THE
ENACTMENTS OF JUSTINIAN. |
( S. P. Scott, The Civil Law, XIV, Cincinnati, 1932 ). |
|
Title
1. Concerning freedom granted by the wand of the Praetor, and manumission conferred in the council. 1.
The Emperor Antoninus to Tertius. The condition
of those who are manumitted in the Council, after the ground for it
has been approved by the court, and the manumission has taken place,
is not usually called in question, even when it is alleged that enfranchisement
was obtained by false representations. 2. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Sallust. It is perfectly
certain that where Roman citizenship has once been granted, a second
manumission can neither add anything to, nor take anything from it. Given on the day
before the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 3. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Attonita. There is no doubt
that a woman cannot legally manumit anyone either through her husband,
or an agent, by means of a wand. 4. The Emperors
Constantius to Maximus, Praetorian Prefect. A slave can obtain his freedom through the efforts of his patron in the presence of Our Council, or before consuls, praters, presidents, governors, or municipal magistrates, to whom this right has been conceded. Title
2. Concerning testamentary manumission. It is certain
that if anyone over twenty years of age should make a codicil, leaving
a slave his freedom, the date of confirmation will not prejudice the
manumission; for, in this instance, the intention of the deceased, and
not his legal capacity, must be considered. 2. The Same
Emperors to Philetus. Freedom cannot
be granted by the will of a deceased person when the estate has not
been entered upon, or if the disposition of the property was set aside,
because of some crime which was not punished on account of death. 3. The Same
Emperors to Euphrosinus. Where freedom
has been granted by the will of the deceased and the estate has been
entered upon, even though the appointed heir may have rejected it for
the purpose of obtaining complete restitution, this will, nevertheless,
in no respect interfere with the grant of freedom. Ordered on the
seventeenth of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of Aper
and Maximus, 208. 4. The Same
Emperors to Archelaus. Although your
father obtained his freedom directly by will, and you were his heir,
still, you cannot be compelled to render accounts of any business which
he transacted while he remained in slavery, as he did not receive his
freedom upon that condition. Again, he to whom freedom has been bequeathed
either directly or under the terms of a trust, on condition that he
would render his accounts, cannot obtain his freedom before having submitted
them and returned any property which he may have abstracted with evil
intent. If, however, having rendered his accounts, he should not be
found to be indebted to the estate, he will obtain his freedom absolutely
after the estate has been entered on. Published on the
Kalends of December, during the second Consulate of Lsetus, and
Cerealis, 216. 5. The Emperor
Alexander to Quintilian. A testamentary
grant of freedom made for the purpose of defrauding creditors, even
though the heir of the debtor may be solvent, is not valid under the
Lex Aelia Sentia. 6. The Emperor
Gordian to Pisistratus. If the estate
of him, by whose will you say you were manumitted, has been rejected
by the heirs on account of its indebtedness, you do not unjustly demand
that the will of the testator shall be observed with reference to you,
for the purpose of protecting the interests of freedom, if you offer
to satisfy the creditors of the estate; especially as this has already
been decreed by that most learned Emperor, the Divine Marcus. This rule shall
also be observed in the case of strangers. 7. The Same
Emperor to Justa. You should not,
against the wishes of your mother, bestow freedom upon a slave whom
she forbade to be liberated, lest you may appear to have violated the
rights of filial affection. 8. The Emperor
Philip and the Caesar Philip to Tremellius. When a testator
has ordered that freedom shall be granted to a certain slave, at the
time of the marriage of his son or daughter, he did not definitely fix
the date of his liberation from servitude, but he merely made it conditional,
so that if the marriage did not take place, freedom could not legally
be demanded by the slave. 9. The Emperors
Cams, Carinus, and Numeriamis to Maurus. The deceased could
not directly bestow freedom upon your slave, although it is stated that
he appointed you his heir; for no one can, in accordance with law, grant
freedom directly to the slaves of others. 10. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian and the Caesars to Germans. When freedom is
legally granted in direct terms to slaves, not only by the imposition
of the cap of liberty, but also by acceptance of the estate, such slaves
become freedmen under the wills of their masters if no legal impediment
exists. 11. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Laurina. If a will is void
in law, any grants of freedom bestowed under it will not be considered
properly made, even if, as you allege, it was not added that the instrument
should be valid as a codicil. 12. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Rhysus. If the heirs appointed
under a will, which was legally executed, enter upon the estate with
the usual formalities, you cannot be deprived of the freedom to which
you were entitled under said will, if the appointed heirs, acting in
collusion with those who claim the estate on the ground of intestacy,
should refuse to accept it. Where, however, they voluntarily reject
the estate left to them, everything included in the will is considered
to be of no effect. If, however, the Governor of the province should ascertain
that the heirs are in collusion for the purpose of defrauding you of
your freedom, he will provide for your obtaining it, in accordance with
the Constitution promulgated by the Divine Pius Antoninus. 13. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Martial. It is certain
that where freedom has been left to a slave conditionally, he cannot
be deprived of it by the heir, nor can either alienation or usucaption
injure a slave who is to be conditionally free, as long as he will be
entitled to his liberty if the condition is complied with. 14. The Emperors
Theodosius and Valentinian to Florentine, Praetorian Prefect. Direct grants
of freedom can be made by wills drawn up in the Greek language, so that
such grants, when made directly, shall be considered of the same force
as if the testator had ordered them to be stated in the terms prescribed
by law. 15. The Emperor
Justinian to John, Praetorian Prefect. As a Constitution
of the Divine Marcus declares that where anyone either makes a will
or dies without doing so, thus furnishing ground for an intestate succession,
and bequeathes grants of freedom, and no one desires to accept the estate
of the deceased because there is reason to suspect it of being insolvent,
and the grants of freedom have been left under a trust, without having
been reduced to writing, any stranger whosoever, or any one of the slaves
to whom freedom has been left and whose status is in danger, can enter
upon the estate, on condition of giving security that he will satisfy
all the creditors, and confer freedom upon those whom the testator intended
should receive it. Various doubts
have arisen with reference to the interpretation of this constitution,
for if the property of the estate should be sold because no heir could
be found, it was asked whether, after the sale of the said property,
it would be possible for either a slave, or anyone else to accept the
estate, recover from the purchasers what had been sold, execute the
grants of freedom, and satisfy the creditors? Although the Divine Severus
did not permit this to be done after the property had once been disposed
of, still We have adopted the opinion of Ulpianus (especially with reference
to the grants of freedom, in order that they may not be lost) who held
that, after the sale of the property, a remedy would be afforded by
the Constitution of the Divine Marcus within a year; provided all the
creditors were paid during that time, and the purchasers suffered no
other inconvenience by submitting to the rescission of the sale before
the aforesaid period had elapsed. Hence the slave who was entitled to
his liberty, or any stranger, will be permitted to enter upon the estate,
either before the sale or afterwards, within the term of a year, and
recover the property, having first furnished security that the grants
of freedom will be carried out, and the creditors satisfied. (1) Moreover,
if anyone, having entered upon an estate, should promise to carry out
all grants of freedom, and to pay the creditors not in full, but only
in part, and the latter accept this proposal, We decree that, in a case
of this kind, the Constitution of the Most Wise Emperor aforesaid shall
be applicable, and We hold that it should by all means be adopted, especially
when the creditors consent, but when they are unwilling, We do not permit
any such agreement to take effect. (2) Where, however,
some of the slaves are willing to accept freedom and others think that
it should be rejected, in this instance, the Rescript of the Divine
Marcus will apply, and there is no doubt that in this case the petitioner
for freedom should be heard, and the slaves have perfect liberty to
decide whether they prefer to be free or to remain in servitude. For
while no slave is allowed to refuse Roman citizenship, still, in this
instance, lest through the ingratitude of some the others may remain
in bondage, all slaves who desire to obtain their freedom shall be permitted
to do so; and if any of them are unwilling, or reject it, they shall
be immediately reduced to servitude, and
those who would not accept a patron will obtain a master, and perhaps
a severe one. (3) When, however,
the person who accepts the estate does not promise to carry out all
the grants of freedom, but only to liberate a certain number of slaves
whose manumission was provided for, if the property of the estate is
sufficient for the payment of the creditors in full, the better course
will be for all the slaves to receive their freedom, even though this
may not have been promised. But when there are not enough assets to
settle the claims of the creditors, it is more advantageous for only
a few of the slaves to be emancipated. (4) In this way
We have found a remedy for the doubts of the ancients, by adding an
excellent provision to the constitution aforesaid; and hence We order
that if no single claimant of the estate appears, but several do, and
two or more appear at the same time, all of them shall be given permission
to enter on the estate, all having previously furnished security that
they will satisfy the creditors, and carry out the grants of freedom.
But if they should appear at different
times, the one who comes first shall take precedence, if he can give
security; but if he is unable to do so, the others shall be entitled
to the privilege in their order, according to the time when they make
the demand; and this must be done within a year. (5) Where one
of the applicants promises to free certain slaves, but not all, and
another is prepared to furnish security that all the creditors will
be satisfied, and all grants of freedom be carried into effect, it will
be perfectly just for the latter to be accepted, so that all the grants
of freedom without distinction may be executed. We grant this favor
not only to a slave to whom freedom was bequeathed, but also to him
to whom it was not left by will; so that the result may be commendable,
and others receive their freedom by means of one to whom it was not
left by will. (6) If, however, anyone should first receive the property of the estate and his liberty, We decree that the preceding provision shall apply to the second or the third claimant, or to any others who promise more generous donations of freedom. But when the slave who was the first to demand the inheritance has already received it, and freedom has been conferred by him upon certain other slaves belonging to the estate, and some slave forming part of the same, or a stranger who is free, appears and offers better terms, he shall be permitted to take the estate, if he promises to do more, and gives proper security. The first applicant shall, however, retain his freedom, even though the property may have been sold by him, and all these things must take place within a year from the time when the first claimant presented himself, in accordance with what has already been stated. Title
3. Concerning the abolition of the Lex Fufia Caninia. We decree that where grants of freedom are left to slaves by will, whether this is done directly, or under the terms of a trust, they shall be valid without distinction, just as where freedom is bestowed by the acts of persons who are living. The Lex Fufia Caninia shall not apply to other cases, and no impediment shall be placed in the way of testators who desire to exercise their beneficence by the emancipation of their slaves. Title
4. Concerning grants of freedom by means of trusts. As you allege
that the estate of the testator, by whom freedom was bequeathed to you
by the terms of a trust, was not entered upon, and another heir than
the one appointed obtained possession of the estate on the ground of
intestacy, if you do not demand the freedom which was granted you under
the trust, with the execution of which the heir at law was charged,
you can not legally demand it from him who was not requested by the
testator to bestow it. It is clear that if you can prove that the appointed
heir neglected to give you your freedom, after having received money
for doing so, the heir at law can be compelled to grant it to you. Published on the
thirteenth of the Kalends of March, during the Consulate of Lateranus
and Rufinus, 198. 2. The Emperor
Antoninus to Valerius. Although the codicil
by which it appears that you were bequeathed to the uncle of the deceased
has been declared forged, still, if you obtained your freedom from the
legatee in a proper manner, before any question arose with reference
to the crime, what happened afterwards will not invalidate the grant
of freedom made in this way. According to the Constitution of the Divine
Hadrian, it is evident that the heir will have the right to demand the
twenty aurei. 3. The Emperor
Alexander to Lucius. As you allege
that freedom was conditionally granted to the female slaves, why should
there be any doubt that children who came into the world before this
was done were born slaves, and became the property of the heirs by the
right of ownership? For relief should only be granted to those who were
born after he who was charged with the grant of freedom was in default,
in order that they may appear to have been born free. 4. The Same
Emperor to Julianus. Where a female
slave, to whom freedom was left under a trust by the will of her master,
has received her liberty, she, having become a
Roman citizen in accordance with the Decree of the Senate, and the constitutions
promulgated with reference thereto, her children will be freeborn. If,
however, she has never claimed her freedom, she should only blame herself
if the children born to her in the meantime are slaves. 5. The Same
Emperors to Dionysius. A minor of twenty
years of age cannot, by his last will, bequeath freedom under a trust
to his slave, unless he is able to prove that he was legally authorized
to do so. 6. The Same
Emperor to Maximus. It has been decided
that freedom granted under the terms of a trust should be given to a
female slave, nor will she be the less entitled to it, if, in the meantime,
her mistress was unwilling to sell her, provided she received nothing
from the will of the person who bequeathed the freedom, for the reason
that she might be liberated in the course of time, whenever an opportunity
to purchase the slave might arise. 7. The Same
Emperor to Nicomedes. Slaves, to whom
freedom has been granted under a trust by the last will of the testator,
become the freedmen of those who have been charged with their manumission. Published on the
Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Fuscus and Dexter,
226. 8. The Same
Emperor to Eutyches. As you state that
freedom was granted you by a trust, on condition that the widow of the
testator agreed to it, even though she did not enter upon the estate,
and all of it, in consequence, passed to his son, if he manifests no
opposition, you can demand your freedom. 9. The Emperors
Valerian and Gallienus to Daphnis. Even if a testator,
when he appointed his slave the guardian of his children, did not, at
the same time, grant him his freedom, it will be considered that he
manumitted him under the terms of a trust, and that this was done for
the sake of liberty and in behalf of the wards. If he had appointed
not his own slaves but those belonging to another, being at the same
time aware of his condition, it was held by jurists that he likewise
would be entitled to his freedom as under a trust, unless it clearly
appeared that the intention of the deceased was otherwise. 10. The Same
Emperors to Mercurialis. You will still
be entitled to the grant of freedom left you by the terms of the trust,
subject to the condition that you shall receive it when the testator's
son attained his twenty-fifth year, even though, as you allege, the
heir should have died before reaching the designated age. For it was held by the ancients that the hope of freedom
should not be destroyed after the time had elapsed when, if the son
of the testator had lived, he would have attained the prescribed age. 11. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Flavianus. If you were a
slave, and freedom was bequeathed you under the terms of a trust, you
are hereby notified that you cannot obtain your liberty without manumission.
Hence if, while a slave, you obtained a fiduciary grant of freedom,
you must appear before the Governor of the province, so that, after
having investigated your case, he may decide whether or not you have
the right to be set free, and may compel him to manumit you, whose duty
it is to do so; or, if the latter conceals himself he can, by means
of a decree, protect your interests against the person who cannot be
found. 12. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Hyrenius. It is stated by
legal authority that freedom under a trust shall not be considered as
bequeathed, on account of the insertion of the phrase, "I recommend,"
into a will or codicil. 13. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Pythagorida. If the testator,
having before his marriage given you to his future wife, afterwards
left her a legacy, and by his will or codicil charged his heirs to manumit
you, there is no doubt that they, as well as she, by accepting the legacy
bequeathed to her, approved the will of the deceased, and will be liable,
and that you will be entitled to your freedom under the terms of the
trust. 14. The Emperor
Justinian to Julianus, Praetorian Prefect. As a doubt arose
among the ancients whether it was possible for freedom to be left under
the terms of a trust to a slave who was, as yet, unborn, and was expected
to be a boy, We, for the purpose of settling this dispute, order that,
in favor of freedom, both the grant of it under a trust, as well as
one made directly, shall be valid, whether the unborn child is male
or female, as only the question of freedom is considered, even if the
mother who brought him forth still remained in slavery. If,
however, several children of different sexes were born at the same time,
and only one or more were mentioned, all of them will be entitled to
their freedom as soon as they are born; as it is better, in case of
doubt, to adopt the more humane opinion, and especially where liberty
is concerned. Given on the Kalends
of October, during the fifth Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes,
530. 15. The Same
Emperor to Julianus, Praetorian Prefect. We decree that
when freedom has been bequeathed to a male or female slave under a trust,
and the debtor is in default in granting it, the
slave shall be liberated from servitude by a decision of the Governor,
without any act of the heir, or without waiting for his consent. Such
a slave shall be entitled to his or her freedom, just as if he or she
had obtained it directly from the testator himself, as it is wicked
as well as absurd for heirs to delay to carry out the wishes of the
testator, especially where liberty is involved. 16. The Same
Emperor to Julianus, Praetorian Prefect. If a testator,
in his will, should charge his heir to grant freedom to any one of the
children of his female slave, whom he designated by name, and the said
slave brought forth one or more children, and the heir did not, during
his lifetime, grant freedom to any of them, or, while deliberating which
one he would set free, died; a doubt arose among the ancient authorities
whether all, one, or none of the said children would be entitled to
be free. We, desiring to punish the evil intention of the heir for
not complying with the wishes of the testator, and for not selecting
one of the children of the female slave and giving it its freedom when
he was able to do so, do hereby decree that not only he, but also his
heirs and successors, shall be compelled to liberate all the children
of the said female slave; for this is not contrary to the intention
of the testator, since, when he provided that any of said children whom
the heir might select would be free, he did not have in mind any certain
one, but all of them; and if the heir did not comply with his wishes,
there is no doubt that, according to the intention of the testator,
all of them would be entitled to their freedom. We order that the same rule shall apply when the testator
charged not the heir, but a legatee or beneficiary of a trust, with
the grant of freedom, so that, for this reason, heirs, legatees, or
beneficiaries of trusts, being actuated by a just fear, may carry out
the will of the testator, and may not themselves suffer loss by being
compelled to liberate all the slaves. Any
complaints they make shall be to no purpose, for they can only blame
themselves for the loss which is not due to Our legislation, but is
the result of their own contumacy. Given at Constantinople,
on the fifteenth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate
of Lampadius and Orestes, 530. 17. The Same
Emperor to Julianus, Praetorian Prefect. Where anyone has bequeathed his slave under the condition that the legatee should grant him his freedom, and the heir, acting dishonorably with reference to the legacy, refused to surrender the slave to the legatee, and suit having been brought against him, and the judge having ordered him not only to give up the slave, but also to pay his appraised value, the ancient interpreters of the law were in doubt whether an obstacle was not placed in the way of freedom by a decision of this kind; and when it was decided that freedom must be granted, whether this should be done by the heir or the legatee, and if the heir granted it, whether the legatee would be entitled to retain the amount which he had received as a pecuniary fine, either entirely, partially, or not at all. We, in disposing of this controversy, are surprised to learn that the judge, who had jurisdiction of the case aforesaid, did not require the heir not to surrender the slave but only to pay his value, as such a fault offers an occasion for a dispute. Wherefore, if such a question should arise, We think that no judge would be so foolish as to render a decision of this description. If, however, the legatee should demand that the slave be delivered to him, and the term of two months should elapse after issue had been joined in the case, We decree that the slave shall immediately obtain his liberty and become free, and that the heir, on account of his evil behaviour, shall be condemned to pay four times the amount of court costs incurred by the legatee, and that the right of patronage shall be preserved unimpaired for the benefit of the latter. Title
5. Concerning the annulment of conditional grants of freedom. Those known as dediticii shall not hereafter, under any circumstances, be permitted to interfere with the administration of Our government, for the reason that We find this term has fallen into disuse, and that the freedom obtained by the aforesaid class exists only in name; for We, who endeavor to cultivate the truth, only desire those things to appear in Our laws which can actually become operative. Given during the Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes. Title
6. Concerning the abolition of Latin freedom, and its transference in certain ways to the entire body of Roman citizens. As the class of
dedititian freedmen, having already been abolished, the freedom of the
Latins, for this reason, becomes in some respects unstable, and though
to a certain extent identified with the former, whatever remained that
was available We have confirmed as law. For as Latin freedom, like that
originally introduced into the ancient Latin colonies, resulted only
in civil war, it would be absurd for its appearance to remain when the
thing itself was abolished. Therefore, as the condition of freedom was obtained by
the Latins in almost innumerable ways, and different laws and decrees
of the Senate were enacted with reference to the same, and in the application
of these the greatest difficulties arose from the Lex Junia, the
Largian Decree of the Senate, and the Edict of the Divine Trajan, of
which Our laws are full, for they were introduced before any experience
had been acquired in matters of this kind. Hence it appears to Us perfectly
proper to remove all these difficulties, abolish Latin freedom, and
having selected other methods different from those by which Latin freedom
was formerly acquired, give authority, at the present time, to such
persons to obtain the status of Roman citizens, so that all the rules
enumerated in the present law, which have originated in Roman States,
and all the other ways by which the name of Latins was acquired shall
be absolutely abolished, and shall not create Latin citizens, but shall
be considered void. For who will tolerate a condition by which, at the
time of his death, freedom and slavery can exist at once in the same
person, and that he who lived as free may die in servitude? (1) Therefore,
We order that if anyone should desire to grant his slave freedom by
means of a letter he can do so, provided he signs it himself, in the
presence of five witnesses called together for that purpose; or when the letter, written in his own hand, discloses
the permanency of his intention. If he, having either drawn up the instrument
himself, or having had it done by a notary, should state therein that
his slave was entitled to his freedom, as in the case of a codicil,
he may, even during the lifetime of his patron, enjoy liberty and the
rights of Roman citizenship. (2) When anyone
desires to liberate his slave in the presence of friends, he shall be
permitted to do so in the same way that he could perform such an act
after having called together five witnesses, provided he announces that
he wishes his slave to be free, where this is done in writing, and attested
by the signatures of the witnesses, and the person granting the manumission;
and if it is made before a public official, it must also bear his signature
as well as that of the witnesses. Slaves
who obtain their freedom in this manner become Roman citizens, just
as if they had obtained it by virtue of a codicil. (3) We know that,
in ancient times, under an Edict of the Divine Claudius, if anyone ejected
his slave publicly from his house when he was suffering from a dangerous
illness, and did not aid him in any way, or commit him to the charge
of others when he himself was unable to take care of him, or place him
in a hospital, or provide for him in some other manner, the said slave
would formerly enjoy Latin freedom, and if his master should die before
he did, he would, with his property, belong to his successor.
A slave of this kind shall hereafter become
absolutely free, even against the consent of his master, and, having
been given his property, he shall immediately become a Roman citizen,
nor shall any of the rights of patronage be enjoyed by his former owner,
for he who publicly drove him away from his house and family, without
either assisting him, recommending him to the mercy of others, placing
him in a hospital, or even paying him ordinary wages, shall be deprived
of the ownership of the said slave, not only during the entire lifetime
of the said freedman, but also at the time of his death, as well as
afterwards. (4) In like manner,
if anyone should alienate his female slave on condition that she would
not prostitute herself, and her new master, through the infamous desire
of gain, should attempt to compel her to do so, or if her former master
should, by the imposition of his hands, make a reservation for himself
when alienating her, and she having been returned to him, cause her
to prostitute herself, she will immediately obtain the privileges of
a Roman citizen, and he who prostituted her will be excluded from all
the rights of patronage, for is anyone so degenerate and wicked as to
pursue such a calling worthy to have either a female slave or a freedwoman? (5) Slaves who
have received the cap of liberty by virtue of the last will of the testator,
and the consent of the heir, immediately become Roman citizens, and
have the right to march first in the funeral procession, and to stand
by the bed on which the body of their master has been laid. No
one shall be permitted to make a display of vain liberality, so that
the people may praise the deceased for his humanity, when they see a
great number of such slaves in the funeral procession wearing the liberty
cap, for they will all be deceived, as the slaves remain in their former
servile condition, and the evidence given in public shall go for naught.
When any such slaves become Roman citizens, the right to patronage is
reserved unimpaired for the benefit of their patrons. (6) It should
undoubtedly be observed that, when anyone manumits a slave either by
his will or under the wand of the Praetor, although he may say or write
that he wishes the slave to enjoy Latin freedom, the superfluous addition
of "Latin" shall be abolished, and he shall become a Roman
citizen, lest the methods by which men were formerly invested with citizenship
may seem to have been annulled by the wills of private persons. (7) But if anyone
should bequeath freedom to his slave conditionally, and while the condition
was still pending, a foreign heir should grant him his freedom, he will
become a Roman citizen, and not a Latin one as in former times. When
the condition is not complied with, the slave shall remain the freedman
of the heir who liberated him. If, however, the
condition should be fulfilled, anyone manumitted by will shall be considered
a freedman of the deceased, in order that children and cognates may
not be deprived of the rights of patronage, and that he who was entitled
to those rights by law may enjoy them. (8) The opinion
held by the ancients seems to Us to be very harsh, that is to say, where
a slave has been defeated by his master in a suit brought to declare
him free, and his value was afterwards paid by someone to his master,
but he still remained subject to Latin law; for how can it be reasonable
for his master to receive the price of the slave, and at the time of
the death of the latter, again reduce him to slavery, since these two
things are not consistent? In the present instance, the slave will be
entitled to Roman freedom, but the rights of patronage will continue
to be enjoyed by his master, for the reason that the slave himself is,
to a certain extent, his freedman. (9) Where, however,
anyone gives his female slave in marriage to a freeman, and provides
her with a dowry, which is only customary in the case of those who are
free, the said female slave becomes a Roman citizen, and not a Latin
one. But if this is done, which very frequently takes place among Roman
citizens, and especially where they are noble, that is to say, where
a dotal instrument is drawn up and delivered to a person of this kind,
such an instrument will necessarily take effect, and the slave will
become a Roman citizen. (10) In like manner,
if a master in a public instrument refers to a certain slave as his
son, his statement must be believed so far as the free condition of
the former is concerned; for if he was inspired with such an affection
for his slave that he did not consider him unworthy to be mentioned
as his son, and he did not do this secretly,
or only among friends, but in a public document, just as he would have
done so in court, how can the slave again be reduced to servitude at
the time of his death? He must, however, become a Roman citizen, receive
absolute freedom, and not depend upon a false statement of his master. (11) Again, the
most recent manner of changing Latin into Roman citizenship should be
adopted, namely, the instrument by which the condition of the slave
was established shall either be given to him or destroyed. But in order
that no opportunity may be afforded to slaves to steal it, and obtain
their freedom by their own wicked act, this manner of enfranchisement
must be proved by certain and undoubted evidence, and the owner of the
slave must either give the instrument to his slave in the presence of
not less than five witnesses, or tear or destroy it in some other way.
Hence, to enable the slave to acquire Roman citizenship, We decree that
one who obtains his freedom in this way shall, in this instance, as
well as in others, be subject to the rights of patronage, except where
We have expressly denied these rights to patrons. (12) With the
exception of these cases alone, which have been selected from the entire
body of ancient jurisprudence relating to Latin citizenship, all the
other methods enumerated either in the books of jurists, or in the Imperial
Constitutions, are absolutely abolished ; and slaves shall not become
Latin citizens by their means, but, as has already been stated, shall
remain in their former condition, and shall not be permitted to profit
by this remedy. And, in order that hereafter no enactment with reference
to Latin freedom may conflict with Our Laws, the Lex Junia is
hereby repealed, the Largian Decree of the Senate shall no longer be
operative, and the Edict of the Divine Trajan, which follows, shall
be of no force or effect, and if any other law, or Decree of the Senate,
or even an Imperial Constitution should treat of Latin manumission,
it shall be void, so far as this subject is concerned, and notice is
hereby given that, instead of the three kinds of freedom which formerly
existed, and which were the cause of much ambiguity, but one direct
method shall prevail. If any law
or constitution should hereafter make mention of freedom, it shall be
understood to be that conferred by Roman citizenship, and not Latin
freedom. (13) Where, however,
Latin freedmen are dead, and their property, as such, has passed to
those.entitled to the same, or if they are still living, no innovations
shall be made by the provisions of this law, but the title to the property
shall vest to the persons aforesaid, and shall remain firm and indisputable.
