is the case with natural law. Second, where
anything is useful to all or to the majority in any state, as for
instance the Civil Law. Nor is honorary law less justly so designated
in Our State, and the Praetor also is said to administer the law even
when he decides unjustly; for the term has reference not to what the
Praetor actually does, but to that which it is suitable for him to
do. Under another signification, the word indicates the place where
justice is administered, the name being shifted from the act itself
to the locality where it is performed, and this locality may be determined
in the following manner; whenever the Praetor may designate a place
for the dispensation of justice, that place is properly called the
law, provided the dignity of his office and the customs of our ancestors
are preserved.
12.
Marcianus, Institutes, Book I.
Sometimes
the term "law" is used to denote a connection, as for instance,
"I am connected by the law of consanguinity or affinity with
such-and-such a person".
Tit. 2. Concerning
the origin of law and of all magistrates, together with a succession
of jurists.
1. Gaius, On the Law of the Twelve Tables,
Book I.
Being about to give an interpretation of ancient
laws, I have thought it necessary, in the first place, to go back
to the origin of the City, not because I wish to make extensive commentaries,
but for the reason that I notice that that is perfect in all things
which is finished in all its parts; and indeed the most important
part of anything is the beginning. Then, where causes are argued in
the forum, if I should say that it is abominable to state the matter
to the judge without making any previous remarks, it would be much
more improper for those making an explanation to neglect the beginning
and avoid reference to the origin of the case; proceeding with unwashed
hands, so to speak, without delay to discuss the question which is
to be decided. For, unless I am mistaken, these previous explanations
render persons more inclined to examine the question at issue, and
when we have approached it, make the comprehension of the subject
more clear.
2. Pomponius, Enchiridion.
It, therefore, seems necessary to explain the
origin of the law itself, as well as its subsequent development.
(1) In fact, at the beginning of our State the
people undertook to act at first without any certain statutes or positive
law, and all government was conducted by the authority of the Kings.
(2) Afterwards, the State being, to some extent
enlarged, it is said that Romulus himself divided the people into
thirty parts which he called curiae; because he then exercised
care over the Republic in accordance with the decisions of the said
parts. Thus he proposed to the people certain laws relating to their
assemblies, and subsequent kings also made similar proposals, all
of which having been committed to writing, are to be found in the
book of Sextus Papirius, who lived in the time of Superbus, the son
of Demaratus of Corinth, and who was one of the principal men. This
book, as We have stated, is called the Papirian Civil Law, not because
Papirius added anything of his own to it, but because he compiled
in a single treatise laws which had been passed without observing
any order.
(3) The kings having afterwards been expelled
by a Tribunitian enactment, all these laws became obsolete, and the
Roman people again began to be governed by uncertain laws and customs,
rather than by statutes regularly passed, and this state of affairs
thus endured for almost twenty years.
(4) Afterwards, in order that this condition might
not be continued, it was decided that ten men should be appointed
by public authority, through whose agency laws should be applied for
to the States of Greece, and that the Commonwealth should be founded
upon statutory enactments. Those thus obtained were inscribed upon
ivory tablets, and placed before the Rostra, so that the laws
might be the more clearly understood; and supreme authority in the
State was conferred upon said officials for that year, so that they
might amend the laws, if it was necessary, and interpret them; and
that there should be no appeal from their decisions, as there was
from those of other magistrates. They, themselves, observed that something
was lacking in these original laws, and therefore during the following
year they added two other tablets to them, and for this reason they
were called the Laws of the Twelve Tables; and some writers have asserted
that a certain Hermodorus, an Ephesian exile in Italy, was responsible
for the enactment of the said laws.
(5) These statutes having been passed, it follows
as a natural consequence that discussion in the forum became requisite;
as a proper interpretation demands the authority of persons learned
in the law. This discussion and this law composed by jurists and which
was unwritten, was not designated by any particular name, as were
the other parts of the law by their specific appellations, but they
are called by the common designation the Civil Law.
(6) Afterwards, at about the same time, certain
actions based upon these laws were established, by means of which
men might argue their cases; and in order to prevent the people from
bringing these actions in any way they might desire, the magistrate
required that this should be done in a certain and solemn manner;
and this part of the law is called that of statutory actions, that
is to say, legal actions. And thus about the same time these three
divisions of the law originated; that is, the Laws of the Twelve Tables,
and from these arose the Civil Law, and from this source likewise
were derived the legal actions. But the knowledge of interpreting
all these, and the actions themselves, were assigned to the College
of Pontiffs; and it was established which one of them should have
jurisdiction over private actions during each year. The people made
use of this custom for almost a century.
(7) Afterwards, Appius Claudius arranged these
actions and reduced them to a certain form, and Gnaeus Flavius, his
secretary, the son of a freedman, gave the book to the people after
it had been surreptitiously obtained; and so acceptable was that gift
that he was made Tribune of the people, Senator, and Curule Aedile.
This work which contains the method of bringing actions is called
the Flavian Civil Law; just as the former one is called the Papirian
Civil Law; for Gnaeus Flavius did not add anything of his own to the
book. As the commonwealth became enlarged, for the reason that certain
methods of procedure were lacking, Sextus Aelius not long afterwards
framed other forms of action, and gave the book to the people which
is called the Aelian Law.
(8) Then, there being in use in the State the
Law of the Twelve Tables, the Civil Law, and that of Statutory Actions,
the result was that the plebs disagreed with the fathers, and
seceded, and enacted laws for itself, which laws are called Plebiscites.
Afterwards, when the plebs was recalled because much discord
arose on account of these plebiscites, it was established by the Lex
Hortensia that they should be observed as laws, and in consequence
of this the distinction between the plebiscites and the other laws
existed in the manner of their establishment, but their force and
effect were the same.
(9) Then, because it was difficult for the plebs
any longer to assemble, and much more so for the entire body of the
people to be collected in such a crowd of persons; necessity caused
the government of the commonwealth to be committed to the Senate.
Thus the Senate began to take an active part in legislation, and whatever
it decreed was observed, and this law was called a Senatus-Consultum.
(10) At the same time there was also magistrates
who dispensed justice, and in order that the citizens might know what
law was to be applied in any matter and defend themselves accordingly,
they proposed edicts, which Edicts of the Praetors constituted the
honorary law. It is styled honorary, because it originated from the
office of the Praetor.
(11) Finally as it became necessary for the commonwealth
that the public welfare should be attended to by one person, for the
mode of enacting laws seemed to have progressed little by little as
occasion demanded; and since the Senate could not properly direct
the affairs of all the provinces, a supreme ruler was selected, and
he was given authority, so that whatever he decided should be considered
valid.
(12) Thus, in Our commonwealth everything depends
either upon statute, that is upon legal enactment; or there exists
a peculiar Civil Law which is founded without writing upon the sole
interpretation of jurists; or there are the statutory actions which
contain the method of procedure; or there is a plebiscite passed without
the authority of the fathers; or there is the edict of the magistrate,
whence is derived the honorary law; or there is the Senatus-Consultum,
which is based upon the action of the Senate alone, without any statute;
or there is the Imperial Constitution, that is, that whatever the
Emperor himself formulates shall be observed as the law.
(13) After the origin of the law and the procedure
have been ascertained, it follows that We should be informed concerning
the titles of magistrates and their origin; because, as We have stated,
it is through those who preside over the administration of justice
that matters are rendered effective; for how much law could there
be in a State unless there are persons who can administer it? Next
in order after this, We shall speak of the succession of authorities;
for law cannot exist unless there are individuals learned in the same,
by means of whom it can daily be improved.
(14) As to what concerns magistrates, there is
no question but that in the beginning of the commonwealth all power
was vested in the kings.
(15) There existed at the same time a Tribunus
Celerum who commanded the knights, and held the second rank after
the king; to which body Junius Brutus, who was responsible for the
expulsion of the kings, belonged.
(16) After the kings were expelled two consuls
were appointed, and it was established by law that they should be
clothed with supreme authority. They were so called from the fact
that they specially "consulted" the interests of the republic;
but to prevent them from claiming for themselves royal power in all
things, it was provided by enactment that an appeal might be taken
from their decisions; and that they should not be able, without the
order of the people, to punish a Roman citizen with death, and the
only thing left to them was the exertion of force and the power of
public imprisonment.
(17) Subsequently, when the census occupied much
time, and the consuls were not able to discharge this duty, censors
were appointed.
(18) Then, the people having increased in numbers,
and frequent wars against neighboring tribes having taken place, it
sometimes became necessary for a magistrate of superior authority
to be appointed, and hence dictators arose, from whose decisions no
right of appeal existed; and who were invested with the power of capital
punishment. As this magistrate had supreme authority, he was not allowed
to retain it for a longer period than six months.
(19) To these dictators Masters of Cavalry were
added, who occupied the same place as the Tribuni Celerum under
the King, whose duties were almost the same as those discharged at
present by the Praetorian Prefect; and they were also considered lawful
magistrates.
(20) At the time when the plebs had seceded
from the fathers, about seventeen years after the expulsion of the
Kings, they created tribunes for themselves on the Sacred Mount, who
were Tribunes of the People; and they were called "tribunes"
for the reason that formerly the people were divided into three parts,
and one tribune was taken from each one, or because they were created
by the votes of the tribes.
(21) Again, that there might be officials who
would have charge of the temples in which the people deposited all
their statutes, two persons were selected from the plebs who
were styled Aediles.
(22) Next, when the Public Treasury began to increase
in importance, Quaestors were appointed to have charge of the same,
and to take care of the funds, and they were so called because they
were created for the purpose of examining the accounts and preserving
the money.
(23) And for the reason (as We have already stated),
that the consuls were not permitted by law to inflict capital punishment,
without the order of the Roman people; Quaestors were also appointed
by the people to preside in capital cases, and these were designated
Quaestores parricidii, of whom mention is made in the Laws
of the Twelve Tables.
(24) And as it was also determined that laws should
be enacted, it was proposed to the people that all magistrates should
resign in order that Decemviri might be appointed for one year;
but as the latter prolonged their term of office, and acted in an
unjust manner, and were not willing afterwards to elect the magistrates
who were to succeed them, so that they and their faction might retain
the commonwealth constantly under their control; they conducted the
public affairs in such an arbitrary and violent manner that the army
withdrew from the commonwealth. It is said that the cause of the succession
was one Virginius, who when he learned that Appius Claudius, in violation
of the provision which he himself had transferred from the ancient
law of the Twelve Tables, had refused to give him control of his own
daughter, but gave it to a man who, instigated by him, claimed her
as a slave, as he, influenced by love for the girl, had confounded
right and wrong; and the said Virginius being indignant that the observance
of a law of great antiquity had been violated with reference to the
person of his daughter, (just as Brutus who, as the first Consul of
Rome had granted temporary freedom to Vindex, a slave of the Vitelli,
who had revealed by his testimony a treasonable conspiracy) and thinking
the chastity of his daughter should be preferred to her life, having
seized a knife from the shop of a butcher, killed her, in order that,
by the death of the girl, he might protect her from the disgrace of
violation; and immediately after the murder, when still wet with the
blood of his daughter, he fled to his fellow soldiers, all of whom
deserting their leaders at Algidiun (where the legions were at the
time for the purpose of waging war) transferred their standards to
the Aventine Hill; and soon all the people of the city at once betook
themselves to the same place, and by popular consent some of the Decemviri
were put to death in prison, and the commonwealth resumed its former
condition.
(25) Then, some years after the Twelve Tables
had been enacted, a controversy arose between the plebs and
the fathers, the former wishing to create consuls from their own body
and the fathers refusing to consent to this; it was resolved that
military tribunes should be created with consular power, partly from
the plebs, and partly from the fathers. The number of these
was different at various times, sometimes there were twenty of them,
sometimes more than that, and sometimes less.
(26) Subsequently it was decided that consuls
could be taken from the plebs, and they began to be appointed
from both bodies; but in order that the fathers might have more power,
it was determined that two officials should be appointed from the
number of the latter, and hence the Curule Aediles originated.
(27) And as the consuls were called away by distant
wars, and there was no one who could dispense justice in the State,
it happened that a Praetor also was created, who was styled "Urbanus",
because he dispensed justice in the city.
(28) Then, after some years, this Praetor, not
being found sufficient because of the great crowd of foreigners who
came into the city, another Praetor called "Peregrinus"
was appointed, for the reason that he usually dispensed justice among
foreigners.
(29) Then, as a magistrate was necessary to preside
over public sales, Decemviri were appointed for deciding cases.
(30) At the same time Quatuorviri also
were appointed who had supervision of the highways, and Triumviri,
who had control of the mint, who melted bronze, silver, and gold,
and capital Triumviri, who had charge of the prisons, so that
when it was necessary to inflict punishment it might be done by their
agency.
(31) And, for the reason that it was inconvenient
for magistrates to appear in public during the evening, Quinqueviri
were appointed on each side of the Tiber, who could discharge the
duties of magistrates.
(32) After Sardinia had been taken, and then Sicily
and Spain, and subsequently the Narbonnese province, as many Praetors
were created as there were provinces which had come under the Roman
rule; part of whom had jurisdiction over matters in cities, and part
over provincial affairs. Next Cornelias Sylla established public investigations,
as for instance, those concerning forgery, parricide, and assassins,
and added four Praetors. Then Gaius Julius Caesar appointed two Praetors
and two aediles, who superintended the distribution of grain, and
were called Cereales, from Ceres. In this way twelve Praetors
and six aediles were created. Then the Divine Augustus appointed sixteen
Praetors, and afterwards the Divine Claudius added two more who administered
justice in matters of trust; one of whom the Divine Titius dispensed
with; and the Divine Nerva added another who expounded the law in
questions arising between the Treasury and private individuals. Thus
eighteen Praetors administered justice in the Commonwealth.
