| THE 
          ENACTMENTS OF JUSTINIAN. | 
| ( S. P. Scott, The Civil Law, XIV, Cincinnati, 1932 ). | 
| 
 | 
| Title 
          1. Concerning freedom granted by the wand of the Praetor, and manumission conferred in the council. 1. 
          The Emperor Antoninus to Tertius. The condition 
          of those who are manumitted in the Council, after the ground for it 
          has been approved by the court, and the manumission has taken place, 
          is not usually called in question, even when it is alleged that enfranchisement 
          was obtained by false representations. 2. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Sallust. It is perfectly 
          certain that where Roman citizenship has once been granted, a second 
          manumission can neither add anything to, nor take anything from it. Given on the day 
          before the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 3. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Attonita. There is no doubt 
          that a woman cannot legally manumit anyone either through her husband, 
          or an agent, by means of a wand. 4. The Emperors 
          Constantius to Maximus, Praetorian Prefect. A slave can obtain his freedom through the efforts of his patron in the presence of Our Council, or before consuls, praters, presidents, governors, or municipal magistrates, to whom this right has been conceded. Title 
          2. Concerning testamentary manumission.    It is certain 
          that if anyone over twenty years of age should make a codicil, leaving 
          a slave his freedom, the date of confirmation will not prejudice the 
          manumission; for, in this instance, the intention of the deceased, and 
          not his legal capacity, must be considered. 2. The Same 
          Emperors to Philetus. Freedom cannot 
          be granted by the will of a deceased person when the estate has not 
          been entered upon, or if the disposition of the property was set aside, 
          because of some crime which was not punished on account of death. 3. The Same 
          Emperors to Euphrosinus. Where freedom 
          has been granted by the will of the deceased and the estate has been 
          entered upon, even though the appointed heir may have rejected it for 
          the purpose of obtaining complete restitution, this will, nevertheless, 
          in no respect interfere with the grant of freedom. Ordered on the 
          seventeenth of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of Aper 
          and Maximus, 208. 4. The Same 
          Emperors to Archelaus. Although your 
          father obtained his freedom directly by will, and you were his heir, 
          still, you cannot be compelled to render accounts of any business which 
          he transacted while he remained in slavery, as he did not receive his 
          freedom upon that condition. Again, he to whom freedom has been bequeathed 
          either directly or under the terms of a trust, on condition that he 
          would render his accounts, cannot obtain his freedom before having submitted 
          them and returned any property which he may have abstracted with evil 
          intent. If, however, having rendered his accounts, he should not be 
          found to be indebted to the estate, he will obtain his freedom absolutely 
          after the estate has been entered on. Published on the 
          Kalends of December, during the second Consulate of Lsetus, and 
          Cerealis, 216. 5. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Quintilian. A testamentary 
          grant of freedom made for the purpose of defrauding creditors, even 
          though the heir of the debtor may be solvent, is not valid under the 
          Lex Aelia Sentia. 6. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Pisistratus. If the estate 
          of him, by whose will you say you were manumitted, has been rejected 
          by the heirs on account of its indebtedness, you do not unjustly demand 
          that the will of the testator shall be observed with reference to you, 
          for the purpose of protecting the interests of freedom, if you offer 
          to satisfy the creditors of the estate; especially as this has already 
          been decreed by that most learned Emperor, the Divine Marcus. This rule shall 
          also be observed in the case of strangers. 7. The Same 
          Emperor to Justa. You should not, 
          against the wishes of your mother, bestow freedom upon a slave whom 
          she forbade to be liberated, lest you may appear to have violated the 
          rights of filial affection. 8. The Emperor 
          Philip and the Caesar Philip to Tremellius. When a testator 
          has ordered that freedom shall be granted to a certain slave, at the 
          time of the marriage of his son or daughter, he did not definitely fix 
          the date of his liberation from servitude, but he merely made it conditional, 
          so that if the marriage did not take place, freedom could not legally 
          be demanded by the slave. 9. The Emperors 
          Cams, Carinus, and Numeriamis to Maurus. The deceased could 
          not directly bestow freedom upon your slave, although it is stated that 
          he appointed you his heir; for no one can, in accordance with law, grant 
          freedom directly to the slaves of others. 10. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian and the Caesars to Germans. When freedom is 
          legally granted in direct terms to slaves, not only by the imposition 
          of the cap of liberty, but also by acceptance of the estate, such slaves 
          become freedmen under the wills of their masters if no legal impediment 
          exists. 11. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Laurina. If a will is void 
          in law, any grants of freedom bestowed under it will not be considered 
          properly made, even if, as you allege, it was not added that the instrument 
          should be valid as a codicil. 12. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Rhysus. If the heirs appointed 
          under a will, which was legally executed, enter upon the estate with 
          the usual formalities, you cannot be deprived of the freedom to which 