The present constitution shall only be
applicable to freedmen in the future. Given at Constantinople, on the Kalends of November, after the fifth Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes. Title
7. Concerning the manumission of a slave owned in common. With reference
to slaves owned in common and their freedom, and whether the share of
the person who gave them liberty accrued to the other master, or not,
and especially among soldiers, when they grant freedom in this way,
much doubt arose among the ancient legal authorities ; and a constitution
is cited in the Commentary of Martian on the Constitutions of the Divine
Severus, by whose terms this Emperor imposed the necessity upon the
heirs of a soldier to purchase the share of the other joint-owner, and
give the slave his freedom. Another
constitution, however, promulgated by the Emperors Severus and Antoninus,
has been found, by which one partner is generally required to sell his
share to the other. When freedom
is granted to a slave, even though no benefit may accrue from the estate
of the dead partner to the other, and the price is required to be fixed
by the decision of the Praetor in accordance with what Ulpian, in the
Sixth Book on Trusts, and Paulus in the Third Book on the same subject,
say, where it is stated that Sextus Aelius, one of the ancient jurists,
also held that the other partner could be compelled by the Praetor to
sell his share, in order that the slave might become free, this Marcellus
also notes in his work on the Digest of Julianus, and it is clear that
he in his commentary on Julianus only adopted the opinion of the latter. (1) Hence, these
matters having been found in the works of the ancient legal authorities,
We, desiring to dispose of all such disputes, do order that, generally
speaking, no distinction shall be made between slaves owned in common
by soldiers or private persons, but in the case of all slaves who are
common property, where anyone desires to give them lawful freedom, either
while alive or by his last will, he can do so, and the other joint-owner
shall be required to sell his share of the slave, whether this be half,
a third, or any other portion whatsoever. When
there are several joint-owners, and one of them desires to liberate
the slave, all the others shall be compelled to sell the shares which
they have in said slave to the one who wishes to manumit him, or to
his heir, even though the common slave himself may have been appointed
the heir of his master, and he only made the appointment immediately
before his death, in order that he who purchased the shares of the other
joint-owners, or his heirs, might liberate the slave. (2) If, however,
the joint-owner or joint-owners refuse to accept the price, We give
him permission to tender it through a public official, and having sealed
it, to deposit it in a temple, and thus be authorized to give the slave
his freedom, which he shall enjoy to the fullest extent, as well as
the privilege of Roman citizenship; and he shall have nothing to fear
from the other joint-owners, for they will have
no one to blame but themselves, if, when they were able to benefit by
the price of the slave, they refused to accept it. (3) But in order
that no doubt may arise with reference to the peculium of the
slave, We decree that his peculium shall be divided among all
the joint-owners in proportion to the ownership of each one in the slave;
permission being granted to him who, at the time of his death, liberated
the slave, to transfer to his freedman his share of the peculium
of the former. Moreover, there is no doubt that the rights of patronage
will pass to him who gave the slave his freedom. (4) Where, however,
the slave is obliged to render accounts in order that no loss may occur,
or any impediment be placed in the way of emancipation, the Governor
of the province, or some competent magistrate, must fix the time within
which his accounts shall be rendered, and any debts which may appear
by them to be due shall be discharged, and he shall then obtain his
liberty. (5) Again, in
order that there may be no doubt as to the amount of the price to be
paid for the slave, but that this may be perfectly clear, We order that
the valuation of a slave, whether male or female, provided he or she
is not skilled in any trade, shall be twenty solidi, and that
those slaves who have reached their tenth year shall be valued at only
ten solidi. When, however, they are skilled in any trade, with
the exception of writers and physicians, their price shall be established
up to thirty solidi, whether they are men or women. A writer
or a physician, either male or female, shall be valued as follows: a
writer up to fifty solidi, and a physician up to sixty. When
eunuchs, who are common slaves and are over ten years of age, are not
familiar with any trade, they shall be valued at fifty solidi, but
if they are skilled artisans they shall be valued up to seventy. We
do not wish eunuchs under ten years of age to be valued at more than
thirty solidi. Joint-owners
shall accept the amounts due to them according to the above-mentioned
standard, and shall be compelled by competent judges to grant the slave
his freedom. (6) If one or
more of the joint-owners of a slave desire to liberate him, or release
him at his own solicitation, the latter paying the price, or one or
more of them say that they desire to free him and pay his value, he
shall be preferred who first manifested this generous intention. But
when all of them come forward with the object of manumitting the slave,
then a competent judge shall compel them all to grant him his freedom
without compensation, and his peculium, shall be distributed
among all the joint-owners in proportion to their shares in the slave.
All those who granted freedom to the slave shall be equally entitled
to the rights of patronage. (7) The right
of accrual, introduced by the ancient laws with reference to the manumission
of slaves owned in common, is hereby annulled, and We shall not hereafter,
under any circumstances, permit it to be considered. Given on the Kalends
of April, during the Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 530. 2. The Same
to Julianus, Praetorian Prefect. It was held by all the ancient jurisconsults that a slave owned in common belonged partly to one master and partly to another, so that he could be bequeathed to himself, or to others, hence the following question arose. Two or more persons owned a slave in common, and one of them bequeathed his own share to the slave, and this having caused perplexity, a serious controversy arose among the ancients. Therefore We, having examined this bequest with great care, think that it is capable of two interpretations, for the testator either thought that the slave would become free, so far as his share, which he bequeathed to him in this way, was concerned, or if this was not the case, he was actuated by affection for his other joint-owner, in order that the slave might be acquired by him, intending that his heirs should not gain possession of the slave, so that it would be clear that he should not, by any means, be included in the property of his estate. We, however, who are partisans of freedom, after investigation have come to the conclusion that, with reference to the doubtful intention of the testator, since he desired to liberate the slave, so far as his own share was concerned, and as slaves owned in common are manumitted, We have already decided what was necessary to be done under such circumstances, and the present case shall be determined by the provisions of the aforesaid law. The slave shall therefore become free, so far as the share of the testator is concerned, in compliance with the will of the latter; and with reference to the other share, in accordance with Our ruling, the price must be paid by the heir to the other joint-owner, or owners, in obedience to the above-mentioned constitution, and if they refuse to accept it, he shall tender it, seal it up, and deposit it at their risk, as it is an attribute of Imperial Majesty to adopt the more humane course instead of the harsher one. Title
8. Concerning the manumission of a slave who has been given in pledge. Although a husband,
who is solvent, can manumit a dotal slave, still there is no doubt that
if it should appear that you have been given in pledge to his wife,
you cannot obtain your freedom without her consent. 2. The Same
Emperors to Abascantus. Where freedom
is granted to a slave by a debtor of the Treasury, and the slave has
not been pledged by the terms of a special agreement but only under
the general privilege of the Treasury, the manumission cannot be annulled,
unless it is established that it was made with fraudulent intent. 3. The Same
Emperors to Antony. It is certain
that he who has pledged the property which he now has, or may hereafter
acquire, can grant freedom to his slaves. This rule of law does not
apply to slaves who have been expressly encumbered by way of pledge,
or delivered for that purpose. 4. The Emperor
Alexander to Sabinianus. If (as you allege)
you, together with other slaves, after having been pledged, were manumitted
by the debtor, with the consent of his creditor, you are entitled to
your freedom. Published on the
sixth of the Ides of May, during the Consulate of Alexander,
223. 5. The Same
Emperor to Extritatianus. If the creditors
have been paid, the female slaves who were pledged and manumitted by
the debtor will be free. If the person who manumitted them, or his heirs,
should, for the purpose of revoking their freedom, venture to say that
he had granted the manumission for the purpose of defrauding his creditors,
neither he nor his heirs shall be heard. 6. The Same
Emperor to Auctionus. If your guardian
manumitted slaves purchased with your money, and said slaves, together
with other property belonging to or purchased with the property of the
wards, have been pledged in accordance with the constitution of the
Emperors, My Parents, the said slaves shall not, on account of the indulgence
shown to wards, become free. 7. The Emperor
Gordian to Juliana. If, at the time of your marriage, whether you gave slaves by way of dowry, or whether, after the dowry was given, your husband purchased them with money forming part of your dowry, the ownership of said slaves will justly belong to you, and therefore you are vainly attempting to raise a question with reference to their status after manumission, as they can legally be manumitted by him who purchased them, or received them as dowry. Title
9. Concerning the manumission of slaves belonging to the state. If, as is provided
by the municipal law and the Imperial Constitutions, you have been regularly
manumitted, when you were a public slave (with the consent of the Governor
of the province), you should not again be reduced to slavery on the
ground that you were not entitled to manumission because the slave whom
you gave instead of yourself took to flight. 2. The Same
Emperor to Hadriana. If the Governor
of the province approved the decree by which he with whom you afterwards
(as you allege) were united in marriage received his freedom, there
is no doubt that the child born of a marriage of this kind is a Roman
citizen and under the control of his father. 3. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Philadelphus. The freedman of a municipality does not become a slave where the title by which the ownership of slaves is usually established cannot be produced. If, therefore, you have been manumitted according to the law of Vectibulicius (whose authority it was held extended to the provinces under the Decree of the Senate issued during the Consulate of Jubentius Celsus, Consul for the second time, and Neratius Marcellus), you will be entitled to the rights of Roman citizenship, nor did you afterwards, while a freedman, by discharging the duties of a notary, lose the liberty which you obtained, and your act does not offer any impediment to the acceptance of your son as decurion, as he was born of parents who were free. Title
10. Concerning slaves manumitted by others than their masters. It has frequently
been stated in rescripts that anyone who manumits slaves belonging to
another, as if they were his own, will be required to pay to the owners
of the same their value, or the amount of damages which the latter may
have sustained. Published during
the Kalends of March, during the Consulate of Antoninus and Balbinus,
214. 2. The Emperor
Alexander to Mercurialis. If Felicissima,
who you say purchased a slave by your order, manumitted him without
transferring his ownership to you, you, in vain, demand that he whom
you allege was manumitted should be refused his freedom, and that possession
of him should be delivered to you. 3. The Same
Emperor to Pompeius. He who sold you
the estate will continue to be the owner of the property until he delivers
it to you, and, therefore, by manumitting a slave belonging to the estate,
he grants him his freedom. Published on the
sixth of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Agricola
and Clement, 231. 4. The Emperors
Valerian and Gallienus to Zoilus. If you did not
give the ownership, but merely the services of the female slave referred
to, when granting her her freedom, the person to whom she was given
shall only have the use of her dependent upon your will, and your right
of ownership will not, in the slightest degree, be prejudiced, for no
one can bestow freedom upon a slave belonging to another by manumitting
him as if he was his own. 5. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Marcellina. Where slaves have
been given by way of donation, the donor has no right to manumit them. 6. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Milius and Others. If your father
manumitted your slave, even with your consent, and you were under the
age of twenty years, he could not grant him his freedom. 7. The Emperor
Constantine to Bassus. Where freedom
is granted to the slave of another than his master, and the consent
of judges who have a right to give it is obtained, there need be no
apprehension of the imposition of a penalty. If, however, it is established
that the act was legally performed by Our order, and it is proved that
the owner did not petition for authority to manumit the slave of another,
then he who is shown to have obtained his freedom by Our generosity
to a person who was not his master shall be immediately restored to
him to whom his ownership belongs, and he who manumitted the slave of
another by deceiving the Emperor shall be compelled to give two slaves
of the same sex, age, and occupation to the master of the one whom he
manumitted, and he shall also be compelled to give three of the same
kind to the Treasury. This penalty should not always be imposed, but should preferably
not be inflicted if the manumitted slave is able to plead lawful prescription
when a question is raised as to his status, as the owner can only blame
himself for his loss, if he, by his silence, confirmed the act to his
own disadvantage. Published during the Ides of July, during the Consulate of Constantine, Consul for the fifth time, and Licinius, 319. Title
11. Who cannot manumit slaves, and concerning the prevention of manumission
for the purpose of defrauding creditors. It is a certain
rule of law established by the Lex Aelia Sentia, that grants
of freedom for the purpose of defrauding creditors, when made directly,
can only be revoked where an intention to commit fraud exists; that
is to say, when this is the design of the person who granted the manumission,
and a loss ensues as a result of the intent. It
was formerly decided that the beneficiaries of a trust should be classed
as creditors. Published on the
third of the Ides of November, during the Consulate of Maximian,
Consul for the fifth time, and Aelianus, 224. 2. The Same
Emperor to Natalianus. It is set forth
in the Imperial Mandates that my slaves cannot, by means of the interposition
of other persons, confer freedom on slaves who constitute part of their
peculium. 3. The Same
Emperor to Justina. The Senate, at
the suggestion of the Divine Marcus, provided that no one could manumit
his own slave, or the slave of another who was a performer in an exhibition
which was being given, and that, if this took place, the manumission
should be considered void. 4. The Same
Emperor to Felicissimus. If, while under
twenty years of age, you delivered slaves for the purpose of rendering
them free, it has been decided by a Decree of the Senate that your act
is void. 5. The Same
Emperor to Priscus. When it can be
proved that freedom was fraudulently granted by persons indebted to
the Treasury, the act will not be valid. If, however, he who you state
is your father paid the purchaser the money, and the slave, having been
redeemed by him, obtained his freedom, it cannot be said that the property
of a debtor to the Treasury has been, in any respect, diminished. 6. The Emperor
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Olympia. It is a positive
rule of law that a guardian cannot grant freedom to slaves under a trust
with which his female ward has been charged. Hence, if you were charged
with their manumission, and did not liberate them when you arrived at
the age fixed by the testator, but your guardian did so, they will still
remain in servitude. 7. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Zoticus. If your master, who was indebted on account of his administration of a curatorship, having been proved to be insolvent, should bequeath you your freedom under a trust, this will be of no advantage to you, as in all fiduciary grants of freedom the condition of the estate must only be considered. Title
12. Who cannot obtain their freedom. As my Father,
the Divine Claudius, decided that persons condemned to perpetual imprisonment
could not be liberated by the Governors of provinces, or by other officials
who have authority to punish crime; and that those sentenced for a term
of years, who have been appointed heirs, or have received legacies or
bequests under a trust cannot, during their imprisonment, obtain their
freedom; nor can any one of those to whom such bequests have been made
acquire them; but if they have served out the time for which they were
condemned, and have been released from all restraint, and, as it were,
restored to their former simple condition of slavery, they will be entitled
to their freedom, if it was left to them by the will of a deceased person
during the period of their sentence, without any question being raised
as to the punishment which they have undergone. 2. The Emperors
Valerian and Gallienus to Theodore. He who has been forbidden by will to be manumitted cannot obtain his freedom. But in the case proposed, it makes a difference whether or not those whom the testator forbade to be sold or manumitted, stating that they had been brought up with his children, did so because he considered their services necessary to his household, and for the benefit of his children, or whether he imposed this restriction as a penalty for bad behavior: for, in the first instance, the slaves can obtain their liberty after the death of those whose interests were consulted, but in the second, what has been decided with reference to the punishment of slaves will remain in full force. It was decided by My Divine Parents that the provisions of wills imposing perpetual servitude upon undeserving slaves should be observed, in order that they might not obtain their freedom through a fraudulent purchaser. Title
13. For what reasons slaves can receive their freedom as a reward. Since scrupulous
care as well as the authority of the law should be exercised for the
purpose of increasing and encouraging the practice of fidelity by slaves,
if you can establish by undoubted proof that you have strenuously exerted
yourself to avenge the death of your master, the freedom which was long
since ordered by Decrees of the Senate and Laws of the Emperors to be
granted to slaves who avenge the death of their masters cannot be conferred
upon you, even after having rendered so great a service, merely through
the performance of your act, but you must obtain it by appearing before
the tribunal of the Governor, and in consequence of his decree. Published on the
seventh of the Ides of December, during the Consulate of Maximus. 2. The Emperor
Constantine to Januarius. Slaves who publicly
denounce those who engage in the nefarious occupation of counterfeiting
money shall be given Roman citizenship, and their master shall be paid
their value by the Treasury. Given at Rome,
on the fifteenth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate
of Crispus. 3. The Same
Emperor to the People. If a slave should
publicly denounce someone guilty of ravishing a virgin, who has escaped
arrest through the connivance of the injured person, or because a compromise
has been effected, he shall be given his freedom. Given on the day
before the Kalends of April. 4. The Emperors
Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius to Syagrius. When a slave betrays
a deserter from the army, he shall be presented with his freedom. Given on the Ides of July at Rome, .... Title
14. Concerning the manumission of freeborn persons. If, although you
have been manumitted by will, you state that you are freeborn, you should
bring your case before the proper court, and if you have a lawful opponent,
that is to say, one who alleges that he is your patron, you must remember
that the Senate decreed that those who, after their manumission, claimed
to be freeborn, must leave in the house of the person who manumitted
them any property which they may have acquired while there. It has been
decided by authorities learned in the law that whatever was bequeathed
or given to a freedman is included under this head. 2. The Emperor
Gordian to Pompeia. Neither provision
for support, nor the services exacted of servitude, will render a freeborn
woman a slave, nor will manumission render her a freedwoman. Published on the
fifth of the Ides of May, during the Consulate of Sabinus, Consul
for the second time, and Venustus, 241. 3. The Emperor
Philip to Felicissimus. If it is proved
that your grandmother, although manumitted as a slave, was afterwards
solemnly declared to be freeborn, and her condition was established
by the authority of a judicial decision, and you brought this matter
to the attention of persons learned in the law, you must have readily
ascertained that her children, even though they were born before the
decision was rendered, have good reason to demand their liberty, as
being freeborn. 4. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Agrippa. As you
state that one of your freeborn relatives, who was made prisoner under
the rule of the faction of Palmyra, and sold as a captive, the Governor
of the province will see that he recovers his status as a freeborn citizen. 5. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Crescens. It is extremely
unjust for the condition of freeborn persons to be disputed through
the mistake or malice of others, especially as you allege that one Governor
after another has been applied to by you to summon the adverse party,
in order that he might oppose your claim, if he thought that he had
a valid defence. As the result of this, it appears that the Governor
of the province, being influenced by your statements, rendered a decision
that you should not hereafter be subjected to annoyance. Therefore,
if the other party should still remain obstinate, the Governor, having
been applied to, shall take measures to have you protected from wrong. Given on the day
before the Nones of .... 6. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Dionysius. It is a perfectly
clear rule of law that a person who is free cannot become the slave
of one who is aware of his condition. Therefore, as you allege that
the father of the ward of whom you have made mention in your petition
kept you in his service as a freeman for a long time, he could not have
changed your condition without having a legal title by which the ownership
of property is ordinarily acquired. Ordered on the
seventh of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 7. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Matrona. If it is established
that you and your children are freeborn, the fact of your birth will
be a sufficient defence, for he who raises the question of slavery by
renouncing any claims which he may have, can, in no way, weaken the
evidence of freebirth, or gain any advantage by doing so. 8. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Callimorphus. Freeborn persons
come into the world as such. Freedmen can only be created by manumission.
Moreover, an agreement cannot confer the privilege of free birth upon
either slaves or freedmen, nor can the rights of those who have not
given their consent to a transaction of this kind be prejudiced in any
way. 9. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Patamon. It is a clear
and manifest rule of law that a woman born of a mother who has been
manumitted is born free, and therefore, as you allege that since your
mother was a freedwoman, and was afterwards captured by the enemy, and
returned home under the rule of postliminium, and that now the
question is raised whether or not you are a slave, you must appear before
the Governor of the province, who has jurisdiction of cases in which
freedom is involved, and he will render a decision according to law,
knowing that neither the status of your mother under such circumstances
nor the captivity which she endured will change her former condition
in any respect. 10. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Athenodora. Names are given
by public consent for the purpose of recognizing individuals, and no
damage results if they are changed for the purpose of concealing the
origin of persons who are freeborn; and the possession of anyone as
a slave (even though he may perform the services of one) does not render
him such if he was born free. 11. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Maxima. If no title establishes
the right to possess you as a slave, but, on the other hand, you can
prove that you were born free, and performed services for wages, which
were agreed upon, your condition is in no respect injuriously affected,
nor will you be forbidden to institute legal proceedings to compel the
fulfillment of the contract. Ordered on the
Nones of March, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 12. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Quieta. The commission
of the crime of kidnapping has no effect in changing the status of a
freeborn woman; but it is established that one who has been abducted
can, even afterwards, remain in the condition in which she was born. Ordered on the
third of .... 13. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Melander. Anyone who contends
that he is freeborn, but is unable to prove it, does not necessarily
lose his status as a freedman. Ordered on the seventh of the Ides
of December. 14. The Same fflmperors and Caesars to Aristotle. The condition
of a freeborn woman can, in no way, be prejudiced, merely from the fact
that she has been given in betrothal as a female slave. Ordered on the seventh of the Kalends of January, .... Title
15. General provisions with reference to manumissions. We order that
if the owner of a slave, whose usufruct belongs to another, should grant
him his freedom, he shall not, according to the ancient rule, be deprived
of it, but shall be considered as having no master, so that no one can
be found to whom any property which may be acquired by him will belong.
If, however, both the owner and the usufructuary
should agree to liberate him, he will become free without any restriction;
and if he should afterwards acquire any property, it shall be his. But
when the owner alone sets him free, without the consent of the usufructuary,
he who, in this way, obtains his liberty from his owner, shall be included
among the freedmen of the latter; and if he should afterwards obtain
any property, he shall acquire it in his own name and be permitted to
leave it to his descendants, the right of patronage being always reserved,
unless his emancipator was deprived of it by the laws. The
freedman himself, however, shall remain with the usufructuary as a slave,
as long as the former lives, unless he is deprived of the usufruct in
a lawful manner. Where the usufruct is terminated in any way, then the
slave shall be permitted to reside wherever he pleases. If, however,
the freedman should die during the lifetime of the usufructuary, his
estate shall descend according to law. Where the usufructuary alone
grants freedom to the slave, the usufruct reverts to the owner, and
he will enjoy complete authority over the slave, and the latter will
acquire all property for him, in accordance with what has been generally
provided with reference to slaves and masters. If the usufructuary should
release the slave from the usufruct, for the purpose of doing him a
favor, and then present him with his freedom, the slave will remain
under the control of the owner, but the necessity is not imposed upon
slaves during the life of the usufructuary, or for the time that the
usufruct may exist, to obey the owner, and perform the services required
of a slave, but Our judge shall see that he remains unmolested.
After the death of the usufructuary, or where the usufruct
has been extinguished in any way, he shall serve the master as a slave,
and all property which may, in the meantime, come into his hands, he
will acquire for his master. This separation shall exist between masters and slaves
as provided by the terms of Our Constitution, and not in accordance
with the ancient law by which the said slaves remained without a master. (1) We make the
following addition to this law, namely, that the ancient distinction
of persons having been abolished, parents of either sex shall be permitted,
in the case of sons and daughters who are under their control or emancipated
and their descendants of every degree, to impose their commands upon
them by will, so far as granting freedom to slaves is concerned; whether
the testator desired that this should
be done in a church, or in any other lawful manner which he might select.