(33) All these regulations are observed as long
as the magistrates are at home, but whenever they travel abroad one
is left who expounds the law, and he is styled the Prefect of the
City. This Prefect was created in former times; he was afterwards
appointed on account of the Latin festivals, and this is done every
year; but the Prefect of Subsistence and that of the Night Watch are
not magistrates, but are extraordinary officials appointed for the
public welfare; and also those whom we have mentioned as being appointed
for this side of the Tiber, were afterwards created aediles by a decree
of the Senate.
(34) Therefore, from all these things we learn
ten Tribunes of the People, two Consuls, eighteen Praetors, and six
aediles dispensed justice in the city.
(35) Many distinguished men have been professors
of the science of the Civil Law; and of these at present We will mention
those who enjoyed the highest esteem among the Roman people; to the
end that it may appear from whom these laws have been derived and
handed down, and what was their reputation. And, indeed, among all
who acquired this knowledge, it is said that no one publicly professed
it before Tiberius Coruncanius; others, however, before him attempted
to keep the Civil Law secret, and only to give advice to those who
consulted them, rather than to instruct such as desired to learn.
(36) Publius Papirius, who compiled the royal
laws in one treatise, was in the first rank of those versed in the
Royal Statutes; then came Appius Claudius, one of the Decemviri
who took the most prominent part in the compilation of the Twelve
Tables. After him, another Appius Claudius was the possessor of great
legal learning, and he was called "Hundred Handed", for
he laid out the Appian Way, constructed the Claudian Aqueduct, and
gave it as his opinion that Pyrrhus should not be received into the
city; it is also said that he drew up forms of action in cases of
wrongful occupation of property, which book no longer exists. The
same Appius Claudius invented the letter R, from which it resulted
that the Valesii became Valerii, and the Fusii became Furii.
(37) After these came Sempronius, a man of preeminent
learning, whom the Roman people called sofoV, that is to say, "wise",
nor was anyone either before or after him designated by this title.
Next in order was Gaius Scipio Nasica, who was styled by the Senate
"The Best", to whom a house on the Via Sacra was
given by the State where he might the more easily be consulted. Then
came Quintus Mucius, who was sent as envoy to the Carthaginians, where
when two dice were placed before him, one for peace and the other
for war, and it was left to his judgment to select whichever he chose
and take it to Rome; he took both, and said that the Carthaginians
must ask for whichever one they preferred to have.
(38) After these came Tiberius Coruncanius, who,
as I have already stated, was the first of the professors of the law,
but no work of his is extant; his opinions, however, were very numerous
and remarkable. Next in order Sextus Aelius, his brother Publius Aelius,
and Publius Atilius had the greatest success in imparting instruction;
so that the two Aelii also became consuls and Atilius was the
first person invested by the people with the appellation of "The
Learned". Ennius praises also Sextus Aelius and a book of his
entitled Tripertita which still exists and contains, as it
were, the cradle of the laws. It is called Tripertita because
it includes the Law of the Twelve Tables, to which it added the interpretation
of the same, as well as the method of legal procedure. Three other
books are also attributed to him of which, however, certain writers
deny him the authorship. Cato, to a certain degree, followed these
men. Subsequently came Marcus Cato, the head of the Porcian family
whose books are extant; but a great many were written by his son,
from which still others derive their origin.
(39) After these came Publius Mucius, Brutus,
and Manilius, who founded the Civil Law. Among them Publius Mucius
left ten works, Brutus seven, and Manilius three; and written volumes
of Manilius are also extant. The first two were of consular rank,
Brutus was Praetor, and Publius Mucius had been Pontifex Maximus.
(40) After these came Publius Rutilius Rufus,
who was Consul at Rome, and Proconsul of Asia, Paulus Virginius, and
Quintus Tubero, the Stoic, a pupil of Pansa, who was himself Consul.
Sextus Pompeius, the paternal uncle of Gnaeus Pompeius, lived at the
same time, and Caelius Antipater, who wrote historical works, but
paid more attention to eloquence than to the science of the law. There
was also Lucius Crassus, the brother of Publius Mucius, who was called
Mucianus, and whom Cicero declared to be the best debater of all the
jurists.
(41) After these came Quintus Mucius, the son
of Publius, the Pontifex Maximus, who first codified the Civil Law
by drawing it up under different heads in eighteen books.
(42) The pupils of Mucius were very numerous,
but those of most eminent authority were Aquilius Gallus, Balbus Lucilius,
Sextus, Papirius, and Gaius Juventius; of whom Servius declared that
Gallus had the greatest authority among the people. All of them, however,
are mentioned by Servius Sulpicius, but none of their writings are
of such a kind as to be generally sought after; and, in fact, their
works are not usually found in men's hands at all, though Servius
made use of them in his own books, and on this account it is that
the memory of them still survives.
(43) Servius, while he held the first place in
arguing cases, or, at all events, held it after Marcus Tullius, is
said to have applied to Quintus Mucius for advice concerning a matter
in which a friend of his was interested, and as he had a very imperfect
comprehension of the answer given him concerning the law, questioned
Quintus a second time, and when the latter replied and he still did
not understand, he was rebuked by Quintus Mucius, who told him that
it was a disgrace for him, a patrician, a noble, and an advocate,
to be ignorant of the law which was his profession. Servius was so
affected by this reproach that he devoted his attention to the Civil
Law, and was especially instructed by those of whom We have spoken;
having been taught by Balbus Lucilius, and also having received much
information from Gallus Aquilius, who resided at Cercina; and for
this reason many of his books which are still extant were written
there. When Servius died while absent on an embassy, the Roman people
erected a statue to him in front of the Rostra, and it stands
there to-day before the Rostra of Augustus. Many volumes of
his remain, for he left nearly one hundred and eighty treatises.
(44) After him came many others, among whom nearly
all of the following wrote books, namely: Alfenus Varus, Gaius, Aulus
Ofilius, Titus Caesius, Aufidius Tucca, Aufidius Namusa, Flavius Priscus,
Gaius Ateius, Pacuvius, Labeo, Antistius, the father of Labeo Antistius,
Cinna, and Publicus Gellius. Of ten eight wrote treatises, all of
which were digested by Aufidius Namusa in a hundred and forty books.
Of these pupils Alfenus Varus and Aulus Ofilius possessed the greatest
authority; Varus became Consul, but Ofilius remained in the Equestrian
rank; the latter was very intimate with the Emperor, and left many
works on the Civil Law, which laid the foundation for the greater
part of the same, for he first wrote on the laws of the five per cent
tax, and on jurisdiction. He was also the first one to carefully systematize
the Edict of the Praetor, although before him Servius had left two
extremely short books relating to the Edict, which were addressed
to Brutus.
(45) Trebatius, a pupil of Cornelius Maximus,
also lived at the same time; and Aulus Cascelius, a pupil of Quintus
Mucius Volusius, as well, and, indeed, in honor of his teacher he
left his property to Publius Mucius, the grandson of the latter. He
was also of quaestorian rank but he declined promotion, although Augustus
offered him the consulship. Among these, Trebatius is said to have
been better informed than Cascellius, but Cascellius is claimed to
have been more eloquent than Trebatius, but Ofilius was more learned
than either. No works of Cascellius are extant, except one of "Good
Sayings", there are, however, several of Trebatius, but they
are very little used.
(46) After this came Tubero, who studied under
Ofilius. He was a patrician and abandoned arguing cases for the study
of the Civil Law, principally because he had prosecuted Quintus Ligarius
before Gaius Caesar, and failed. This is the same Quintus Ligarius
that, while he was holding the shore of Africa, refused to allow Tubero,
who was ill, to land and obtain water, for which reason he accused
him, and Cicero defended him. The oration of the latter, a very elegant
one, which is entitled "For Quintus Ligarius", is still
extant. Tubero was considered to be most learned in both public and
private law, and left a great many treatises on both subjects. He
had the affectation of writing in ancient language and therefore his
works are not popular.
(47) After him the following were of the highest
authority, namely, Ateius Capito, who followed Ofilius, and Antistius
Labeo, who studied under all of them, he was also taught by Trebatius.
Of these Ateius was Consul, but Labeo declined to accept the office
which would have made him temporary consul when it was offered to
him by Augustus; but he gave great attention to legal studies, and
divided up the entire year so that he could be at Rome for six months
with his pupils, and might be absent for the remaining six months,
and employ his time in writing books. By doing this he left four hundred
volumes, of which a great many are still in use. These two founded,
as it were, two different schools, for Ateius Capito retained the
principles which had been taught him; but Labeo, from the nature of
his genius and his reliance upon his own learning, and who had given
attention to other branches of knowledge, made many innovations.
(48) Massurius Sabinus succeeded Ateius Capito,
and Nerva, Labeo; and these still further increased the aforesaid
distinction between the schools. Nerva was also very intimate with
the Emperor. Massurius Sabinus was of Equestrian rank, and was the
first who wrote with public authority, and after this privilege was
conceded, it was also granted to him by Tiberius Caesar.
(49) And We may remark, in passing, that
prior to the reign of Augustus, the right of giving opinions publicly
was not granted by the chiefs of the State, but anyone who had confidence
in his own attainments gave answers to those who consulted him, but
they did not impress their seals upon the latter, and very frequently
wrote to the judges, or to those who had consulted them, to bear witness
to their opinions. The Divine Augustus, in order to enable the authority
of the law to have greater weight, first decreed that jurists might
answer in his name; and from that time, this began to be claimed as
a privilege. The result was that the distinguished Emperor Hadrian,
when certain men of praetorian rank asked of him leave to deliver
opinions, told them in a rescript, "that this permission was
not to be asked, but was granted as a right; and therefore if anyone
had confidence in his knowledge, he should be delighted, and he might
prepare himself for giving opinions to the people."
(50) Therefore, permission was given to Sabinus
by Tiberius Caesar to give opinions to the people. He was already
advanced in age when he attained to the Equestrian rank, and indeed
was fifty years old, nor was he a man of great pecuniary resources,
but was, for the most part, supported by his pupils.
(51) He was succeeded by Gaius Cassius Longinus,
the son of a daughter of Tubero, who was the granddaughter of Servius
Sulpicius; and for this reason he alluded to Servius Sulpicius as
his grandfather. He was Consul with Quartinus during the reign of
Tiberius, and enjoyed great authority in the State until the Emperor
banished him, and having been exiled to Sardinia by the latter, he
was recalled by Vespasian to Rome, where he died.
(52) Proculus succeeded Nerva, and there
was, at the same time, another Nerva, a son; there was also another
Longinus, belonging to the Equestrian order, who afterwards attained
to the Praetorship. The authority of Proculus was, however, greater.
The adherents of the two schools were designated respectively, Cassiani
and Proculeiani, having derived their origin from Capito and Labeo.
(53) Caelius Sabinus, who had greater influence
in the time of Vespasian, succeeded Cassius; Pegasus succeeded Proculus,
who was Prefect of the City during the reign of Vespasian; Priscus
Javolenus succeeded Caelius Sabinus; Celsus succeeded Pegasus; the
son Celsus and Priscus Neratius, both of whom were consuls, succeeded
his father; (Celsus, indeed, was Consul a second time), Aburnus Valens
succeeded Javolenus Priscus along with Tuscinaus, as well as Salvius
Julianus.
Tit. 3. Concerning
statutes, decrees of the Senate, and long established customs.
1. Papinianus, Definitions, Book I.
A statute
is a general precept; a resolution of men learned in the law; a restraint
of crimes committed either voluntarily or through ignorance; or a
general obligation of the State.
2.
Marcianus, Institutes, Book I.
The
orator Demosthenes thus defined it. "A law is something which
it is proper for all men to obey for many reasons, and principally
because every law was devised by, and is a gift of God; the decree
of learned men; the restraint of those who either voluntarily or involuntarily
are guilty of crime; it is also a common obligation of the State,
by whose rules all those who reside therein should regulate their
lives." Chrysius,
a Stoic philosopher of the greatest erudition, began a book which
he wrote as follows: "Law is the queen of all things, Divine
and human. It should also be the Governor, the leader, the ruler,
of both the good and the bad, and, in this way, be the standard of
whatever is just and unjust, as well as of those things which are
civil by Nature, prescribing what should be done, and prohibiting
what should not be done."
3.
Pomponius on Sabinus, Book XXV.
Laws,
as Theophrastus has stated, ought to be established with respect to
matters which often occur, and not with reference to such as occur
unexpectedly.
4.
Celsus, Digest, Book V.
Laws
are not established concerning matters which can only happen in a
single instance.
5.
The Same, Digest, Book XVII.
For
laws ought to be adapted to events which frequently and readily occur,
rather than to such as rarely happen.
6.
Paulus, On Plautius, Book XVII.
In
fact, what only happens once or twice, as Theophrastus says, legislators
omit.
7.
Modestinus, Rules, Book I.
The
office of the law is to command, to forbid, and to punish.
8.
Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book III.
Laws
are not established for individuals, but for general purposes.
9.
The Same, On the Edict, Book XVI.