          you were entitled under said will, if the appointed heirs, acting in 
          collusion with those who claim the estate on the ground of intestacy, 
          should refuse to accept it. Where, however, they voluntarily reject 
          the estate left to them, everything included in the will is considered 
          to be of no effect. If, however, the Governor of the province should ascertain 
          that the heirs are in collusion for the purpose of defrauding you of 
          your freedom, he will provide for your obtaining it, in accordance with 
          the Constitution promulgated by the Divine Pius Antoninus. 13. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Martial. It is certain 
          that where freedom has been left to a slave conditionally, he cannot 
          be deprived of it by the heir, nor can either alienation or usucaption 
          injure a slave who is to be conditionally free, as long as he will be 
          entitled to his liberty if the condition is complied with. 14. The Emperors 
          Theodosius and Valentinian to Florentine, Praetorian Prefect. Direct grants 
          of freedom can be made by wills drawn up in the Greek language, so that 
          such grants, when made directly, shall be considered of the same force 
          as if the testator had ordered them to be stated in the terms prescribed 
          by law. 15. The Emperor 
          Justinian to John, Praetorian Prefect. As a Constitution 
          of the Divine Marcus declares that where anyone either makes a will 
          or dies without doing so, thus furnishing ground for an intestate succession, 
          and bequeathes grants of freedom, and no one desires to accept the estate 
          of the deceased because there is reason to suspect it of being insolvent, 
          and the grants of freedom have been left under a trust, without having 
          been reduced to writing, any stranger whosoever, or any one of the slaves 
          to whom freedom has been left and whose status is in danger, can enter 
          upon the estate, on condition of giving security that he will satisfy 
          all the creditors, and confer freedom upon those whom the testator intended 
          should receive it. Various doubts 
          have arisen with reference to the interpretation of this constitution, 
          for if the property of the estate should be sold because no heir could 
          be found, it was asked whether, after the sale of the said property, 
          it would be possible for either a slave, or anyone else to accept the 
          estate, recover from the purchasers what had been sold, execute the 
          grants of freedom, and satisfy the creditors? Although the Divine Severus 
          did not permit this to be done after the property had once been disposed 
          of, still We have adopted the opinion of Ulpianus (especially with reference 
          to the grants of freedom, in order that they may not be lost) who held 
          that, after the sale of the property, a remedy would be afforded by 
          the Constitution of the Divine Marcus within a year; provided all the 
          creditors were paid during that time, and the purchasers suffered no 
          other inconvenience by submitting to the rescission of the sale before 
          the aforesaid period had elapsed. Hence the slave who was entitled to 
          his liberty, or any stranger, will be permitted to enter upon the estate, 
          either before the sale or afterwards, within the term of a year, and 
          recover the property, having first furnished security that the grants 
          of freedom will be carried out, and the creditors satisfied. (1) Moreover, 
          if anyone, having entered upon an estate, should promise to carry out 
          all grants of freedom, and to pay the creditors not in full, but only 
          in part, and the latter accept this proposal, We decree that, in a case 
          of this kind, the Constitution of the Most Wise Emperor aforesaid shall 
          be applicable, and We hold that it should by all means be adopted, especially 
          when the creditors consent, but when they are unwilling, We do not permit 
          any such agreement to take effect. (2) Where, however, 
          some of the slaves are willing to accept freedom and others think that 
          it should be rejected, in this instance, the Rescript of the Divine 
          Marcus will apply, and there is no doubt that in this case the petitioner 
          for freedom should be heard, and the slaves have perfect liberty to 
          decide whether they prefer to be free or to remain in servitude. For 
          while no slave is allowed to refuse Roman citizenship, still, in this 
          instance, lest through the ingratitude of some the others may remain 
          in bondage, all slaves who desire to obtain their freedom shall be permitted 
          to do so; and if any of them are unwilling, or reject it, they shall 
          be immediately reduced to servitude, and 
          those who would not accept a patron will obtain a master, and perhaps 
          a severe one. (3) When, however, 
          the person who accepts the estate does not promise to carry out all 
          the grants of freedom, but only to liberate a certain number of slaves 
          whose manumission was provided for, if the property of the estate is 
          sufficient for the payment of the creditors in full, the better course 
          will be for all the slaves to receive their freedom, even though this 
          may not have been promised. But when there are not enough assets to 
          settle the claims of the creditors, it is more advantageous for only 
          a few of the slaves to be emancipated. (4) In this way 
          We have found a remedy for the doubts of the ancients, by adding an 
          excellent provision to the constitution aforesaid; and hence We order 
          that if no single claimant of the estate appears, but several do, and 
          two or more appear at the same time, all of them shall be given permission 
          to enter on the estate, all having previously furnished security that 
          they will satisfy the creditors, and carry out the grants of freedom. 