For, since in successions, as well as in almost all other things, no
distinction is made between children, this rule must be observed (and
above all in the present instance) in favor of freedom which is especially
and peculiarly Our care to cherish and protect by the Roman laws. Given on the fifteenth
of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Lampadius and
Orestes, 530. 2. The Same
Emperor to Julianus, Praetorian Prefect. Where anyone bestows
freedom upon a slave, either in a church or any other sacred edifice,
or in any tribunal, or before any judge who has authority under the
law to grant freedom, whether this be done by will, or by any final
disposition of property, either directly or under the terms of a trust,
the age of those who obtain their freedom shall, under no circumstances,
offer any impediment. For We do not wish that those only who have passed
the age of thirty shall acquire Roman citizenship, as was formerly done,
but, as in the case of ecclesiastical enfranchisement, no distinction
of age exists, so whenever freedom is granted by masters to slaves either
under last wills, before magistrates, or in any other legal manner,
We order that they shall all become Roman citizens; for We think that
the number of those should rather be increased than diminished. 3. The Same
Emperor to John, Praetorian Prefect. Where a man who
has no wife keeps his female slave as a concubine, and persists in this
practice until his death, whether he had children by her or not, We
order that the said female slave shall, under no circumstances, belong
to his heirs, and that her children, if she has any, shall not be reduced
to slavery; but that, after the death of her master, she, together with
her offspring, if she has had any by the deceased, shall obtain their
freedom in the manner to be explained hereafter. We
grant permission to the master, during his lifetime, to make use of
his female slaves, as well as of their offspring, in any way that he
may desire, and to dispose of them by his last will in accordance with
his wishes; that is to say, bequeath them as slaves to others, or leave
them by name to his heirs to remain in servitude. But
if he should pass them over in silence, then, after his death, they
shall obtain their freedom, which will date from the death of their
master. Neither the ancient laws nor Our own, however, permit men who
have wives to keep either freedwomen, or slaves as concubines. Given at Constantinople, on the Kalends of November, after the Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 531. Title
16. Concerning cases involving freedom. You confess that
you have committed an unlawful and dishonorable act, as you state that
your own children, who were born free, have been sold by you; but, for
the reason that what you have done cannot injure your children, go before
a competent judge (if you desire to do so) in order that the case may
be decided in conformity with the law. Published on the
fifth of the Ides of February, .... 2. The Same
Emperor to Veronianus. If those who you
allege are your slaves are declared by others to be free, their status
must be determined in the ordinary way, for even where a decision has
been rendered with reference to their ownership, this cannot be advanced
in opposition to a matter involving freedom. Given at Rome
on the Nones of February, during the Consulate of Messala and
Sabinus, 215. 3. The Emperor
Alexander to Quirinus. If a freeman cohabits
with the female slave of another, he does not become the slave of her
master, even if he has been notified to abandon her. Published on the
Nones of February, during the Consulate of Fuscus and Dexter,
226. 4. The Same
Emperor to Jocundus. If he whom you
claim as a slave has, after proper investigation, been decided to be
free (although this may have been done in your absence), another opportunity
to claim him as a slave shall not be afforded you. If, however, after
you ascertained the fact, you appealed from the decision of the judge,
it shall be determined by the appellate court whether judgment was rendered
in accordance with law. 5. The Same
Emperor to Sabinus. The woman whom
you declared to be your slave is none the less entitled to demand her
freedom, because you purchased her from the Treasury. Nor can recourse
to prescription be had at the present time, because, when the sale took
place, the woman was more than twenty years old, as age cannot be pleaded
by way of prescription against Roman citizenship, unless the slave is
shown to have consented to become such in consideration of sharing the
price. The burden of proof is placed
upon one who, being a slave, asserts that he is free, and if he cannot
establish his assertion, you will obtain the undisputed right of possession. 6. The Emperors
Valerian and Gallienus, and the Caesar Valerian, to Versimenus. Even if you voluntarily
stated in writing that you were a slave, and not free, you would not,
by doing so, prejudice your rights in any
respect, and this is all the more true as you allege that you are compelled
to do this. 7. The Emperor
Aurelian to Secundus. If you have been
manumitted by the person whose slave you were, there is no reason for
you to maintain the controversy with reference to your freedom, and
above all, with the heir who manumitted you; for even if your freedom
was not legally obtained, the heir, on account of his acceptance of
the estate, has confirmed the will of the deceased by his consent. 8. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Verina. As you allege
that it was agreed between your former owner and yourself that he should,
upon the payment of a certain sum of money, manumit you as well as your
daughter, and he only liberated you, you should appear before the Governor
of the province and he will urge your former master to abide by his
agreement, all respect which freedmen are accustomed to display toward
their patrons being shown him. Given on the day
before ...., during the Consulate of Maximus, Consul for the second
time, and Aquilinus, 286. 9. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Proculus. As the terms of
your petition set forth, he against whom you filed it is the son of
your female slave, still as you refer to him by a name which can only
be borne by persons who are free, and state that he is not a slave,
but only bears the stigma of servitude, you are notified that your petition
is directed against one who is not a slave. 10. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Stratonicus. It is a positive
rule of law that freemen cannot become slaves, and their condition be
changed either by a private agreement, or by any act of administration
whatsoever. 11. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Faustinus. Slaves will not
change their status if they unlawfully and dishonorably obtain public
office. Wherefore, if a question arises with reference to yours, you
are advised that it is of no advantage to you that your father enjoyed
civil distinction. Hence, after all the legal formalities have been
complied with, your condition must be determined by the Governor of
the province. 12. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Proculus. If you were born
of a female slave, and someone purchased you, you will remain in the
condition in which you formerly were; but if, being the child of a female
slave, your natural father, who was also your master, sold you, and
afterwards you paid the price to the purchaser, you will not, for that
reason, obtain your freedom. Published on the
eighteenth of the Kalends of May, .... 13. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Paulus. A judicial
tribunal cannot concern itself principally with the status of a deceased
person. If, then, property is claimed, as part of the peculium belonging
to the estate of him whom you mention as having bequeathed it, or if
any question arises as to the status of his children, all these points
must be formally decided by the Governor of the province. Given on the fifth
of the Kalends of May, .... 14. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Quintianus. When proceedings
have been instituted with reference to one whose liberty is in dispute,
and he is in possession of it, he will, in the meantime, be considered
free. Given at Heraclea,
on the fourth of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of
the above-mentioned Emperors. 15. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Palladius. The loss of a
document establishing anyone's birth does not exclude other evidence
to prove the same, nor can a forged document of this kind affect the
truth. Therefore, in order to ascertain the truth every proof allowed
by law should be admitted, and the Governor of the province having been
applied to, and all requisite formalities having been observed, he will
decide the case between you in accordance with the legal requirements. 16. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Diogenia. If you, being
a free woman, have served as such, and, without your knowledge, an instrument
was drawn up under whose terms you were given by way of dowry as a female
slave, these things can, in no way, prejudice your freedom; and, above
all, as you state that you were a minor at the time, and it has been
decided that minors less than twenty years old can, under no circumstances,
change their status and become slaves instead of freemen, in order that
no one may unintentionally lose his liberty before reaching the age
at which others cannot confer it without authority. Published on the
sixth of the Ides of May, during the Consulate of Hadrian. 17. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Resinus. In numerous instances,
the status of brothers who are freeborn varies, on account of the commission
of crime, or other events which have taken place. Therefore, there is
nothing to prevent the question of status being raised with reference
to those whom you assert are your brothers, and whether they shall be
claimed as slaves, or maintained in servitude. Hence, other evidence
is necessary to establish their freedom, for it is clear that the fact
that your liberty has not been questioned is not sufficient proof. 18. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Zoticus. The lease made
to you by the person against whose heirs you have brought suit is not
sufficient evidence of your free origin, nor does this alone show conclusively
that you are a slave. Given on the Ides
of July, at Philippi, under the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 19. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Paulus. In Our opinion,
he against whom you have filed your petition, rather than you yourself,
has the principal interest in the case, for as you state that you have
given him his freedom, it is more to his interest to formally defend
his status, and consequently your case also is included in his; for
if he is declared to be a slave by the party against whom you have filed
your petition, he can claim his freedom on the ground of your manumission,
and, by proving his original servitude, and showing that he obtained
his freedom through your having manumitted him, your right of patronage
will be preserved. When, however,
he prefers to remain a slave, then, after having appeared before the
Governor of the province, you will be permitted by law to defend him
even against his own consent. 20. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Aeternalis. Just as when freedom
has once been conferred it cannot be revoked, so, where masters take
any steps whatever against their own slaves, without the intention of
manumitting them, they will sustain no loss. Ordered on the
sixth of the Kalends of September, during the Consulate of the
above-mentioned Emperors. 21. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Thrasylla. It is provided
by the Perpetual Edict that a woman who is found in the possession of
freedom fraudulently obtained occupies the same position as one who
is still in servitude. If, however, any controversy should arise, whether
she who is in slavery petitions for freedom, or whether it is clearly
proved that, while free, an attempt has been made to enslave her, no
fraud committed by a female slave should deprive her master of his rights. Ordered on the
Nones of October, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 22. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Pardala. It is a man's
parents, and not his own statements, that establish the fact of his
birth. Wherefore, if, having been born of a female slave, and afterwards
manumitted, you obtained your freedom, you can, by no means, lose it,
either through fraudulently or erroneously contending that you are the
child of another female slave, for slaves are known to be born in that
condition, and are not rendered such merely by their own assertions. Given on the fifth
of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 23. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Muscia. If freedom was
directly bequeathed to you by your master in his will, and his daughters
succeeded him as his appointed heirs, it does not follow that, either
according to his will, or in opposition to it, if you serve one of his
daughters, the others can revoke your freedom. 24. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Sebastian. A woman
is not excluded from demanding her freedom, if she has been interrogated
and has publicly acknowledged that she is a slave. 25. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Licentianus. When the instruments
evidencing manumission, which was legally effected, have not been drawn
up, this, in no way, prejudices the grant of freedom, so that, if you
have liberated a slave, the failure to execute such instruments cannot
possibly injure him. Ordered on the
fifth of the Ides of February, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 26. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Modestus. A patron cannot
revoke freedom when it has once been bestowed upon a manumitted slave;
and he can be compelled to produce the instrument evidencing the manumission. 27. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Austerius. If Arianus was
declared to be free, after the question as to his status had been raised
by Leonis, he cannot again be claimed as a slave by the former, after
he has lost his case. A co-heir having been given to you by Arianus,
who was in collusion with the person who raised the controversy with
reference to the status of the deceased, or his heirs, cannot injure
you in any respect, nor can admissions made by them affect the truth,
or change the condition of the estate of the deceased. 28. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Eurymedontus. The fact that
a paternal grandfather was invested with the dignity of a magistrate
can be of no advantage to his grandson, in proving that he is free,
as in a case involving freedom the status of the mother and not that
of the father must be considered. The civil condition of the maternal
grandmother is not of itself sufficient, for although she was proved
to be free, still, a person's status may be lost in many ways. Given on the fourth
of the Ides of April, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 29. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Troila. There is no doubt
that a daughter born of a female slave, and who was purchased by the
man with whom she afterwards lived in concubinage, will remain in servitude
if she is not manumitted. 30. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Eutychia. Freedom, when
once bestowed, cannot be revoked under the sole pretext that proper
respect has not been shown to the patron. 31. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Cassiana. If an inquiry
has been wrongfully instituted for the purpose of proving you to be
a slave, and you have brought suit for malicious prosecution, or for
injury committed (whichever one you may select), and it has been decided
that you were a slave, you can afterwards ask that judgment be rendered
against the adverse party, and that restitution be made of the property
of which you can prove that you are deprived, after a decision has been
given declaring you to be free. 32. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Athenais. The signature
of the son of the master who manumitted you does not add anything to,
or if it is omitted, does not detract in any way from a grant of freedom. 33. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Melitiana. Although your
master manumitted you after you had paid him a sum of money, still the
freedom which you have received cannot be revoked. Ordered on the
third of the Ides of November, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 34. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Eremonia. A free woman does
not become a slave on account of living in concubinage. Given on the Ides
of November, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 35. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Attatus. The fact that
a person is said to have administered the affairs of a minor in the
capacity of his guardian does not release him from defending himself,
when the question as to whether or not he is a slave is raised. Given on the Nones
of November, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 36. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Theodore. When a mistress
agrees with her female slave that, after having served her for a certain
time, she shall become free, she will, by no means, be required to observe
her contract. On the other hand, it is also true that a free woman can
not be compelled to comply with her agreement, if she is proved to have
promised to give you her own children as slaves. 37. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Olympius. If you sold your
son, who is free, to your son-in-law, who, being so closely connected
with you, could not pretend ignorance of his condition, you cannot accuse
one another of crime. 38. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Philesarphus. An action to determine
your status can be brought against you, in the name of the State, notwithstanding
the fact that no one denies that you have been created limenarch. Given at Nicomedia,
on the sixteenth of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate
of the Caesars. 39. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Potesenticus. It is settled
that freemen who allege that they are slaves cannot change their condition. Ordered on the
seventh of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of the
Caesars. 40. A Copy
of the Imperial Letters of the Above-Mentioned Emperors and Caesars
to Verutus. According to the
provisions of Our Edict, nothing will prevent a case involving freedom
from being heard and a decision rendered in accordance with justice,
notwithstanding the absence of one of the parties, whether the controversy
arose with reference to manumission or free birth. 41. The Emperors
Constantine and Licinius to Eutychius, Governor of Cappadocia. We order that
all the letters that the mistress of the slave Aelius wrote to him as
Chief Decurion shall be null and void and revoked as of no effect, and
that the investigation to determine the free birth of the said Aelius
shall proceed, nor shall the rights of the woman be prejudiced for the
reason that she addressed him as Chief Decurion, or that he himself
pretended to be a decurion or the head of that body, when his servile
condition has been ascertained not only by the testimony of witnesses,
and that of his relatives, but also by the admissions made by himself
in the presence of another magistrate. 42. The Emperor
Constantius to Maximus, Praetorian Prefect. It has been decided
that children born of a mother whose condition is contested shall follow
her after judgment has been rendered in the case. Any, however, whose
birth occurred before the suit was instituted, shall have their status
determined separately, since those alone who were born during the proceedings
are to be included in the decision given with reference to their mother,
and shall either be delivered to their lawful owners, or enjoy their
freedom with their parents. Given on the day before the Ides of July, .... Title
17. Concerning the abolition of legal, assertions that a man is free. We order that
actions involving the servile condition which have been begun shall
be regarded with favor, as well as shortened; and direct that if anyone
who, up to the time, has served as a slave, should declare himself to
be free, or while enjoying freedom should be claimed as a slave, he
shall, in neither instance, be required to provide a defender, but shall
himself answer in his own proper person the claim of him who alleges
that he is his master; and if, after having been in the possession of
freedom, he should be reduced to slavery, he shall be forbidden to employ
an attorney, We absolutely forbid those who have passed from slavery
to freedom to defend themselves in this way, all the laws which provide
that cases requiring defenders shall be heard a second and a third time
being, for the future, repealed; for it is just that the first decision
should remain in full force, where no appeal is taken. If one is taken,
the judge shall examine the case just as he would any other which has
been appealed, without a second examination being required by the laws
enacted with reference to cases in which defenders appear, and which
We have rescinded. (1) We also abolish
the ancient rule requiring defence in actions involving the peculium
or other personal effects of slaves, directing that not ,only the
peculium of those who, while in servitude, have tak.en legal
steps to become free, but also any other property which is claimed shall
be placed in safe-keeping, by order of court. (2) Moreover,
all those whose freedom is in danger through their being claimed as
slaves shall be compelled to furnish a surety, if they wish to do so;
but when it is impossible for them to provide one, and this is clearly
proved to the judge, they shall be bound by being sworn. If, after proceedings of this kind have been instituted,
they purposely absent themselves, and, having been summoned to appear,
remain absent for more than a year; they shall, by all means, be reduced
to slavery, and decided beyond question to be the property of him who
brought suit against them. (3) Again, We
wish those who claim anyone as a slave to know that, if after the first
demand has been presented in any court, or made by virtue of an Imperial
Rescript, and he who is alleged to be a slave has been notified, and,
having been released, the parties bring another claim against him in
a different court, even if the reputed slave should have given occasion
for this to be done, the plaintiffs, although they may be his legal
masters, shall be deprived of their right. Given on the third
of the Ides of December, .... 2. The Same
Emperor to John, Praetorian Prefect. We think that the difficulty which may arise under Our present law, authorizing adsertores, should be disposed of by a comprehensive remedy. As the action with reference to freedom was usually conducted by them, if, while this was taking place, the principal party in interest should die, the necessity was, nevertheless, imposed upon the adsertor to conduct the case to a conclusion, so that if the purchaser should be defeated, and a decision be rendered in favor of freedom, he can have recourse against the vendor, and the latter return to him what was contained in the bill of sale, or what the nature of the contract required, on account of having sold him a person who was free. Moreover, as the empty name of adsertor is abolished by the present law, if any person whose status is the subject of litigation should die, how can the judgment be executed where only one party is left to appear in court? Therefore We decree that, in the present instance, the purchaser shall be permitted to proceed against the vendor to the extent of proving that the latter sold him a freeman as a slave, or if he cannot do this, that he should be subjected to the risk of eviction for having sold a person who was free. Title
18. What slaves are not permitted to declare that they are free, and concerning the property of those who are forbidden to do so. The case of him
who, concealing his condition, permitted himself to be sold as a slave,
differs from that of him who shared in the price paid for himself; for
the former is not denied the right to demand his freedom, but if the
latter was a Roman citizen, and shared in the price, he cannot claim
this right. The most eminent legal authorities have decided that the
same rule is applicable to one who is entitled to his freedom under
the terms of a trust. Published on the
Kalends of May, during the Consulate of Gordian and Aviola, 240. 2. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Melana. Our predecessors,
the Emperors, decreed that freedom should be denied to the descendants
of the families of robbers who had been made slaves by Imperial donation,
or by the authority of the Treasury. 3. The Emperor
Constantine to Maximus, Praetorian Prefect. When anyone demands
his freedom, he will be entitled to any of his property which he states
is in the hands of his alleged master, since, if there is no question
as to his status, the judge must at once order it to be restored, and
delivered to him. When, however, there is any doubt as to the ownership
of property which he claims, because the master refuses to surrender
it, a bond shall be executed to preserve it, and the hearing of the
case shall be postponed. If the freedom of the reputed slave should
be established (as those must be protected who have entrusted him with
their property) an account of his administration must be rendered, and
everything which is due shall be paid, so that if he is proved to be
free, he who formerly acted as his master may acquire what was given
to the slave by the right of ownership, as well as whatever was derived
from the possession and profits of the said property, and anything obtained
surreptitiously from it by the alleged slave; as that could not be free
which the master placed in the hands of his slave as peculium.
Property, however, obtained either by will or donation,
or which was purchased or acquired with the profits of the same, shall
belong to the said alleged slave as being freeborn. After judgment has
been rendered declaring him to be free, all this property should be
sequestered, after having been separated from that above mentioned;
so that, both having been set aside and placed in full view, each of
the parties may claim that to which he is entitled. Given at Thessalonica, on the fifteenth of the Kalends of March, under the Consulate of Severus and Rufinus, 343. Title
19. Concerning the order of judicial inquiries. As you, yourself,
have acknowledged that a controversy has arisen concerning your status,
with what reason do you demand that, before it has been established,
you should be granted authority to accuse him who contends that you
are his slave? Therefore, as you
allege that you are confident of success, appear before the Governor
of the province, who, in accordance with the general rule, will not
hesitate to render a proper decision with reference to the crime said
to have been committed, dependent, of course, upon the result of the
case involving your freedom, which must first be determined. Published during
the Ides of ... , during the Consulate of Maximus, Consul
for the eleventh time, and Julianus, 224. 2. The Same
Emperor to Gallus. Where a controversy
has arisen both with reference to the title to an estate and the right
of someone to freedom, the latter must first be heard. Where only the
ownership of the estate is directly concerned, any question involving
freedom must first be decided; but it will be sufficient for him who
enjoys his liberty to have succeeded, where judgment was rendered in
his favor in an action brought to recover the estate. Published on the
fifth of the Ides of August, during the Consulate of Maximus,
Consul for the second time, 224. 3. The Same
Emperor to Valerius. If an accusation
of crime is brought against a woman whom you say is freeborn, the Governor
must not take cognizance of this case before deciding the one in which
her liberty is involved, as, if the crime should be proved, it will
be necessary in the first place to ascertain whether she must be punished
as a woman who was free and freeborn, or as a female slave. 4. The Emperor
Gordian to Menedemus. If a controversy
has arisen with reference to your status, and a decision should be rendered
in your favor at the termination of the case, you will not be prevented
from proceeding against him who asserted that he was your master. If,
however, he did not claim you as his own slave, but accused you of being
the slave of another, no judgment should be rendered on the question
of freedom, and the examination of the case before the judge will show
whether the accusation should be heard in order to determine your condition,
or whether it should be rejected. Given on the tenth
of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of Gordian and
Aviola, 240. 5. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Alphenus. As you allege
that a controversy has arisen with reference to your status, and that
you desire to bring suit to collect certain debts, the ordinary practice,
under such circumstances, is for the case involving your freedom to
be decided by the Governor of the province, after the usual formalities
have been complied with (if the law permits this to be done) ; and if
you should become free, or the decision should be that you are not a
slave, then the magistrate will order your debts to be paid to you,
provided they are lawfully due; as, if the decree should set forth that
you are a slave, it is uncertain whether they are due to you as a freeman,
or to your master, and their payment cannot be exacted from your debtor. Ordered on the
day before the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 6. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Alexandria. If you allege
that your property has been stolen or carried away by those whom you
claim as your slaves, and they should apply to a court to grant them
freedom, and the case should be decided against them, actions for damages
and for property clandestinely removed must then be brought before the
Governor of the province, and if the persons in question are decided
to be free, or not slaves, the actions for damages and to recover whatever
has been removed can be tried; and, after proper evidence has been offered,
they shall be sentenced. If, however, the result should be otherwise, and they should
be found to be slaves, the suits having reference to the clandestine
removal of the property shall be dismissed. Given on the third
of the Ides of January, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 7. The Emperor
Constantine to Bassus, Praetorian Prefect. If, when a question as to status arises, the person alleged to be a slave is accused of having stolen something from his master, it must first be considered whether the reputed slave, being in servitude, believes that he has a right to his freedom; or whether, while in the enjoyment of his freedom, an attempt is being made to reduce him to slavery. When he who is in slavery demands his freedom, it is proper that his condition should first be decided, and afterwards the case of the theft should be investigated, if circumstances demand it. But where he who is alleged to be a slave is said to have stolen something, whatever is proved to have been taken must be returned to him, provided he furnishes proper sureties for its preservation. If, however, he should be unable to furnish them, then it is proper that all the property in dispute should be sequestrated, until the controversy is settled, but this should be done in such a way that, if the party interested has no other resources, whatever is necessary for the expenses of litigation and for the support of the said alleged slave must be reserved from the said property to the amount that the judge may decide to be reasonable. But if the question with reference to status has not been raised, but someone has stolen certain articles, and has been ordered to restore possession of them to the owner for the purpose of avoiding the execution of the sentence, he will be required to return the said property without asking for security, and then the case involving his freedom shall proceed according to law. Title
20. Concerning the detection of collusion. As you state that
your mother's slave has not only been guilty of committing sexual intercourse
with her, but, in addition to this disgraceful conduct, has, in collusion
with her and under the pretext of false captivity, planned to have himself
declared freeborn by a competent judge, and your mother did not grant
him his freedom, but, as you assert, attempted to establish his free
birth by fraudulent representations, it is clear that he still remains
her slave; for as you say that she did not manumit him, the slave does
not appear to have become free, and cannot have recourse to the Rescript
of the Divine Pius, published with reference to captivity, nor could
the mere statement that you had consented confer upon him the right
of freedom. Published on the
fourteenth of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Diocletian,
Consul for the fourth time, and Maximian, Consul for the third time,
290. 2. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Milesius. It is clearly
stated by the Noninian Decree of the Senate that a freedman is not permitted
to change his status by means of a private contract, and a penalty for
collusion is fixed by it, and as well as a reward promised to the informer. Given on the fifth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of the Caesars. Title
21. The status of a deceased person cannot be brought in question after
the expiration of five years. A competent judge,
after having been applied to, will examine the question of prescription,
and whether the patron of Domitia, who lived as a Roman citizen until
his death, can be proved to have died five years before the controversy
with reference to the property of the said woman arose; for her condition
as a freedwoman cannot be revoked on account of the alleged incapacity
of the person who manumitted her. 2. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Maximus. If he who appointed
you his heir is said to have been a slave on account of the condition
of his mother, and she died five years before any controversy on this
point aroise, there will be ground for prescription, as no inquiry can
be instituted with reference to his status without also investigating
that of his mother. This rule only
applies to cases where the persons concerned lived as Roman citizens,
without dispute, until the time of their death. Published during
the second Consulate of Antoninus and Geta, 206. 3. The Emperor
Alexander to Olympias. Although your
husband, concerning whose condition a controversy has arisen, is dead,
the case shall be continued notwithstanding his death, on account of
his estate, and it must be decided by the court having jurisdiction
over estates, or property forming part of the same. 4. The Same
Emperor to Martianus. If he whom you
allege to have been your slave, and who was manumitted by your brother,
and appointed his heir, lived as a Roman citizen after his manumission,
and you did not begin proceedings for the purpose of determining his
status within five years after his death, you understand that you cannot,
in violation of the provisions of the Decree of the Senate, raise any
controversy, either with reference to the heirs appointed by your brother,
or concerning the condition of those whom he intended to be free.
If, however, you instituted proceedings
before that period of time has elapsed, and claimed his peculium
in accordance with the legal formalities required, and also brought
suit to recover the slaves who were manumitted, you will not be prevented
from proceeding in accordance with the terms of the Edict. Published on the
fifth of the ... of June, during the Consulate of Modestus and Probus,
229. 5. The Emperor
Gordian to Severus. The rule which
has been established, namely, that no question can be raised with reference
to the condition of deceased persons after the lapse of five years,
does not, in any way, apply to an apparent emancipation which has not
been perfected by law. 6. The Emperors
Valerius and Gallienus to Polla. If your mother,
while living, was generally believed to be freeborn, and five years
have elapsed since her death, you can plead the well-known prescription
on this point against the State and the minor heirs, if they should
attempt to raise a question as to your condition. Moreover, a judicial inquiry must be instituted to determine
whether or not she passed as a freeborn woman when she died, and if
it was found that she was not always considered such, the general opinion
at the time of her decease must be taken into account. Published on the
sixth of the Ides of June, during the Consulate of Secularis
and Donatus, 261. 7. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Heliodorus. If your father
lived as a freeborn man until his death, and no controversy as to whether
he was a slave of the Treasury or not arose before the Governor of the
province, who is accustomed to decide questions of this kind, but the
matter was brought before the Imperial Procurator, who is not a competent
judge of such cases, and five years elapsed after your father's death,
your condition is protected by the prescription derived from the Decree
of the Senate. 8. The Same
Emperors to Theodora. The right to claim
the property composing the peculium of your slave is not barred
by prescription, if the said property is in possession of another under
an unlawful title. For the Decree of the Senate which was
enacted to prevent the revoking of the condition of deceased persons
does not apply, if the decedent, having taken to flight, died a fugitive. Given at Milan, on the tenth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of Diocletian and Maximian. Title
22. Concerning the prescription of long time which is pleaded in behalf
of and not against freedom. The benefit of
prescription based on long time cannot be claimed by anyone who, for
an extended period, has enjoyed freedom fraudulently obtained. Therefore,
as you acknowledge that you fled from the person whom you mentioned,
you understood that you are not in possession of liberty without being
guilty of fraud. 2. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Carcinus. The possession
of freedom lawfully acquired can be resolutely maintained by prescription,
since the favor with which it is regarded— and good reason as well—argue
that prescription should benefit those who have been in possession of
liberty for the term of twenty years, without their right being challenged
by anyone seeking to disturb them, so that they may become both free,
and Roman citizens. Given at Antioch,
on the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Constantius,
Consul for the fourth time, and Maximus, Consul for the second time,
302. 3. Copy of
the Imperial Letter of Constantine and Licinius addressed to Dionysius,
Temporarily in Charge of a Prefecture. It is consistent
with equity that the rights of freedom should, in no way, be interfered
with, solely on account of lapse of time, even if the term of sixty
years has passed. Given on the fourth of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of Volusianus and Annianus, 314. Title
23. Concerning the peculium of him who has obtained his freedom. You should not forget that a great difference exists between the cases of those who have been manumitted by persons who were living at the time, and those to whom freedom has been bequeathed by will, as, in the first instance, they are tacitly entitled to their peculium if they were not specifically deprived of it, and in the second, the heirs will have the right to it, unless it was expressly left to the manumitted slave. This rule of law is perfectly clear. Title
24. Concerning the abolition of the Claudian Decree of the Senate. As We think that during oar reign (when We have exerted ourselves so greatly in favor of the liberty of Our subjects) it would be extremely wicked for certain women to be deprived of their freedom, and that from the lust of unprincipled men there should result a state of affairs which could only be caused by the ferocity of enemies in violation of natural law, We desire that the Claudian Decree of the Senate, as well as all denunciations and legal decisions having reference to the same, shall hereafter be abolished, so that any woman who is free and has been deceived, or rendered the victim of unfortunate affection, shall not, for this or any other reason, be reduced to slavery, and the liberty to which she was entitled by birth lost; and the worst dishonor tarnish the glory of her kindred, as she may, perhaps, have relatives of distinguished rank, and the master under whose control she comes may be inferior to her relatives. This rule shall also apply to freedmen, for the principles by which My reign is governed do not suffer that a person who once has obtained freedom shall, under any circumstances, be reduced to slavery for such a cause. But to prevent slaves and serfs from thinking that they can go unpunished for the commission of such acts (and this is especially provided in the case of serfs in order that their condition may not be gradually changed through their marriage with free women), We order that if anything of this kind should be perpetrated by either a slave or a serf, his master shall have full authority, either in his own person or by the Governor of the province, to administer proper punishment to the said slave or serf, and separate him from the said woman. If he should fail to do this, he is hereby notified that his own loss will be the result of his neglect. Title
25. Concerning the abolition of the mere civil right of Romans. With the intention of abolishing by this law a ridiculous example of the subtlety of the ancient jurists, We shall not hereafter permit any distinction to be made between owners who hold property merely by the civil right of Romans, and those who hold it as part of their own possessions, for the reason that We do not wish this distinction to exist any longer, as the term "Ex jure Quiritium" is enigmatical, is nowhere seriously considered, and does not strictly apply to property, but is a phase void of meaning, and superfluous, and by it the minds of youths who are beginning the study of the law are bewildered, and they are compelled to learn the useless provisions of ancient enactments. Therefore, anyone who is the owner of a slave, or of any other property which belongs to him, shall become its full and lawful proprietor. Title
26. Concerning usucaption either in favor of the purchaser or acquired
by virtue of the transaction. If your slaves
have been stolen by persons who did not have the right to sell them,
you can bring suit to recover them, for they are not susceptible of
usucaption by the purchasers, as theft may be committed by an illegal
sale. Given on the day
before the Ides of August, during the Consulate of Antoninus,
Consul for the fourth time, and Balbinus, 214. 2. The Emperor
Alexander to Marcellinus. If the guardians,
contrary to the intention of the deceased, sold the slaves which he
directed by his will to go to his heirs on account of their skill as
artisans, they cannot be acquired by usucaption. Given on the fifth
of the Nones of March, during the Consulate of Julianus, Consul
for the second time, and Crispinus, 225. 3. The Same
Emperor to Nepotilla. If you purchased
and now hold possession in good faith of the mother of him with reference
to whose condition you have instituted legal
proceedings, you can obtain by usucaption the child which she brought
forth afterwards while under your control, even if she herself formed
part of the stolen property. 4. The Same
Emperor to Achilles. If you establish
that the other party gave his consent to the sale of the female slave,
and then rescinded the contract which he himself had ratified, he shall
not be heard. If, however, he cannot produce this proof, but can show
that the slave was purchased in good faith from a bona fide vendor,
you can acquire her by usucaption on the ground of lapse of time, and
the attempt of the claimant to hold the property will be of no avail. 5. The Emperor
Gordian to Marinus. When a possessor
in bad faith sold a part of the property, the remainder which he still
retains can certainly, with all its profits, be recovered from him.
The portion which was sold, however, can only lawfully be demanded from
the possessor, where he knowingly bought what belonged to another, or
when, as a purchaser in good faith, he has not held it long enough to
acquire usucaption. Possession which has been lost by violence cannot be acquired
by a purchaser through usucaption, even though he bought it in good
faith before it had again come under the control of the owner. 6. The Emperor
Philip to Caelius. If it is proved
that the property was pledged and afterwards sold by the debtor, it
is clear that, being, as it were, stolen, it cannot be acquired by usucaption. Without date or
designation of Consulate. 7. The Same
Emperor and Caesar to Compedius. He who knowingly
sells the slave of another without the consent of the owner commits
a theft, and this defect of title does not permit usucaption to take
place before the property is returned to the possession of the owner,
even though possession was obtained in good faith. Given on the fifth
of the Ides of February, during the Consulate of the Caesars,
248. 8. The Same
Emperor and Caesar to Sevens. Those who have
a legal right to possession growing out of a compromise can acquire
property by usucaption. 9. The Same
Emperor and Caesar to Gaius. No kind of prescription
will protect one who has purchased property sold by a ward without the
authority of his guardian, but if the ward is found to have been benefited
by the money of the purchaser, he will be barred by an exception on
the ground of bad faith if, after having arrived at puberty, he attempts
to rescind the contract by law on the ground that it is unjust. Given during the Consulate of the Caesars. Title
27. Concerning the usucaption of property which has been donated. Whether the owner
himself gave you the lands with reference to which you have filed your
petition, or whether you received them as a donation in good faith from
a person who was not their owner, you have acquired the right to them
by usucaption, and you cannot be deprived of what you have legally obtained. Published on the
fifth of the Ides of March, .... 2. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian to Capitonius. There is no doubt
that, in law, the rights of the master are not affected by the donation
of a female slave belonging to another, for a theft is committed by
the disposal of property without the consent of the owner, and usucaption
of such property cannot be acquired. Ordered on the
fifth of the Ides of April, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 3. The Same
Emperors and the Caesars to Rhodanus. No one is permitted to revoke a donation which has been lawfully made, but it is also true that a mistake cannot be defended on the ground of good faith. This rule applies where ownership is claimed on the ground of usucaption. Title
28. Concerning usucaption in the case of a dowry. When movable property is given by way of dowry, even though none of it belongs to another, if there is no defect in the title, and it is accepted in good faith, it can be acquired by usucaption as part of the dowry. Title
29. Concerning usucaption with reference to an heir. As usucaption,
in this instance, does not apply to the heir, you are advised that neither
your mother, whose heir you are, nor you, yourself, can acquire the
slaves referred to, by usucaption. Published at Rome,
on the seventh of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of
Laetus and Cerealis. 2. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Maurina. It has been established
that nothing can be acquired through usucaption by some one acting as
heir, when there are any proper heirs. 3. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Diodorus. The possession
of the property of an absent person by anyone acting in the capacity
of heir will not authorize usucaption, if the report of the death of
the said person is false. 4. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Serapion. Usucaption cannot
be claimed except under a lawful title, nor can it be taken advantage
of, nor can it avail the possessor or the heir, nor will the right of
the owner be affected by lapse of time, even if property belonging to
another is claimed under the pretext of its having formed part of an
estate. Given on the seventh of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of the Caesars. Title
30. General rules with reference to usucaption. Anyone who holds
property under a lease, although he holds it corporeally, is not considered
to possess it in person, but for the owner, as prescription based on
long possession cannot be acquired by either a tenant or a lessee. Published on the
seventh of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Alexander,
Consul for the fifth time, and Marcellus, 227. 2. The Same
Emperor to Onesima. You say that sometime
ago you purchased the slave with reference to whom you petition, but,
if you reflect, you will remember that property belonging to My Treasury
cannot be acquired by usucaption, and you are hereby notified that you
will be compelled to answer in any actions brought by My Treasury, nor
can the owership of the slave in question be acquired by you through
usucaption, unless he was not born of a female slave belonging to the
Treasury. Published during
the Nones of March, during the Consulate of Pompeianus and Pelignus. 3. The Emperor
Philip and the Caesar to Pantinus. If Antiochus knowingly held your slave in bad faith, he cannot be acquired by usucaption by his successor, even though he may possess him in good faith, because of the original defect in the title. Title
31. Concerning the transfer of the right of usucaption and the abolition
of the distinction of res mancipi and res nec mancipi. As We, by Our
care, have disposed of the name and substance of acquisitions ex
jure Quiritium, and have provided that ordinary prescription shall
be valid everywhere, whether it arises from possession for ten, twenty,
or thirty years, or even for a much longer time, it would be useless
to admit the right of usucaption only with reference to property situated
in Italy, and to exclude it from application to that situated in the
provinces. Where, however, anyone has had in his possession in good
faith, for the term of two years, property belonging to another, which
is situated in Italy, the unfortunate owner of the same shall lose his
right to it, and shall be entitled to no recourse with reference to
said property, which was lost without the knowledge of the said owner,
for which reason there is nothing more unjust than for him, who is ignorant
of the fact, to be deprived of his possession in so short a time.