There
is no doubt that the Senate can make law.
10.
Julianus, Digest, Book LIX.
Neither
statutes nor decrees of the Senate can be written in such a way as
to include all cases at any time which may arise; but it is sufficient
if they include such as frequently occur.
11.
The Same, Digest, Book XC.
And
therefore in those laws which are enacted in the first place, a more
certain interpretation or construction must be given by the most excellent
Emperor.
12.
The Same, Digest, Book XV.
All
matters cannot be specifically included in the laws or decrees of
the Senate; but where their sense is clear in any instance, he who
has jurisdiction of the same can apply it to others that are similar,
and in this way administer justice.
13.
Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Curule aediles, Book I.
For,
as Pedius says, whenever anything has been introduced by law there
is a good opportunity for extending it by interpretation or certain
construction to other matters, where the same principle is involved.
14.
Publius, On the Edict, Book LIV.
Where
anything contrary to the principles of the Law has been accepted,
it must not be applied to its full extent.
15.
Julianus, Digest, Book XXVII.
In
those instances where anything has been established contrary to the
principles of the law, we cannot follow this rule of law.
16.
Paulus, Sole Book on Special Law.
Special
law is that which has been introduced by the authority of those establishing
it against the tenor of a legal principle, on account of some particular
advantage.
17.
Celsus, Digest, Book XXVI.
To
know the laws is not to be familiar with their phraseology, but with
their force and effect.
18.
The Same, Digest, Book XXIX.
Laws
should be interpreted liberally, in order that their intention may
be preserved.
19.
The Same, Digest, Book XXIII.
When
the terms of the law are ambiguous, that meaning is to be accepted
which is without incongruity; especially when the intention of the
law can be ascertained therefrom.
20.
Julianus, Digest, Book LV.
The
principle of every law established by our ancestors cannot be stated.
21.
Neratius, Parchments, Book VI.
Hence
it is not necessary to seek for the reasons of those laws which have
been established; otherwise many rules which are based upon the same
and which are now accepted, will be overthrown.
22.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXV.
When
the law pardons anything which is past it forbids it for the future.
23.
Paulus, On Plautius, Book IV.
Matters
which have always had a certain interpretation should, under no circumstances,
be changed.
24.
Celsus, Digest, Book IX.
It
is not proper without taking into consideration an entire law either
to decide, or give an opinion upon any particular portion of the same.
25.
Modestinus, Opinions, Book VIII.
No
principle of law or indulgent construction of equity permits matters
which have been introduced for the welfare of mankind to be interpreted
so rigorously as to be productive of hardship to them.
26.
Paulus, Questions, Book IV.
There
is nothing new in the interpretation of recent laws by former ones.
27.
Tertullianus, Questions, Book I.
Therefore,
for the reason that it is the custom to interpret recent laws by former
ones, it ought always to be understood that the principles of the
laws are applicable to such persons or things as may at any time be
of a similar character.
28.
Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book V.
Recent
laws are applicable to former ones unless they are opposed to them;
and this may be established by many reasons.
29.
The Same, On the Lex Cincia.
To
do what the law prohibits violates the law, and anyone who evades
the meaning of the law without disobeying its words, is guilty of
fraud against it.
30.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book IV.
Fraud
is committed against the law when something is done which the law
did not wish to be done, but did not absolutely prohibit; and the
difference between fraud against the law and violation of the same
is that between speech and opinion.
31.
The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia.
The
Emperor is free from the operation of the law, and though the Empress
is undoubtedly subject to it, still, the Emperors generally confer
upon her the same privileges which they themselves enjoy.
32.
Julianus, Digest, Book XCIV.
In
cases where there are no written laws, that should be observed which
has been established by usage and custom, and if anything is lacking
therein, then whatever is nearest to, and resulting from it should
be observed; and if even this does not exist, then the law which is
used by the City of Rome must be followed.
(1)
An ancient custom is not improperly observed as a law (and this is
what is called law established by usage). For as the laws themselves
restrain us for no other reason than because they are accepted by
the judgment of the people — for it is but proper that what the people
have approved without being written should bind all persons — for
what difference does it make whether the people have manifested their
will by vote, or by acts and deeds? Wherefore the rule has also been
most justly adopted that laws shall be abrogated not only by the vote
of the legislator, but also through disuse by the silent consent of
all.
33.
Ulpianus, Concerning the Office of Proconsul, Book I.
It
is usual for long established custom to be observed as law in those
matters which have not come down in writing.
34.
The Same, Book IV.
When
anyone seems to be confident concerning the custom of a city or province,
I think it should first be determined whether that custom has been
confirmed by a judicial decree after it had been disputed.
35.
Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book I.
Those
rules which have been approved by long established custom and have
been observed for many years, by, as it were, a tacit agreement of
citizens, are no less to be obeyed than laws which have been committed
to writing.
36.
Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VII.
And
indeed, a law of this kind has greater authority, for the reason that
it has been approved to such an extent that it is not necessary to
commit it to writing.
37.
Callistratus, Questions, Book I.
When
inquiry is made as to the interpretation of a law, it must in the
first place be ascertained what rule the State formerly made use of
in cases of the same kind; for custom is the best interpreter of the
laws.
38.
The Same, Questions, Book I.
For
our Emperor Severus stated in a Rescript that in questions of doubt
arising from statutory enactments, custom, or the authority of decisions
which have always been decided in the same manner, should obtain the
force of law.
39.
Celsus, Digest, Book XXIII.
That
which has in the first place been introduced, not by any rule but
through error, and has afterwards been confirmed by custom, shall
not prevail in other similar cases.
40.
Modestinus, Rules, Book I.
Thus
all law has been either made by consent, or established by necessity,
or confirmed by custom.
41.
Ulpianus, Institutes, Book II.
Hence
all law consists either in the acquisition, preservation, or diminution
of right; for it has reference to the way in which anything becomes
the property of a person, or how he can preserve it or his rights,
or how he can alienate or lose them.
Tit. 4. Concerning
the constitutions of the Emperors.
1. Ulpianus, Institutes, Book I.
Whatever
the Emperor has decreed has the force of law; since by a Royal ordinance
which was passed concerning his sovereignty, the people conferred
upon him all their own authority and power.
(1)
Therefore, everything which the Emperor decrees by a letter over his
signature, whether he decided after examining it or did so without
judicial consideration or ordered it by means of an edict, has the
force of law; and these are what we generally designate constitutions.
(2)
Among the latter there are some which are special, and are not to
be employed as precedents; for whatever the Emperor has granted to
anyone as a reward of merit, or where he inflicts a penalty, or relieves
a person in an unusual way, this does not extend beyond the party
in question.
2.
Ulpianus, Trusts, Book IV.
In
the enactment of new laws evidence of benefit should manifestly appear
to justify departure from a law which has been considered just for
a long period of time.
3.
Javolenus, Epistles, Book XIII.
We
should interpret as liberally as possible any favor of the Emperor
which in fact proceeds from his Divine indulgence.
4.
Modestinus, Excuses, Book II.
Recent
constitutions have greater authority than those which have preceded
them.
Tit. 5. Concerning
the condition of men.
1. Gaius, Institutes, Book I.
All
the law which We make use of relates either to persons, things, or
actions.
2.
Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book I.
Therefore,
since all law has been established on account of mankind, we shall
first speak of the condition of persons, and afterwards of other matters,
following the order of the Perpetual Edict, and adding to them the
titles as arranged and connected with them, as far as the matter permits.
3.
Gaius, Institutes, Book I.
The
principal division of the law of persons is as follows, namely, that
all men are either free or slaves.
4.
Florentinus, Institutes, Book IX.
Liberty
is the natural power of doing whatever anyone wishes to do unless
he is prevented in some way, by force or by law.
(1)
Slavery is an institution of the Law of Nations by means of which
anyone may subject one man to the control of another, contrary to
nature.
(2)
Slaves are so called for the reason that military commanders were
accustomed to sell their captives, and in this manner to preserve
them, instead of putting them to death.
(3)
They are styled mancipia, because they are taken by the hands
of their enemies.
5.
Marcianus, Institutes, Book I.
One
condition is common to all slaves; but of persons who are free some
are born such, and others are manumitted.
(1)
Slaves are brought under our ownership either by the Civil Law or
by that of Nations. This is done by the Civil Law where anyone who
is over twenty years of age permits himself to be sold for the sake
of sharing in his own price. Slaves become our property by the Law
of Nations when they are either taken from the enemy, or are born
of our female slaves.
(2)
Persons are born free who are born from a free mother, and it is sufficient
for her to have been free at the time when her child was born, even
though she may have been a slave when she conceived; and, on the other
hand, if she was free when she conceived, and was a slave when she
brought forth, it has been established that her child is born free,
nor does it make any difference whether she conceived in a lawful
marriage or through promiscuous intercourse; because the misfortune
of the mother should not be a source of injury to her unborn child.
(3)
Hence the following question arose, where a female slave who was pregnant,
has been manumitted, and is afterwards again made a slave, or, after
having been expelled from the city, should bring forth a child, whether
that child should be free or a slave? It was very properly established
that it was born free; and that it is sufficient for a child who is
unborn that its mother should have been free during the intermediate
time.
6.
Gaius, Institutes, Book I.
Freedmen
are those who are manumitted from lawful slavery.
7.
Paulus, On the Shares Granted to the Children of Condemned Persons.
A child
in its mother's womb is cared for just as if it were in existence,
whenever its own advantage is concerned; although it cannot be of
any benefit to anyone else before it is born.
8.
Papinianus, Questions, Book III.
The
Emperor Titius Antoninus stated in a Rescript that the status of children
could not be prejudiced on account of the tenor of an improperly drawn
instrument.
9.
The Same, Questions, Book XXXI.
In
many parts of our law the condition of women is worse than that of
men.
10.
Ulpianus, on Sabinus, Book I.
The
question has been raised to which sex shall we assign an hermaphrodite?
And I am of the opinion that its sex should be determined from that
which predominates in it.
11.
Paulus, Opinions, Book XVIII.
Paulus
was of the opinion that a child who was conceived during the life
of its grandfather, while the latter was ignorant of the connexion
of his daughter, even though it was born after the death of its grandfather,
was not the lawful son of him by whom it was begotten.
12.
The Same, Opinions, Book XIX.
It
is now generally held upon the authority of that most learned man
Hippocrates, that a child perfectly formed may be born in the seventh
month; and therefore it is established that a child who is born in
lawful marriage after seven months is legitimate.
13.
Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book I.
A slave
abandoned by his master to fortune in the trial of a capital case
does not become free even if he should be acquitted.
14.
Paulus, Sentences, Book IV.
Those
beings are not children who are born formed in some way which is contrary
to the likeness of the human race; as, for instance, where a woman
brings forth something monstrous or unnatural. A child, however, which
has more than the ordinary number of human limbs seems to be, to some
extent, completely formed, and therefore may be included among children.
15.
Tryphoninus, Controversies, Book X.
A slave
named Arescusa was declared to be free by will if she brought forth
three children; and at her first delivery she had one child, and at
her second she had three. The question then arose as to which of the
said children were free? The condition on which her freedom pended
had to be fulfilled by the woman, and there was no doubt that the
last child was born free; for nature does not permit two children
to come forth from their mother's womb at the same time, by one movement,
so that the order of birth being uncertain, it does not appear which
one was born in slavery, and which was born free. Therefore, the condition
having been fulfilled at the time the birth began, namely that the
child should be born of a free woman, it is the one born last, just
as if any other condition imposed on the freedom of the woman had
been fulfilled at the moment of her delivery; for example, that she
should be manumitted on condition that she gave ten thousand sesterces
to the heir, or to Titius; and at the instant when she was delivered
she fulfilled the condition through the agency of someone else; it
would necessarily be held that she was already a free woman when she
brought forth the child.
16.
Ulpianus, Controversies, Book VI.
The
same thing should take place if Arescusa had first brought forth two
children, and afterwards brought forth twins; for it must be held
that both the latter are not born free, but only the one who was born
last. The question, however, is rather one of fact than of law.
17.
The Same, On the Edict, Book XXII.
According
to a Constitution of the Emperor Antoninus, all those who were living
in the Roman world were made Roman citizens.
18.
The Same, on Sabinus, Book XXVII.
The
Emperor Hadrian set forth in a Rescript addressed to Publicius Marcellus,
that if a free woman after having been condemned to death while pregnant
brought forth a child it would be free; and that it was customary
to hold her until she was delivered. Also, where a woman who has conceived
in lawful marriage is interdicted from fire and water, the child she
brings forth is a Roman citizen, and remains under the control of
its father.
19.
Celsus, Digest, Book XXIX.
When
children are born in lawful marriage they follow the condition of
the father, but one that is conceived in promiscuous intercourse follows
the condition of the mother.
20.
Ulpianus, on Sabinus, Book XXXVIII.
Anyone
who becomes insane is considered to retain the position and rank he
previously held, and also his magistracy and authority; just as he
retains the ownership of his property.
21.
Modestinus, Rules, Book VII.
Where
a freeman sells himself and is afterwards manumitted, he does not
recover his former condition of which he deprived himself, but belongs
to the class of freedmen.
22.
The Same, Opinions, Book XII.
Herennius
Modestinus held that if a female slave brought forth a child at the
time when, according to the terms of the donation which disposed of
her, she should be manumitted; since she was free by the Imperial
Constitution, the child born of her is freeborn.
23.