          But if they should appear at different 
          times, the one who comes first shall take precedence, if he can give 
          security; but if he is unable to do so, the others shall be entitled 
          to the privilege in their order, according to the time when they make 
          the demand; and this must be done within a year. (5) Where one 
          of the applicants promises to free certain slaves, but not all, and 
          another is prepared to furnish security that all the creditors will 
          be satisfied, and all grants of freedom be carried into effect, it will 
          be perfectly just for the latter to be accepted, so that all the grants 
          of freedom without distinction may be executed. We grant this favor 
          not only to a slave to whom freedom was bequeathed, but also to him 
          to whom it was not left by will; so that the result may be commendable, 
          and others receive their freedom by means of one to whom it was not 
          left by will. (6) If, however, anyone should first receive the property of the estate and his liberty, We decree that the preceding provision shall apply to the second or the third claimant, or to any others who promise more generous donations of freedom. But when the slave who was the first to demand the inheritance has already received it, and freedom has been conferred by him upon certain other slaves belonging to the estate, and some slave forming part of the same, or a stranger who is free, appears and offers better terms, he shall be permitted to take the estate, if he promises to do more, and gives proper security. The first applicant shall, however, retain his freedom, even though the property may have been sold by him, and all these things must take place within a year from the time when the first claimant presented himself, in accordance with what has already been stated. Title 
          3. Concerning the abolition of the Lex Fufia Caninia.   We decree that where grants of freedom are left to slaves by will, whether this is done directly, or under the terms of a trust, they shall be valid without distinction, just as where freedom is bestowed by the acts of persons who are living. The Lex Fufia Caninia shall not apply to other cases, and no impediment shall be placed in the way of testators who desire to exercise their beneficence by the emancipation of their slaves. Title 
          4. Concerning grants of freedom by means of trusts.   As you allege 
          that the estate of the testator, by whom freedom was bequeathed to you 
          by the terms of a trust, was not entered upon, and another heir than 
          the one appointed obtained possession of the estate on the ground of 
          intestacy, if you do not demand the freedom which was granted you under 
          the trust, with the execution of which the heir at law was charged, 
          you can not legally demand it from him who was not requested by the 
          testator to bestow it. It is clear that if you can prove that the appointed 
          heir neglected to give you your freedom, after having received money 
          for doing so, the heir at law can be compelled to grant it to you. Published on the 
          thirteenth of the Kalends of March, during the Consulate of Lateranus 
          and Rufinus, 198. 2. The Emperor 
          Antoninus to Valerius. Although the codicil 
          by which it appears that you were bequeathed to the uncle of the deceased 
          has been declared forged, still, if you obtained your freedom from the 
          legatee in a proper manner, before any question arose with reference 
          to the crime, what happened afterwards will not invalidate the grant 
          of freedom made in this way. According to the Constitution of the Divine 
          Hadrian, it is evident that the heir will have the right to demand the 
          twenty aurei. 3. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Lucius. As you allege 
          that freedom was conditionally granted to the female slaves, why should 
          there be any doubt that children who came into the world before this 
          was done were born slaves, and became the property of the heirs by the 
          right of ownership? For relief should only be granted to those who were 
          born after he who was charged with the grant of freedom was in default, 
          in order that they may appear to have been born free. 4. The Same 
          Emperor to Julianus. Where a female 
          slave, to whom freedom was left under a trust by the will of her master, 
          has received her liberty, she, having become a 
          Roman citizen in accordance with the Decree of the Senate, and the constitutions 
          promulgated with reference thereto, her children will be freeborn. If, 
          however, she has never claimed her freedom, she should only blame herself 
          if the children born to her in the meantime are slaves. 5. The Same 
          Emperors to Dionysius. A minor of twenty 
          years of age cannot, by his last will, bequeath freedom under a trust 
          to his slave, unless he is able to prove that he was legally authorized 
          to do so. 6. The Same 
          Emperor to Maximus. It has been decided 
          that freedom granted under the terms of a trust should be given to a 
          female slave, nor will she be the less entitled to it, if, in the meantime, 