Therefore, We order by the present law,
that where property situated in Italy is either immovable, or is understood
to be such, the term of usucaption shall be extended (like that for
a year), so that it will now run with those of ten, twenty, or thirty
years, and others of still longer duration, and that the present limited
period shall be abolished. Moreover,
as the ancients fixed the time for the acquisition of movable property,
or that which was capable of moving itself, or which was, in any way
retained (of course when held in good faith), whether situated in Italy
or anywhere else in the world, and allowed ownership to vest after possession
for a year, We consider that this should be amended, so that where anyone
has had possession in good faith of any movable property, or of any
which was capable of moving itself, either in Italy, or in any of the
provinces, for the continuous term of three years, he can acquire a
legal title to the same, just as if it had been acquired by usucaption,
it being only observed that in all such cases he must, in the first
place, obtain it in good faith, just as is required by a prescription
of long time, and that the possession acquired by any preceding lawful
possessor shall be included in the term of ten, twenty, or thirty years.
We decree that, in the case of movable
property, the legal retention of the preceding holder under a just right
of possession, which he exercised over the said property, shall not
be interrupted by the fact that the subsequent holder may have been
aware that the property belonged to another, even though it was obtained
under a lucrative title. The time has been extended by this law with
reference to the usucaption of property which is the subject of the
same, and We have limited that of usucaption, productive of such loss
and injury to owners, and abolished the ancient practice of dividing
property into mancipi, and nee
mancipi, which is only in conformity with reason, so that a similar
rule may apply to all property and all localities, and useless ambiguities
and differences be finally disposed of. Given at Constantinople, on the fifteenth of the Kalends of November, after the Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 531. Title
32. Concerning the acquisition and retention of possession. It is established
by the principles of public convenience, as well as by those of law,
that possession can be acquired by anyone without his knowledge, through
another who is free; and that usucaption will begin to run as soon as
he becomes aware of the fact. Published on the
sixth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of Fuscus
and Dexter, 226. 2. The Emperor
Alexander to Maurus. He who has caused
you anxiety is not well informed when he asserts that you did not obtain
possession of the property which you purchased through an agent, as
you yourself allege that you have been in possession of the same for
a long time, and have, as the owner, transacted all the business relating
to it; for although transfer of the property whose possession has been
delivered to you was not mentioned in the instrument, you, nevertheless,
in fact acquired it if the vendor knew that you were in possession. 3. The Emperor
Decius to Rufinus. The possession
of property donated by anyone to an infant is actually acquired, for
although the opinions of legal authorities differ on this point, still
it is more proper to hold that, in the meantime, possession is acquired
by delivery, although the infant is not capable of giving his full consent
to the transaction. For otherwise, in accordance with the opinion of
the most learned jurist Papinian, possession could not be acquired by
the infant through his guardian. Published on the
fifth of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Decius,
Consul for the fifth time, and Gratus, 251. 4. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian to Nepotianus. Although possession
cannot be acquired by mere intention, still it can be retained in this
way. Therefore, if you have failed to cultivate your land for a certain
time, not with the intention of relinquishing possession, but only because
of fear, your rights cannot be prejudiced on account of the time which
has elapsed. Published during
the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Diocletian, Consul
for the fourth time, and Maximian, Consul for the third time, 290. 5. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Menno. As no one can
change his own title to possession, and you allege that the tenant,
without any external cause arising, allowed the farm which he unjustly
occupied to be sold, the Governor of the province, after having ascertained
the truth, will not permit you to be deprived of your right of ownership. 6. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Valerius. If the Governor
of the province should ascertain that your field or your vineyard has
been seized without good reason by the person whom you mentioned, and
that your claim is not barred by any prescription, he will not hesitate
to restore to you possession of the land with all its appurtenances. Ordered during
the Ides of April, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 7. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Asyncritus. Unjust possession
does not confer a valid title upon the possessor. Wherefore it is certain
that anyone who takes possession of the land of another, without the
consent of the owner, or of his agent who has authority to transfer
it, cannot obtain legal ground for possession of the same. Published on the
fifth of the Ides of December, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 8. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Cyrillus. It has been decided
on the ground of the public welfare that the ownership, as well as the
possession of property, can be acquired through an agent, as the two
cannot be separated. Published on the
eighteenth of the Kalends of March, during the Consulate of the
Caesars. 9. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Sergius. A purchaser cannot
legally hold possession of property which he occupied on his own responsibility
by virtue of a genuine sale, and much less does he who, falsely representing
himself as the purchaser, for the reason that he lent money without
the obligation of a pledge and seized the land of another, have just
cause to retain it. Published on the
third of the Nones of April, .... 10. The Emperor
Constantine to Maternus. No one can entertain
any doubt that there are two grounds of possession, one based on the
law, and the other on the fact; and both of them are legal when they
are confirmed by the silence and want of opposition of all adversaries.
Where, however, a controversy arises, he cannot be considered the possessor
who, although he may have actual possession of the property, still his
right to occupy it having been questioned, a contest has been begun,
and the case brought into court. Published on the
eleventh of the Kalends of February, under the Consulate of Volusianus
and Annianus, 314. 11. The Emperors
Arcadius and Honorius to Petroneus, Lieutenant of the Spains. Previous defects
of possession are transferred by former owners, and the imperfection
of the original proprietor passes to his successor. Given on the fifth
of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of Caesarius
and Atticus, 397. 12. The Emperor
Justinian to John, Praetorian Prefect. We, intending to dispose of the question which has been brought to Our attention by the works of the Sabinians, hereby order that, if either a slave, an agent, a tenant, a lessee, or anyone else through whom we are permitted to hold possession has, either through negligence or fraud, abandoned or delivered to another the actual occupation of any property which he held, so that the said third party may have ground for obtaining possession of the same, no prejudice whatever can result to the owner, nor can any injury be inflicted upon him by the malignity of his representative, but the latter, if he is free, will be liable to suitable actions at law, and all loss must be made good by him to the owner of said property, or to him with reference to whom he has acted negligently or fraudulently. But where possession has not yet been acquired by the said agent, tenant, lessee, or slave, but the latter, through negligence or fraud, has failed to secure it, then the person himself who appointed him shall suffer the damage resulting from his bad selection of the individual directed to take possession of the property, and attributable either to the evil design or negligence of the latter. We also order that the owner shall only be entitled to redress when he has sustained any injury through the agency of him whom he appointed, but not when he has failed to reap any benefit through his acts, as the ancient rule of law which states that the condition of a master can, under no circumstances, be made worse through the conduct of his slave, only applies when he suffers actual loss, and not when he unsuccessfully attempts to obtain some advantage for himself by means of his slave. In this instance, all legal rights of action are reserved for the owner of the property, or for him who appointed any of the above-mentioned persons to hold possession, as against the latter, if he is entitled to the same under the law. Title
33. Concerning the prescription of long time based upon occupancy for
ten or twenty years. If, after the
question of possession has been disposed of, the ownership of the property
passes in good faith to another, and remains in
his possession without any interruption for the term of twenty years,
the party then in possession should not be disturbed, but if the latter
does not take advantage of the occupancy of the former owner, there
is nothing to prevent him from being disturbed by a dispute as to the
title. If, however, the right of the former possessor was disputed,
even though he remained in possession for a long time without interruption,
he will, nevertheless, not be able to avail himself of prescription
based on long time. This rule also
must be observed with reference to property belonging to the State. 2. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars. The prescription
of long time can usually only benefit those who, after having obtained
possession of property in good faith, have enjoyed it continuously,
without its being interrupted by legal proceedings. Published on the
fifth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of Maximus,
Consul for the second time, and Aquilinus, 286. 3. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Antoninus. If the vineyard
which your mother gave to your step-father by way of dowry belonged
to you, and no prescription has arisen oh account of lapse of time,
the Governor of the province must cause it to be restored to you. 4. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Hermogenes. Long-continued
possession which has been acquired only by the right of succession,
and without any legal title can, for this reason alone, be of no advantage
in claiming prescription. Given on the fourth
of the Ides of April, during the Consulate of the Emperors. 5. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Sotericus. It is a perfectly
clear rule of law that anyone who claims ownership from one who is indebted
to some mistake alone for his possession of certain
property to which he holds a legal title cannot be excluded by prescription
of long time. Ordered on the
eleventh of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of the Emperors. 6. Extract
from a Letter of the Same Emperors and Caesars to Primosus, Governor
of Syria. If the sale was
fraudulently and deceitfully made, even though the parties were over
twenty-five years of age, the time which has elapsed cannot confirm
it, as the prescription of long time does not apply to contracts entered
into in bad faith. 7. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Anthea. The loss of documents
does not legally prejudice the right of persons whose title is protected
by long possession, nor can the evil designs of another disturb security
acquired by long-continued possession. Given on the day
before the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 8. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Celsus. If he against
whom you petitioned alleges that the slaves of your late mother belonged
to him as her adopted son, the fact of an illegal adoption is not alone
sufficient to enable him to acquire the ownership of the property, for
which reason you will not be prevented from claiming the slaves, without
being under any apprehension that prescription can be successfully pleaded
against you, if he, against whom you have filed your petition, only
obtained possession of the said slaves under the title above mentioned. 9. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Demosthenes. A purchaser in
good faith, who pleaded an exception against the prescription of ten
years advanced by the other party who was present during that time,
from the beginning of the controversy, and who proved this after the
plaintiff had disclosed his claim, has shown that he has a right to
legal possession, and very properly asks to be released from liability. 10. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Rheginus. The prescription
of long time cannot benefit those who have obtained possession in good
faith, after being in default in joining issue, because the time should
be reckoned after legal proceedings have been instituted. 11. The Emperor
Justinian to Menna, Praetorian Prefect. We directly order
that, with reference to prescription of long time, and which is based
upon occupancy for either ten or twenty years, that where anyone is
proved to have held possession of property for either ten or twenty
years, which property has been acquired by donation,
or by any other lucrative title, and the time it was occupied by the
former possessor is added to that during which he held it, he will undoubtedly
be entitled to the above-mentioned prescription of long time, nor can
he be excluded on the ground that he acquired the property by a lucrative
title. Given during the
Kalends of June, under the Consulate of Our Lord Justinian, 528. 12. The Same
Emperor to John, Praetorian Prefect. Three difficulties arose among the ancient authorities concerning prescription based upon long time: the first, with reference to where the property was situated; the second, relating to the persons, whether the presence of one or of both should be required; and the third, whether the claimant as well as the possessor should be in the same province, or even in the same city where the property was in dispute; and We shall include all these matters in the present law, so that no doubt may remain on the subject. Therefore We decree that, in cases of this kind, the domicile of the claimant as well as that of the possessor shall be taken into account, so that he who raised the question of the ownership or of the hypothecation of the property, as well as he who is in possession, must reside in the same place, that is to say, in the same province. For We think that We should decide in favor of considering the province rather than the city as the domicile of the parties, and if both of them have their domicile in the same province, the case will be considered as having arisen between them while present, and any longer prescription than that of ten years will be excluded. Moreover, with reference to the doubt arising concerning the property, there shall be no distinction whether it is situated in the same province, or in a neighboring one, or whether it is situated beyond seas or even in a far distant country. If, however, both parties should not reside in the same province, but one should have his domicile in one province, and the other in another, then the case will be one as between absent parties, and the prescription of twenty years shall apply, for there is nothing to prevent the action with reference to the property, whether it is situated in one province or in another, from being brought in a provincial court, and still less to prevent this being done in this Most Flourishing City. For what advantage would it be for possession to be held in one province or another, as the right to claim property is incorporeal, and wherever it is situated, the ownership of the same can revert to the owner or the creditor? Hence our ancestors, with great shrewdness, and with a species of divine inspiration, established the rule that rights of action existed wherever the claims or the property itself could be situated. Therefore, after the promulgation of this law, let no one doubt what should be decided, whether the parties are present or absent; for if the occupant acquired possession in good faith in the beginning, and the domicile of both parties is ascertained, then let the question be determined, no matter where the property may be situated, without taking into consideration either knowledge or ignorance, in order that no other embarrassing occasion for doubt may arise. The same rule must be observed if the property is not attached to the soil, but is incorporeal and consists merely of rights, as, for instance, usufructs and other servitudes. Title
34. To what cases prescription of long time does not apply. If he to whom
you have given your land for the purpose of cultivation afterwards,
through the agency of your step-mother, secretly removed the documents
by which it could be proved that the ownership of the land belonged
to you, he cannot defend himself on the ground of long possession alone. 2. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Dionysius. It is superfluous
to have recourse to the prescription of long time in matters relating
to the ownership of slaves. 3. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Apollinarus. One of two joint-owners,
who has possession of all the common undivided property, cannot plead
prescription of long time to prevent the other joint-owner from claiming
his share of the property, or for bringing suit in partition; as neither
the action in partition, nor that brought for the division of property
owned in common, is barred by the prescription of long time. Given on the third
of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 4. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Libroa. The prescription
of long time does not injure those who are claiming an estate. None
of the provisions of this law, however, shall prejudice the rights of
those who do not hold possession of property which belongs, or has belonged
to an estate, either as heirs or possessors, but have obtained it by
purchase, gift, or some other title, as the succession cannot be demanded
by them. Given on the third
of the Ides of September .... 5. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Hosimus. If you have cared for a boy slave who had not been abandoned, but had been wounded by the enemy, and you did this at your own expense (as you assert) believing him to be free, you cannot legally plead the prescription of long time to prevent his master from recovering him, provided he tenders you the amount which you have legitimately expended in his behalf. Title
35. In what cases prescription of long time cannot be pleaded. The time passed
in an expedition cannot be included in pleading prescription against
a claim for land, if it can be legally established. Given on the sixth
of the Nones of July, under the Consulate of Julian and Crispus,
225. 2. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian and the Caesars to Aurelius, Chief Physician. As you assert
that, during your absence, those of whom you complain seized your property,
and it is clear that you could not leave Our retinue on account of your
profession as a physician, Our Praetorian Prefect, after summoning all
the parties interested, will decide between you. It is not necessary
for you to request that prescription based on lapse of time shall not
be pleaded against you, since the fact that you were lawfully absent,
and engaged in the public service, will protect you from damage in this
respect. Published at Nicea,
on the fifteenth of the Kalends of March, during the Consulate
of Maximus, Consul for the fifth time, and Aquilinus, 286. 3. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Numidius, Governor of Italy. It is well known
that time passed in minority cannot be included in prescription, for
the latter only begins to run when the owner of the property attains
his majority. Published on the
fourth of the Ides of September, during the Consulate of Diocletian,
Consul for the fourth time, and Maximian, Consul for the third time,
290. 4. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Crispinus. If uninterrupted
possession has continued without dispute, you have a right to plead
prescription. We, however, decree that it shall never be valid against
persons who are absent on business for the State, and especially where
this takes place unexpectedly. Published on the
sixth of the Kalends of March, during the Consulate of Ambalianus
and Asclepiodotus, 292. 5. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Januarius. It is a positive
rule of law that prescription cannot be pleaded in suits growing out
of loans for consumption, or for use, or deposits, legacies, trusts,
guardianships, or in any other personal action. Ordered on the
Kalends of February, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned
Emperors. 6. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Dulcius. Having been taken
captive by the enemy, and returned under the right of postliminium,
you have no reason to apprehend that the possession of your adversary
based upon long time can be legally pleaded in a direct action in
rem, or in any other which you may bring for the purpose of recovering
your ownership of the property, as an act of this kind is of no avail
against those who, for any reason, have the right to invoke the aid
of restitution. 7. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Cassander. Possessors of
property in good faith are protected by prescription against those who
have been present for ten years, or have been absent for twenty. If
the relief of restitution is demanded by anyone with reference to a
share of the plaintiffs, as much of the time should be deducted as would
usually be counted in case anything had been done, and the remainder
should be computed, which is reasonable. 8. The Emperor
Justinian to Menna, Praetorian Prefect. We order that,
exclusively in the case of soldiers who are engaged in expeditions only,
that time which has elapsed during the expedition shall be pleaded in
opposition to prescription, but this privilege shall not be enjoyed
by them, so far as the time which they may have passed either at home,
or in other places, while they were not in active service, is concerned. Given at Constantinople, on the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Decius, 529. Title
36. Where prescription is pleaded against a creditor. Unbroken silence
is strengthened by the prescription of long time, and renders an action
brought by creditors for the recovery of a pledge of no effect, when
the debtors, or those who have succeeded to their rights, have possession
of the property pledged. When, however, prescription of long time is
pleaded by a possessor against his creditor, a personal action will
lie in favor of the latter against the debtor. 2. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Marcella. If you were not the heir of a debtor, but obtained the property as a donation, and have had lawful possession of the same for the term of twenty years, the rule of law does not permit a personal action to be brought against you (for the reason that you did not succeed the debtor), nor can you be deprived of land given in pledge after the necessary time has elapsed, even when prescription based upon ten years occupancy can be pleaded against creditors, who have been present, a principle which has not only been established by Our Rescripts but also by those of the Emperors, Our predecessors. Title
37. Concerning the prescription of forty years. It is well known
that no question can be raised by the Treasury with reference to property
which has no owner, after continuous occupancy of the same for the term
of forty years. 2. The Emperor Zeno to Aeneas, Count of Private Affairs. We order that
when persons who have purchased any property, whether it be movable,
immovable, or capable of moving itself, or which consists of rights
of action, or of any other rights whatsoever, from Our Most Sacred Treasury,
or, where any movable or immovable property, or any capable of moving
itself, or any rights of action, or any other rights whatsover, have
been given to them by the munificence of the Emperor, they shall be
entitled to all the privileges to be obtained from the divine laws of
the Emperor Leo, of illustrious memory, and from Our own, as well, with
reference to certain estates, in preference to purchasers, and that
all of them shall enjoy benefits or privileges of this description,
just as if they had already been, or may hereafter be granted, in the
case of individual property or inheritances. Nor
can any suits for the ownership of property, or on account of its hypothecation,
or any civil, praetorian, or personal action based upon laws or Imperial
Constitutions, or any other statutory provisions whatsoever (even though
they may not be expressly enumerated in the present law), be brought
against the purchasers of the property aforesaid, whether they already
are, or may subsequently become such, or against those who, in the case
of property of this kind, have been the recipients of Our generosity,
or who may become such hereafter. Permission is, however, given to those
who desire to do so, to institute proceedings against Our Treasury within
the term of forty years, but after the said term has elapsed, they are
advised that they will not be allowed to bring any actions whatsoever
against it. (1) With a view
to the consideration of the rights of purchasers of property from the
Treasury, We decree that whenever a person competent to sell such property
states in writing that he has received the price of the same, purchasers
who have paid money shall not, under such circumstances, be molested
on the ground of non-payment, nor shall the said purchasers be required
to prove that the price was paid, even though they may not have obtained
the security of a receipt for the same. But, as it is in the power of
him who receives the price not to give a receipt at a time when it was
not paid, so it is proper that purchasers should enjoy perfect security
by the payment of the price in this manner, and not be obliged to furnish
other proof, as has already been stated. 3. The Emperor Justinian to Florus, Count of Private Affairs. It was very properly
provided by the Emperor Zeno, of Divine Memory, in the case of fiscal
alienations, that persons who obtain property
from Our Treasury by way of donation, purchase, or any other kind of
alienation—if anything should arise to impugn the validity of the contract,
either on the ground of eviction, or to produce any other annoyance
with reference to the ownership or hypothecation of the property—shall
not suffer any loss; and that no suits can be brought against the purchasers,
or those who have received the property by way of donation, or who have
possession of the same under any other title; but they can only be brought
against the Treasury within the term of four years, which, having elapsed,
no action will lie against the Treasury. We know that this rule is constantly observed in fiscal
alienations, but that it is not observed in the case of property acquired
from private resources of the Emperor, and not from the funds of the
Treasury. This is unreasonable, for why should such a difference be
established when everything is understood to belong to the Emperor,
and what is alienated is derived from his private property, or from
that belonging to the Treasury? In
like manner, when anything is alienated by the Empress, why should it
not enjoy the same privilege? Our stewards, by whom We are accustomed
to administer Our estates when anything is sold, are required to attach
to the bills of sale agreements with reference to eviction, and others
having a view to private convenience, and to acknowledge obligations
of this kind in instruments relating to alienations, as well as those
concerning changes or compromises, where such transactions take place.
This also refers to those who do not acknowledge the Imperial Majesty,
nor realize what a distance exists between private fortune and Imperial
rank, but attempt to injure and cause loss to Our stewards, by whom
the affairs of the Imperial household are conducted. For
the purpose of correcting all these things, We order by this general
rule, which shall be valid for all time, that every alienation proceeding
from the Imperial Palace, whether it is made by Us or by Her August
Majesty the Empress, or by those who may hereafter be worthy of the
Imperial Name—whether the property has already been alienated, or may
be alienated hereafter—shall remain irrevocable; whether the transfer
has been made by Us in person, or by Our agents in pursuance of Our
authority. And let no one be so bold as to bring suit against those
who acquire such property under any title whatsoever, whether the said
property be movable, immovable, or capable of moving itself, or whether
it consists of incorporeal rights or civil privileges, or think that
there is any way open for him to molest them, but every avenue shall
be closed, and every method of procedure, and every hope of the tolerance
of such malignancy, shall be excluded. They shall, however, have the right to bring actions in
rem or hypothecary actions against Us within the term of four years,
as they can do against the Treasury, if they think that they are entitled
to such actions; and such a cause shall proceed by Our order and be
decided in the proper manner. When, however, the said term of four
years has elapsed, no one will be entitled
to bring any suit whatsoever against Us. Therefore, because We know
that not only We, Ourselves, but also Our Illustrious Consort, the Empress,
has already given, sold, and alienated much property in other ways,
and that Our liberality, as well as that of Our Illustrious Consort,
the Empress, has been, above all, displayed with reference to churches,
hospitals, poorhouses, as well as bishops, monks, and innumerable other
persons, We order that they also shall hold by an indisputable title
what they have acquired, and that no proceeding shall be instituted
against them, and that, within the term of four years from the present
time, they shall all have a right to bring suit against Us to recover
said property; but they are hereby notified that, after the said term
of four years has expired, they shall be entitled to no recourse against
Us. For as Imperial rank is entitled to many privileges, all Imperial
donations shall be irrevocable, without being recorded, and the title
to any property which the Illustrious Emperor may have given to his
August Consort temporarily, or during marriage, or which he himself
may have received from his Illustrious Consort, the Empress, as a donation,
shall immediately become complete, without being subject to confirmation
by time, and this shall be considered an Imperial privilege. For why
should those who, giving their advice and their efforts, toil day and
night for the benefit of the entire world, not enjoy privileges becoming
their rank? Therefore, Your Excellency,
as well as all Our other judges, shall cause these provisions to be
observed which We have promulgated for the honor of the Imperial Name,
and for the security of those who have experienced Our bounty, and which
shall be valid from the time when, by the Divine Will, We assumed the
Imperial insignia. Given at Constantinople, on the fifth of the Kalends of December, after the fifth Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 581. Title
38. The claim to property belonging to the crown, or to that belonging to the temples, shall not be barred by prescription. It has repeatedly
been ordered that freedmen and serfs attached to the Imperial domain,
as well as their offspring and other descendants, who have left Our
land and engaged in other different occupations, shall be restored to
Our estates and stripped of any dignity which they may have fraudulently
obtained, and shall not be permitted to avail themselves of any prescription. 2. The Emperors
Valentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius to Dexter, Count of Private Affairs. We order that
all lands held by tenants or under emphyteusis, and which are the property
of the State or the Emperor, or belong to
the sacred temples, or have been sold in any province, or alienated
in pursuance of any other contract, by persons who had possession of
them wrongfully and contrary to law, shall be restored; and that no
prescription can be pleaded against their restoration, so that those
who have purchased them legally cannot demand the repayment of the price
of the same. Given at Constantinople,
on the fifth of the Nones of July, during the Consulate of Valentinian,
Consul for the fourth time, and Eutropius, 387. 3. The Emperors
Arcadius and Honorius to Paulus, Count of the Imperial Domain. If anyone should
have the boldness to take possession of land forming part of the Imperial
Domain, its rights shall be recovered in accordance with the provisions
of the ancient census. Therefore Your Highness should not pay any more
attention to rescripts which have been fraudulently obtained than to
prescription of long time, or to the new census; and hence you must
restore everything which has been taken away to its proper place, for
temporary possession or a new return cannot abolish the privilege enjoyed
by Our property. Given on the fifth of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Arcadius, Consul for the fifth time, and Honorius, Consul for the third time, 396. Title
39. Concerning the prescription of thirty and forty years. As you allege
that, during your absence, certain persons who coveted your lands purposely
caused them to be sold at a low price, by the Governor of the province,
under the pretext of the collection of taxes, if the lawful time from
the day of the sale within which you can claim said land has passed,
the Governor of the province shall take cognizance of your case, and
shall decide whatever the law directs. If,
however, the time prescribed by law from the day of the public sale
has not yet elapsed, the judge, having examined your allegations, shall
decide what the nature of the case requires, being aware that if he
should ascertain the sale to be unjust, the price paid under a fraudulent
contract of this kind must be returned to the purchaser, in accordance
with the tenor of the Imperial Constitutions. 2. The Emperor
Valens and Valentinian to Volusianus, Praetorian Prefect. Improper action
is taken with reference to the owners of land when such a precarious
title is granted to possessors that they cannot be molested for any
cause after the lapse of forty years, as the law of Constantine provides that no other title whatever shall
be required by possessors who have held property for themselves but
not for others. It is established that those shall not be designated
possessors who occupy property on the condition of the payment of a
certain fixed sum as rent. Therefore, no one who has obtained possession
as a lessee, by retaining the property of another for a long time, can
obtain the ownership of the same for himself; for otherwise, the owners
might lose the land which they have leased, or be obliged to exclude
valuable tenants, or to publicly proclaim their ownership every year.
Given on the eighth of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate
of Valens and Valentinian, 365. 3. The Emperors
Arcadius and Honorius to Asclepiodotus, Praetorian Prefect. The right to bring
special actions in rem, or general personal actions, cannot be
extended beyond the term of thirty years. When any property or right
is claimed, or anyone has a suit or a prosecution of any kind brought
against him, the prescription of thirty years can be pleaded against
the plaintiff. The same law is applicable
in the case of a person who endeavors to recover property which has
been pledged or hypothecated, not from his debtor, but from another
who has had it in his possession for a long time; therefore, where actions
have not been brought within thirty year's from the time in which this
could be done, they cannot longer be prosecuted. Nor will it be sufficient
to obtain a special and favorable answer, even though this be secured
by personal application and petition to the Emperor, or even to state
this in court, unless, after the Imperial Rescript has been mentioned,
or the demand formally made, an agreement has been effected through
a bailiff, nor can a defence based on infirmity of sex, or on absence,
or service in the army, be set up in opposition to this law, but only
on the ground of the minority of the defendant, even though he may be
represented by his guardian. For, after persons who have been subject to the care of
a curator become of age, their rights, as well as those of others, must
necessarily be dependent upon possession for the term of thirty years.