The Same, Pandects, Book I.
The
term "conceived in promiscuous intercourse" is applicable
to those who cannot show who their father is, or if they can do so,
he is not their lawful father, and these are called spurious, from
spora.
24.
Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVII.
The
law of nature is that a child born out of lawful matrimony follows
the mother, unless a special law provides otherwise.
25.
The Same, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I.
We
should consider him to be freeborn who has been legally declared such,
even though he is in fact a freedman; for the reason that whatever
is judicially determined is accepted as truth.
26.
Julianus, Digest, Book LXIX.
Those
who are unborn are, by almost every provision of the Civil Law, understood
to be already in existence; for estates legally descend to them, and
if a pregnant woman is taken by the enemy, her child has the right
of postliminium, and it also follows the condition of the father,
or mother. Moreover, if a pregnant female slave is stolen, even after
she may have brought forth in the hands of a purchaser in good faith,
her child being stolen property is not acquired by use. The result
of this is that a manumitted slave, also, as long as a son can be
born to his patron is considered to hold the same position under the
law as those who have patrons living.
27.
Ulpianus, Opinions, Book V.
Where
a man admits that he is a freedman, his patron cannot make him freeborn
even by adopting him.
Tit. 6. Concerning
those who are their own masters, and those that are under the control
of others.
1. Gaius, Institutes, Book I.
Another
division of persons follows according to law, some of whom are their
own masters, and some are subject to the control of others. We shall
now consider those who are subject to the control of others; for if
we know who these persons are, we shall at once understand who those
are that are their own masters. Let us then examine those who are
under the control of others.
(1)
Thus, slaves are under the power of their masters, and this power
is derived from the Law of Nations, for we may perceive that among
nearly all nations masters have the power of life and death over their
slaves, and whatever is acquired by a slave is acquired by his master.
(2)
But, at present, it is not permitted to any persons living under Roman
dominion to be guilty of cruelty to their slaves which is atrocious,
or without a cause recognized by the law. For, according to a Constitution
of the Divine Antoninus, anyone who kills his slave without a cause
shall be punished as severely as one who kills the slave of another;
the inordinate severity of masters is also repressed by a Constitution
of the same Emperor.
2.
Ulpianus, Concerning the Office of Proconsul, Book VIII.
Where
a master is cruel to his slaves and forces them to licentiousness
or to disgraceful violation, the course to be taken by the presiding
judge is disclosed by a Rescript of the Divine Pius addressed to Julius
Marcianus, Proconsul of Baetica. These are the terms of the Rescript:
"It is proper that the power of masters over their slaves should
remain unimpaired, and that no man should be deprived of his right;
but it is to the interest of the masters themselves that relief from
cruelty, hunger, or intolerable injury, should not be denied to those
who justly implore it. Therefore, take cognizance of the complaints
of those slaves of Julius Sabinus who fled for refuge to the Imperial
statue; and if you find that they have been treated with greater severity
than was proper, or subjected to disgraceful outrage, order them to
be sold, under such conditions that they may not be restored to the
power of their master; and if he violates this My Constitutions, let
him know that he will be more severely punished". The Divine
Hadrian also, banished for five years a certain matron named Umbricia,
because she had treated her female slaves with atrocious cruelty for
very trivial reasons.
3.
Gaius, Institutes, Book I.
Our
children also who are born in lawful marriage are under our control;
which is a law peculiar to Roman citizens.
4.
Ulpianus, Institutes, Book I.
Certain
Roman citizens are fathers of families, others are sons of families,
some are mothers of families, others again are daughters of families.
Those are fathers of families who are their own masters, whether they
have arrived at puberty or not; in the same manner those who are under
the control of others are either the mothers of families, or the sons
or daughters of families. For any child who is born of me and my wife
is under my control; also a child born of my son and his wife, that
is to say my grandson and granddaughter, are also under my control,
as well as my great-grandson and great-granddaughter, and so on with
reference to other descendants.
5.
The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXXVI.
Grandsons,
after the death of their paternal grandfather, usually come under
the control of his son, that is, of their own father. In like manner,
great-grandchildren and other descendants also come under the control
of a son, if he is living, and remains in the family; or under that
of an ascendant who precedes them in authority. This is also the law
not only concerning natural children but also with reference to those
who have been adopted.
6.
The Same, On Sabinus, Book IX.
We
define a son to be a male child born of a man and his wife. But if
we suppose the husband was absent, for example for the term of ten
years, and on his return finds a child a year old in his house, our
opinion coincides with that of Julianus, that this is not the son
of the husband. Nevertheless, Julianus says, it ought not to be tolerated
that a man, who has lived constantly with his wife, should refuse
to acknowledge his son as not being his own. It appears to me, however,
(and this Scaevola also holds), that if it should appear that a husband
had not cohabited with his wife for some time, because of disease,
or for some other reason, or if he was in such a condition of ill
health that he could not procreate, a child born in his house, although
this was known to the neighbors, is not his son.
7.
The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXV.
Where
a father has been condemned to punishment by which he cither loses
his citizenship, or is subjected to penal servitude, there is no doubt
that his grandson takes the place of his son.
8.
The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXVI.
Where
a father is insane, his child, nevertheless, remains under his control.
The case is the same with all ascendants who have children subject
to their authority, for the right of paternal control having been
established by custom, no one can cease to have persons under it except
where children are released from the same as they are under certain
circumstances, and there is no question whatever that they still remain
subject to his authority. For this reason a father not only, retains
under his control those children whom he begat before he became insane,
but also any who were conceived before his insanity developed, and
were born while it existed. Moreover, if his wife conceives while
he is insane, it must be considered whether the child is born under
his control or not; for although an insane person cannot marry, he
can still retain his matrimonial condition; and since this is the
case he will have his son under his control. In like manner, if his
wife becomes insane, a child conceived by her previous to her insanity
is born under his control; but if it is conceived while she was insane
and her husband was not, it undoubtedly is born under his control,
for the reason that the marriage still exists. But if both husband
and wife are insane, and she then conceives, the child is born under
the control of its father; for it is presumed that insane persons
still have some will remaining; and, as the marriage relation continues
while one or the other is insane, it also does so when both are in
that condition.
(1)
Moreover, an insane father retains his paternal authority to such
an extent that everything acquired by his son belongs to him.
9.
Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book XVI.
In
all matters relating to the public interest the son of a family takes
the place of the father of a family; for instance, where he discharges
the duty of a magistrate, or is appointed a guardian.
10.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV.
Where
a judge decides that a child is to be brought up or supported, it
should be held that it must be certainly ascertained whether it is
his son or not; a ruling as to support cannot prejudice the truth.
11.
Modestinus, Pandects, Book I.
Illegitimate
or emancipated children cannot be brought under paternal authority
against their consent.
Tit. 7. Concerning
adoptions and emancipations, and other methods by which paternal authority
is dissolved.
1. Modestinus, Rules, Book II.
Sons
of families are not only created by nature but also by adoption.
(1)
The term "adoption" is one of general signification, and
includes two kinds; one of which is likewise styled adoption, the
other arrogation. The sons of families are adopted; those who are
their own masters are arrogated.
2.
Gaius, Institutes, Book I.
Adoption,
generally speaking, takes place in two ways, either by the authority
of the Emperor, or by the order of a magistrate. We adopt those by
the authority of the Emperor who are their own masters; and this kind
of adoption is called arrogation, because he who adopts is asked,
that is, interrogated, whether he is willing that the party whom he
is about to adopt shall be his lawful son; and he who is adopted is
asked whether he suffers this to be done, We adopt by the order of
a magistrate those who are under paternal control, whether they are
in the first degree of children, such as son and daughter, or in one
that is more remote, as grandson and granddaughter, and great-grandson
and great-granddaughter.
(1)
There is one thing common to both kinds of adoption, namely, that
those who are incapable of procreation, as for instance, eunuchs,
can adopt.
(2)
Adoption effected through the Emperor is peculiar in that if anyone
who has children under his control gives himself in arrogation, he
himself is not only subjected to the authority of his adoptive father,
but also his children and grandchildren pass under the control of
the former.
3.
Paulus, On Sabinus, Book IV.
Where
the son of a family becomes a consul, or governor, he can be emancipated,
or given in adoption before himself.
4.
Modestinus, Rules, Book II.
It
is the opinion of Neratius that a magistrate before whom a legal action
can be brought can emancipate his own children, or give them in adoption
before himself.
5.
Celsus, Digest, Book XXVIII.
In
adoption, the will of only those parties who are their own masters
shall be consulted; but where children are given in adoption by their
fathers, the will of both must be taken into consideration, either
consent being given, or no opposition being offered.
6.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXV.
When
a person is adopted as grandson just as if he were born to a son,
the consent of the son is required; and this opinion Julianus also
rendered.
7.
Celsus, Digest, Book XXXIX.
When
an adoption is made, the consent of those who will be connected by
agnation is not necessary for that purpose.
8.
Modestinus, Rules, Book II.
It
was formerly held that the authority of a curator could not be interposed
in a case of arrogation; but this has been very properly changed by
the Divine Claudius.
9.
Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book I.
Even
a blind man can adopt, and be adopted.
10.
Paulus, On Sabinus, Book II.
When
anyone adopts a grandson as if he were born to his own son over whom
he has control, with the consent of the latter, he does not become
a proper heir of his grandfather; as, after the death of the grandfather
he comes, as it were, under the control of his father.
11.
The Same, On Sabinus, Book IV.
If
anyone who has a son adopts a person as a grandson, just as if he
was the son of his son, and the latter does not consent; if the grandfather
should die, the adopted grandson does not come under the control of
the son.
12.
Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XIV.
He
who is released from paternal authority cannot afterwards be honorably
subjected to it again, except by adoption.
13.
Papinianus, Questions, Book XXXVI.
By
almost every principle of law, when the power of an adoptive father
has once been ended, no vestige of it afterwards remains; and even
the paternal dignity obtained by adoption is lost when the relationship
is terminated.
14.
Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book V.
A grandson
conceived and born under the control of his adoptive grandfather also
loses all his rights by emancipation.
15.
Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVI.
When
the father of a family is adopted, all the property which belongs
to him and all that can be acquired is, by silent operation of law,
transferred to his adoptive father; and, moreover, his children who
are under his control follow him, as well as those who may return
from captivity under the law of postliminium, and those who
were unborn when he was arrogated are in like manner brought under
the control of the arrogator.
(1)
Where a man has two sons, and a grandson by one of them, and desires
to adopt the grandson as born of the other son, he can do so if he
emancipates him and adopts him as if he were born to the other son,
for he does this as if he were a stranger, and not his grandfather;
and for whatever reason he can adopt anyone born of a stranger he
can adopt him as it were born of another son.
(2)
In arrogation it must be ascertained whether the arrogator is under
sixty years of age, because if he is, he should rather devote himself
to the procreation of children; unless, indeed, disease or weakness
of any kind, or any other just cause for arrogation exists, as, for
instance, if he desires to adopt some person related to himself.
(3)
Again, no one should arrogate several children, unless for a good
reason. Nor should he adopt the freedman of another, nor anyone older
than himself.
16.
Javolenus, On Cassius, Book VI.
For
adoption can only take place with persons between whom the natural
relation of father and son might exist.
17.
Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVI.
Anyone
who administers the office of guardian, or has the curatorship of
another, is not permitted to arrogate him, so long as the minor is
less than twenty-five years of age, for fear that he may have arrogated
him to avoid rendering an account. Inquiry must also be made as to
whether the reason for the arrogation is not an infamous one.
(1)
Arrogation of wards is only permitted to those who, induced by natural
relationship or great affection adopt them; and it is prohibited to
others lest it may be placed in the power of guardians to terminate
their trust, and invalidate the substitution made by the parent.
(2)
It is necessary, in the first place, to learn the amount of property
belonging to the ward, as well as that of the party who desires to
adopt him; so that, by comparing the two, an opinion may be formed
as to whether an adoption would be advantageous to the ward. Then
the mode of life of the party, who desires to bring the ward into
his family should be investigated; and third, his age must be considered,
so that it may be determined whether he had not better pay attention
to the procreation of children, than to bring under his control some
one belonging to another family.
(3)
Moreover, it should be taken into consideration, whether he who already
has one or more children ought to be permitted to adopt another, in
order that the expectations of those begotten in lawful marriage may
not be diminished, which expectations every child prepares for itself
by respectful behavior; or whether the ward thus adopted would obtain
less than he was worthy of.
(4)
Sometimes the adoption of a child who is more wealthy by a person
who is poor is permitted; if the latter is of a thoroughly temperate
life, or his affection is honorable and publicly known.
(5)
It is, however, customary to give security in cases of this kind.
18.
Marcellus, Digest, Book XXVI.
For
when a man desires to arrogate a ward, if he shows a good reason for
doing so in other respects, he can only be heard if he gives a bond
to a public slave binding himself, "that he will restore any
of the property of his ward that may come into his possession to those
persons who would have been entitled to said property, if the arrogated
party had remained in his former condition".
19.
Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVI.
By
these words of the bond which must be furnished by the arrogating
party, "to those entitled to said property", there is no
doubt that it was intended to include any manumissions made by a second
will; and especially where a slave was substituted as heir, and also
to protect the interests of legatees.
(1)
If this bond is not given, an equitable action will lie against the
arrogator.
20.
Marcellus, Digest, Book XXVI.
This
bond becomes operative where the ward dies before reaching the age
of puberty.