          her mistress was unwilling to sell her, provided she received nothing 
          from the will of the person who bequeathed the freedom, for the reason 
          that she might be liberated in the course of time, whenever an opportunity 
          to purchase the slave might arise. 7. The Same 
          Emperor to Nicomedes. Slaves, to whom 
          freedom has been granted under a trust by the last will of the testator, 
          become the freedmen of those who have been charged with their manumission. Published on the 
          Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Fuscus and Dexter, 
          226. 8. The Same 
          Emperor to Eutyches. As you state that 
          freedom was granted you by a trust, on condition that the widow of the 
          testator agreed to it, even though she did not enter upon the estate, 
          and all of it, in consequence, passed to his son, if he manifests no 
          opposition, you can demand your freedom. 9. The Emperors 
          Valerian and Gallienus to Daphnis. Even if a testator, 
          when he appointed his slave the guardian of his children, did not, at 
          the same time, grant him his freedom, it will be considered that he 
          manumitted him under the terms of a trust, and that this was done for 
          the sake of liberty and in behalf of the wards. If he had appointed 
          not his own slaves but those belonging to another, being at the same 
          time aware of his condition, it was held by jurists that he likewise 
          would be entitled to his freedom as under a trust, unless it clearly 
          appeared that the intention of the deceased was otherwise. 10. The Same 
          Emperors to Mercurialis. You will still 
          be entitled to the grant of freedom left you by the terms of the trust, 
          subject to the condition that you shall receive it when the testator's 
          son attained his twenty-fifth year, even though, as you allege, the 
          heir should have died before reaching the designated age. For it was held by the ancients that the hope of freedom 
          should not be destroyed after the time had elapsed when, if the son 
          of the testator had lived, he would have attained the prescribed age. 11. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Flavianus. If you were a 
          slave, and freedom was bequeathed you under the terms of a trust, you 
          are hereby notified that you cannot obtain your liberty without manumission. 
          Hence if, while a slave, you obtained a fiduciary grant of freedom, 
          you must appear before the Governor of the province, so that, after 
          having investigated your case, he may decide whether or not you have 
          the right to be set free, and may compel him to manumit you, whose duty 
          it is to do so; or, if the latter conceals himself he can, by means 
          of a decree, protect your interests against the person who cannot be 
          found. 12. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Hyrenius. It is stated by 
          legal authority that freedom under a trust shall not be considered as 
          bequeathed, on account of the insertion of the phrase, "I recommend," 
          into a will or codicil. 13. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Pythagorida. If the testator, 
          having before his marriage given you to his future wife, afterwards 
          left her a legacy, and by his will or codicil charged his heirs to manumit 
          you, there is no doubt that they, as well as she, by accepting the legacy 
          bequeathed to her, approved the will of the deceased, and will be liable, 
          and that you will be entitled to your freedom under the terms of the 
          trust. 14. The Emperor 
          Justinian to Julianus, Praetorian Prefect. As a doubt arose 
          among the ancients whether it was possible for freedom to be left under 
          the terms of a trust to a slave who was, as yet, unborn, and was expected 
          to be a boy, We, for the purpose of settling this dispute, order that, 
          in favor of freedom, both the grant of it under a trust, as well as 
          one made directly, shall be valid, whether the unborn child is male 
          or female, as only the question of freedom is considered, even if the 
          mother who brought him forth still remained in slavery. If, 
          however, several children of different sexes were born at the same time, 
          and only one or more were mentioned, all of them will be entitled to 
          their freedom as soon as they are born; as it is better, in case of 
          doubt, to adopt the more humane opinion, and especially where liberty 
          is concerned. Given on the Kalends 
          of October, during the fifth Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 
          530. 15. The Same 
          Emperor to Julianus, Praetorian Prefect. We decree that 
          when freedom has been bequeathed to a male or female slave under a trust, 
          and the debtor is in default in granting it, the 
          slave shall be liberated from servitude by a decision of the Governor, 
          without any act of the heir, or without waiting for his consent. Such 
          a slave shall be entitled to his or her freedom, just as if he or she 