Rights of action, considered perpetual, are extinguished by the prescription
cf thirty continuous years, but not those which were limited in former
times to a certain term. We decree
that, after this period has elapsed, no one shall have the power to
proceed, even if he should attempt to excuse himself by professing ignorance
of the law. Given at Constantinople,
on the Kalends of September, during the Consulate of Victor. 4. The Emperor
Anastasius to Matronianus, Praetorian Prefect. We, desiring to
permanently dispose of every opportunity to cause injury, do decree
that all prescriptions having reference to time, which are derived from
the ancient laws or from Imperial decrees, shall endure in full force, just as if they had been specifically
and definitely enumerated in this law; and those who now have a right
to avail themselves of them, or may in the future acquire such a right,
shall, in accordance with their tenor, be able to do so for all time
hereafter. And wishing to supplement what may have been omitted, either
in words or meaning in prescriptions formerly in force, We order, by
this law (which shall be valid for all time) that if there should be
any contract or action which has not been expressly provided for by
the rules governing the prescriptions above mentioned which, by means
of either an accidental or an intentional interpretation, appears to
afford means to evade the restrictions imposed by the prescriptions
aforesaid, it shall be included in this Our most salutary law, and it
shall, unquestionably, be extinguished after the lapse of forty years,
and no private or public action relating to any cause or person which
has been extinguished by the silence of the aforesaid forty years shall
be brought. Anyone, however, who,
under some title which has been undisputed during the above-mentioned
period, has had possession of property without any judicial controversy
having been raised with reference to it, still holds the same, shall
remain secure in its ownership; and any slave who, after the expiration
of said term, without having his case submitted to judicial investigation,
has obtained an advantage of this kind, shall become free under the
provisions of this most salutary law. Given at Constantinople,
on the third of the Kalends of ... , during the Consulate of
Olybrius. 5. The Same
Emperor to Thomas, Praetorian Prefect of Illyria. We do not permit
the prescription of forty years to be pleaded by those who are called
to the office of decurion, but We order that they shall always be-compelled
to remain in the civil condition in which they were born. For the law
which We have promulgated applies to other conditions, and former constitutions
are not repealed by the said new law, which plainly directs that decurions
and their children shall be returned to their former status without
reference to any prescription whatsoever. 6. The Same
Emperor to Leo, Praetorian Prefect. We, having ascertained
that certain persons have attempted to apply the Imperial Constitutions
which treats of the prescription of forty years to the prejudice of
the payment of public contributions, alleging that if anyone had failed
to pay anything for that time or longer, or had paid less than he should,
he would be released from liability for taxes, and that they cannot
be collected or he be compelled to pay them, as an attempt of this kind
is well known to be contrary to both the spirit and the letter of Our
law, We, therefore, order that those who have had possession of any
property continuously for the term of forty years, without any lawful
interruption, shall not, in any way, be deprived of the possession or
ownership of the said property, but that they can be compelled to pay
any public tax imposed upon them
by the civil law, and that no prescription of any time can be pleaded
in a case of this description. 7. The Emperor
Justin to Archelaus, Praetorian Prefect. As it is a well-known
rule of law that an hypothecary action is extinguished after the lapse
of thirty years, so far as foreign possessors of the encumbered property
are concerned, if the silence is not interrupted as provided by law,
that is to say, by an agreement, or where the incapacity of one of the
parties who has not arrived at the age of puberty is demonstrated, he
will have recourse against the debtors or heirs of the possessors, either
immediate or remote, who will not be entitled to take advantage of any
prescription. We have taken occasion
to amend this law, to prevent possessors of this kind from being subject
to constant apprehension. (1) Therefore,
We order that the right to bring the hypothecary action on the ground
of property remaining in the hands of debtors or their heirs shall not
be extended beyond the term of forty years within which said action
can be brought, unless some agreement has been made, or the minority
of the party enjoying the right is involved (as has already been stated),
so that the difference existing between the actions brought against
the debtor or his heir, and against strangers, for the recovery of the
property, shall only consist in the number of years, but that the two
shall be similar in all other respects. With reference to personal actions, those rules shall be
observed which have been prescribed by former constitutions. (2) But as the
question frequently arose in judicial controversies as to whether a
creditor claiming prior rights could, after the lapse of thirty years,
molest a subsequent creditor, who had possession of the land under hypothecation,
the latter being the representative of the debtor, and holding possession
like him, We have considered it necessary to dispose of it. Hence, We
order that while a common debtor is living, the prescription of thirty
years cannot be pleaded against a prior creditor, but that there will
be ground for the prescription of forty years, because, while the debtor
is living, the prior creditor should reasonably think that the subsequent
creditor holds possession of the property for and in the name of the
common debtor. And therefore, if the debtor should die, the subsequent
creditor having possession in his name can, with good reason, plead
prescription of thirty years. In accordance with this distinction, the computation of
time should be made in such a way that the prescription of the subsequent
creditor will date from the death of the debtor. If, however, he should
wish to add the time during which he had possession after the death
of the debtor to that which he had during the lifetime of the latter,
or while the common debtor himself had possession, then the rights conferred
by prescription of forty years must be considered, and the subsequent
creditor must show that he had possession for a term sufficient to complete
the period of forty years, by which the debtor himself would have been
able to exclude him, in his turn. (3) The same rule
must be observed in the computation of time, where the subsequent creditor
is ready to tender payment of the debt to the prior creditor, and the
latter attempts to bar him by pleading the prescription of long possession. (4) It is more
than manifest that, in all contracts in which either promises or agreements
are entered into subject to any condition, depending upon a fixed, or
indefinite time, after the condition has been fulfilled, or the certain
or uncertain time has elapsed, the prescription of thirty or forty years,
which is pleaded in personal or hypothecary actions, begins to run.
The result of this is that in marriages, in which the restitution
of the dowry is provided for, or in the case of ante-nuptial donations,
in which it is customary to specify the indefinite date of death or
divorce, after the dissolution of marriage, the prescription which can
be pleaded in personal as well as in hypothecary actions, begins to
run. (5) Moreover,
there is no doubt that if any one of those to whom something is due
holds property which has been hypothecated to him without the employment
of violence, an interruption of prescription takes place by means of
this possession, if less than thirty or forty years has passed; and
much more is this the case, if the interruption was caused by an agreement,
as such possession bears a resemblance to the joinder of issue.
If one of the debtors should give his creditor
additional security for the purpose of securing his obligation, the
time of the abovementioned prescription will be considered as having
been interrupted, so far as the original security is concerned, and
the prescription in both personal and hypothecary actions will run from
the date of the novation; for it would be dishonorable for the debtor
to dispute this, in order to avoid his liability to his creditor, after
having given him a second security for the former debt. (6) With reference
to promises, legacies, and other obligations which require the giving
or payment of something every year, or every month, or at any other
prescribed date, it is clear that the times of the above-mentioned prescription
should not be computed from the date of such an obligation, but from
the beginning of each year, or each month, or from any other time which
may be specified. Moreover, permission
should not be given to anyone who has held any property under emphyteutical
right, for the term of forty, or any other number of years, who alleges
that he is entitled to ownership of the said property, to acquire the
same on account of the time which has elapsed; as what is granted under
emphyteutical right must always remain in the same condition, since
the lessee, or the agent who has charge of the business of another,
is obliged to restore the said property to the owner, if he wishes him
to do so, even though he may allege that he is not obliged to surrender
it, and is entitled to possession of the same by prescription, after
the expiration of a certain time. Given during the
Kalends of December, .... 8. The Emperor
Justinian to Menna, Praetorian Prefect. When anyone has
held possession of any property which was obtained in good faith by
purchase, agreement, donation, or any other contract, for ten or twenty
years, and has acquired for himself the right of prescription based
on long time, against the owners of said property, or creditors who
claim that they are entitled to it through hypothecation, and he afterwards
loses possession of said property by accident, We order that he shall
be entitled to an action to recover the same. If anyone carefully examines
the ancient laws, he will ascertain that they authorize this. (1) If, however,
anyone should cease to hold possession of property, where the owner
or someone who has a lien on it has been barred by prescription of thirty
or forty years, We direct that the abovementioned relief shall be afforded
him, not indiscriminately, but in moderation; and if anyone should,
in the beginning, have held the said property in good faith, he can
avail himself of the same advantage. But
where he acquired it in bad faith, he shall, for this reason, be considered
unworthy, so that he who was the original owner of the property, or
held it under a pledge and was barred by the effect of the above-mentioned
prescription, can acquire the benefit of possession for himself, in
the capacity of a new possessor. If,
however, he had no right to such property at any time, then the original
owner, or the creditor who had possession of it under hypothecation,
shall, with their heirs, be permitted to recover it from the unlawful
possessor, notwithstanding that the former possessor has already excluded
him by means of the prescription of thirty or forty years, unless the
illegal possessor himself is protected by the prescription of thirty
or forty years, to be computed from the time when the former possessor,
who evicted him, lost possession of said property. (2) We, however,
decree that these rules shall only apply to possessors who have obtained
control of the property without violence, for if anyone should forcibly
remove it, the former possessor shall, by all means, be entitled to
it without any opposition. (3) If, anyone,
however, should obtain the property, not by violence, but by a judicial
decision, he shall only be responsible for the time when the former
possessor was absent, and was summoned to court, and he, like others
entitled to the ownership of the property, shall be permitted, within
a year, to take the said property if he presents himself, and offers
security for the conduct of the case, and to obey the decision with
reference to the matter in litigation. (4) We decree
that the prescription of thirty or forty years shall, in the case of
contracts in which interest is promised, begin to run from the time
when the debtor has failed to pay it. Given at Constantinople,
on the third of the Ides of December, during the Consulate of
our Lord the Emperor Justinian. 9. The Same to Demosthenes, Praetorian Prefect. Certain persons frequently call their opponents into court, and in the prosecution of judicial proceedings are not able to bring their cases to a definite conclusion, and as the conditions of life are subject to constant variation, they, in the meantime, having preserved silence either on account of the superior power of their adversaries, or their own weakness, or for innumerable other reasons which can neither be mentioned nor enumerated, appear to have forfeited their rights, because, after the last trial of the case, the term of thirty years has elapsed, and having been opposed by a prescription of this kind see their property transferred to others, which in former times caused them much sorrow and with good reason, as they had no remedy. We, desiring to correct this, do not permit such a prescription based upon the lapse of thirty years to be pleaded in a case of this kind, but even though a personal action was brought in the first place, We authorize it to be extended to the fortieth year, as he who is in the beginning absolutely silent as to his rights does not resemble him who filed his complaint, came into court, and went to trial, but for some cause or other was prevented from finishing his case. And, although the plaintiff himself may have died, We decree that he can leave the conduct of his action to his posterity, and that his heirs or successors shall be permitted to conduct it to a conclusion, and not be in any way barred by the prescription of thirty years. The period available (that is to say, the term of forty years), We decree shall be computed from the time when the last judicial investigation took place, after both parties failed to proceed. Title
40. Concerning the abolition of the prescription of a year affecting contracts made in With reference
to the exception of a year which is applicable to contracts made in
Italy, such an enormous mass of controversies has arisen in all the
tribunals that it is difficult to enumerate and impossible to explain
them; for, in the first place, it has been attended with so many technicalities
and difficulties that it is necessary for many things to agree in order
for it to take effect. Then some authorities have interpreted the said
period in such a liberal way that it can be extended as long as ten
years; others have held that it should be limited to five, and in Our
time, different constructions have been made by judges with reference
to this computation; hence this exception does not readily produce any
effect upon litigation. Therefore,
as other exceptions of time or prescriptions appear to Us to be sufficient,
We are not willing for the subjects of Our Empire to
be embarrassed by difficulties of this kind, and therefore the abovementioned
exception of a year having been absolutely abolished, all other lawful
exceptions and prescriptions shall have full force in the courts, whether
they depend upon the lapse of ten, twenty, thirty, or forty years, or
whether they run for a shorter time. (1) As nothing
prevents matters which are in any way doubtful from being explained
by clearer or more comprehensive laws, We direct that all personal actions
which any voluminous interpretation has attempted to extend beyond the
limit of thirty years shall be terminated by the said period of thirty
years, unless the lawful method, which was mentioned by the ancient
laws as well as ours, introduced an interruption of the time, and that
the hypothecary action alone shall be extinguished after the expiration
of forty years. Hence, let no one
venture to decide that a suit in partition, or for the division of property
owned in common, or for the establishment of boundaries, or of partnership,
or of theft, or of property seized with violence, or any other personal
action, can be brought after a longer time than thirty years. But where
a suit could properly be brought in the beginning, and, having once
been instituted, was not renewed by repeated false allegations (as was
stated in the action of theft) it may be terminated after the above-mentioned
time has expired. All actions which
have been brought in the courts, even though they are personal ones,
and have been argued, and afterwards abandoned, are hereby excepted;
for, in the case of these, Our former law provided that not thirty,
but forty years must elapse from the time when the litigants last became
silent with reference to their claims. (2) In order that
this law may not appear to be imperfect, since provision has already
been made for prescription to run against the sons of a family with
reference to their mother's estate, from the time when they were released
from paternal control, but nothing was especially provided with reference
to other property which cannot be acquired, We order, by this clearly
stated law, that no prescription can be pleaded against the sons of
a family in all cases in which property is not acquired for their parents,
except from the time when they could have brought suit, that is to say,
after they had been released from the control of their father, or of
him in whose power they were; for who could blame them for not doing
this, even if they were willing, when they could not act on account
of the opposition of the law? Given at Constantinople,
on the fifteenth of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate
of Lampadius and Orestes, 530. 2. The Same
Emperor to John, Praetorian Prefect. In order that
We may protect the interests of all persons in a more thorough manner,
and that neither absence, superior authority, nor the infamy of an adversary
may injure anyone, but that a distinction may be made between the negligent
and the vigilant, We decree that if he who has possession of property
belonging to another, or which is
pledged to a creditor, should be absent, and the owner of the said property
or the creditor, desires to exercise his right of action, he shall not
be permitted to do so in the absence of his adversary, who has possession
of the property, or who labors under the disadvantage of either infancy
or insanity, and has no guardian or curator to represent him, or is
subject to superior power, and that the owner or creditor aforesaid
cannot seize the property by his own authority; but permission is hereby
given him to appear before the Governor of the province, or to send
him a statement in writing, and file his complaint within the time prescribed
by law, and, by so doing, interrupt the prescription, and this shall
be amply sufficient for the purpose. If, however, he should be unable
to appear before the Governor, he can apply to the bishop of the diocese,
or the Defender of the City, and state his wishes in writing without
delay. When the Governor, the bishop, or the Defender of the City is
absent, he shall be permitted to publish his intention in the place
where the possessor has his domicile, by means of a statement signed
by a notary, or if there are no notaries in the city, by one signed
by three witnesses, and this shall be sufficient for the interruption
of any prescription, whether it be of three years, or for a longer time,
or even for thirty or forty years. All
other prescriptions of long time, whether they are of thirty or forty
years, which have been established either by ancient legislators or
by Ourselves, shall remain in full force. Given at Constantinople,
during the Kalends of October, after the Consulate of Lampadius
and Orestes, 531. 3. The Same
to John, Praetorian Prefect. Where one person is indebted to another on account of several different claims, and, having brought suit, did not include in his petition the separate amount of each, but only stated the entire indebtedness, a doubt arose among the ancient authorities whether all of the debts had been brought into court, or whether the proceedings only related to the oldest one, or whether the act of the creditor was void, as his intention appeared to be uncertain. We have found disputes of this kind in many cases which have been brought in the courts, and, above all, with reference to the interruption of prescription. If, for instance, a personal action had been brought, and no mention of an hypothecary action was made, certain authorities held that the personal action was affected by the interruption of prescription, but that the hypothecary action was extinguished on account of its not having been referred to. And if someone had alleged in general terms that another was indebted to him, additional doubts arose whether all competent actions should be considered to be included in a mere statement of this kind, or whether, as they were passed over in silence, they were barred by prescription, as they acquired no support from the uncertain wording of the petition. Therefore, We order that no doubt of this kind shall be entertained hereafter in cases in court, but anyone who has instituted proceedings against his debtor, and has produced the document evidencing his agreement, whether it only refers to his indebtedness in a general way, or specifically mentions a single obligation, the plaintiff shall be considered to have brought all his claims into court, and his petition shall be held to include all personal as well as hypothecary causes of action; and the course of prescription will be interrupted, as prescriptions pleaded against persons who are negligent and careless of their own rights are odious. Title
41. Concerning alluvion, marshes, and pastures brought into another
condition. Although it is
not lawful to divert the natural course of a stream to another place
by artificial means, still it is not forbidden to protect a bank against
a rapid current. But where a river, having left its former channel,
makes another for itself, the land which it surrounds remains the property
of the former owner. If, however, it does this by degrees, and carries
soil elsewhere, this is acquired under the right of alluvion by the
person to whose land it is added. 2. The Emperors
Arcadius, Honorius, and Theodosius to Caesarius, Praetorian Prefect. Persons whom the
inundations of the River Nile enrich are required to pay taxes in proportion
to the lands which they hold. Those, however, who deplore the loss of
their estates from this cause are, on the other hand, released from
the burden of taxation. The new proprietors protected by Our generosity
should remain content with the possession of what they hold, and gratefully
pay the taxes assessed upon them. 3. The Emperors
Valentinian and Theodosius to Cyrus, Praetorian Prefect. Land acquired by the possessors by virtue of the right of alluvion either in Egypt on account of the inundations of the Nile, or in other provinces through the overflow of different rivers, can neither be sold by the Treasury, claimed by anyone, assessed separately, nor be the subject of additional taxation, and this We decree by this law, which shall remain forever valid, lest We may appear to ignore the defects of alluvial titles, or render the property injurious to the possessors of the same. In like manner, We do not permit lands which, in former times, were either marshes or devoted to pasture, and are now rendered fertile at the expense of the possessors of the same, to be sold, claimed, or assessed separately as capable of cultivation and subject to increased taxation, lest those who are diligent may not regret that their labors have been dedicated to the culture of the soil, and may realize that their industry did not result in their injury. We decree that violators of this law shall be punished by a fine of fifty pounds of gold, and Your Highness will also be included, if you should make any other construction of this law, in order to countenance the claims of those who may demand it. Title
42. Concerning the decisions of Praetorian Prefects. We grant the right
of petition to litigants against whom a decision has been rendered by
the Praetorian Prefecture, if they allege that they have been injured
contrary to law, but We do not concede them the right of appeal, even
though the decision was said to have been rendered with reference to
a curia, or for some other object of general utility, or for
any other reason, as it is not conducive to the public welfare to deny
to individuals the assistance of a law; and hence the right of petition
against decisions of the Praetorian Prefecture is given them only within
the term of two years after the judge who decided the case has retired
from office. Given at Constantinople, on the third of the Ides of August, during the Consulate of Theodosius, Consul for the thirteenth time, and Festus, Consul for the fifth time, 439. Title
43. How and when a judge should render a decision in the presence of both parties, or in the absence of one of them. You will not always
be obliged to decide against an absent party under the Rescript of My
Father, by which it was provided that decisions could even be rendered
against those who are absent, for by this it is meant that you can decide
against one who is not present, but not that it is absolutely necessary
for you to do so. 2. The Emperor
Gordian to Severus. It is certain
that although judgment has not been rendered under the terms of the
Peremptory Edict, a decision can be given by the judge against those
who, having been notified, have refused to appear in court. Given on the fourth
of the Kalends of April, under the Consulate of Gordian and Pontianus,
139. 3. The Same
Emperor to Antistius. You cannot avoid
complying with the judgment on the ground that it was rendered during
your absence, and without your knowledge, and as you allege, no defence
was made, if, when you first learned of it, you did not immediately
file a complaint; for the decision which has been rendered will not
be valid if you did not consent to it. Published on the
fourth of the Ides of June, during the Consulate of Gordian and
Aviola, 240. 4. The Emperor
Philip to Domitian. If, as you state,
the adverse party obtained a judgment against you on the ground of contumacy,
on a holiday when you were absent, or while you were ignorant that it
had been rendered by the judge, the Governor will, not without reason,
assign the case to another judge to be settled by his decision. Published on the
fifth of the Ides of October, during the Consulate of Peregrinus
and Aelianus, 245. 5. The Same
Emperor and the Caesar Philip to Longinus. If (as you allege)
the Governor of the province, after having appointed a certain place
for hearing the case, fraudulently decided it against you elsewhere
during your absence, whatever was done shall have no effect whatever
in law. 6. The Emperors
Valerian and Gallienus to Domitius. If the Governor
refused to admit the appeal made by the guardian of your wards at the
time when they, having become adults, had no curator, he will be required
to hear the case again; for any decision rendered at that time should
not prejudice the rights of said minors, they having been deprived of
a just defence and the assistance of a curator. 7. The Emperor
Diocletian and Maximian to Marinus. It is certain
that judgments rendered against absent parties not guilty of contumacy,
and who have not been notified in the usual way, cannot be considered
as res judicata. Published on the
third of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Diocletian,
Consul for the fifth time, and Maximian, Consul for the fourth time,
293. 8. The Same
Emperors to Claudia. It is in conformity
with law that the Governor of the province, after having observed all
the legal formalities and notified the adverse party three times by
means of letters, or once for all by a peremptory edict to appear as
is required, if the latter perseveres in his obstinacy, to hear the
allegations of the party who is present, or take care that his successor
shall do so. Wherefore, if the other party has been summoned three times
and still obstinately refuses to appear, it will
not be unreasonable for the judge to either compel him to do so, or
transfer the possession of the property in dispute to you, and make
your adversary the plaintiff, or, having heard your defence, render
his decision as the law may require. Published on the
third of the Kalends of October, .... 9. The Same
Emperors to Leontius. It has very properly
been provided that three summonses have all the force of a peremptory
edict against persons guilty of contumacy. Published on the
eleventh of the Kalends of November, during the Consulate of
Diocletian, Consul for the fourth time, and Maximian, Consul for the
third time. 10. The Same
Emperors to Blesius. As you went on
a journey, not of your own free will, but through necessity, the law
will not permit any judgment to be rendered against you so as to injure
you in any way, when your absence was the result of necessity. Published on the
third of the Ides of May, during the Consulate of Tiberanus and
Dio, 291. 11. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Valerius. As you state that the suit was begun when all the parties were present, and that afterwards judgment was rendered against you, although you were absent, and you did not appeal within the time prescribed by law, many Imperial Constitutions oppose your demand to have the judgment rendered against you set aside. Title
44. Concerning opinions rendered with reference to statements made in
a written petition. The decision of
an arbiter is void if he himself did not deliver it to the parties litigant,
even though he may have notified them in writing. Therefore, if what
you allege is true, your case can be heard again by the Governor of
the province, without taking into account the fact that you did not
appeal. 2. The Emperors
Valens, Valentinian, and Gratian to Probus, Praetorian Prefect. We think that
it should be perpetually established by this law that judges who are
required to hear and determine cases should not arrive at sudden conclusions,
but should render their decisions after careful consideration and reflection;
and, after having revised them, and reduced them to writing with the
greatest accuracy, they ought to deliver them in this form to the parties
interested, and not afterwards be permitted to correct or change them,
with the exception of the Illustrious Praetorian Prefect and others
who administer important offices, and eminent judges to whom permission
is granted to read their final decisions, or have this done by their
attendants and the other officers in their service. Given on the eleventh
of the Kalends of February, during the Consulate of Gratian,
Consul for the second time, and Probus, 371. 3. The Same
Emperors to Probus, Praetorian Prefect. We order by Our
general laws that all judges whom We have invested with the power of
dispensing justice in the various provinces, after having heard the
cases, shall render their final decision in writing. We add to this
law that any judgment rendered without having been reduced to writing
shall not be worthy of the name, and the formality of an appeal shall
not be required for the annulment of such a wrongful decree. Given on the third of the Nones of December, under the Consulate of Gratian, Consul for the fourth time, and Equitius, 374. Title