(1)
Although the ward is mentioned as a male, the same proceeding must
be taken with reference to a female ward.
21.
Gaius, Rules.
For
women may be arrogated by an Imperial Rescript.
22.
Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVI.
Where
an arrogator dies leaving an adopted son who is under age, and he
dies afterwards before reaching puberty, will the heirs of the arrogator
be liable? It must be held that the heirs also are bound to deliver
up the property of the party arrogated, and the fourth part of the
estate besides.
(1)
The question arises whether the arrogator can substitute another heir
to the adopted minor son? I think that the substitution cannot be
admitted, unless merely with reference to the fourth part of the estate
of his adoptive father to which he is entitled; and that it only extends
to the time of puberty. But if he should leave his property in trust
to be delivered at a certain time, a trust of this kind should not
be admitted; for this share does not vest in him by the will of his
father but by an Imperial provision.
(2)
All these rules are applicable whether anyone has arrogated a boy
under puberty as a son, or as a grandson.
23.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXV.
When
anyone is given in adoption he becomes cognate to all those to whom
he becomes agnate, and does not become cognate to those to whom he
does not become agnate, for adoption does not impart the right of
blood but the right of agnation; and therefore if I adopt a son my
wife does not occupy the place of a mother to him, nor is she related
to him by agnation, because she is not his cognate. Again, my mother
does not occupy the place of grandmother to him, since he does not
become connected by agnation with those who are outside of my own
family; but he whom I have adopted becomes the brother of my daughter,
since my daughter is a member of my family, and marriage between them
is prohibited.
24.
Ulpianus, Controversies, Book I.
Anyone
who is absent, or who does not give his consent cannot be arrogated.
25.
The Same, Opinions, Book V.
After
the death of his daughter who had been living as her own mistress
on the ground of having been lawfully emancipated, and who died after
appointing heirs by her will, the father is forbidden to institute
proceedings against his own act, claiming that the emancipation was
not made legally, or in the presence of witnesses.
(1)
A party who is absent can neither adopt, nor arrogate, nor carry out
by the agency of another any of the formalities which are requisite
in such cases.
26.
Julianus, Digest, Book LXX.
Anyone
whom my emancipated son adopts is not my grandson.
27.
The Same, Digest, Book LXXXV.
The
child of an adopted son is considered by the Civil Law to occupy the
same place as if he himself were adopted.
28.
Gaius, Institutes, Book I.
He
who has a son and a grandson under his control is at perfect liberty
to release his son from his authority, and to retain it over his grandson;
or, on the other hand, to retain his son under his control and to
manumit his grandson; or to make both of them their own masters. We
hold that the same rule applies to a great-grandson.
29.
Callistratus, Institutes, Book II.
Where
the natural father does not possess the power of speech, but can indicate
in some other way than verbally his desire to give his son in adoption,
that adoption shall be confirmed; just as if it had taken place under
the forms prescribed by law.
30.
Paulus, Rules, Book I.
Those
who have no wives can adopt children.
31.
Marcianus, Rules, Book V.
A son,
whether he is natural or adopted, who is under the control of his
father, cannot in any way compel him to release him from it.
32.
Papinianus, Questions, Book XXXI.
However,
a boy who is under puberty and has been adopted, should sometimes
be heard if, having arrived at puberty, he desires to be emancipated;
and this must be determined by the judge after the case has been stated.
(1)
The Emperor Titius Antoninus decided in a Rescript that it was permissible
for a man to adopt his stepson of whom he was guardian.
33.
Marcianus, Rules, Book V.
And
where the adopted son, having arrived at puberty, proves that it is
not advantageous to himself to be brought under the paternal control
of the other, it is just that he should be emancipated by his adoptive
father, and in this way be reinstated in his former condition.
34.
Paulus, Questions, Book XI.
The
question arose where a son is given to you in adoption, for instance
under this condition that, "after three years, you will give
the same person to me in adoption"; whether any action will lie
against you. Labeo thinks that there is no cause of action, for it
is not in accordance with our customs for anyone to have a son temporarily.
35.
The Same, Opinions, Book I.
The
rank of a person is not diminished by adoption, but is in fact increased;
therefore a Senator, if adopted by a plebeian, remains a Senator;
and, in like manner, a son of the Senator still remains such.
36.
The Same; Opinions, Book XVIII.
It
is settled that a son can be emancipated anywhere in order to be released
from paternal authority.
(1)
It has been decided that manumission and adoption can be performed
before a Proconsul, even in a province which has not been assigned
to him.
37.
The Same, Sentences, Book II.
Anyone
can adopt another as his grandson, even though he has no son.
(1)
No one can a second time adopt a person whom he has once adopted and
emancipated.
38.
Marcellus, Digest, Book XXVI.
An
adoption not legally made may be confirmed by the Emperor.
39.
Ulpianus, On the Office of Consul, Book III.
The
Divine Marcus stated in a Rescript to Eutychianus that, "The
judges will determine whether you can obtain what you desire, after
those who may object have been produced before them, that is to say,
those who might be injured by the confirmation of the adoption".
40.
Modestinus, Differences, Book I.
By
the arrogation of the father of a family the children who are under
his control become the grandchildren of the arrogator, and at the
same time with their father are placed under his authority, which
does not also take place in case of adoption; for then the grandchildren
remain under the control of their natural grandfather.
(1)
He who adopts, and also he who arrogates, must not only be older than
the person whom he makes his son either through arrogation or adoption,
but he must be so by the term of complete puberty, that is to say,
he must be further advanced in age by eighteen years.
(2)
A person who is impotent can obtain a proper heir for himself by arrogation,
nor is his corporeal weakness an obstacle to his doing so.
41.
The Same, Rules, Book II.
When
a father emancipates his son by whom he has a grandson under his control
and afterwards adopts his son and dies, the grandson does not again
come under the authority of his father. Nor does the grandson come
under the control of his father if his grandfather retained him in
his power when he gave his son in adoption, and readopted him afterwards.
42.
The Same, Pandects, Book I.
We
can even give an infant in adoption.
43.
Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book XX.
Adoption
of sons as well as grandsons can take place so that anyone may seem
to be our grandson as through a son, although his birth may be uncertain.
44.
Proculus, Epistles, Book VIII.
Where
anyone who has a grandson by a son adopts another in the place of
his grandson, I do not think that when the grandfather dies any bond
of consanguinity will exist between the grandsons. But if he adopted
him in such a way that he should be his grandson by legal right, for
instance, as if he had been the son of Lucius his own son and the
lawful wife of the latter, I am of the contrary opinion.
45.
Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book III.
The
liabilities of him who was given in adoption are transferred to the
adoptive father.
46.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV.
A son
begotten by me while in slavery can be brought under my authority
by the indulgence of the Emperor; still, there is no question that
such a son remains in the class of freedmen.
Tit. 8. Concerning
the division and nature of things.
1. Gaius, Institutes, Book II.
The
principal division of Things is under two heads: for some of them
belong to Divine and some to human law. Those which come under Divine
law are, for instance, sacred and religious things. Sacred things
are, for example, walls and gates, which, to a certain extent, are
under Divine law. For what is subject to Divine law is not the property
of anyone, and that indeed which belongs to human law is, for the
most part, the property of someone, nevertheless, it may belong to
none, for things belonging to an estate until an heir appears, are
not the property of anyone. Again, those things that are under human
law are either public or private. Those which are public are held
to be the property of no one, and are considered to belong to the
entire community, and those which are private belong to individuals.
(1)
Moreover, some things are corporeal, and some are incorporeal. Those
are corporeal which are tangible, as for instance land, slaves, clothing,
gold, silver, as well as innumerable other articles. Those are incorporeal
which cannot be touched as an usufruct, and obligations, in whatever
way contracted. It does not matter if corporeal things are included
in an estate, for the crops taken from land are corporeal, and whatever
is owing to us through the obligation of another, is for the most
part corporeal, as land, slaves, money; still, the right of succession,
the right of use and enjoyment, and the right based upon an obligation
are all incorporeal. To the same class belong all the rights of urban
and rustic estates, which are designated as servitudes.
2.
Marcianus, Institutes, Book III.
Certain
things are common to all by natural law; some belong to the entire
community, some to no one, and the greater number to individuals;
these are acquired in various ways respectively.
(1)
Again, all the following things are common by natural law, namely
the air, running water, the sea, and hence the shores of the sea.
3.
Florentinus, Institutes, Book VI.
Likewise,
precious stones, gems, and other things which we find upon the seashore
also at once become ours by natural law.
4.
Marcianus, Institutes, Book III.
Consequently
no one can be forbidden to approach the shore of the sea in order
to fish; still, they must avoid interfering with houses, buildings,
and monuments, because they are not subject to the Law of Nations,
as the sea is; and this the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript addressed
to the fisherman of Formiae and Capena.
(1)
Almost all rivers and harbors are also public.
5.
Gaius, Legal Doctrines of Daily Application and Utility. Book II.
The
public use of the banks of rivers is subject to the Law of Nations,
just as the rivers themselves are. Therefore, everyone is free to
conduct a boat to the bank; to attach ropes to trees growing there;
to dry nets, and draw them up from the sea; and to deposit any cargo
thereon; just as he can navigate the river itself. The ownership of
the banks, however, is vested in those to whose lands they are contiguous;
for which reason the trees growing upon them also belong to the latter.
(1)
Those who fish in the sea have a right to erect a hut upon the shore
in which to shelter themselves.
6.
Marcianus, Institutes, Book III.
This
right exists to such an extent that those who build there actually
become the owners of the land, but only as long as the building stands;
otherwise, if it falls down, the place reverts to its former condition
by the law of postliminium, so to speak, and if another party
builds a house in the same place, the soil becomes his.
(1)
There are some things which, by natural law, belong to the entire
community and not to individuals; as, for instance, theatres, racecourses,
and other things of this kind, or anything else which is the common
property of a city. Therefore, a slave belonging to a city is not
understood to be the property of any individual in particular, but
of the entire community; and for this reason the Divine Brothers stated
in a Rescript that a slave belonging to a city could be put to torture
either against a citizen or in his behalf. In consequence of this,
also the freedman of a city is not compelled to ask permission under
the Edict, if he brings any citizen into court.
(2)
Things which are sacred, religious, and holy are not the property
of anyone.
(3)
Sacred things are those which are publicly and not privately consecrated;
and hence if anyone should make anything sacred for himself privately,
it is not sacred but profane; where, however, a temple has once been
made sacred the place still remains so, even after the edifice has
been demolished.
(4)
Anyone by his will can render a place religious by burying a corpse
on his own premises; and where a burial-place belongs to several persons,
one of the owners can inter a body there, even though the others may
be unwilling. An interment can also be made upon the land of another,
if the owner consents; and even where he ratifies it afterwards the
place where the corpse was buried becomes religious.
(5)
Again, the better opinion is that an empty tomb is a religious place,
as is stated in Virgil.
7.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXV.
Nevertheless,
the Divine Brothers published a Rescript to the contrary.
8.
Marcianus, Rules, Book IV.
A holy
place is one which is defended and protected from the injuries of
men.
(1)
The word "sacred" is said to have been derived from the
word sagmina, certain plants which were usually carried by
the ambassadors of the Roman people to prevent their persons from
being violated; just as the Greek Ambassadors carried those which
are called khrukia.
(2)
Cassius states that Sabinus very properly gave the opinion that the
walls of a city were holy, and that it was necessary for persons to
be prohibited from placing anything against them.
9.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII.
Sacred
places are those which are dedicated to the public, either in the
city or in the country.
(1)
It should be understood that a public place can only become sacred
when the Emperor has dedicated it, or granted permission for this
to be done.
(2)
It must be remarked that a sacred place is one thing and a sacrarium
is another; for a sacred place is one which has been consecrated,
and a sacrarium is one in which sacred things are deposited,
which also may exist in a private house; and when persons desire to
divest such a place of its religious character they usually withdraw
the sacred things therefrom.
(3)
We properly call those things holy which are neither sacred nor profane,
but which have been confirmed by some sanction, hence the laws are
holy, for the reason that they are based upon a certain sanction;
and anything that is supported by a certain sanction also is holy,
even though it may not be consecrated to God; and it is even sometimes
added in the sanction itself that anyone who is guilty of an offence
in that place shall be punished with death.
(4)
Moreover, it is not permitted to repair the walls of cities, or to
add anything to them, or place anything upon them, without the authority
of the Emperor or the Governor.
(5)
Anything that is sacred is not susceptible of appraisement.
10.
Pomponius, On Plautius, Book VI.
Aristo
declares that just as anything built into the sea becomes private
property, so whatever the sea encroaches upon becomes public property.
11.
Pomponius, From Various Passages, Book II.
Where
anyone trespasses upon the walls, he is punished with death; just
as where anyone climbs over them by means of ladders, or in any other
manner; since Roman citizens are not permitted to leave a city except
by the gates; as the former is an act of hostility and abominable.
It is said that Remus, the brother of Romulus, was killed because
he wished to scale the wall.
Tit. 9. Concerning
Senators.
1. Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXII.
No
one doubts that a man of consular rank should always take precedence
of a woman of consular rank, but it is a matter for consideration
whether a man of praefectorian rank takes precedence of a woman of
consular rank. I think that he does take precedence of her, because
greater dignity attaches to the male sex.
(1)
We call the wives of consuls women of consular rank, and Saturninus
extends this quality to their mothers, but this is not stated anywhere
else and it is nowhere admitted.