          had obtained it directly from the testator himself, as it is wicked 
          as well as absurd for heirs to delay to carry out the wishes of the 
          testator, especially where liberty is involved. 16. The Same 
          Emperor to Julianus, Praetorian Prefect. If a testator, 
          in his will, should charge his heir to grant freedom to any one of the 
          children of his female slave, whom he designated by name, and the said 
          slave brought forth one or more children, and the heir did not, during 
          his lifetime, grant freedom to any of them, or, while deliberating which 
          one he would set free, died; a doubt arose among the ancient authorities 
          whether all, one, or none of the said children would be entitled to 
          be free. We, desiring to punish the evil intention of the heir for 
          not complying with the wishes of the testator, and for not selecting 
          one of the children of the female slave and giving it its freedom when 
          he was able to do so, do hereby decree that not only he, but also his 
          heirs and successors, shall be compelled to liberate all the children 
          of the said female slave; for this is not contrary to the intention 
          of the testator, since, when he provided that any of said children whom 
          the heir might select would be free, he did not have in mind any certain 
          one, but all of them; and if the heir did not comply with his wishes, 
          there is no doubt that, according to the intention of the testator, 
          all of them would be entitled to their freedom. We order that the same rule shall apply when the testator 
          charged not the heir, but a legatee or beneficiary of a trust, with 
          the grant of freedom, so that, for this reason, heirs, legatees, or 
          beneficiaries of trusts, being actuated by a just fear, may carry out 
          the will of the testator, and may not themselves suffer loss by being 
          compelled to liberate all the slaves. Any 
          complaints they make shall be to no purpose, for they can only blame 
          themselves for the loss which is not due to Our legislation, but is 
          the result of their own contumacy. Given at Constantinople, 
          on the fifteenth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate 
          of Lampadius and Orestes, 530. 17. The Same 
          Emperor to Julianus, Praetorian Prefect. Where anyone has bequeathed his slave under the condition that the legatee should grant him his freedom, and the heir, acting dishonorably with reference to the legacy, refused to surrender the slave to the legatee, and suit having been brought against him, and the judge having ordered him not only to give up the slave, but also to pay his appraised value, the ancient interpreters of the law were in doubt whether an obstacle was not placed in the way of freedom by a decision of this kind; and when it was decided that freedom must be granted, whether this should be done by the heir or the legatee, and if the heir granted it, whether the legatee would be entitled to retain the amount which he had received as a pecuniary fine, either entirely, partially, or not at all. We, in disposing of this controversy, are surprised to learn that the judge, who had jurisdiction of the case aforesaid, did not require the heir not to surrender the slave but only to pay his value, as such a fault offers an occasion for a dispute. Wherefore, if such a question should arise, We think that no judge would be so foolish as to render a decision of this description. If, however, the legatee should demand that the slave be delivered to him, and the term of two months should elapse after issue had been joined in the case, We decree that the slave shall immediately obtain his liberty and become free, and that the heir, on account of his evil behaviour, shall be condemned to pay four times the amount of court costs incurred by the legatee, and that the right of patronage shall be preserved unimpaired for the benefit of the latter. Title 
          5. Concerning the annulment of conditional grants of freedom.   Those known as dediticii shall not hereafter, under any circumstances, be permitted to interfere with the administration of Our government, for the reason that We find this term has fallen into disuse, and that the freedom obtained by the aforesaid class exists only in name; for We, who endeavor to cultivate the truth, only desire those things to appear in Our laws which can actually become operative. Given during the Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes. Title 
          6. Concerning the abolition of Latin freedom, and its transference in certain ways to the entire body of Roman citizens.   As the class of 
          dedititian freedmen, having already been abolished, the freedom of the 
          Latins, for this reason, becomes in some respects unstable, and though 
          to a certain extent identified with the former, whatever remained that 
          was available We have confirmed as law. For as Latin freedom, like that 
          originally introduced into the ancient Latin colonies, resulted only 
          in civil war, it would be absurd for its appearance to remain when the 
          thing itself was abolished. Therefore, as the condition of freedom was obtained by 