45. Concerning the final and interlocutory decisions of all judges.
The decision of
your predecessor does not appear to Us to be legal, as he, in rendering
it between the plaintiff and the defendant's attorney, did not decide
against the latter but the client represented by him, who did not appear
personally in court. You can, therefore, hear the cause again, just
as if it had never been tried. Given on the fourth
of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Antoninus, Consul
for the third time, and Geta, 209. 2. The Emperor
Antoninus to Sextilius. If the arbiter
appointed by the magistrate was in possession of his freedom when he
rendered his award, even though he was subsequently reduced to slavery,
the award rendered by him will, nevertheless, have the authority of
res judicata. 3. The Emperor
Alexander to Vectius. The Governor of
the province is aware of the fact that a final decision, which does
not include either condemnation or acquittal, is not considered legal. Published during
the Kalends of October. 4. The Same
Emperor to Severus. It is certain
that a decision rendered by a Governor contrary to the usual formalities
required in judgments does not obtain the authority of res judicata. Published on the
fifteenth of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of
Alexander and Dio, 230. 5. The Emperor
Philip and the Caesar Philip to Montanus. If the Attorney
of the Treasury ordered the property of those indebted to it to be delivered
to their sureties, under the condition that they should indemnify the
Treasury, no appeal will lie from his decision, and it consequently
must be obeyed as rendered. 6. The Emperors
Cams, Carinus, and Numerianus to Zoilus. As you allege
that the decision of the Governor is void for the reason that he did
not render it in public, but in a secret place, and without the presence
of his attendant, no injury can result to you from anything that he
decided. Published on the
fifth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of Carus
and Carinus, 283. 7. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Isidora. The Governor of
the province, by persuading you to compromise with your relatives in
the action on stipulation which you brought against
them, does not extinguish the verbal obligation, which can only be annulled
in a way provided by law, for the mere act of a judge has not the force
of a judicial decision, as his authority is confined within certain
limits, as has been frequently established. Wherefore, if, having heard
the case, the Governor did not decide in accordance with the rules of
law, his words persuading you to permanently dispose of the action (if
you had one) could not produce this effect. 8. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Licinius. If Theodora, whom
you allege was liberated either on account of a purchase or because
of her delivery to a creditor in discharge of a debt, has been decided
to be free, the judgment cannot be set aside without having recourse
to an appeal. But if suit was brought, and a decision rendered after
he who is said to be the owner of the woman was notified, you will not
be prevented from recovering the amount of your interest in the purchase,
if you bought her, or to recover the debt, if she was given in payment
for one. 9. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Domnus. After final judgment
in a case, anything decided by the magistrate who rendered it, or his
successor, with reference to the question already disposed of, does
not obtain the force of res judicata, nor do decisions involving
possession in any way prejudice the ownership of the property, and interlocutory
decrees do not, for the most part, terminate an action. Ordered on the
Nones of April, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 10. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Menodorus. Anyone invested
with judicial authority is not allowed to forbid a person to remain
in his own country. Given on the third of the Nones .... 11. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Lucian. When the judge,
by a final decision, merely orders that an oath shall be tendered, without
adding what shall be done if the oath is taken, or refused, it is clear
that his decision will be of no force or effect. 12. The Emperors
Arcadius and Honorius to Julian, Proconsul of Asia. Judges can render
their decisions in the Latin as well as in the Greek language. 13. The Emperor
Justinian to Demosthenes, Praetorian Prefect. Let no judge or arbiter think that he is compelled to abide by any of the results of Imperial consultations which he does not consider to have been stated properly and in accordance with law, and this applies with still greater force to the decisions of the Illustrious Prefects and other dignitaries, for if any matters have not been properly disposed of, this defect should not be extended to the decrees of other judges, as the decisions of courts should not be founded upon the examples set by others, but upon the laws. The final decisions of the Prefecture, or the court of any other supreme magistrate, are not binding if not legal, and We order all Our judges to conform to the truth, and to follow the principles of law and justice. Given on the third
of the Kalends of November .... 14. The Same
Emperor to Demosthenes, Praetorian Prefect. As that distinguished
man, Papinian, very properly stated in his book of Questions, that a
judge could not only discharge the defendant from liability, but could
render a decision against the plaintiff himself, if, on the other hand,
he should find that he was indebted to the defendant, We also order
this rule to be extended so that the judge may be permitted to render
a decision against the plaintiff, and require him to either pay or do
something without allowing any exception to be pleaded against him on
the ground that he is not a competent judge of the plaintiff, for he
should not object to have the same judge whom he had accepted in the
beginning of the case decide against him at the end. Given on the fifteenth
of the Kalends of December, during the fifth Consulate of Lampadius
and Orestes, 530. 15. A Law which
is not Authentic. 16. The Same
Emperor to Julian, Praetorian Prefect. As it is customary for magistrates to render interlocutory decrees setting forth that the parties shall not be permitted to have recourse to an appeal, or to call their jurisdiction in question before a final decision has been given, certain authorities held that before issue has been joined, a judge cannot be objected to, nor can an appeal be taken from his interlocutory decree. For as the same terms are applicable to an appeal as to an objection to jurisdiction, and an appeal cannot be taken before issue has been joined, they thought that no one would be permitted to refuse a judge before issue had been joined, which is by no means prohibited. Hence judges must be careful to use terms of this kind together, and without making any distinction between them. Title
46. Concerning decisions which are rendered without stating the exact
amount to be paid. It is clear that
the judge did not render his decision against the rule of law in providing,
as you allege, that interest must be paid until the amount mentioned
in the judgment has been settled. 2. The Emperor
Alexander to Marcellinus. Although the sum
of money due is not stated in the decision of the Curator of the State,
his decision, nevertheless, is valid, since he ordered the State to
be indemnified. 3. The Emperor
Gordian to Aemylius. The following
decision, namely, "Pay the entire amount due with legal interest,"
does not comply with the requirements of the action to enforce judgment,
as a judicial decision which does not specify a certain sum only obtains
the authority of res judicata when the amount has been mentioned
in some other part of the documents belonging to the case. 4. The Same
Emperor to Saturnina. The following decision, namely, "Pay what you have received in good faith," as it is uncertain how much the debtor received, and how much is demanded of him — and especially when the judge who promulgated the decision out of the regular order has rendered an interlocutory decree that the dowry which had been given and which was claimed had not been paid — does not obtain the authority of judgment. Therefore, if another judge should afterwards render a judgment and decide against you, and you do not appeal from his decision, you will confirm it by your own act. Title
47. Concerning decisions rendered for damages. As an infinite
number of doubts with reference to damages arose among the ancients,
it seems best to Us, as far as is possible, to reduce this prolixity
into more narrow limits. Hence We order that, whenever the amount or
the nature of the property is certain, as in the case of sales, leases,
and all other contracts, the damages shall not exceed double the value
of the property. In other instances, however, where the value seems
to be uncertain, the judges having jurisdiction shall carefully ascertain
the actual amount of the loss, and damages to that amount shall be granted,
and it shall not be reduced by any machinations and immoderate perversions
of values leading to inextricable confusion, lest, when the calculation
is indefinitely reduced, it may become impossible of application; as
We know that it is in conformity with Nature that those penalties alone
should be exacted which can be imposed with a proper degree of moderation,
or are definitely prescribed by the laws. Our Constitution not only applies where loss, but also
to where profit is involved, for the reason that the ancient authorities
held that damages could be collected from him who did not obtain any
profit, when he could have done so. Let
the promulgation of this Constitution put an end to verbosity in all
cases, in accordance with what has been already stated. Given at Constantinople on the Kalends of September, after the fifth Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 530. Title
48. Where a decision has been rendered by a judge who is said not to
be competent. When a judge has
been appointed to decide a certain matter, and renders an opinion with
reference to others which have no connection with it, he performs an
act which is void in law. Given on the third
of the Nones of ... , during the Consulate of Maximus, Consul
for the second time, and Aelianus, 224. 2. The Emperor
Gordian to Licinia. If a military
judge, who was not appointed by one who had authority to do so, should
hear a case which ought to have been determined by means of a civil
proceeding, his act will not have the authority of a legal decision,
and an appeal need not be taken. 3. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Phileta. If a judge appointed
to determine the right of ownership did not render judgment against
you on this point, the Governor of the province, after having been applied
to, shall take cognizance of your case, and decide it, and the right
of ownership will, by no means, be prejudiced because it is established
that a decision has been rendered with reference to possession. Ordered at Herculaneum,
on the Nones of November, during the Consulate of the Caesars,
297. 4. The Emperors
Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius to Potitus, Vicegerent. This rule also
applies to the cases of private persons, namely, that a decision rendered
by a judge without authority does not bind any of the litigants. Given on the tenth of the Kalends of October .... Title
49. Concerning the penalty to which a judge is liable who has rendered
an improper decision, and the punishment which may be inflicted upon
anyone who attempts to corrupt a judge, or his adversary. It is established
that, where in any case, either public or private, or in which the Treasury
is interested, money is paid by anyone, whether to the judge or to the
adversary of the former, he who, doubtful of the justice of his cause,
placed a corrupt hope of success in the payment of money, will lose
his action. Given on the seventh
of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of the two Aspers,
213. 2. The Emperor
Constantine to Felix. He who has been
corrupted by money, or who, through partiality, has rendered a wrongful
decision, shall be required to indemnify the party
whom he injured, not only for the costs of the suit, but also to assume
the risk of the same. Given at Constantinople, on the eighth of the Kalends of November, during the Consulate of Constantine, Consul for the fifth time, and Licinius, 319. Title
50. A decision when once rendered cannot be revoked. There is no doubt
that anyone cannot revoke either his own decision or that of his predecessor,
and it is a well-known rule of law that it is not necessary to take
an appeal from a decision of this kind. Published during
the Kalends of March, .... 2. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Alexander. The Perpetual
Edict clearly states that peremptory exceptions which have been omitted
in the beginning can be pleaded subsequently before judgment is rendered.
If this has not previously been done, complete restitution will be permitted;
for where judgment has been rendered against persons over the age of
twenty-five years, on the ground that prescription was not contested,
it cannot be annulled without having recourse to the remedy of appeal. Given at Nicomedia,
on the seventh of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate
of the Caesars. 3. The Emperor
Constantine to Proculus. It has been decided
that rescripts which have been granted shall not have authority when
the cases to which they relate have once been terminated by a judicial
decision which admitted of no appeal, but those who have obtained rescripts
of this kind should also be excluded from making use of them in court. Given at Constantinople, on the sixth of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of the Emperor .... Title
51. Concerning the profits and the expenses of litigation. The term "profits"
only includes what remains after the deduction of the legitimate expenses. Given on the third
of the Nones of April, during the Consulate of the
Caesars. 2. The Emperor
Valentinian to Olybrius, Praetorian Prefect. The defeated party
litigant is not only required to restore the property, but also to pay
over the profits which he himself has obtained, as well as those which
he could have acquired, and he must pay them from the time that he knew
that he was a possessor in bad faith, as established by the action brought
in court. This rule shall also apply
to an heir whose property is held by the same defective title. Given on the third
of the Kalends of March, .... 3. The Emperors
Honorius and Theodosius to Asclepiodotus, Praetorian Prefect. After a matter
has been terminated and settled by compromise, no action, even if based
upon a rescript, will be granted for the purpose of recovering the expenses,
unless, all the parties being present, the judge who rendered an opinion
in the first matter stated in his decision that the expenses of the
case should be paid to the successful party, or that he had a right
to resort to legal proceedings to collect them, for where anyone has
been released from future liability when the case was decided, it would
be infamous to authorize another action to be brought with reference
to what had been settled by the first one. Given at Constantinople,
on the third of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of
Asclepiodotus and Marinianus, 423. 4. The Emperors
Valentinian. Theodosius, and Arcadius, Edict to the People. He by whose demand
someone has been summoned in accordance with the legal formalities to
a place far from his residence, and the hearing of his case protracted,
is hereby notified that, if by his fault the trial was deferred, or
if he should not himself be present, or should be unable to prove his
allegations, he must pay the penalty prescribed by the laws for malicious
litigations; and if the expenses were incurred in a pecuniary case,
the value of the property claimed, as well as the time consumed in the
journey, having been considered, the judge shall render a decision in
accordance with his estimate of the damages sustained. Given at Constantinople,
on the fifth of the Ides of October, during the Consulate of
Valentinian, Consul for the seventh time, and Avienus, 450. 5. A Law which
is not Authentic. 6. The Emperor
Anastasius to Stephen, General of the Army. As certain persons allege that they enjoy privileges, some of them under the laws and Imperial constitutions, and others through special favors which have been granted them, as well as with reference to the payment of taxes by agreement for which they are only liable to a specified amount, and are not required to pay the costs of litigation at all, or only a small part of the same, We decree by this law that whoever enjoys a privilege of this kind, or may hereafter obtain it in any way, is hereby notified that those against whom he has instituted any civil or criminal proceeding will also enjoy the same right; as it would be intolerable for those who are entitled to the privileges aforesaid to be permitted to collect, as plaintiffs, anything more from their adversaries than they themselves, as defendants, if beaten, would be compelled to surrender to them, in turn; so, in order that this rule may be observed in every instance involving privileges granted through liberality, or generally attaching to certain offices, classes, or dignities, or which have been specially bestowed upon certain persons, or which may hereafter be conferred, whether this has been expressly stated in the Imperial grants or Rescripts or whether it has been omitted, We order it to be enforced. Title
52. Concerning res judicata. A judicial decision
must be adhered to, but if you can prove that the party in whose favor
judgment was rendered against you has received what he appeared to have
lost by theft, you can defend yourself by an exception on the ground
of fraud, if he attempts to carry the judgment into execution. Given on the twelfth
of the Kalends of March, during the Consulate of Antoninus, Consul
for the fourth time, and Balbinus. 2. The Same
Emperor to Pacatianus. If a case which
has been decided could be revived under the pretext of a mistake in
calculation, litigation would never end. Published at Rome,
on the day before the Nones of ... , during the Consulate of
Lsetus and Cerealis, 216. 3. The Same
Emperor to Demetrius and Others. If it should appear
that you have collected money by means of fraudulent accounts, and you
have been ordered to refund it with a penalty, and you did not appeal
from the decision of the Governor, you will be obliged to pay the entire
amount of the judgment. 4. The Emperor
Gordian to Antoninus. It is a bad precedent to revive a case which has been decided, under the pretext of the discovery of new documents. Given on the eighth
of the Ides of March. 5. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Valentine. It is clearly
proved that the party demanding a delay for payment acquiesced in the
decision, and he is in the same position as one who in any other way
has agreed to it; for a case which has been terminated should not be
suffered to be revived. 6. The Emperors
Honorius and Theodosius to Julian, Proconsul of Africa. We desire that
matters which have been transacted by public authority shall remain
forever valid, as the public faith should not pass away with the death
of the official having jurisdiction. Given on the third of the Kalends of September, during the Consulate of Constans, 414. Title
53. Concerning the execution of judgment. The court was
too hasty in ordering the pledges of Marcella to be taken in execution
and sold, for in order that the procedure prescribed by law may be observed,
you must first bring suit against your adversary, and the case having
been heard, have judgment rendered in your favor. Published on the
third of the Kalends of February, during the Consulate of Albinus
and jEmilianus, 207. 2. The Same
Emperors to Agrippa. If you have not
changed the judgment by novation, the Governor of the province, after
the pledges have been taken in execution and sold, shall order the proceeds
to be disposed of for your benefit. If, however, the case has been altered
by novation, an action on stipulation will lie in your favor, and a
competent judge having been appointed, you can proceed in accordance
with the legal formalities. 3. The Same
Emperors to Agrippa. The nature of
the transaction and the delay in payment which has resulted demand a
more speedy remedy; therefore, if you appear before the Governor of
the province, whose duty it is to see that the judgment is executed,
and state that although the land given in pledge has, in accordance
with the contract, for a long time been offered at public sale, it has
not yet found a purchaser on account of the intrigues of the adverse
party, he will place you in possession of the said land, in order that
by this means the execution which has been so long delayed may be issued. Given on the eleventh
of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Messala and Sabinus,
215. 4. The Same
Emperors to the Soldier Marcellus. The Governor of
the province will not permit your pay to be withheld for the purpose
of satisfying the judgment which has been rendered against you, since
this can be accomplished by having recourse to other measures. Published on the
third of the Nones .... 5. The Emperor
Gordian to Amandus. It is well known
that the claims of a debtor can be taken in execution where judgment
has been rendered against him. Published on the
third of the Ides of October, during the Consulate of Atticus
and Praetextus, 243. 6. The Emperor
Philip and the Caesar to Titian. If (as you allege)
the court officer appointed to execute the judgment assumed judicial
duties, and thought that a decision should be rendered contrary to what
had previously been determined with reference to your case, the opinion
given by him can never obtain the torce of a judgment. 7. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian to Theodorus. If the restoration
to which you were entitled has been delayed by the protracted and unconcealed
efforts of the adverse party, and the slaves who were the subject of
controversy have died, their value should be paid to you by him who
prevented you from receiving them. The animals, also, together with
their offspring, shall be delivered to you by the intervention of the
Governor. 8. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Nicomachus. It is clear that
the official whose duty it is to see that the judgment is executed after
it has been rendered, and the case has been heard and argued by the
parties, is the only person who can give force and effect to the decision. Without date or
designation of Consulate. 9. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Glyco. Bring suit before
the Governor of the province against those whom you allege to be your
debtors, whether they acknowledge the obligation or deny it, and having
had judgment rendered against them, if they do not satisfy it by payment
within the time prescribed by law, the Governor, observing the legal
formalities shall, after the pledges have been seized and sold, see
that execution takes place in the manner repeatedly mentioned in the
Imperial constitutions. Ordered on the Nones of November, during the Consulate of the Caesars. Title
54. Concerning interest on a judgment. He who proceeds
against the property of a defeated party litigant in accordance with
the judgment rendered shall, in addition to the principal, be entitled
to interest at twelve per cent for the time which elapsed during which
he refused to obey the judgment. 2. The Emperor
Justinian to Menna, Praetorian Prefect. Those who have
been ordered to pay a certain sum of money, and have failed to do so
for more than four months from the date of the judgment, or, if an appeal
was taken, have failed to satisfy it from the day of its confirmation,
We decree shall be required to pay interest at twelve per cent; and
what has been prescribed by former laws which imposed upon them interest
at twenty-four per cent, or by Our law which fixed the rate at six per
cent, shall not apply to the cases of such persons. Given at Constantinople,
on the seventh of the Ides of April, during the Consulate of
Decius, 529. 3. The Same Emperor to John, Praetorian Prefect. We decree that
if anyone should have judgment rendered against him, and a further delay
of four months has been granted by Us, he shall, after that time has
expired, be compelled to pay interest at the rate of twelve per cent
in accordance with the terms of the judgment; but this shall only be
on the principal and not on the interest which was originally included
in the judgment, for We have already decided that the collection of
interest on interest shall be abolished, and have left no case in which
this can be done. For if this was left without correction, something
absurd and awkward must necessarily result, as interest arising from
contracts is legally payable, and is very frequently fixed by Our laws
at a lower rate than twelve per cent; and compound interest would necessarily
be imposed at a higher rate than simple interest. If interest ran at
twelve per cent at all times on a judgment, this would rarely happen
under the provisions of contracts, and if, by certain articles of Our
law exceptions have, in some instances, been made, the necessities of
the case were responsible for the apparent injustice. Hence,
We, desiring to correct this by means of a proper remedy, do hereby
order that interest only on the principal to the amount of twelve per
cent shall be collected on a judgment, and that interest on interest,
no matter at what rate, shall not be exacted; since if the original
contract was changed by the judgment, interest should not be collected
on the contract after the judgment was rendered, for otherwise, it would
only be payable on the principal as a result of the judgment ; and because
both principal and interest were included in a single sum, it should
not be concluded that interest on the entire amount could be collected,
but only on the principal. (1) As the ancients, by an exceedingly pernicious regulation under which, in the satisfaction of a judgment, indulgence was granted for two months to persons who had lost their cases, their sureties, however, were not permitted to enjoy this privilege, as the successful parties (the principals who had judgment rendered against them being left for the time on account of the provisions of the law) were authorized to collect the money or take the property which was the object of the judgment from the sureties or mandators of the former, We, desiring to abolish this injustice, do hereby order that the delay of four months which We granted to the principals in the case shall also be extended to their sureties and mandators, in order that the law may not be evaded, for when anyone who volunteers to defend a case is compelled to make payment, and he, in his turn, forces the defendant involuntarily to satisfy him, the defeated party does not experience the benefit of Our indulgence, because, through his surety, he was compelled to pay the money which he owes. Title
55. Where judgment is rendered against several persons at once. If you and your
colleagues have not had judgment in full rendered against you severally,
but only jointly for a single and specified sum, and it is not stated
in the judgment that what cannot be collected from one shall be made
up by the other, the effect of the decision is that each party shall
be liable for an equal portion. Therefore, if, in obedience to the judgment,
you have paid your share, you cannot be compelled to pay that of the
other party if he should fail to do so. 2. The Emperor
Gordian to Annianus. Whenever judgment is rendered against two guardians, each of whom had employed an attorney to defend him, liability for the amount of the judgment is considered to have been divided between them, hence it is a well-established rule of law that what cannot be collected from one cannot be recovered from the other. Title
56. Who are not injured by a judgment. If you did not
commit the defence of your property to your brother, and did not ratify
his acts, the exception of res judicata will not affect you,
and therefore you will not be prevented from conducting your case without
prejudice on account of the judgment. Published during
the Nones of May, under the Consulate of Alexander, 223. 2. The Emperor
Gordian to Athenius. Where judgment
has been rendered between certain parties, those who did not appear
in the case will experience neither benefit nor injury, and therefore
your granddaughter cannot be prejudiced where a judgment has been rendered
against her co-heirs, if nothing was decided against her. 3. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Honoratus. It is a perfectly
clear rule of law that, even in criminal cases, those who did not appear
in court will not be affected, if, perchance, they should seem to have
sustained any injury. 4. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Soterianus. It has frequently
been held that where a case has been decided between certain parties,
the rights of one who is absent, and equally interested, will not be
prejudiced. Given on the sixth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of the Caesars. Title
57. Notices, letters, proclamations, and signatures do not possess the
authority of judgments. Notification by
a judge who directs certain interest to be paid by persons who failed
to discharge a debt within a specified time does not have the force
of a stipulation. Given on the day
before the Ides of January, during the Consulate of Antoninus,
Consul for the fourth time, and Balbinus, 214. 2. The Emperor
Alexander to Maximus. The fact that
the Governor of the province, by a letter, ordered you to pay a certain
sum of money to the State, does not have the effect of a judicial decision. Given on the fourth
of the Ides of March, during the Consulate of Maximus, Consul
for the second time, and Julianus, 234. 3. The Same
Emperor to Zoticus. It has frequently
been stated in Rescripts that a decision rendered after the trial of
a case cannot be revoked by the signature of the Emperor. Published on the
sixth of the Ides of September, during the Consulate of Albinus
and Maximus, 228. 4. The Emperor
Gordian to Asclepiodotus. The interlocutory
decree of a Governor, which has been duly recorded, ordering the party
sued to obey it by making payment of a debt or be liable to double or
quadruple damages, is rather the act of one who gives warning than the
decision of a magistrate, as the rule of law declares that an act of
this kind does not obtain the force of a judgment. 5. The Same
Emperor to Jucundus. The judge who
admitted the controversy should have heard and examined the allegations
of both parties, for there is no doubt that the note
which he appended to the petition, and by which he placed one of the
parties in possession of the land, cannot be considered to take the
place of a judgment. 6. The Emperor
Philip and the Caesar Philip to Cassianus. It is clear that
a proclamation published by the Governor of a province cannot have the
force of a judgment any more than a summons. 7. The Emperor
Constantine to Bassus, Praetorian Prefect. It is not proper
or customary for a judgment rendered after a prolonged contest to be
stated in a few written phrases. Given on the fifteenth of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Constantine, Consul for the sixth time, and Maximus, 306. Title
58. Where a judgment is based on forged documents or false evidence. If you desire
to declare a will to be forged, in accordance with the terms of which
the illustrious Proconsul has rendered a judgment, he will grant you
a hearing, notwithstanding this is barred by the judgment, because the
question as to the forgery of the will has not yet been decided. 2. The Emperor
Alexander to Optatus. Those who did
not appeal when they were able to prove that they had lost their case
by reason of forged documents should be heard just as if the suit was
begun for the first time, as they are giving information with reference
to a crime. Published on the
sixth of the Kalends of October, during the Consulate of Julian,
Consul for the second time, and Crispinus. 3. The Same
Emperor to Clement. You will not be
prevented from proving in the ordinary way that the evidence which the
adverse party produced against you in court is (as you allege) false.