2.
Marcellus, Digest, Book III.
Cassius
Longinus is of the opinion that when a man has been expelled from
the Senate for infamous behaviour, and has not been reinstated, he
should not be permitted to preside in court, or testify as a witness;
for the reason that the Lex Julia forbids this to be done in
cases of extortion.
3.
Modestinus, Rules, Book VI.
A Senator
who has been expelled from the Senate does not lose his citizenship;
and the Divine Severus and Antoninus even permitted him to live at
Rome.
4.
Pomponius, From Various Passages, Book XII.
Whoever
is unworthy of a lower rank is still more unworthy of a higher one.
5.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I.
We
should understand by the terms "the son of a Senator", not
only a natural son but also an adopted one, and it does not matter
by whom or in what way he has been adopted. Nor does it make any difference
whether he was already invested with Senatorial rank when he adopted
him, or whether this was done subsequently.
6.
Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book II.
A son
adopted by a Senator continues to be such as long as he remains in
his family; but when he is emancipated, then by the emancipation he
loses the name of son.
(1)
When a son is given in adoption by a Senator to a person of inferior
rank he is always considered the son of a Senator; because the Senatorial
dignity is not lost by an adoption arising from an inferior station,
any more than anyone would cease to be of consular dignity under similar
circumstances.
7.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I.
It
is established that the son of a Senator emancipated by his father
is always considered a Senator's son.
(1)
Labeo also declares that a child born after the death of his father
who was a Senator, shall be considered the son of the Senator. Proculus
and Pegasus are of the opinion, however, that a child who was conceived
and born after the expulsion of its father from the Senate, should
not be considered a Senator's son. This opinion is correct, for he
whose father has been expelled from the Senate before he was born,
cannot properly be called the son of a Senator; but where a child
has been conceived before its father was expelled from the Senate,
and born after his father had lost his rank, the better opinion is
that he should be understood to be the son of a Senator. It is held
by many that the time of conception should only be considered under
such circumstances.
(2)
Anyone whose father and grandfather have been Senators is understood
to be both the son and the grandson of a Senator; if, however, his
father lost his rank before the conception of the former, the question
might arise whether he should not be considered the grandson of a
Senator, even though he was no longer regarded as the son of one?
It is the better opinion that he ought to be, so that the rank of
his grandfather may be of advantage to him, rather than he should
be injured by the condition of his father.
8.
The Same, Trusts, Book VI.
Women
who are married to persons of illustrious rank are included in the
appellation of illustrious persons. The daughters of Senators are
not known by the name of illustrious women, unless they have obtained
husbands of eminent dignity, for their husbands confer illustrious
rank upon them; but parents, indeed, do so, so long as they are not
connected with plebeian families. Therefore, a woman is of illustrious
rank while she is married to a Senator or a distinguished man; or,
having been separated from him, she has not married a person of inferior
station.
9.
Papinianus, Opinions, Book IV.
When
the daughter of a Senator marries a freeman, the condition of her
father does not make her a wife; since, on the other hand, where her
father had been expelled from the Senate, his children should not
be deprived of the rank which they have obtained.
10.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXIV.
We
should consider the children of Senators to be not only their sons,
but also all those descended from them or from their children, whether
they be the natural or adopted offspring of the Senators from whom
they are said to have descended; but in the case of a child, born
to the daughter of a Senator, we must examine the condition of the
father.
11.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XLI.
Senators
are always considered to have their residence at Rome; still, they
are understood to have a residence in the place where they were born,
for the reason that the rank of Senator is considered rather to give
an additional domicile than to change the old one.
12.
Ulpianus, On Registers of the Censor, Book II.
Women
married in the first place to men of consular dignity, and afterwards
to men of inferior station, sometimes, though rarely, despite this
obtain from the Emperor the privilege of retaining their consular
rank; for I know that Antoninus Augustus favored his cousin Julia
Mammae in this respect.
(1)
Those are to be considered persons of Senatorial rank who are descended
from patricians and consuls, or any illustrious men; because these
alone have the right to give their opinions in the Senate.
Tit. 10. Concerning
the Office of Consul.
1. Ulpianus, On the Duties of Consul, Book II.
It
is the duty of the Consul to appoint a council for those who desire
to manumit slaves.
(1)
Consuls can manumit together, or alone, but he who has left names
with one Consul cannot manumit before another for then the manumissions
are separate; and if, for any reason, either through sickness, or
through being prevented by any other just cause, one of them cannot
manumit, the Senate has decided that his colleague can proceed with
the manumission.
(2)
There is no doubt that Consuls can manumit their own slaves before
themselves, but if it should happen that a Consul is under twenty
years of age, he has not the power of manumission in his own tribunal,
as he himself is the one who, according to a decree of the Senate,
must determine the ground for the appointment of a council. He can,
however, do this before his colleague where proper cause has been
established.
Tit. 11. Concerning
the Office of Praetorian Prefect.
1. Aurelius Arcadius Charisius, Master of Requests, On the Duties
of Praetorian Prefect.
It
is necessary to state briefly whence the origin of the office of Praetorian
Prefect was derived. It has been asserted by some writers that Praetorian
Prefects were formerly created instead of Masters of Cavalry; for,
as in the time of the ancients the supreme power was occasionally
conferred upon dictators, they were accustomed to choose their Masters
of Cavalry, who were associated with them in the discharge of their
military duties, and held the next rank after them. The government
of the republic having been permanently transferred to the Emperors,
Praetorian Prefects were chosen by those princes, just as had been
done in the case of the Masters of Cavalry, and upon them was conferred
greater power for the purpose of promoting public discipline.
(1)
The authority of the Prefects having originated in this manner, it
was subsequently increased to such an extent that no appeal can be
taken from the decision of a Praetorian Prefect; for when formerly
a question arose as to whether an appeal could be taken from the decision
of a Praetorian Prefect, which, in fact, was allowed by law, and examples
of those who did so are extant; afterwards, by an Imperial Decree
publicly promulgated, the right of appeal was forbidden. For the Emperor
thought that those who were appointed to this high office on account
of their eminent industry, after their discernment and integrity had
been established, would render judgment not otherwise than he himself
would do, the wisdom and enlightenment attaching to their rank being
taken into consideration.
(2)
Praetorian Prefects also enjoyed an additional privilege; for minors
could not obtain restitution after condemnation, from any other magistrates
than from the Praetorian Prefects themselves.
Tit. 12. Concerning
the Office of Prefect of the City.
1. Ulpianus, On the Duties of the Urban Prefect.
An
Epistle of the Divine Severus to Fabius Cilo, Prefect of the City,
states that he has jurisdiction of all offences of every description,
not only those committed within the city, but also those which are
committed outside of it, in Italy.
(1)
He must hear the complaints of slaves against their masters who have
fled for refuge to the Imperial statues, or have been purchased by
their own money in order to be manumitted.
(2)
He must also hear the complaints of needy patrons concerning their
freedmen; especially if they assert that they are ill and wish to
be supported by them.
(3)
He has authority to relegate and deport persons to an island designated
by the Emperor.
(4)
In the beginning of the Epistle referred to the following appears:
"Since We have confided Our City to your care"; hence whatever
is done within the city appears to be under the jurisdiction of the
Prefect, and this also applies to any offence committed within the
hundredth milestone, but beyond that distance the Prefect of the City
has no jurisdiction.
(5)
Where anyone accuses a slave of having committed adultery with his
wife, the case must be tried before the Prefect of the City.
(6)
He can take cognizance of proceedings under the interdicts Quod
vi aut clam, or Unde vi.
(7)
It is customary to send guardians or curators before the Prefect of
the City, who, having administered their trusts fraudulently, deserve
a more severe punishment than the infamy arising from suspicion; for
example, when it can be proved that they have bought their guardianships
with money, or for a bribe have exerted themselves to prevent a suitable
guardian from being appointed for anyone; or when they, having declared
the amount of the property of their wards; purposely diminished it;
or where they alienated the said property evidently with fraudulent
design.
(8)
When it is said that the prefect must hear the complaints of slaves
against their masters, we should understand that this does not mean
that they can accuse their masters (for a slave is never allowed to
do this, unless for specific reasons), but that they may humbly apply
to him where their masters treat them with cruelty, harshness, or
starve them, or may state to the Prefect of the City that they have
been forced to endure indecent attacks. It was also a duty imposed
upon the Prefect of the City by the Divine Severus, that he should
protect slaves from being prostituted by their masters.
(9)
Again, the Prefect of the City should take care that money-brokers
conduct everything connected with their business honestly, and refrain
from illegal acts.
(10)
Where a patron states that he has been treated disrespectfully or
been insulted by his freedman; or that he and his children, or his
wife, have been abused by him, or brings any similar accusation; it
is customary for him to appear before the Prefect of the City, who
will punish the freedman according to the complaint, either by warning
him, or by having him scourged, or by inflicting a still more severe
penalty, for freedmen very often deserve to be punished. And indeed
if the patron can prove that he brought a criminal accusation against
him, or that he has conspired against him with his enemy, he can be
sentenced to labor in the mines.
(11)
Supervision of every kind of meat and its sale at a reasonable price
is one of the duties of the Prefect, and the hog market is also in
his charge, as well as that of other animals, and herds of cattle
and flocks of sheep destined for this purpose come under his jurisdiction.
(12)
The preservation of public peace and order at exhibitions is held
to be one of the duties of the Prefect of the City; and, indeed, he
should station soldiers at different points for the purpose of maintaining
the public peace, and to report to him whatever takes place in the
city.
(13)
The Urban Prefect can compel anyone to remain away from the city,
as well as from any of the other districts, and forbid him to transact
any business, or practice any profession, or act as advocate, either
temporarily or for all time. He can also prohibit him from attending
exhibitions, and if he exiles him from Italy, can remove him from
his native province as well.
(14)
The Divine Severus stated in a Rescript that those who are said to
have held unlawful assemblies must be prosecuted before the Prefect
of the City.
2.
Paulus, On the Duties of the Prefect of the City.
According
to an Epistle of the Divine Hadrian he can be applied to in cases
brought by bankers or against them, and pecuniary cases can, for the
most part, be tried before him.
3.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II.
The
Prefect of the City has no jurisdiction beyond the limits of the city,
but he can appoint judges outside of it.
Tit. 13. Concerning
the Office of Quaestor.
1. Ulpianus, On the Duties of Quaestor.
The
origin of Quaestor is very ancient, more so than that of almost any
other magistracy. Gracchanus Julius, in the Seventh Book "On
Authorities", relates that Romulus himself, and Numa Pompilius
had two Quaestors not appointed by themselves, but by the votes of
the people; but even if doubt exists whether there was any Quaestor
during the reigns of Romulus and Numa, it is certain that Quaestors
existed during that of Tullus Hostilius; and, indeed, it is the prevalent
opinion of ancient writers that Tullus Hostilius was the first to
introduce Quaestors into the government of the commonwealth.
(1)
Junius, Trebatius, and Fenestella deduced the origin of the word Quaestor
from quaero (to seek).
(2)
Some of the Quaestors were accustomed to draw lots for the provinces
assigned by the decree of the Senate, which was also done under the
consulate of Decimus Drusus and Porcina. All the Quaestors, however,
did not obtain their provinces by lot, the candidates of the Emperor
being excepted, for these were only employed in reading the Imperial
Epistles in the Senate.
(3)
At present, Quaestors are taken indiscriminately from patricians and
plebeians; for the place is an entrance to, and, so to speak, the
beginning of other offices, and confers the right to state one's opinion
in the Senate.
(4)
There are some of these, as We have just stated, who are styled the
candidates of the Emperor, and who read his Epistles in the Senate.
Tit. 14. Concerning
the Office of the Praetors.
1. Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVI.
A father
can manumit before a son who is under his control, if the son is a
Praetor.
2.
Paulus, On Sabinus, Book IV.
It
is also settled that he himself can be emancipated or give in adoption
in his own tribunal.
3.
Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXXVIII.
Barbarus
Philippus, a fugitive slave, sought the praetorship of Rome, and was
appointed Praetor. Pomponius is of the opinion that his condition
as a slave was no obstacle to his holding the office of Praetor. It
is true that he performed the duties of that office, still, let us
consider the case of a slave having kept his condition secret for
a long time, while he discharged his duty as Praetor. Will all that
he decided or decreed be of no force or effect? What shall We say?
Or will it be valid on account of the welfare of those who instituted
proceedings before him either under the law, or by virtue of some
other legal right? Indeed, I think that none of these things should
be rejected; for this is the more humane view to take, since the Roman
people had the power to invest a slave with this authority, and if
they had known that he was such they would have granted him his freedom.
Much more must this right be considered well founded with respect
to the Emperor.
4.
The Same, On All Tribunals, Book I.
A Praetor
cannot appoint himself a guardian, or a judge in any special proceeding.
Tit. 15. Concerning
the Office of Prefect of the night watch.
1. Paulus, On the Duties of the Prefect of the Night Watch.
Among
the ancients three men were appointed for the purpose of providing
against fire, who, because they kept watch at night, were styled Nocturni.
The Aediles and the tribunes of the plebs also sometimes took
part; and there were, in addition, a detachment of public slaves stationed
around the gate and the walls, whence they could be summoned if necessary.
There were also certain bodies of private slaves who extinguished
fires, either for pay, or gratuitously. Finally, the Divine Augustus
preferred to have this duty performed under his own supervision.