          the Latins in almost innumerable ways, and different laws and decrees 
          of the Senate were enacted with reference to the same, and in the application 
          of these the greatest difficulties arose from the Lex Junia, the 
          Largian Decree of the Senate, and the Edict of the Divine Trajan, of 
          which Our laws are full, for they were introduced before any experience 
          had been acquired in matters of this kind. Hence it appears to Us perfectly 
          proper to remove all these difficulties, abolish Latin freedom, and 
          having selected other methods different from those by which Latin freedom 
          was formerly acquired, give authority, at the present time, to such 
          persons to obtain the status of Roman citizens, so that all the rules 
          enumerated in the present law, which have originated in Roman States, 
          and all the other ways by which the name of Latins was acquired shall 
          be absolutely abolished, and shall not create Latin citizens, but shall 
          be considered void. For who will tolerate a condition by which, at the 
          time of his death, freedom and slavery can exist at once in the same 
          person, and that he who lived as free may die in servitude? (1) Therefore, 
          We order that if anyone should desire to grant his slave freedom by 
          means of a letter he can do so, provided he signs it himself, in the 
          presence of five witnesses called together for that purpose; or when the letter, written in his own hand, discloses 
          the permanency of his intention. If he, having either drawn up the instrument 
          himself, or having had it done by a notary, should state therein that 
          his slave was entitled to his freedom, as in the case of a codicil, 
          he may, even during the lifetime of his patron, enjoy liberty and the 
          rights of Roman citizenship. (2) When anyone 
          desires to liberate his slave in the presence of friends, he shall be 
          permitted to do so in the same way that he could perform such an act 
          after having called together five witnesses, provided he announces that 
          he wishes his slave to be free, where this is done in writing, and attested 
          by the signatures of the witnesses, and the person granting the manumission; 
          and if it is made before a public official, it must also bear his signature 
          as well as that of the witnesses. Slaves 
          who obtain their freedom in this manner become Roman citizens, just 
          as if they had obtained it by virtue of a codicil. (3) We know that, 
          in ancient times, under an Edict of the Divine Claudius, if anyone ejected 
          his slave publicly from his house when he was suffering from a dangerous 
          illness, and did not aid him in any way, or commit him to the charge 
          of others when he himself was unable to take care of him, or place him 
          in a hospital, or provide for him in some other manner, the said slave 
          would formerly enjoy Latin freedom, and if his master should die before 
          he did, he would, with his property, belong to his successor. 
          A slave of this kind shall hereafter become 
          absolutely free, even against the consent of his master, and, having 
          been given his property, he shall immediately become a Roman citizen, 
          nor shall any of the rights of patronage be enjoyed by his former owner, 
          for he who publicly drove him away from his house and family, without 
          either assisting him, recommending him to the mercy of others, placing 
          him in a hospital, or even paying him ordinary wages, shall be deprived 
          of the ownership of the said slave, not only during the entire lifetime 
          of the said freedman, but also at the time of his death, as well as 
          afterwards. (4) In like manner, 
          if anyone should alienate his female slave on condition that she would 
          not prostitute herself, and her new master, through the infamous desire 
          of gain, should attempt to compel her to do so, or if her former master 
          should, by the imposition of his hands, make a reservation for himself 
          when alienating her, and she having been returned to him, cause her 
          to prostitute herself, she will immediately obtain the privileges of 
          a Roman citizen, and he who prostituted her will be excluded from all 
          the rights of patronage, for is anyone so degenerate and wicked as to 
          pursue such a calling worthy to have either a female slave or a freedwoman? (5) Slaves who 
          have received the cap of liberty by virtue of the last will of the testator, 
          and the consent of the heir, immediately become Roman citizens, and 
          have the right to march first in the funeral procession, and to stand 
          by the bed on which the body of their master has been laid. No 
          one shall be permitted to make a display of vain liberality, so that 
          the people may praise the deceased for his humanity, when they see a 
          great number of such slaves in the funeral procession wearing the liberty 
          cap, for they will all be deceived, as the slaves remain in their former 
          servile condition, and the evidence given in public shall go for naught. 