The judgment, however, shall not be set aside unless you can show that
he who rendered it decided against you, because he relied upon the genuineness
of an instrument which is proved to have been forged. Published on the
seventh of the Kalends of September, .... 4. The Emperor
Gordian to Herennius. The execution
of a judgment is usually suspended, and recovery of what has been paid
granted, if it can be shown by positive evidence that the judge was
deceived by a forged instrument, the commission of the crime
having afterwards been established. Published on the fifth of the Ides of September, .... Title
59. Concerning
confessions. It has been decided
that confessions made in court have the effect of judgments, therefore
you have no right to revoke your confession, as you will be compelled
to make payment. Adopted on the third of the Kalends of October, during the Consulate of Gentian and Bassus, 212. Title
60. Acts performed or judgments rendered between some persons cannot
prejudice the rights of others. It has frequently
been decided that matters transacted by certain persons cannot prejudice
the rights of others. Wherefore, although you state that some of the
heirs of him whom you allege to have been your debtor have paid you,
the others should not be pressed for settlement unless the indebtedness
is proved to be due. Given at Byzantium,
on the fifth of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of
the above-mentioned Emperors. 2. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Epicrates. It is a well-known
rule of law that a compromise made between certain parties cannot prejudice
the rights of another who is absent. Therefore, having appeared before
the Governor of the province, prove that your grandmother gave you the
slave in question, and if the Governor should find that he legally belongs
to you for this reason, he will cause him to be restored to you, for
if the others divided the slave during your absence, they could not
deprive you of any of your rights. 3. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Fortunata. If you, along
with your brother, succeeded to your mother, and your brother entered
into a compromise with the creditors of the estate with reference to
your share of the same, and did so without your consent, he could not
extinguish the right acquired by you to your share of said estate. Given on the fifth of the Ides of October, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned Emperors. Title
61. Concerning references to the Emperor. When a judge thinks
that the case should be referred to Us, and does
not decide between the parties, but concludes that the point upon
which he is in doubt ought to be left to
Our wisdom, or if he has rendered a judgment, he must not prevent the
litigants from afterwards appealing from it, for fear that it may be
reversed, being well aware that if he does so, an appeal can, nevertheless,
legally be taken. Nothing should be sent to Us which needs a complete
examination. Whenever the judge believes that a case should be referred
to Us, he must immediately order all the litigants to be notified that
a consultation is about to take place, and if the point referred is
not sufficiently explicit, or appears to be contrary to law, the judge
shall, without any unnecessary delay, be required to place the petition
upon record. Given at Sirmium,
on the fourth of the Kalends of February, during the Consulate
of Constantine, Consul for the fifth time, and Licinius, 312. 2. The Emperors
Valentinian and Valens to Viventius, Praetorian Prefect. The Governors
of provinces must not think that criminal cases originating in their
jurisdiction should be referred to Us unless they have previously notified
the parties that this is to be done, for only the truth will be established
when the matters are referred, whether their allegations are refuted
or confirmed by their consent. Given on the twenty-third
of the Kalends of January, during the Consulship of Valentinian
and Valens, 365. 3. The Same
Emperors and Gratian to Apodemius. If when either
reason or necessity requires Our decision in any instance, and an opinion
is expected, the submission of the reference must include the whole
case, so that, having been read, it will not be necessary for all the
documents to be reviewed; still, all of them should accompany the application. Given on the sixth of the Ides of May, during the Consulate of Our Noble Prince Valentinian, and Victor, 369. Title
62. Concerning appeals and Imperial decisions. The Governor of
the province must first determine the question of possession, and then
inquire into the crime of violence, and if he should not do so, there
will be good ground to appeal from his decision. 2. The Emperor
Alexander to Plautianus. What you demand
is not new, hence you must not be denied the right to appeal, even though
one of My Rescripts is pleaded against you. 3. The Emperor
Gordian to Victor. It has frequently
been established that, where an appeal was taken, although it may have
been rejected by the court, nothing took place to prejudice the decision,
and that everything remains in the same condition that it was when judgment
was rendered. Published on the
fourth .... 4. The Emperor
Philip and the Caesar Philip to Probus. If, having been
appointed to the office of clerk, you did not appeal, the laws cannot
be violated by your refusal. 5. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Valens and Others. If the Governor
of the province, to whom you have appealed, should decide that you were
not to blame because you did not file your petition within the time
prescribed by law, but that this resulted from the death of the person
who had been charged with presenting it, he will grant you relief in
accordance with the terms of the Perpetual Edict. 6. The Same
Emperors and Caesars decree: It is proper for
those who have jurisdiction of appeals, and hear them, to dispose of
them in such a way that it may be understood that the appeal was filed
after a decision was rendered by the court below, as it is not right
that, under any pretext whatever, the case should be sent back to the
trial judge, but in every instance it must be ended by its own decision;
as the salutary law enacted with reference to this provides that, after
the appellate judge has passed upon the appeal, recourse cannot be had
to the magistrate from whose decision the appeal was taken. Wherefore,
judges are hereby notified that, under no pretext whatever, can litigants
be sent back to their own provinces, as appellate judges in every instance
are only permitted to determine whether the appeal was properly taken
or not. (1) If one of
the litigants should think that he has failed to make use of some good
defence in his allegations before the lower court, he can avail himself
of it before the judge who has cognizance of the appeal, as it is Our
desire that judges should only decide in conformity with justice, and
that no important evidence which may have been omitted should be excluded. (2) When anyone,
after having taken an appeal, thinks that the presence of certain persons
is necessary for him to establish the truth before the judge who has
jurisdiction of the appeal, because he believes that it was concealed,
and the judge decides that this ought to be done, the appellant should
pay the said witnesses their travelling expenses,
for justice demands that he who thinks that he is interested in having
them summoned should do this. (3) However, with
reference to those who, accused of capital offences, have appealed from
the sentences passed upon them, neither they themselves nor those who
appeal in their behalf, can do so until the case has been fully heard
and argued and judgment has been rendered, and We order that this rule
shall be observed, in order that if the defendant is unable to obtain
a solvent surety he may be kept in custody, and that the judges shall
send their decisions as well as copies of the documents filed by the
appellants, together with the replies made to them, to the court of
appeal, so that the condition of the case may be made clear to the appellate
judge, and its merits having been considered, judgment be rendered in
accordance with the rights of each of the parties. (4) In order that
the power to appeal may not be rashly and indiscriminately granted,
We decree that he who has failed to establish his case on appeal shall
be compelled by a competent judge to pay a reasonable penalty. (5) Where, however,
anyone having conducted his own case in court, and having been defeated,
desires to appeal, he must file his petition on the same day, or on
the next after judgment has been rendered. He who is transacting the
business of another must, under the same circumstances, appeal within
three days. (6) The judge shall, without delay, notify the other party that an appeal has been taken, even when the appellant does not request it, but the former is by no means required to furnish security to conduct his side of the appeal. Without date or
designation of Consulate. 7. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Nero. If those who have
been appointed to civil offices, to the decurionate, or to any other
honors, even though they may have been released from the discharge of
their duties by the Emperor, do not avail themselves of the aid of an
appeal, they will be considered to have confirmed their appointments
by their own consent. Therefore, as you have been appointed to a public
office, and have appealed, prove before the Governor of the province
that you have done so for a good reason. 8. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Opimiamus. Where a decision
has been rendered against someone who is more than twenty-five years
of age, and an appeal was not taken within the
time prescribed by law, and the Governor of the province ascertains
that the matter was not settled by compromise while the appeal was pending,
he shall see that the judgment is executed. 9. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Our Dear Haberad. The principal
party in the case can himself prosecute an appeal which his attorney
has taken in the course of the proceedings, even during the absence
of the latter. 10. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Titian. If an attorney
appointed by a curator should lose the case, he himself as well as the
curator can invoke the aid of appeal, or the curator alone can exercise
that right. If, however, the minor should, in the meantime, claim the
indulgence due to his age, or attain his majority, he can, in his own
name, conduct the appeal. Ordered on the
day before the Kalends of October, during the Consulate of the
Caesars. 11. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Antoninus. Citizens, and
the inhabitants of towns who have good excuses and did not appeal after
having legally been appointed to office, will not be permitted to establish
the trust of their allegations. 12. The Emperor
Constantine to Catulinus. Where an appeal
has been filed in a civil case it is, under no circumstances, allowed
for the appellant to be kept in prison, or subjected to any kind of
injury whatsoever, or be tortured or even exposed to insult. It is,
however, otherwise in criminal prosecutions, for in these, even if an
appeal can be taken, the defendant must be kept in custody until the
case has been decided after the appeal, if he is not able to furnish
a surety who is solvent. Adopted on the
fifteenth of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of Volusianus
and Annianus, 314. 13. The Same
Emperor to Petronius Probianus, Greeting. From the time
when proceedings in civil cases were instituted between private individuals,
and you determined to consult or refer them to Us, or you admitted the
appeal, and complied with the requisite legal formalities, nothing afterwards
should be permitted or performed by you in any way, even if any evidence
of Our favor should be produced, but you must, in obedience to former
laws, do all that is required and see that the case is sent to the Imperial
Court. Published during
the Ides of October, during the Consulate of Sabinus and Rufinus,
316. 14. The Same
Emperor to Bassus, Prefect of the City. Litigants have
a right to immediately appeal orally, without doing so in writing, if
the circumstances of the judgment demand it, and this applies to civil
as well as to criminal cases. Given at Sirmium,
on the eighth of the Ides of June, during the Consulate of Gallicanus
and Bassus, 317. 15. The Same
Emperor to Severus Vicegerent. In order that
it may not be necessary for cases which have been brought before Us
on appeal to be sent back to the lower court, We order that all necessary
information be inserted in the papers. We are compelled to be lenient
in rendering Our Decrees, as there is reason to apprehend that where
a case has not been thoroughly investigated the opportunity for further
examination may be lost. Therefore, a judge shall be liable to perpetual
infamy if all the matters stated by the litigants in the examination
and the evidence are not inserted, and cannot be found in the documents
accompanying the appeal. Given at Aquileia,
on the tenth of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of
Constantine, Consul for the fifth time, and Licinius, 319. 16. The Same
Emperor to Maximus. Those also are
entitled to the benefit of an appeal against whom judgment has been
rendered by a Deputy appointed by the Emperor. Given at Sirmium,
on the day before the Ides of January, during the Second Consulate
of Crispus and Constantine, 321. 17. The Same
Emperor to Julian, Prefect of the City. When, after a
case has been heard by any of the Praetors, an appeal is taken by either
party, the appellant must obey the judgment of the Prefect of the City. Given at Heraclea
on the third of the Nones of August, during the Consulate of
Constantine, Consul for the seventh time, and the Caesar Constantius,
Consul for the third time, 326. 18. The Same
Emperor to Victor, Collector of Taxes of the City of Rome. As some debtors
of the Treasury, when ordered to pay certain sums of money, are accustomed
to evade execution by having recourse to an appeal, which they do not
afterwards attempt to prosecute, it has been decided that if they do
not comply with all the formalities prescribed by law within the proper
time, the appeal shall be held to have been abandoned, and the amount
due shall immediately be collected. Given on the day
before the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Constantius
and Maximus, 327. 19. The Same
Emperor to All the Inhabitants of the Provinces. We permit appeals
to be taken from the decisions of Proconsuls, counts, and those who
preside in the place of prefects, whether the decisions have been made
on appeal, after delegation, or under ordinary jurisdiction, but the
judge must give a copy of the decision to the appellant, as well as
send to Us all the pleadings of the parties, together with the arguments
on both sides, as well as his own decision. We
do not permit an appeal to be taken from the decisions of Praetorian
Prefects. If the defeated party can show that he applied for an appeal,
but that the judge refused to entertain it, he can go before the Prefect
and begin the case again just as if an appeal had been taken. If the
appellant is shown not to have appealed on proper grounds, and loses
his case, he shall be. branded with infamy. If, however, he should succeed,
the judge who refused to receive his appeal must be prosecuted before
Us, in order that he may be properly punished. Given at Constantinople
on the Kalends of September, during the Consulate of Bassus and
Ablavius, 331. 20. The Same
Emperor to Albinus. The power of appeal
is granted in cases of great as well as minor importance, and the judge
should not think that he has sustained any injury because the litigant
has had recourse to an appeal. Given on the seventh
of the Ides of April, during the Consulate of Marcellinus and
Probinus. 21. The Emperors
Constantius and Constans to Lollianus, Praetorian Prefect. As ordinary judges
frequently hold that appeals should be rejected, it is hereby decreed
that if any judge should refuse to permit an appeal to be taken, which
is not against the execution of the judgment but against the judgment
itself, which has been finally rendered, he shall be compelled to pay
thirty pounds of gold to the Treasury of Our Largesses, and his officer
shall also be required to pay the same amount, unless he can show that
he obstinately resisted, and opposed, in writing, the decision rendered
by the judge. Given on the eighth
of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Arbitio and
Lollianus, 355. 22. The Same
Emperor to Volusianus, Praetorian Prefect. Where a judgment
has been rendered with reference to property which has no owner, or
that of which persons have been deprived by law as being unworthy to
hold it, and anyone thinks that an appeal should be taken, his right
to do so shall be admitted. Given on the third
of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Arbitio and
Lollianus, 355. 23. The Same
Emperor to the Senate. When an appeal
is taken from judgments rendered in Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Lydia, the
Islands of the Hellespont, Phrygia, Europe, Rodope, and Mount Hemus,
the appellant must comply with the decision of the Prefect of this City. 24. The Emperor
Valentinian and Valens to the Council of the City of Carthage, Greeting. The necessity
is imposed upon judges not only to permit an appeal to be taken, but
also to remember that the term of only thirty days is granted
from the date of the judgment within which the parties litigant are
to be notified that an appeal has been granted. The judge and his officer
shall be liable to a fine if they fail to observe these rules in
every particular. Given at Milan,
on the day before the Nones of February, during the Consulate
of the Divine Jovian and Varonianus, 364. 25. The Emperors
Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius to Syagrius, Praetorian Prefect. We order that
appeals from judgments imposing fines shall be permitted. Given on the fourteenth
of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Gratian, Consul
for the fifth time, and Theodosius, 380. 26. The Same
Emperors to Pelagius, Count of Private Affairs. Let an appeal
to Your Excellency be taken from the decision of the Imperial Procurator,
so that if the trifling value of the property involved, or the distance,
does not permit the litigants to appear in your court, refer the matter
to the Governor of the province for his decision, if you should approve
of this being done. Given at Milan,
on the fifteenth of the Kalends of March, during the Consulate
of Arcadius and Bauto, 385. 27. The Emperors
Theodosius, Arcadius, and Honorius to Evodius, Proconsul of Africa. Appointments made
by notices or edicts without public authority are not valid, and if
the proper formalities have not been complied with, it is not necessary
to appeal from them. Given at Milan,
on the seventeenth of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate
of Olybrius and Probinus, 395. 28. The Same Emperors to Neridius, Proconsul of Asia. Anyone who has
taken an appeal is hereby notified that he has a right to change his
mind, and withdraw his petition, in order that the opportunity for just
repentance may not be lost. Given at Constantinople,
on the eleventh of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate
of Arcadius, Consul for the fourth time, and Honorius, Consul for the
third time, 396. 29. The Same Emperors to Eutychianus, Praetorian Prefect. It shall not be
lawful for persons sentenced to punishment, after having been condemned
for the enormity of their crimes, to be arbitrarily removed and held
by force, and from humane considerations, We do not refuse to persons
of this kind the power to appeal in criminal cases, provided this is
done within the time prescribed by law; so that a more careful examination
may take place, where injustice is thought to have been committed, and
the safety of a man endangered through the error or prejudice of the
court. However, if a Proconsul,
the Count of the East, the Augustal Prefect, or any of the Imperial
Deputies were among the judges, it is hereby
decreed that an appeal cannot be taken to Us, but they shall have the
most ample power to execute sentence; for We desire them to have full
authority to punish those who are condemned in the manner prescribed
by law, if circumstances and the crime demand it. Given on the sixth
of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Honorius, Consul
for the fourth time, and Eutychianus, 393. 30. The Same
Emperors to Theodore, Praetorian Prefect. When anyone appeals
for the reason that he wishes to avoid the judgment rendered against
him by a judge whom he regards as suspicious, he shall have full power
to do so; nor need he be apprehensive of the undue severity of judges,
as he can easily appeal from any injurious decision which they may render,
and especially as the Praetorian Prefect is the only one from whom he
is not permitted to appeal without losing his case. Therefore, all persons
are informed that the right of appeal is granted to them from the unjust
decisions of judges, and from the rulings of those who are suspected,
in capital cases, as well in those involving the loss of their fortunes. Given at Milan,
on the seventh of the Ides of June, during the Consulate of Theodore,
Consul for the fifth time, 399. 31. The Emperors
Theodosius and Honorius to Asclepiodotus, Praetorian Prefect. If the judge of
the lower court refuses to permit an appeal to be taken against his
decision, to the tribunal of Your Highness, or to the Prefecture of
the City, or if the appeal having been admitted, he should refuse to
notify the parties, the appellant shall, according to the ancient law,
be entitled to the term of a year from the date of the decision to file
a complaint on account of this injustice, as well as to prosecute the
judge; or where an appeal of this kind was not allowed after having
been requested of the judge of the lower court, the appellant will be
entitled to six months for the purpose of doing these things.
If, however, the judge should refuse to grant the appeal,
or to refer the case to the proper magistrate, four months shall be
granted, so that those acts which We have prescribed having been performed,
the appellant may proceed during the time known to have been fixed by
law for the prosecution of appeals. Given at Constantinople,
on the third of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of
Asclepiodotus and Marinianus, 423. 32. The Emperors
Theodosius and Valentinian to Cyrus, Praetorian Prefect. We order that
hereafter there shall be no recourse to Us by appeal from the decisions
of judges of distinguished rank, lest the rights of others may seem
to be infringed if We are called upon to consider them, and are called
away from the occupations which We are pursuing for the general welfare.
If, however, a case should be appealed from the decision of any of the
Proconsuls, or the Augustal Prefect, or from that
of the Count of the East, or of any of the Vicegerents of the Emperor,
We order that the illustrious Praetorian Prefect, who is a member of
Our retinue, as well as the illustrious Quaestor of Our Palace, shall
take cognizance of the appeal in the same order, and with the observation
of the same formalities, and at the same times as other actions taken
up in one appeal are decided in the Imperial Council; and this shall
be done, even though some of the eminent magistrates aforesaid have
the right, as judges, to hear appeals. (1) When an appeal
is taken from a decision of a duke who is at the same time a Governor,
the Prefect shall be required to hear and determine the same, in accordance
with the ordinary rules of his tribunal. (2) In all the
different judicial proceedings which We have introduced instead of references
to Us, or the notices or other matters connected with the same, where
an appeal is taken from the decision of a judge, the above-mentioned
distinguished magistrates must hear the appellants and take cognizance
of their demands, and We order Our secretaries to obtain the papers
and record them, and notify the parties litigant, and the officials
associated with the illustrious Quaestor shall execute the judgments. (3) These rules
shall apply where an appeal was taken from the decision of a judge who
did not hear the case by virtue of a special appointment, for when the
time of the execution of a judgment is extended by an appeal from the
decision of a judge who was specially designated for that purpose, it
will be necessary for the magistrate who appointed him to ascertain
whether or not there is good ground for an appeal. (4) We think that
it is eminently proper to add to this most salutary law that if the
Emperor, after having been applied to, should assign the case to a private
individual, or to one or more persons who are not of illustrious rank,
to be heard (as is customary), and an appeal should be taken from the
decision of the person thus appointed, the illustrious Praetorian Prefect,
who is one of Our retinue, shall hear and decide the case along with
the illustrious Qusestor, at the proper time. Our
secretaries shall receive and record all matters heard and decided by
Our arbiters, and notify the litigants in writing, and they shall also
receive and examine any appeals taken from the awards of arbiters especially
appointed by Us (even though they be of illustrious rank) provided the
cases are referred to the Council of the Empire. (5) But when an
appeal is taken from the decision of the illustrious and distinguished
judges who do not belong to the court of last resort, We order that
it shall be heard by Us, even though it may have been taken from the
decision of someone who was appointed by Us to decide it, and who was
not originally of illustrious rank, but was afterwards raised to the
dignity of a noble. The same rule
shall also be observed when another arbiter also not of noble birth
is associated with him. (6) Moreover,
anything which has not been expressly stated in this law shall be understood
to remain subject to the rules of the ancient laws and constitutions. 33. The Same
Emperors to Cyrus, Praetorian Prefect. In a case in which
the attendant of an officer of the rank of general, with reference to
whose status a controversy arises in a province on the ground that he
is a decurion, or is a member of the retinue of the Governor, and is
detained in the province for the reason that he has not paid his taxes,
or discharged his official duties, and the decision of the Governor
of the province is not executed, for the reason that an appeal has been
taken from the same, We order that the case shall be decided by Your
Highness, along with the distinguished general, according to its merits,
even though the general may have appointed the Governor of the province
to hear it. 34. The Emperor
Justinian to Demosthenes, Praetorian Prefect. We decree that
when any judge of superior or inferior rank suggests that a matter which
We appointed him to decide, or which he should determine as belonging
to his jurisdiction, should be referred to Us, the case which has been
appealed shall be decided by Us in Council, whether his opinion accompanied
the reference or not (provided he did not state it to the parties) ;
or if nothing of this kind was added, but he simply requested a reply
from Our Majesty, the case should not be determined until Our order,
two illustrious men who are either of patrician, consular, or prefectorian
rank, and whom We have selected for that purpose, are ordered to be
joined with the illustrious Quaestor of Our Palace, and with him examine
the appeal (whether they do so in the presence or the absence of the
parties to the suit), and give their opinion concerning the case; and
the decision made by these most eminent magistrates shall be considered
as final; and permission shall not be given to appeal from it, or to
raise any doubt whatever concerning the same. We
decree that this rule shall not only apply where a single judge has
referred a case of this kind to Us, but where two or more judges were
appointed and none of them agreed, but each one submitted a different
opinion for Our consideration; or where they all consulted Us as to
what disposition should be made of the case. 35 and 36.
Laws which are not Authentic. 37. The Emperor
Justinian to Menna, Praetorian Prefect. We think that
the following should be added where appeals are taken by which it is
customary to bring matters for final determination to the Imperial Palace,
namely, when the amount in dispute does not exceed ten pounds of gold,
one judge alone, and not two (as was formerly the practice) shall be
appointed to decide it. If, however, the value of the property exceeds
that amount but is not more than twenty pounds of gold, the matter shall
be submitted to two illustrious judges, who will take cognizance of
the question involved, which must be reduced to writing by the clerks, so that if they differ,
they may call in the illustrious Quaestor, and the doubt be disposed
of by his decision. In
actions, however, where the property involved exceeds in value the sum
of twenty pounds of gold, they should be brought before the distinguished
nobles who compose the Council of State of Our Sacred Palace, so that,
in accordance with what has already been established, not only the defeated
party but also the one who is successful may have the case referred
to one or two judges, but this must be done within the term of two years,
as, after that time has elapsed, We refuse to authorize it. Any decisions
made by one or more of these judges shall, under no circumstances, be
subject to appeal. We, however, permit new allegations to be made by
the litigants before the said judge or judges, just as in the case of
a reference to the Council of Our Sacred Palace. Given at Constantinople,
on the eighth of the Ides of April, during the
Consulate of Decius, 329. 38. The Same
Emperor to Demosthenes, Praetorian Prefect. Where an appeal
was taken from the decision of a duke, whether under his regular jurisdiction,
or whether he was especially appointed to hear the case by the Emperor,
or whether he himself was included among the eminent magistrates, or
was of illustrious rank, or even if he was of higher position (as military
men as well as those of consular rank often discharge duties of this
kind when required to do so by the public welfare), no distinction being
made on this account, but only the ducal dignity being considered, the
appeal having been taken from the decision of any duke whomsoever, shall
not, as was formerly the case, be disposed of by the judges, but We
order that it shall be referred to and decided by the most sublime Master
of the Offices, and the most excellent Qusestor of Our Palace, who shall
hear it together, as is done in Our Council of State, and that it shall
be recorded by Our Imperial Secretaries, and that none of the provisions
of the ancient law with reference to such cases shall be observed, but
it shall only be brought before the said most eminent magistrates. 39. The Same
Emperor to Julian, Praetorian Prefect. We, having greater
consideration for Our subjects than they themselves would perhaps display,
do hereby amend an ancient rule, that is to say, in cases of appeal,
he alone who had recourse to such a proceeding is entitled to have the
decision of the judge corrected, but the other party who failed to do
this is compelled to obey the decision, no matter what it may be.
Hence We order that if the appellant should come into court,
and state the grounds for appeal, and his adversary wishes to contest
the judgment, and is prepared, he can do so, if his position is worthy
of the attention of the court. But when he is absent the judge must,
nevertheless, use his authority to protect his rights. (1) Moreover,
with reference to the legal documents required for the appeal, which,
by all means, must be read before the distinguished and
learned men composing the Imperial Council, the parties litigant, as
well as those who draw up said documents, must be careful not to use
too many words, and not to repeat statements which have already been
made therein, but they must only insert those things which set forth
the causes for the appeal, expressed in concise language, and must see
that they do not contain any new matter, or make additions to supply
what was omitted, for they are hereby notified that if this is not done,
those who drew up the papers will be liable to the just indignation
of the judges of the court of appeal, for a succinct statement of the
facts and an abridgment of the opinions of the eminent magistrates who
originally heard the case will be amply sufficient. (2) We remember
that, by a law which We recently promulgated, We order that one judge
should be appointed to hear cases in which a sum up to the value of
ten pounds of gold is involved, and that two should be appointed when
the value was twenty pounds of gold, in accordance with the custom observed
in cases brought before the Imperial Council. But
as, at first sight, the amount might not appear to be so large, and
in the final decision the judge or judges concluded that a greater one
should be considered, and since it was not possible for them to exceed
the limits by which they were bound, We grant them full power in cases
of this kind to adopt a larger sum than that above mentioned, if the
value of the property was more than originally estimated by them, and
they shall be permitted to render their decision in conformity to the
truth, and not in accordance with the first appraisement, in order that
magistrates may not be impeded in the discharge of their duties, but
may strictly enforce observance of the laws, and in every respect exert
their judicial authority. Given at Constantinople, on the sixth of the Kalends of April, during the fifth Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 530. Title
63. Concerning delays, and the amendments of appeals or references to
the Emperor. If anyone, having
been appointed duumvir, or honored with any other office, or invested
with any public charge during his absence, should invoke the aid of
appeal, he will only be entitled to the term of two months in which
to file his application, to be computed from the time when he can show
that he was first notified of his appointment; but if he was present,
the said term of two months must be computed from the very day when
his appointment was made. Given on the eighth
of the Ides of July, during the Consulate of Constantine, Consul
for the sixth time, and the Caesar Constantius, 820. 2. The Emperors
Theodosius and Valentinian to Cyrus, Praetorian Prefect. We think that
it will be to the advantage of Our reign for the provisions of the laws
having reference to time granted to litigants to be amended, and that
pretexts for delay should, under all circumstances, be abolished. We
order that, after an appeal has been granted, the time allowed for the
prosecution of the same, whether this has been done by the illustrious
Governor of the province, or by an eminent judge, shall, in the first
place, be six months. If the appellant permits this time to go by, We
grant him an additional term of thirty-one days. If he should let this
pass, We allow him, in like manner, a third term of the same number
of days. If the third term should also expire, We decree that he shall
be entitled to a fourth and final term of thirty-one days. If the appellant
should also let this fourth term elapse, We decree that he shall be
granted the term of three months longer, to petition Us to have his
right to appeal restored. This application having been made, We decree
that it will not be necessary to notify his adversary or to mention
the time which has expired, in his petition, but We direct that the
term of three months shall be computed from the date of the expiration
of the fourth and last term, even though restoration of his right of
appeal was granted one day before, or the judgment was not rendered
by one of the illustrious Prefects. These
rules shall not prejudice the adverse party, as the expiration of the
time is not uncertain, but is well known to all persons, and they apply
to appeals from the decisions of the illustrious Governors of provinces,
as well as from those of eminent judges. Where an appeal is taken from
the decision of an arbiter in a province, who has been specially appointed
by the Emperor, We authorize three similar terms, after the first one
has expired (as above stated) to which the appellant shall be entitled,
but he shall have no restoration of his right to appeal granted by Us,
so that, after the ninety-three days shall have elapsed, the execution
of the judgment must be ordered. If,
however, the arbiter was specially appointed in this Most Holy City,
by the Praetorian Prefect,, the Master of the Offices, or any other
official of exalted rank, and the appeal should be taken against either
the ruling or decision rendered by the lower court, the first term within
which it can be brought shall consist of two months, but the other three
shall be computed as above set forth. Anyone who takes an appeal from
the decision of an arbiter, who has been specially appointed by the
Governor of a province, or an eminent judge, shall be entitled to two
months in which to file it, and also for three other terms as above
enumerated. With reference to the
observance of the terms aforesaid, We order that if they should happen
to occur during holidays, those which precede them may be counted by
the litigants as available. If anyone, without observing the provisions of the law,
should permit the time to elapse, he can be opposed in the first instance
by his adversary, or by the judge if the appellant alone is present
in court, and the latter shall be considered as having accepted
the decision without having been subjected to any restraint. Given on the twelfth
of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of Valentinian, Consul
for the fifth time, and Anatolius, 440. 3. The Emperor Justinian to Appio, Praetorian Prefect. Let no one think
that, in the future, he will be permitted to appeal to the members of
the Imperial Council after the legally established terms
have expired, either by means of a petition, or through a Rescript of
the Emperor granting him restitution of his right, nor in any other
way whatsoever; but all persons shall be required to use due diligence
for the purpose of taking advantage of appeals within the time fixed
by law, and a statement of what has taken place in the lower court and
has been made the basis of appeal shall not be filed in the office of
the Imperial Secretary near the expiration of the term, lest, by evil
schemes, the termination of the case may be interfered with, but this
shall be done immediately after the appeal has been taken, or at least
before half of the prescribed period has elapsed, in order that the
party who has appealed may not lose his right on account of the little
time that remains. 4. The Same
Emperor to Tatianus, Master of the Offices. We decree by this
Imperial lav; that where appeals are taken to the Emperor permission
shall be given to the appellant, as well as the adverse party, to make
use of new allegations or exceptions which may, indeed, not be applicable
to the new proceeding, but arise from and are connected with questions
known to have been brought up before the lower court. If,
however, it should be shown that any allegation was made, or any document
introduced before the lower court, proof of which the party employing
it was not able to present at that time, but which can now be done without
delay before the members of the Imperial Council, they should admit
it, in order that, by doing so, more light may be thrown upon the matters
in dispute. 5. The Same
Emperor to Tribonian, Quaestor of the Imperial Palace. As by former laws,
in case of appeals, provision was not made for the time occupied by
parties residing at a distance from Our Most Sacred Court, it appears
to Us to be necessary to establish a proper scale for these distances.
Therefore, We order that when any case is appealed from the frontier
of Egypt, or Lydia, or from the Orient, or from both Cilicias, or from
the Armenians, as well as from all Illyria, the term of six months shall
be granted, as by the ancient law, and this shall neither be diminished
or increased. When, however, a case is appealed from any other portion
of Our Empire, as, for instance, from the Departments of Asia, Pontus,
or Thrace, to this Royal City, We order that, instead of the term of
six months above mentioned, only that of three shall be conceded, and
the other three terms which follow shall consist of three months, that
is to say ninety-three days, whether the first term of six months or
the other one of three is allowed, according to the enumeration of the
places which We have just made; but the other period of three months,
which is usually granted by the Council for the purpose of reinstating
the party in his right of appeal, shall remain unaltered, and shall
be added to those previously designated, so that, in one instance, the
term allowed shall consist of a year, and in the other of nine months. (1) As, in former
times, one day was granted by the ancient legislators at the end of
each term, which was designated "The Fatal Day,"
and it often happened (as mortals are exposed to many accidents) when
appeals were taken, that either from illness, length of time, or other
causes (which would not be easy to remember or enumerate), the said
fatal day passed without the parties taking advantage of it, and the
time for appealing expired, and the estates of men were thereby endangered,
We, for the purpose of disposing of these injurious vicissitudes of
fortune, do order that hereafter not merely one fatal day shall be reckoned,
but if the appellant shall have appeared at any time within four days
preceding the fatal day, or within five days after that time, and shall
bring his action before a competent judge, the law shall be considered
to have been complied with. He should not be expected to deplore the
loss of his case, but he ought to rejoice in the privilege We bestow
upon him, as We are aware that suits are frequently endangered through
an error in calculation as to the time within which the judge should
act, which it is to be hoped will not occur hereafter, because of the
remedy afforded under the present law. This
privilege is applicable to all delays, whether they have been granted
by specially appointed judges or by others, and which the laws have
mentioned as being required to be kept or observed, so that ten fatal
days, instead of only one, shall everywhere be established. (2) In those instances,
however, with reference to which the term of two years has been prescribed,
whenever cases are heard in this Imperial City by the assembled Council
of the Nobles of Our Sacred Palace, We limit the time to one instead
of two years, so that within that period the papers in the case may
be collected, and delivered to Our devoted Secretaries, and the arguments
in opposition be made, if this should be desirable, and the litigants
be compelled to bring the case before Our Imperial Council. A successful
party shall, in accordance with what has already been decided, be permitted
to present his case there at once, without waiting for the expiration
of a year, if he should wish to do so. (3) When, however,
proceedings have been begun in Our Imperial Council, and have not been
concluded on the same day, We permit them to be continued, as it would
be unjust for men to lose their cases for the reason that the Imperial
Council was occupied with matters brought before it by the Emperor. (4) We think that
it is reasonable for what follows to be added to this law, namely: that
if anyone should have taken his case before an appellate judge, prior
to the expiration of the time prescribed by law (whether one or both
parties were present), and, having formulated his appeal, should afterwards
depart and abandon it, and the remainder of the time should pass in
inactivity, and the term of a year elapse after the case was begun,
the successful party not being able to have the judgment executed on
account of the case being still incomplete, and not having the power
to bring it to a conclusion, as the absence of the appellant, did not,
of itself, cause it to be terminated, We, for the purpose of removing
this injustice (as the adverse party can, even in the absence of the
appellant, proceed with the case, for the
reason that the special privilege enjoyed by the magistrate having jurisdiction
of an appeal authorizes him to dispose of it when only one party is
present), do hereby order that if the said appellant does not attend
to the case, and conduct it to the end, when he was to blame because
the trial did not proceed, he will forfeit his right of appeal, and
the judgment rendered against him shall remain in full force and effect,
just as if an appeal had not been taken in the first place, unless the
said appellant can establish by perfectly clear evidence that he intended
to use every effort to have the case heard, but was unable to do so,
either through the fault of the judge, or for some other cause over
which he had no control. For, under such circumstances, We grant him
another term of a year, and if this should elapse, and the case not
be terminated within that time, We decree that he shall be deprived
of the benefit of an appeal, because he had full power to appear before
Us, and complain of the delay of the judge, and profit by Our indulgence. (5) In conformity
with the above, the same rule shall apply to appeals from the decisions
of Our distinguished Prefects brought before Our Imperial Council, on
the application of one or both parties, not only because of the absence
of one of them, but also on account of the expiration of the terms prescribed
by law. (6) Moreover,
if the parties came to the conclusion that their dispute should be settled
by means of a written agreement, neither of them shall have the right
to invoke the aid of an appeal, or take advantage of the lapse of time,
and We decree that a compromise of this kind shall stand, for under
such circumstances, We desire the harshness of the laws to be mitigated
by the agreement of the litigants. Given at Chalcedon, on the fifteenth of the Kalends of December, during the fifth Consulate of Decius, 526. Title
64. When it is necessary to appeal. You allege that
the sentence has no force, as it was pronounced in opposition to a judgment
from which no appeal was taken. If you can prove this readily, without
having recourse to an appeal, what has been decided will not have the
authority of a judicial decision. Published on the
eighth of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Alexander,
223. 2. The Same
Emperor to Capilaneis. When a question
with reference to the succession of the deceased arose between you and
your grandmother, and a judge appointed by the Governor of the province
decided that the deceased, although under the age of fourteen years,
could make a will, and by this means you obtained the advantage over
your grandmother, it is evident that the decision having been rendered
in violation of a plain rule of law can have
no force; therefore, in this instance, it will not be necessary to have
recourse to an appeal. If, however, an inquiry was made as to the age
of the deceased, and it was ascertained that he had completed his fourteenth
year, and the judge decided that for this reason he could make a will,
and you did not appeal, or you failed to prosecute the appeal after
it was taken, you cannot again bring up a matter which has been decided. 3. The Emperor
Gordian to Ingenuus. If (as you allege)
you were appointed to the duumvirate, and your previous designation
as decurion was suspended on account of the appeal which you made to
the eminent judges against your selection for the latter office, it
is clear that your appointment to the duumvirate will not be prejudiced
before your appeal has been disposed of by the above-mentioned judges. 4. The Emperors
Valerian and Gallienus, and the Caesar Valerian to Julianus. As you state that
several magistrates have been appointed judges in your case, and that
only one of them has rendered a decision, there does not seem to be
any necessity to appeal, as the decision is not valid in law. 5. The Emperors
Cams, Carimis, and Numerianus to Domitian. Governors can
impose fines within certain limits. If the Governor of the province
should exceed his authority, and fine you more than the amount prescribed
by law, there is no doubt that what appears to have been done illegally
is void, and can be set aside without appeal. Published during
the Ides of January, during the Consulate of Carus and Carinus,
283. 6. The Same
Emperors to Germanus. If the judge appointed
by the Governor of the province to hear the case is said not to have
rendered his decision on the day that the Governor appointed, but a
considerable time afterwards, in order to avoid the introduction of
technicalities and the delay which will result from a fruitless appeal,
the Governor of the province must decide the entire case, without it
being necessary to have recourse to an appeal. 7. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian to Nicagora. It has already
been decreed by our Imperial Predecessors that decisions rendered by
corrupt judges for the sake of reward are void in law, even if no appeal
should be taken. 8. The Same
Emperors to Constantine. If your father
did not give his consent to your appointment as decurion, and you were
still in the fifteenth year of your age, and the Governor of the province,
having been applied to, should find that you are not eligible to the
said office of decurion, he will revoke the unjust appointment as being void on account of your age, even
if no appeal was taken. 9. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Rufina. We grant to veterans
who, after service in the legions or under the standards for twenty
years, have obtained an honorable and regular discharge, the privilege
of being exempt from onerous public duties. Moreover, desiring to remunerate
the faithful devotion of Our soldiers by this mark of Our indulgence,
We hereby release them from the necessity of appealing, when judgments
are rendered against them. 10. The Emperor
Justinian to Menna, Praetorian Prefect. For the sake of
maintaining unimpaired the honor of judges, where one of the parties,
considering himself injured by their final decision, takes an appeal,
We forbid the other party, who was successful, to appeal from the same
judgment on the ground that he did not receive anything as costs and
damages in the case, or received less than he ought to have done, as
he himself admits that the decision was justly rendered. The judges,
however, or the nobles of Our Imperial Palace, when the amount involved
in the case is not of great value, and they think that the successful
party is entitled to his expenses, have power to grant him a reasonable
sum for that purpose, without rendering it necessary for him to appeal.