2.
Ulpianus, On the Duties of the Prefect of the Night Watch.
Because
several fires took place during one day.
3.
Paulus, On the Duties of the Prefect of the Night Watch.
In
fact, Augustus thought that the safety of the Republic could be protected
by no one better than by him, and that no one was so equal to the
task as the Emperor. Therefore he posted seven cohorts in proper places,
in order that each cohort might protect two quarters of the city;
these were commanded by tribunes, and above them was a superior officer
who was designated the Prefect of the Night Watch.
(1)
The Prefect of the Night Watch takes cognizance of incendiaries, burglars,
thieves, robbers, and harborers of criminals, unless the culprit is
so savage and notorious, that he is turned over to the Prefect of
the City. And as, for the most part, fires are caused by the negligence
of the inhabitants, he either has those whipped who have been careless
in regard to fire, or he remits the whipping, and gives them a severe
warning.
(2)
Burglaries are generally committed in houses containing many apartments,
or in warehouses where men have deposited the most valuable part of
their goods; the burglar either breaks open a storeroom, a closet,
or a chest, and those who are appointed to guard this property are
the ones ordinarily punished. The Divine Antoninus stated this in
a Rescript to Erycius Clarus, for he says: "That if his warehouses
are broken open, he can put the slaves who were guarding them to torture,
even though some of them may belong to the Emperor himself."
(3)
It should be noted that the Prefect of the Night Watch must be on
guard during the entire night, and should make his rounds properly
shod, and provided with hooks and axes.
(4)
He must be careful to notify all occupants of houses not to allow
any fire to occur through their negligence, and such occupant must
be directed to always have water on his upper floor.
(5)
He also has supervision over those who, for a compensation, take charge
of clothing in the baths; and if while performing this duty they are
guilty of any illegal acts he must take cognizance of them.
4.
Ulpianus, On the Duties of the Prefect of the City.
The
Emperors Severus and Antoninus stated the following in a Rescript
to Julius Rufmus, Prefect of the Night Watch: "If the occupants
of blocks of houses, or others are negligent with regard to their
fires, you can order them to be whipped with rods or scourged; and
those who are accused of arson you may send to Our friend Fabius Cilo,
Prefect of the City; fugitive slaves you must seek out and restore
to their masters."
Tit. 16. Concerning
the Office of Proconsul, and his Deputy.
1. Ulpianus, Controversies, Book I.
The
Proconsul bears everywhere the insignia of his rank after he leaves
the city; but he does not exercise authority except in the province
which has been assigned to him.
2.
Marcianus, Institutes, Book I.
All
Proconsuls after having left the city have jurisdiction, provided
it is not contentious, but voluntary; for example, the manumissions
of children as well as of slaves, and adoptions can take place before
them.
(1)
No one can manumit, however, before the Deputy, for the reason that
he has not sufficient jurisdiction.
3.
Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVI.
Nor
can adoptions take place before him, as in fact no legal action can
be brought in his court.
4.
The Same, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book I.
It
is necessary for the Proconsul also, to be careful not to oppress
his province in the entertainment of officials; as our Emperor, as
well as his father stated in a Rescript to Aufidius Severianus.
(1)
No proconsul can have his own grooms, but in their stead soldiers
should perform their duties in the provinces.
(2)
It would also be better for the Proconsul to travel without his wife,
still, he can bring his wife with him; but he must remember that the
Senate, during the consulship of Cotta and Mesalla, decreed, "That
in the future if the wives of those travelling to take charge of their
offices should commit any offence, an accounting will be required
of their husbands and punishment will be inflicted upon them".
(3)
Before the Proconsul passes the boundaries of the province assigned
to him, he should publish an edict announcing his arrival, and containing
a recommendation of himself, if he has any acquaintance or connection
with the people of the province; and by all means request them not
to come to meet him either publicly or privately, it being more suitable
that each one should receive him in his own country.
(4)
He will also act properly and according to the regular order of proceeding,
if he sends a notice to his predecessor indicating the day when he
will pass the boundaries of his jurisdiction; for frequently when
these things are not certainly known or expected, the people of the
province are disturbed, and business transactions are impeded.
(5)
It is proper when he enters the province for him to do so in that
portion where this is customary; and that whatever city he reaches
first he should pay attention to what the Greeks call epidymias,
that is "the place of sojourn", or kataploun "the
port of arrival"; for the provincials attach great importance
to the preservation and observance of this custom and of privileges
of this description. There are some provinces to which the Proconsul
goes by sea, as, for instance, Asia; and to such an extent was this
carried that our Emperor Antoninus Augustus stated in a Rescript,
in reply to a request of the Asiatics, "That the Proconsul was
absolutely required to proceed to Asia by sea, and to land at Ephesus,
before touching at any of the other principal cities".
(6)
After having made his entry into the province, he should invest his
Deputy with his jurisdiction, but he should not do this before, as
it would be absurd for him to confer authority on another which he
does not yet himself possess; for he is not entitled to the same until
he enters the province. If, however, he should do this before, and
after having entered the province should not change his mind, it would
probably be decided that the Deputy has jurisdiction, not from the
time when it had been conferred upon him, but from the day when the
Proconsul entered the province.
5.
Papinianus, Questions, Book I.
There
are cases in which a Proconsul can delegate his jurisdiction, even
though he has not yet entered the province; for example, if he had
been subjected to some necessary delay during his journey, and his
Deputy was able to arrive at the province very soon.
6.
Ulpianus, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book I.
It
is customary for him to commit to his Deputies cognizance of the offences
of prisoners; so that, after having been interrogated, the Deputies
can send them back, in order that the Proconsuls may discharge those
who are innocent. This species of delegated power is, however, extraordinary;
for no one can transfer to another the right to impose the penalty
of death, or that of inflicting any other punishment, which has been
conferred upon himself, or even that of discharging prisoners who
cannot be prosecuted before him.
(1)
As the Proconsul has the right to delegate or not to delegate his
judicial authority according to his will, he has also the right to
recall it; but he should not do so without consulting the Emperor.
(2)
It is not proper for the Deputies to consult the Emperor, but they
should apply to their own Proconsul, and he is compelled to answer
their inquiries.
(3)
The Proconsul should not absolutely refuse to receive presents, but
he should act with moderation, so as not rudely to reject them altogether,
nor avariciously transcend the bounds of reason in their acceptance;
which matter the Divine Severus and the Emperor Antoninus have very
properly regulated in an Epistle, the words of which are as follows:
"With reference to presents, We are of the opinion stated in
an ancient proverb, viz: 'Not all things should be received, nor at
all times, nor from all persons'; for, indeed, it is impolite to accept
gifts from no one; but, on the other hand it is most despicable, and
most avaricious to accept without distinction everything that is given."
And as to what is contained in the Imperial Mandates, namely: "That
the Proconsul himself, or any other person in office shall accept
no gift or present, and shall not even purchase anything except for
the purpose of daily subsistence"; this has no reference to small
gratuities, but to those which exceed the requirements of ordinary
support. Nor should such presents be extended to the point of making
donations of great value.
7.
The Same, On the Duties of the Proconsul, Book II.
When
the Proconsul enters any other city which is not a populous one or
the capital of the province, he should permit it to be placed under
his protection, and listen to the compliments bestowed upon him without
evincing any discontent, since the people of the province do this
in his honor; and he should also appoint festivals in accordance with
the manners and customs which have previously been observed.
(1)
He should visit the temples and public monuments, for the purpose
of inspecting them, and ascertaining whether they are in good condition,
and properly cared for, or whether they need any repairs, and provide
for the completion of such as have been begun, as far as the resources
of the government permit; and he should appoint with the proper formalities
superintendents who are diligent in their work, and also detail soldiers
for the purpose of assisting the superintendents, if this should be
necessary.
(2)
As the Proconsul has complete jurisdiction, all the authority of those
who dispense justice at Rome either in the capacity of magistrates
or through the grant of extraordinary power, is vested in him.
8.
The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXIX.
Therefore
the Proconsul has in his own province greater authority than anyone
else except the Emperor.
9.
The Same, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book I.
Nor
can any question arise in his province which he cannot himself dispose
of. However, if any matter relating to the affairs of the Treasury
arises and which belongs to the jurisdiction of the Imperial Steward,
it will be better for him to pass it by.
(1)
In cases where a decree is necessary, the Proconsul cannot dispose
of the same by means of a notice by the plaintiff, for all things
whatsoever which demand judicial investigation cannot be terminated
in this way.
(2)
The Proconsul must hear the advocates with patience and also with
discernment, lest he appear contemptible; nor ought he to dissimulate
if he ascertains that parties have trumped up cases, or purchased
the right to litigation; and he should only suffer those to institute
proceedings who are permitted to do so by his Edict.
(3)
The Proconsul has power to dispose of the following matters extrajudicially;
he can order persons to show proper respect to their parents, and
freedmen to their patrons and the children of the latter; he can also
threaten and severely menace a son brought before him by his father
and who is said not to be living as he should. He can, in like manner,
correct an impudent freedman either by reproof or by castigation.
(4)
Hence he should be careful to have a certain order prevail in legal
procedure, namely, that the petitions of all persons shall be heard;
lest it may happen that if the rank of some is favored, or attention
is paid to others as are not worthy, those of moderate pretensions
who have no one to appear for them, or having employed advocates of
small experience or no standing, may not be able to properly present
their claims.
(5)
He must also appoint advocates for those who request it, and especially
for female wards or persons otherwise incapacitated; as well as for
those who are out of their minds, if anyone petitions him to do so
for them; and if there is no one to request it, he can grant this
at his own instance. He must also appoint an advocate for any person
who alleges that he cannot himself find one on account of the influence
of his adversary, as it is not just for anyone to be oppressed by
the superior power of his adversary; for this, indeed, has a tendency
to reflect upon the Governor of the province, where anyone acts with
so little self-control that all are afraid to appear as advocates
against him.
(6)
These rules are applicable to all Governors, and should be observed
by them.
10.
The Same, on the Duties of Proconsul, Book X.
The
Proconsul must remember that he ought to perform all his duties until
the arrival of his successor, for the reason that there is but one
Proconsulate, and the welfare of the province requires that there
should always be someone through whom the people may transact their
business; he should therefore administer justice until the arrival
of his successor.
(1)
The Lex Julia Concerning Extortion and the Rescript of the
Emperor Hadrian to Calpurnius Rufus, Proconsul of Achaia, forbids
Proconsuls to dismiss their Deputies previously to their own departure.
11.
Venuleius Saturninus, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book II.
If
there is anything that demands severe punishment, the Deputy should
send the case to the Proconsul; for he himself has not the right to
execute, to imprison, or to scourge with great severity.
12.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book II.
A Deputy
on whom jurisdiction has been conferred has the right to appoint judges.
13.
Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book X.
The
Deputy of a Proconsul has no jurisdiction of his own where none has
been conferred upon him by the Proconsul.
14.
Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XX.
Proconsuls
are only entitled to six lictors.
15.
Licinius Rufinus, Rules, Book III.
The
Deputies of Proconsuls can appoint guardians.
16.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II.
As
soon as the Proconsul enters the gate of Rome, he loses his authority.
Tit. 17. Concerning
the Office of Augustal Prefect.
1. Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV.
The
Prefect of Egypt does not lay aside his prefectship and the authority
granted to him by law under Augustus, as Proconsuls do, before his
successor enters the City of Alexandria; even though he may have already
reached the province; and it is so stated in his commission.
Tit. 18. Concerning
the Office of Governor.
1. Macer, On the Duties of Governor, Book I.
The
title of Governor is a general one, and hence it is applicable to
Proconsuls and Deputies of the Emperor, as well as to all Governors
of the provinces, and even to Senators. The title of Proconsul is
one of special signification.
2.
Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVI.
A Governor
can adopt before himself, just as he can emancipate a son, or manumit
a slave.
3.
Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XIII.
The
Governor of a province has authority only over the inhabitants of
his province; and this only as long as he remains therein, for if
he departs from it, he becomes a private person. He sometimes has
jurisdiction over foreigners, when one actually commits an offence;
for it is stated in the Imperial Mandates that he who presides over
a province must take care to purge it of bad characters, without any
distinction as to where they come from.
4.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX.
The
Governor of a province has greater authority therein than anyone else
except the Emperor.
5.
The Same, On All Tribunals, Book I.
The
Governor of a province cannot appoint himself either a guardian, or
a judge in a particular case.
6.
The Same, Opinions, Book I.
The
Governor of a province must suppress illegal exactions, including
such as are committed with violence, as well as sales and obligations
extorted by fear, and those where the money is not paid down. He must
also provide against anyone unjustly obtaining profit, or suffering
loss.
(1)
The truth is not changed by error, and hence the Governor of a province
must follow the course which is suitable by taking into consideration
facts which have been proved.
(2)
It is a matter affecting the honor of the Governor of a province to
provide that the more humble shall not be injured by the more powerful,
and do not persecute the defenders of the innocent by means of false
accusations.
(3)
He shall restrain unauthorized parties who, under the pretext of assisting
officials, proceed to disturb the people; and take measures to punish
them when detected. He must also prevent illegal exactions from being
made under the pretence of collecting tribute.
(4)
The Governor of a province must make it his especial care that no
one shall be prevented from transacting any lawful business, and that
nothing prohibited shall be done, and that no punishment shall be
inflicted upon the innocent.