          When any such slaves become Roman citizens, the right to patronage is 
          reserved unimpaired for the benefit of their patrons. (6) It should 
          undoubtedly be observed that, when anyone manumits a slave either by 
          his will or under the wand of the Praetor, although he may say or write 
          that he wishes the slave to enjoy Latin freedom, the superfluous addition 
          of "Latin" shall be abolished, and he shall become a Roman 
          citizen, lest the methods by which men were formerly invested with citizenship 
          may seem to have been annulled by the wills of private persons. (7) But if anyone 
          should bequeath freedom to his slave conditionally, and while the condition 
          was still pending, a foreign heir should grant him his freedom, he will 
          become a Roman citizen, and not a Latin one as in former times. When 
          the condition is not complied with, the slave shall remain the freedman 
          of the heir who liberated him. If, however, the 
          condition should be fulfilled, anyone manumitted by will shall be considered 
          a freedman of the deceased, in order that children and cognates may 
          not be deprived of the rights of patronage, and that he who was entitled 
          to those rights by law may enjoy them. (8) The opinion 
          held by the ancients seems to Us to be very harsh, that is to say, where 
          a slave has been defeated by his master in a suit brought to declare 
          him free, and his value was afterwards paid by someone to his master, 
          but he still remained subject to Latin law; for how can it be reasonable 
          for his master to receive the price of the slave, and at the time of 
          the death of the latter, again reduce him to slavery, since these two 
          things are not consistent? In the present instance, the slave will be 
          entitled to Roman freedom, but the rights of patronage will continue 
          to be enjoyed by his master, for the reason that the slave himself is, 
          to a certain extent, his freedman. (9) Where, however, 
          anyone gives his female slave in marriage to a freeman, and provides 
          her with a dowry, which is only customary in the case of those who are 
          free, the said female slave becomes a Roman citizen, and not a Latin 
          one. But if this is done, which very frequently takes place among Roman 
          citizens, and especially where they are noble, that is to say, where 
          a dotal instrument is drawn up and delivered to a person of this kind, 
          such an instrument will necessarily take effect, and the slave will 
          become a Roman citizen. (10) In like manner, 
          if a master in a public instrument refers to a certain slave as his 
          son, his statement must be believed so far as the free condition of 
          the former is concerned; for if he was inspired with such an affection 
          for his slave that he did not consider him unworthy to be mentioned 
          as his son, and he did not do this secretly, 
          or only among friends, but in a public document, just as he would have 
          done so in court, how can the slave again be reduced to servitude at 
          the time of his death? He must, however, become a Roman citizen, receive 
          absolute freedom, and not depend upon a false statement of his master. (11) Again, the 
          most recent manner of changing Latin into Roman citizenship should be 
          adopted, namely, the instrument by which the condition of the slave 
          was established shall either be given to him or destroyed. But in order 
          that no opportunity may be afforded to slaves to steal it, and obtain 
          their freedom by their own wicked act, this manner of enfranchisement 
          must be proved by certain and undoubted evidence, and the owner of the 
          slave must either give the instrument to his slave in the presence of 
          not less than five witnesses, or tear or destroy it in some other way. 
          Hence, to enable the slave to acquire Roman citizenship, We decree that 
          one who obtains his freedom in this way shall, in this instance, as 
          well as in others, be subject to the rights of patronage, except where 
          We have expressly denied these rights to patrons. (12) With the 
          exception of these cases alone, which have been selected from the entire 
          body of ancient jurisprudence relating to Latin citizenship, all the 
          other methods enumerated either in the books of jurists, or in the Imperial 
          Constitutions, are absolutely abolished ; and slaves shall not become 
          Latin citizens by their means, but, as has already been stated, shall 
          remain in their former condition, and shall not be permitted to profit 
          by this remedy. And, in order that hereafter no enactment with reference 
          to Latin freedom may conflict with Our Laws, the Lex Junia is 
          hereby repealed, the Largian Decree of the Senate shall no longer be 
          operative, and the Edict of the Divine Trajan, which follows, shall 
          be of no force or effect, and if any other law, or Decree of the Senate, 
          or even an Imperial Constitution should treat of Latin manumission, 
          it shall be void, so far as this subject is concerned, and notice is 
          hereby given that, instead of the three kinds of freedom which formerly 
          existed, and which were the cause of much ambiguity, but one direct 
          method shall prevail. If any law 
          or constitution should hereafter make mention of freedom, it shall be 
          understood to be that conferred by Roman citizenship, and not Latin 
          freedom. (13) Where, however, 
          Latin freedmen are dead, and their property, as such, has passed to 
          those.entitled to the same, or if they are still living, no innovations 
          shall be made by the provisions of this law, but the title to the property 
          shall vest to the persons aforesaid, and shall remain firm and indisputable. 