And as he is permitted by former laws to apply for this relief, if his
adversary should fail to appeal to Our Council, We nevertheless authorize
this to be done, but We forbid any imputation to be cast upon the court
by taking an appeal when it is unnecessary. Given on the eighth of the Ides of April, .... Title
65. Whose appeals should not be received. The appeal of
a party who, being absent through obstinacy, has had judgment rendered
against him after having been regularly summoned to conduct his case,
cannot be received, if the matter has previously been summarily examined. Published on the
Nones of July, during the Consulate of Antoninus, Consul for
the fourth time, and Balbinus, 214. 2. The Emperors
Constantius and Constans to Hierocles, Consular of Syria. You will be careful
to note that no homicide, poisoner, malefactor, adulterer, or any person
who has been guilty of manifest violence, who has been convicted by
witnesses, or with his own mouth has confessed that he is guilty of
vices and crimes, shall be heard, if he takes an appeal. We, however, wish it to be observed that justice requires
that where witnesses have been called, instruments produced, and other
evidence offered, and a judgment has been rendered against the culprit,
and the latter does not confess his guilt, or, terrified by the fear
of torture, states anything against himself, he shall not be denied
the right of appeal. Given on the fifth
of the Ides of December, during the Consulate of Leontius and
Sallust, 344. 3. The Emperors
Valentinian and Valens to Modestus, Praetorian Prefect. An appeal from
the decision of his own judge is not permitted to any official, except
solely where, in a civil proceeding, he has brought suit before his
own judge with reference to an estate, but any official can, under other
circumstances, appeal from the sentence of the said judge, and the right
is granted him by law to appear by an attorney. Given on the fourth
of the Ides of June, during the Consulate of Valentinian and
Valens, 365. 4. The Emperors
Valentinian, Valens, and Gratian to Olybrius, Prefect of the City. We order that
no appeal shall be taken where satisfaction of a claim is demanded by
the Treasury, or where the payment of public taxes is in question, or
the recovery of a debt, either public or private is involved (provided
that the indebtedness has been clearly proved), so that judicial authority
may be severely exercised against the delinquent if guilty of contumacy. Published at Rome,
on the fifteenth of the Kalends of September, during the second
Consulate of Valentinian and Valens, 368. 5. The Emperors
Valens, Gratian, and Valentinian to Thalassius, Proconsul of Africa. It has been thoroughly
established by the laws and Imperial Constitutions that an appeal cannot
be taken from an execution, unless the officer charged with it has exceeded
the terms of the judgment. When an appeal of this kind is taken, We
think that it should be held that the execution is suspended, and if
the property, which the officer charged with the execution attempted
to return, is movable, it should be taken from the possessor and sequestered
after the appeal, to be restored eventually to the party whom the judge
may decide is entitled to it. Where, however, execution was issued with reference to
either the possession or the ownership of property, and it is suspended
by an appeal, all the profits acquired therefrom during the time of
the appeal, or subsequently obtained, shall be placed on deposit, and
the land left temporarily in the hands of the appellant. Litigants,
however, are notified that, if they appeal either from the execution
of the judgment, or from the judgment itself, and it should appear that
they have done so wrongfully, they shall be fined the sum of fifty pounds
of gold. Given on the third
of the Kalends of February, during the Consulate of Valens, Consul
for the sixth time, and Valentinian, Consul for the second time, 378. 6. The Emperors
Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius to Hypatius, Prefect of the City. Anyone who has
ventured to appeal against the opening of the will of a deceased person,
or to prevent those who, it is evident, have been appointed heirs, from
being placed in possession of the estate, if the judge having jurisdiction
should hold that the appeal which has been interposed in such a matter
ought to be received, he who appealed so improperly shall pay a fine
of twenty pounds of silver, and the judge who connived at such a base
proceeding shall be fined an equal sum. Given on the Nones
of April, during the Consulate of Ausonius, Consul for the tenth
time, and Olybrius, 379. 7. The Same
Emperors and Arcadius to Pelagius, Count of Private Affairs. No appeal shall
be permitted either from interlocutory decrees or from other judicial
acts, before a final decision has been rendered in its proper order. 8. The Emperors
Arcadius and Honorius to Apollodorus, Count of Private Affairs. The interest of
the public as well as that of Our Private Treasury requires that claims
due to Our Household should not be deferred by the cunning arts of debtors.
Wherefore, We decree that the following rule shall be obeyed, namely:
that those who have been openly and manifestly ascertained to be public
debtors shall be denied the privilege of appeal, and their application
for the same shall be rejected. Given at Milan, on the third of the Ides of August, during the Consulate of Arcadius, Consul for the fourth time, and Honorius, Consul for the third time, 396. Title
66. Where the appellant dies while the appeal is pending. Even after the
death of the party who appealed, his heirs are required either to continue
the case on appeal, or to acquiesce in the original
decision. Published on the
third of the Nones of December, during the Consulate of Alexander,
223. 2. The Same
to Marcellina. My Parents ordered
that the property of him who, having been accused of a capital crime,
did not appear, and died before the case was heard, should belong to
his heirs. Published on the
third of the Nones of December, during the Consulate of Alexander,
223. 3. The Same
Emperor to Ulpius. If anyone sentenced
to exile with confiscation of his property should appeal, and should
die while the appeal is pending, although the crime vanished with his
death, still the case involving his property must proceed. For it makes
a great difference whether a capital penalty which deprives the accused
of his property has been imposed (in which case the crime, having been
extinguished by his death, no question with reference to it can survive),
or whether the property is taken, not as the result of condemnation
for the crime, but by a special decision of the Governor, for the defendant
being dead, the question of the crime alone is removed, but that of
the disposition of the property remains. Published during
the Ides of March, during the Consulate of Modestus and Probus,
279. 4. The Emperor
Gordian to Alexander. If your father,
having been appointed to the decurionate and appealed, died while the
appeal was pending, the question of the appointment is terminated by
his death. 5. The Same
Emperor to Felix. Although the female
slave, with reference to whose ownership a controversy arose and a decision
was rendered against you by the Governor of the province, died, still,
as an appeal was taken in the case, and as you allege that it was pending
along with other cases, this appeal should be heard and decided in its
regular order, so far as the disposal of the peculium of said
slave is concerned. 6. The Emperor
Constantine to Bassus, Prefect of the City. If one of the
litigants should die while the appeal is still pending, his heirs will
be entitled not only to the remaining time which remained to the deceased,
but also to four months in addition. Where, however, a certain time
was granted to the heirs for deliberation, after this has expired, the
term of four months more shall be granted them, in order that they,
being ignorant of business, or having doubts as to whether they should
accept the estate or not, may not suffer loss before acquiring any benefit. Published at Sirmium, on the twelfth of the Kalends of June, during the second Consulate of the Caesars Crispus and Constantine, 331. Title
67. Concerning those who do not appeal through fear of the judge. If a judicial
decision was rendered against you and you did not invoke the aid of
an appeal, you understand that you must abide by the decision,
for you need fear nothing in the presence of the Imperial Council. Given on the fifteenth
of the Kalends of June, .... 2. The Emperor
Julian to Geminianus. The privilege
of having the right to appeal restored to them is denied to those who
did not apply within the time prescribed by law. Therefore, all who,
under the pretext of fear, fail to appeal from the decisions of Prefects
of the City, Masters of the Offices, Generals of the Army, Proconsuls,
Counts, Prefects of the East, Augustal Vicegerents, or any other magistrates
whomsoever, shall be excluded from reviving their cases. But persons
who have suffered violence, and make a public statement of the facts
within the lawful time during which they have a right to appeal, or
show by their statements that they intended to do so, shall, by reason
of this fact, have the support of equity, just as if an appeal had been
taken. Published on the fifteenth of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Mamertinus and Nevitta, 362. Title
68. Where one or more of the parties appeal. If it is proved
to the court that the same judgment was rendered against you as against
the party whose appeal was decided to be just, and that there was no
separation on account of any difference of facts in the case, he will
not fail to see that you also, who did not appeal, shall profit by the
success of the other party, in accordance with what has frequently been
decided. Published on the
fourteenth of the Kalends of September, .... 2. The Same
Emperor to Serenus. When one of several parties in the same case appeals and his appeal is decided to be just, it will also benefit those who did not appeal. Where, however, one of them obtained restitution in opposition to the judgment, on the ground of his age, this will be of no advantage to another who is older, but did not appeal in his own name. Title
69. Where an appeal is taken against temporary possession. Where proceedings
have been instituted with reference to temporary possession, even though
an appeal may have been taken, the judgment rendered will, nevertheless,
be effective, as the question of possession must be decided, in order that that of ownership
may remain intact. Given at Milan, on the fourteenth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of our Prince Honorius, and Evodius, 386. Title
70. No one shall be permitted to appeal for the third time in one and
the same case, or to refuse to obey the judgment of a court which has
been rendered twice and confirmed by the decision of a Prefect. When a party has appealed a second time in a case, he shall not be permitted to do so again with reference to the same matters, in the same suit, or to refuse to comply with the judgment of the distinguished Praetorian Prefect. Permission, however, is granted to litigants for whom an arbiter has been appointed to question the jurisdiction of the judge who appointed him, before issue had been joined, for a proceeding of this kind has by no means the effect of an appeal. Title
71. Who can make an assignment of their property. When the creditors
of those who make an assignment of their property are not paid in full,
the latter are not released from liability, for the only advantage they
derive from doing so is that, if judgment should be rendered against
them, they cannot be placed in prison. Given on the tenth
of the ... of December, during the Consulate of Maximus, Consul for
the second time, and Aelianus, 224. 2. The Emperor Philip and the Caesar Philip to Abascantus. If you are prepared
to pay what you owe, after judgment has been rendered against you in
favor of the State, because you have hastily consented
to assign your property, you need have no apprehension that you will
be deprived of your right to the same, if it has not yet been sold. Published on the
thirteenth of the Kalends of February, during the Consulate of
the Emperor Philip, and Retianus, 246. 3. The Emperors
Valerian and Gallienus to Julianus. If your father
made an assignment of his property on account of civil liabilities which
he had incurred, an inquiry should be made as to his means, and the
estate which you allege you acquired after your emancipation should
not be interfered with. In order that this may be accomplished, you
should invoke the justice of the Governor. 4. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Chilo. It is a well-known
fact that the benefit of the Lex Julia, having reference to the
assignment of property for the benefit of creditors, was extended by
the Constitutions of Our Divine Predecessors to the Provinces, so that
such assignments may take place there, but creditors are not allowed
to divide the said property on their own authority, and hold it by the
right of ownership, but they are obliged to sell it, and can then indemnify
themselves as far as the proceeds permit this to be done. Therefore,
you, having the possession of the property of him who assigned it to
you on the sole ground that you are his creditor, against the rule of
law, it is clear that the claimant will not be barred by the prescription
of long time, but if it is shown that he did not assign the property,
but gave it to you in payment of his debt, the Governor of the province
will grant you a hearing with reference to your ownership of the same. 5. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Myro. The assignment
of property by anyone on account of his being unable to meet some indebtedness
incurred on account of municipal offices or duties, can, by no means,
be admitted, but those who are liable must discharge their obligations
in proportion to the pecuniary resources of each. 6. The Emperor
Theodosius. In every assignment
of property, no matter for what cause it is made, the statement of the
assignor alone should be required, and the precise formalities introduced
by former laws are hereby abolished. (1) The same Emperor
said: "In every assignment of property the sole statement of the
intention of the party who makes it is sufficient." Given on the Kalends
of May, during the Consulate of Our Prince Honorius, and Evodius,
386. 7. The Emperor Justinian to Julian, Praetorian Prefect. As sons under
paternal control can hold property which is forbidden to be acquired
by their fathers, as well as peculium, not only castrense,
but also what they can obtain with the consent of the former, •why
should the power to assign their property be refused them? The reason
for this is that those who are under paternal control are understood
to possess nothing in their own right, still, in order that they may
not suffer injury, they should be allowed to make an assignment, for
if the head of a family is permitted to have the weak aid of assignment
on account of the fear of some injury to which he may be subjected,
why should We deny this right to children of either sex who are under
paternal control? For it is a perfectly clear rule of law that, where
those who are under the control of others, subsequently, as heads of
families, acquire anything, this can legally be seized by creditors
to the amount of the indebtedness. Given at Constantinople,
on the tenth of the Kalends of March, after the fifth Consulate
of Lampadius and Orestes, 531. 8. The Same Emperor to John, Praetorian Prefect. When, as is customary, a petition is presented to Us to allow someone to have recourse to the wretched expedient of making an assignment of his property, and his creditors are given the choice to grant him five years for payment of their claims, or to accept the assignment, that by so doing his reputation may be preserved, and the prospect of all bodily suffering be removed, where some of the creditors are willing to allow the term of five years, but others insist that an immediate assignment be made, it was constantly doubted which of them should be heard. Where a doubt of this kind exists, We think that Our opinion should be readily accepted by everyone, that is to say, We choose and authorize the more humane, instead of the harsher course, and decree that the case shall be decided either by the amount of the indebtedness, or according to the number of the creditors. Where, however, there is one creditor whose claim is found to be greater than all the others, that is to say, if all of them were united into one, and the entire indebtedness computed, it would be greater in amount than the rest combined, this decision shall prevail, whether the creditor is willing to grant the time above mentioned or to accept an assignment of the property. But if there are several creditors who have different claims, the one who has the largest should be preferred to the others, whether the creditors are equal or unequal in number, as the case should be decided, not in accordance with the number of creditors, but by the amount of the indebtedness. If the claims are found to be equal in amount, but the number of the creditors is unequal, then the majority of the creditors shall obtain the preference, and the decision shall be made in compliance with their wishes. When, however, the debts, as well as the number of creditors are equal, then those shall be preferred who incline to the more humane course, and do not require an assignment of the property, but are willing to grant the time, and, with reference to this choice, no difference shall be observed between hypothecary and other creditors. When an assignment is made, the judge shall exercise his authority by dividing the property among the individual creditors, as prescribed by law, and no prejudice shall result to any creditor from the delay of five years, so far as prescription is concerned. Title
72. Concerning the seizure and sale of property by authority of court,
and the separation of the same. With reference
to the estate of a deceased person it is clear that the case of legatees
is preferable to that of those to whom his heir has bequeathed property,
since they can sue them, as they could have done his heir, for the first
bequest can be collected as a debt, and what has been left by the deceased
will only be available after the failure to pay it. 2. The Emperor
Gordian to Aristo. It is part of
the jurisdiction of the Praetor under the Edict, after it has been established
that the creditors of an estate are entitled to indemnity, that they
shall be granted a separation of the property, whenever they demand
it, and proper cause is shown. Therefore, you will obtain what you desire,
if you can prove that you did not proceed against the heir as representing
the estate, but that you were compelled by necessity to bring him into
court. 3. The Same
Emperor to Claudiana. The suit which
you have brought against your debtor on the contract which preceded
the assignment of his property is contrary to the rule of law, as equity
furnishes him with the relief of an exception. You can, however, again
bring suit against him, if he has subsequently acquired other property,
and the Governor of the province should authorize you to do so. 4. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Clariana. The demand which
you make, namely, that one of the creditors who has a written claim
against the debtor, and has seized the property of the latter, is obliged
to satisfy all the other creditors, is contrary to law. 5. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Acyndinus. If it is
established that the property of your debtor is unoccupied, and it has
not been seized by the Treasury, you can lawfully demand to be placed
in possession by a competent judge. Given on the seventeenth
of the Kalends of January, under the Consulate of .... 6. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Agathomarus. Creditors cannot
legally demand that the property of their debtor be transferred to them
in satisfaction of their claims. Therefore, if the other creditors of
your debtor have received property by way of pledge, there is no doubt
that their claims will be preferred to yours, as you have only a written
obligation. If, however, it should be proved that the property of your
creditor is not encumbered to anyone either specially or generally,
and the common debtor himself, or his heir, died without leaving any
successor, the interest of all the creditors will be protected, not
by asserting their right to the ownership of the property, but by obtaining
possession of and selling the same, and each one should receive a share
of the proceeds in proportion to the amount of nis claim. 7. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Domnus. If your wife has
been appointed heir by her uncle, who was her debtor for the third part
of his estate, she will not be prevented from collecting the debt from
his co-heirs in proportion to their two-thirds, as the right of action
is not merged, except so far as the share of the estate to which she
succeeded is concerned. If, however, the co-heirs should be insolvent,
and a separation of property is demanded, she will not be allowed to
suffer any loss. Given on the Kalends
of December, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 8. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Elida. The wife of the
deceased, or other creditors who have been placed in possession of the
property of the estate for the purpose of preserving it can, by no means,
be considered to have acquired the ownership of the same for this reason. 9. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Teruncius. As you allege
that he of whom you complain is indebted to you on account of the administration
of your business, having appeared before the Governor of the province,
you can legally bring suit against him. If it is established that he
is your debtor, and that in an attempt to defraud you of your rights,
he has concealed himself, and does not make any defence, you can, by
virtue of the Edict, obtain possession of his property, and the time
prescribed by law having expired, you will not be forbidden by a competent
judge to sell the same. Given on the fourteenth
of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of Diocletian
and Maximian. 10. The Emperor
Justinian to John, Praetorian Prefect. In cases where
money was due, and property which belonged to the debtor had not been
hypothecated to secure payment, and he, fearing the harshness of his
creditors, concealed himself, and they, having instituted proceedings
with reference to said property, demand that possession of the same
should be transferred to them, We find that the question
arose among the ancient authorities whether other creditors, to whom
he was also indebted, could share in the possession of the property,
and desiring to remove this doubt, do order by this general Imperial
Constitution that, where not all the creditors, having claims of this
kind, but only certain ones, are placed in possession of the property
under a judicial decree, not only they, but all others having such claims
shall enjoy the same privilege, and have a common interest with those
who first obtained possession, and in whose favor a decree was rendered,
as above stated; for what could be more just than that all those who
are admitted to the possession of the property of the debtor should
share an advantage of this description? But,
in order that the negligence of the others may not be a source of perpetual
annoyance to those creditors who are shown to have been more diligent
in the collection of their claims, it seems to Us to be equitable to
direct that the other creditors who are not known, to have exerted such
diligence shall share in the possession of said property, and that they
shall be entitled to the term of two years if they are present and live
in the same province in which those who have possession of it reside,
and in case of their absence shall have the term of four years in which
to prove their claims to the creditors in possession and pay the expenses
pro rata to those who obtained the judgments. Those who incurred
such expenses in order to obtain possession of the property, must prove
the amount of the same under oath, because it is an established rule
that they shall be reimbursed in proportion to the amount of their claims.
After the time above mentioned has expired, however, the creditors who
have obtained possession as aforesaid shall not be molested or subjected
to loss, and they can bring any actions against their debtors to which
they think that they are entitled under the laws. (1) But if those
creditors who hold possession should sell the property, either by virtue
of a judicial decree or for any other lawful reason, or if they should
transfer every right which they are known to have in said property to
other persons, after the time which has been prescribed by Us, and receive
a certain sum of money in payment for the same, anything which is found
to be in excess of what is due to them, they will, by all means, be
required to seal up in the presence of notaries, and deposit in the
strong box of the Holy Church of the town in which the said transaction
took place, after a statement has been drawn up by the notaries aforesaid,
in the presence of the person who sold the property or transferred it
to other persons, in which not only the amount of money which was paid
for the sale or transfer of said property, as well as that of the surplus
which remained after the discharge of the debt, shall be set forth,
so that if any creditor should subsequently appear and produce evidence
of a debt, he can be paid out of said surplus. If another creditor should appear, the Governor of the
province shall make an examination of his claim without any charge,
and if he should not admit it, the reverend Stewards or Treasurers of
the Holy Church in which the money is deposited shall not be subjected
to any loss or expense, but the creditor shall be entitled to receive
the amount of his debt, pro rata,,
out of the money deposited under the decree of the Governor. To
prevent the creditors from practicing any fraud, machination, or evasion
in the sale or transfer of said property, We order that the statement
drawn up with reference to the transaction shall, with all the customary
formalities, be recorded in the office of the Defender of the City,
whether the amount of the price was equal to that of the debt, or whether
it was more, or less; and this should take place, not only in the presence
of notaries, as aforesaid, but also in that of the most reverend Treasurer
of the Church in whose hands the excess of the money, if there was any,
was deposited under seal. The vendor, or the person who transferred the property,
shall be required to make oath on the Holy Scriptures that this was
not done to favor either the purchaser or him to whom the property was
delivered, and that he did not fraudulently receive a lower price for
the same than it was worth, but the highest one in fact which, after
every effort, it was possible for him to obtain. Given at Constantinople, on the fifteenth of the Kalends of November, after the fifth Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 532. Title
73. Concerning the privilege of the Treasury. If the property
of your husband was seized by the Treasury for the payment of claims
incurred during his administration as Chief Centurion of the Triarii,
any of it that you can prove beyond question to be yours shall be separated
from the rest, and returned to you. 2. The Same
Emperor to Valeriana. Although your
former husband may have had judgment rendered against him on account
of your dowry, still, if he made a contract with the Treasury before
his property was encumbered to you, the claim of the Treasury will be
preferred to yours. If, however, he became liable to the Treasury after
you had obtained a lien on his property, the claim of the Treasury to
said property will not take precedence of yours. Published on the
fourteenth of the Kalends of November, during the Consulate of
Antoninus, Consul for the fourth time, and Balbinus, 214. 3. The Same
Emperor to Juliana. If, when you paid
money for your husband, you did not have the claim of the Treasury transferred
to you, and did not receive a house or any other property from him by
way of security, you will be entitled to a personal action, but your
claim by which you allege that the taxes have again been farmed out
to him cannot be preferred to that of the Treasury, as, under the terms
of that contract, whatever property he has or did have at the time the
agreement was entered into, is encumbered to the Treasury by the right
of pledge. Therefore, with the exception of the indemnity to which the
Treasury is entitled, you will not
be prevented from suing your debtor, in the ordinary way, for the sum
which you have paid in his behalf to the Treasury. Published on the
third of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of Antoninus,
Consul for the fourth time, and Balbinus, 214. 4. The Same
Emperor to Quintus. If the debtor,
to whom you state that the land in question belonged, sold it before
he owed anything to the Treasury, My attorney will see that you are
not subjected to annoyance on this account, for even though he afterwards
became the debtor of the Treasury, still, any property which did not
belong to him at that time cannot, for this reason, be encumbered to
the Treasury by the right of pledge. Published on the
third of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Lsetus,
Consul for the second time, and Cerealis, 216. 5. The Emperor
Alexander to Menna. If the money which
a creditor received from his debtor should afterwards be decided to
justly belong to the Treasury, it will be due without interest, because
it was acquired, not under a contract for interest, but as being the
property of the Treasury by special privilege. Published on the
fifteenth of the Kalends of June, during the Consulate of Fuscus
and Dexter, 226. 6. The Emperor
Gordian to Severiana. As you yourself
state that your father was a debtor of the Treasury, and you allege
that, at the time of your marriage, he gave you possession of certain
property, you understand that the Attorney of the Treasury can institute
proceedings to revoke said gift, on the ground that said property was
pledged to the Treasury. Published on the
Nones of June, during the Consulate of Sabinus and Venustus,
241. 7. The Emperors
Valerian and Gallienus, and the Caesar Valerian, to Diodorus. If, after you
have paid for a debtor to the Treasury the balance which he owed, and
a competent judge has assigned to you the right of the Treasury, and
deprived the creditors (to whom the Treasury had a preferred claim)
of the property in your favor, they cannot molest you for the reason
that you hold it by this title. Published on the fifteenth of the Kalends of June, during the Consulate of Aemilianus and Bassus, 260. Title
74. Concerning the privilege of dowry. You should know
that the dotal privilege which women avail themselves of in an action
of dowry does not pass to their heirs. Published on the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of Pompeianus and Avitus, 210. Title
75. Concerning the revocation of contracts by which property has been alienated for the purpose of defrauding creditors. An heir who, after
having entered upon the estate, transfers it to another, remains liable
to the creditors of the estate. Therefore, if he did this for the purpose
of defrauding you, and you have seized and sold his property in the
ordinary way, you can revoke the contract by which it is proved that
the property was fraudulently alienated. Published on the
second of the Ides of October, during the Consulate of Antoninus,
Consul for the fourth time, and Balbinus, 214. 2. The Emperor
Alexander to Symphoriana. If you did not
accept the estate of your father, his creditors cannot proceed against
you on account of the property which was given to you by way of dowry,
when it is not shown that the said property was previously pledged to
them, unless, after the estate of the deceased was found to be insufficient
to pay his debts, it should be proved that the dowry had been constituted
for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. 3. The Emperors
Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Acindynus. If you refused
to accept the estate of your father, and none of the property of the
same was transferred to you as a donation for the purpose of defrauding
creditors, the Governor of the province will not permit you to be sued
by the private creditors of your father. 4. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Epagathus. It is a well-known
rule of law that the sons of a debtor have no power to revoke contracts
made by their father for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. Published on the
tenth of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of
the above-mentioned Emperors. 5. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Crescentius. It is a well-recognized
legal principle that the interests of creditors shall be protected against
a person who, after judgment has been rendered against him, does not
satisfy it within the time prescribed; and no defence is made by bringing
an action in factum against the purchaser, where property has
been sold after the remaining assets have been found to be insufficient,
and the purchaser knowingly and fraudulently bought the property, or
against him who has possession under a lucrative title, whether he was
aware of the fraud or not. Ordered on the
tenth of the Kalends of November, during the Consulate of the
above-mentioned Emperors. 6. The Same
Emperors and Caesars to Menandra. If you have formally
released an obligation, you are advised that the right to sue is only
granted by the Perpetual Edict against the party guilty of fraud, within
the year during which he could be compelled to make payment, or committed
a fraudulent act by which he became unable to do so. |