(5)
The Governor of a province must see that persons of limited resources
are not treated unjustly by having their only lamp or small supply
of furniture taken from them for the use of others, under the pretext
of the arrival of officers or soldiers.
(6)
The Government of a province must provide that no partiality shall
be shown to soldiers — that is which does not benefit all of them
— by certain ones claiming undue advantage for themselves.
(7)
The event of death should not be imputed to a physician, but it is
also a fact that he is responsible for anything caused by his lack
of skill; for a wrong committed by a person who gives bad advice in
a dangerous emergency should not be imputed to human frailty and be
considered blameless.
(8)
Those who govern entire provinces have the right to inflict the death
penalty, and authority is conferred upon them to condemn delinquents
to the mines.
(9)
The Governor of a province who, after having imposed a fine, ascertains
that it cannot be collected from the property of the parties whom
he has directed to pay it, must relieve them from the necessity of
payment, and repress the unlawful avarice of those who demand it.
Where, on account of poverty a fine has been remitted by the provincial
authorities, it should not be exacted.
7.
The Same, Opinions, Book III.
The
Governor of a province where buildings have been inspected by him,
can compel their owners to repair them when sufficient cause for this
exists; and where a refusal is made, he should take proper measures
for their reparation.
8.
Julianus, Digest, Book I.
I have
often heard our Emperor say that where it is set forth in a Rescript
that: "You can apply to him who presides over the province",
this does not place the Proconsul, or his Deputy, or the Governor
of the province under the obligation of hearing the case; but he should
consider whether he ought to hear it himself, or appoint a judge for
that purpose.
9.
Callistratus, On Judicial Inquiries, Book I.
Generally
speaking, whenever the Emperor issues a Rescript referring any matter
to the Governor of a province, as for instance, when he says: "You
can apply to him who presides over the province," or with this
addition, "He will consider what his duty requires", no
obligation is imposed upon the Proconsul or his Deputy to take cognizance
of the case; but even where the words "He will consider what
his duty requires" are not added, he must make up his mind whether
he will hear it himself or appoint a judge to do so.
10.
Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book II.
It
is the duty of the Governors of provinces to hear all cases which
either the Prefect of the City, the Praetorian Prefect, or the Consuls,
Praetors, or other magistrates hear at Rome.
11.
Marcianus, Institutes, Book III.
All
provincial applications which are made to various Judges at Rome come
within the jurisdiction of Governors.
12.
Proculus, Epistles, Book IV.
And
although he who governs the province ought to be invested with authority
to discharge the duties of all Roman magistrates, still, he should
pay attention to what should be done in each case, rather than to
what is done at Rome.
13.
Ulpianus, On the Office of Proconsul, Book VII.
It
is proper for every good and worthy Governor to take care that the
province over which he presides is peaceable and quiet. This he will
accomplish without difficulty if he exerts himself to expel bad men,
and diligently seek for them, as he must apprehend all sacrilegious
persons, robbers, kidnappers, and thieves, and punish each one in
proportion to his crime; he should also restrain those who harbor
them, as without their assistance a robber cannot long remain concealed.
(1)
In the case of insane persons who cannot be controlled by their relatives,
it is the duty of the Governor to apply a remedy, namely, that of
confinement in prison, as the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript. The
Divine Brothers were of the opinion that where a man had committed
parricide, a personal investigation should be made to learn whether
he had perpetrated the deed while simulating insanity, or whether,
in fact, he was not in possession of his faculties, for if he was
feigning he should be punished, and if he was actually insane, he
should be confined in prison.
14.
Macer, On Criminal Trials, Book II.
The
Divine Marcus and Commodus addressed a Rescript to Scapulas Tertullus
in the following terms: "If it is positively ascertained by you
that Aelius Perseus is to such a degree insane that, through his constant
alienation of mind, he is void of all understanding, and no suspicion
exists that he was pretending insanity when he killed his mother,
you can disregard the manner of his punishment, since he has already
been sufficiently punished by his insanity; still, he should be placed
under careful restraint, and, if you think proper, even be placed
in chains; as this has reference not so much to his punishment as
to his own protection and the safety of his neighbors. If, however,
as often happens, he has intervals of sounder mind, you must diligently
inquire whether he did not commit the crime during one of these periods,
so that no indulgence should be given to his affliction; and, if you
find that this is the case, notify Us, that We may determine whether
he should be punished in proportion to the enormity of his offence,
if he committed it at a time when he seemed to know what he was doing.
"But,
when We are informed by your letter that his condition so far
as place and treatment are concerned, is that he remains in charge
of his friends, or under guard in his own house; it appears to Us
that you will act properly if you summon those who had care of him
at that time, and investigate the cause of such great neglect, and
decide the case of each one of them, so far as you discover anything
tending to excuse or increase his negligence; for keepers are appointed
for insane persons, not only to prevent them from injuring themselves,
but that they may not be a source of destruction to others; and where
this takes place, those very properly should be held responsible who
are guilty of negligence in the discharge of their duties."
15.
Marcianus, On Criminal Trials, Book I.
One
thing must be observed, he who governs the province must not pass
its boundaries unless for the purpose of fulfilling a vow; and, even
then he must not spend a night outside.
16.
Macer, On the Office of Governor, Book I.
It
is provided by a Decree of the Senate "That judicial proceeding
must be very sparingly instituted with reference to obligations contracted
by those who govern provinces, their attendants, or their freedmen,
before they entered the province; for any actions which are not brought
for this reason can be filed afterwards when any of the parties have
left the province. But where anything occurs against the will of the
party, as for instance if he suffers some injury, or is made the victim
of theft, proceedings can be instituted to the extent of joining issue,
and ordering the production and deposit of the stolen property; or
a promise shall be given with security that the party will appear,
or that the article in question will be produced."
17.
Celsus, Digest, Book III.
Where
the Governor of a province has manumitted anyone, or appointed a guardian
before he was aware of the arrival of his successor, these acts shall
be valid.
18.
Modestinus, Rules, Book V.
It
is provided by a plebiscite "That no Governor shall accept a
present or a gift, except food or beverages which may be consumed
within a few days".
19.
Callistratus, On Judicial Inquiries, Book I.
He
who administers justice must be careful to be easy of access, but
not permit anyone to treat him disrespectfully, for which reason it
is stated in their directions: "That the Governors of provinces
must not admit provincials to great familiarity with them"; for
contempt of rank arises from equality of intercourse.
(1)
But, in the trial of cases, it is not proper for an official to become
inflamed against those of whom he thinks ill, or be moved to tears
by the supplications of the unfortunate; for it is not the part of
a resolute and upright judge to let his countenance disclose the emotions
of his mind. In a word, he should so administer justice as to increase
the authority of his rank by the force of his mental qualities.
20.
Papinianus, Opinions, Book I.
The
Deputy of the Emperor, that is to say the Governor, or the highest
official of a province, does not lose his authority by relinquishing
his office.
21.
Paulus, On the Office of Assessor.
When
the Governor is trying the case of a slave who has been corrupted,
or of a female slave who has been debauched, or of a male slave who
has been indecently attacked; if the slave who is said to have been
corrupted is the business agent of anyone, or occupies such a place
that, without considering the injury to property alone, the destruction
and the ruin of the master's entire household is involved, he ought
to be punished with the greatest severity.
Tit. 19. Concerning
the Office of the Imperial Steward or accountant.
1. Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XVI.
All
acts performed by the Imperial Steward are approved by the Emperor,
just as if they had been performed by himself.
(1)
If the Imperial Steward disposes of any property which belongs to
the Emperor as his own, I do not think that the ownership of the same
is transferred; for he only makes a legal transfer while he is conducting
the business of the Emperor and delivers it with his consent; for
if he performs any act for the purpose of effecting a sale, a gift,
or an agreement, it is void; as he has no authority to alienate the
Emperor's property, but only to diligently administer it.
(2)
It is a special function of the Imperial Steward that, by his order,
a slave of the Emperor may enter upon an estate, and if the Emperor
is appointed heir, the Procurator, by interfering with a rich estate,
makes the Emperor the heir.
2.
Paulus, Sentences, Book V.
If,
however, the estate to which the Emperor is appointed heir is not
solvent, after this has been learned, the Emperor must be consulted;
for the wishes of an heir who has been appointed must be ascertained
as to whether he will accept or reject an estate of this kind.
3.
Callistratus, On Judicial Inquiries, Book VI.
The
Imperial Stewards cannot sentence to deportation, for the reason that
they have not the right of imposing this penalty.
(1)
If, however, they forbid anyone to enter upon the land of the Emperor
because his riotous or violent conduct might injure the Imperial tenants,
the person is obliged to withdraw; for this the Divine Pius stated
in a Rescript to Julius.
(2)
Stewards cannot give permission to anyone to return after deportation,
and this our Emperors Severus and Antoninus stated in a Rescript in
answer to a petition of Hermias.
Tit. 20. Concerning
the Office of Juridicus.
1. Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVI.
Anyone
can adopt in the tribunal of the Juridicus, because the right
of legal action is granted him.
2.
The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXXIX.
The
privilege of appointing guardians was, by a Constitution of the Divine
Marcus conferred upon the Juridicus who presides at Alexandria.
Tit. 21. Concerning
the Office of him to whom jurisdiction is delegated.
1. Papinianus, Questions, Book I.
Whatever
authority is specially conferred either by a law, a decree of the
Senate, or an Imperial Constitution, is not transferred when delegated,
but any powers acquired by the right of magistracy can be delegated.
Therefore, those magistrates are in error who, having authority conferred
upon them by law or by a decree of the Senate, (such for instance
as the Lex Julia de Adulteriis, and others of the same kind)
to preside in a criminal trial, delegate their jurisdiction. A very
strong argument in favor of this is, that in the Lex Julia de Vi
it is expressly provided: "That he to whom the jurisdiction belongs
can delegate it if he departs." He can not delegate it unless
he is absent, although any other jurisdiction can be delegated by
one who is present. Where a master is said to have been killed by
his slaves, the Praetor cannot delegate the right to try them, which
was conferred upon him by a decree of the Senate.
(1)
He to whom jurisdiction has been delegated possesses none peculiar
to himself, but must only exercise that of the magistrate who conferred
it upon him; for while it is true that by the custom of our ancestors
jurisdiction can be transferred, the authority conferred by law cannot
be transferred. For this reason no one says that the Deputy of a Proconsul
has the right of imposing penalties when jurisdiction has been delegated
to him. Paulus states that the authority attaching to jurisdiction
is also delegated with it.
2.
Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book III.
Where
jurisdiction has been delegated by a Governor, he to whom it is delegated
cannot assemble a Council.
(1)
Where guardians or curators desire to sell land, the Praetor or Governor
can permit this to be done after hearing the case; but if he delegates
his jurisdiction he can, under no circumstances, transfer with it
the right to conduct the inquiry instituted for this purpose.
3.
Julianus, Digest, Book V.
He
who exercises the jurisdiction of another, even if he is a Praetor,
still does not do so by his own authority, but every time he acts
he administers justice in the place of him by whom he was appointed.
4.
Macer, On the Office of Governor, Book I.
Cognizance
of the acts of suspected guardians can be delegated, and it is settled
that this may occur in the general delegation of jurisdiction, on
account of the interest of wards, as follows: "The Emperors Severus
and Antoninus to Braduas, Proconsul of Africa. Since you have delegated
your jurisdiction to your Deputies, it follows that they can take
cognizance of the acts of suspected guardians."
(1)
Thus power can be delegated to give possession of property, as for
instance, when an order is issued to take possession where a bond
is not furnished to provide against threatened injury; or for possession
in the case of a woman in behalf of her unborn child; or to grant
possession to a legatee for the preservation of his legacy.
5.
Paulus, On Plautius, Book XVIII.
It
is evident that anyone to whom jurisdiction has been delegated cannot
delegate the same to another.
(1)
When jurisdiction is delegated to a private individual, it is held
that all magisterial power except that of condemning to death is delegated
with it; because there is no jurisdiction which does not include the
right to inflict moderate punishment.
Tit. 22. Concerning
the Office of assessors.
1. Paulus, On the Duties of Assessor.
The
entire office of assessor in which those learned in the law discharge
their duties, embraces, for the most part, the following cases: Judicial
inquiries, motions, statements of causes of action, edicts, decrees,
and epistles.
2.
Marcianus, On Criminal Trials, Book I.
Freedmen
can act as assessors, and although persons who are infamous are not
prohibited by law from doing so, still, I am of the opinion that they
cannot perform the duties of an assessor; and, indeed, it is said
that there is an Imperial Constitution extant upon this subject.
3.
Macer, On the Office of Governor, Book I.
Where
the same province has been divided between two Governors, as for instance,
Germany and Mysia, a man born in either can act as assessor in the
other and is not considered as acting in his own province.
4.
Papinianus, Opinions, Book IV.
When
an Imperial Deputy dies, his attendants have a right to their salaries
for the balance of the time for which they were appointed by the Deputy;
provided they do not act as the attendants of others during that time.
The case is different where the Deputy retired in favor of a successor
before his term of office had expired.
5.
Paulus, Sentences, Book I.
Assessors
are, under no circumstances, permitted to transact business before
a tribunal where they are councillors; but they are not forbidden
to do so before another tribunal.
6.
Papinianus, Opinions, Book I.
A citizen
of the Republic is not prohibited from acting as assessor in the court
of a public official of his own town, because he does not receive
a public salary.