          The present constitution shall only be 
          applicable to freedmen in the future. Given at Constantinople, on the Kalends of November, after the fifth Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes. Title 
          7. Concerning the manumission of a slave owned in common.   With reference 
          to slaves owned in common and their freedom, and whether the share of 
          the person who gave them liberty accrued to the other master, or not, 
          and especially among soldiers, when they grant freedom in this way, 
          much doubt arose among the ancient legal authorities ; and a constitution 
          is cited in the Commentary of Martian on the Constitutions of the Divine 
          Severus, by whose terms this Emperor imposed the necessity upon the 
          heirs of a soldier to purchase the share of the other joint-owner, and 
          give the slave his freedom. Another 
          constitution, however, promulgated by the Emperors Severus and Antoninus, 
          has been found, by which one partner is generally required to sell his 
          share to the other. When freedom 
          is granted to a slave, even though no benefit may accrue from the estate 
          of the dead partner to the other, and the price is required to be fixed 
          by the decision of the Praetor in accordance with what Ulpian, in the 
          Sixth Book on Trusts, and Paulus in the Third Book on the same subject, 
          say, where it is stated that Sextus Aelius, one of the ancient jurists, 
          also held that the other partner could be compelled by the Praetor to 
          sell his share, in order that the slave might become free, this Marcellus 
          also notes in his work on the Digest of Julianus, and it is clear that 
          he in his commentary on Julianus only adopted the opinion of the latter. (1) Hence, these 
          matters having been found in the works of the ancient legal authorities, 
          We, desiring to dispose of all such disputes, do order that, generally 
          speaking, no distinction shall be made between slaves owned in common 
          by soldiers or private persons, but in the case of all slaves who are 
          common property, where anyone desires to give them lawful freedom, either 
          while alive or by his last will, he can do so, and the other joint-owner 
          shall be required to sell his share of the slave, whether this be half, 
          a third, or any other portion whatsoever. When 
          there are several joint-owners, and one of them desires to liberate 
          the slave, all the others shall be compelled to sell the shares which 
          they have in said slave to the one who wishes to manumit him, or to 
          his heir, even though the common slave himself may have been appointed 
          the heir of his master, and he only made the appointment immediately 
          before his death, in order that he who purchased the shares of the other 
          joint-owners, or his heirs, might liberate the slave. (2) If, however, 
          the joint-owner or joint-owners refuse to accept the price, We give 
          him permission to tender it through a public official, and having sealed 
          it, to deposit it in a temple, and thus be authorized to give the slave 
          his freedom, which he shall enjoy to the fullest extent, as well as 
          the privilege of Roman citizenship; and he shall have nothing to fear 
          from the other joint-owners, for they will have 
          no one to blame but themselves, if, when they were able to benefit by 
          the price of the slave, they refused to accept it. (3) But in order 
          that no doubt may arise with reference to the peculium of the 
          slave, We decree that his peculium shall be divided among all 
          the joint-owners in proportion to the ownership of each one in the slave; 
          permission being granted to him who, at the time of his death, liberated 
          the slave, to transfer to his freedman his share of the peculium 
          of the former. Moreover, there is no doubt that the rights of patronage 
          will pass to him who gave the slave his freedom. (4) Where, however, 
          the slave is obliged to render accounts in order that no loss may occur, 
          or any impediment be placed in the way of emancipation, the Governor 
          of the province, or some competent magistrate, must fix the time within 
          which his accounts shall be rendered, and any debts which may appear 
          by them to be due shall be discharged, and he shall then obtain his 
          liberty. (5) Again, in 
          order that there may be no doubt as to the amount of the price to be 
          paid for the slave, but that this may be perfectly clear, We order that 
          the valuation of a slave, whether male or female, provided he or she 
          is not skilled in any trade, shall be twenty solidi, and that 
          those slaves who have reached their tenth year shall be valued at only 
          ten solidi. When, however, they are skilled in any trade, with 
          the exception of writers and physicians, their price shall be established 
          up to thirty solidi, whether they are men or women. A writer 
          or a physician, either male or female, shall be valued as follows: a 
          writer up to fifty solidi, and a physician up to sixty. When 
          eunuchs, who are common slaves and are over ten years of age, are not 
          familiar with any trade, they shall be valued at fifty solidi, but 
          if they are skilled artisans they shall be valued up to seventy. We 
          do not wish eunuchs under ten years of age to be valued at more than 
          thirty solidi. Joint-owners 
          shall accept the amounts due to them according to the above-mentioned 
          standard, and shall be compelled by competent judges to grant the slave 
          his freedom. (6) If one or 
          more of the joint-owners of a slave desire to liberate him, or release 
          him at his own solicitation, the latter paying the price, or one or 
          more of them say that they desire to free him and pay his value, he 
          shall be preferred who first manifested this generous intention. But 
          when all of them come forward with the object of manumitting the slave, 
          then a competent judge shall compel them all to grant him his freedom 
          without compensation, and his peculium, shall be distributed 
          among all the joint-owners in proportion to their shares in the slave. 
          All those who granted freedom to the slave shall be equally entitled 
          to the rights of patronage. (7) The right 
          of accrual, introduced by the ancient laws with reference to the manumission 
          of slaves owned in common, is hereby annulled, and We shall not hereafter, 
          under any circumstances, permit it to be considered. Given on the Kalends 
          of April, during the Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 530. 2. The Same 
          to Julianus, Praetorian Prefect. It was held by all the ancient jurisconsults that a slave owned in common belonged partly to one master and partly to another, so that he could be bequeathed to himself, or to others, hence the following question arose. Two or more persons owned a slave in common, and one of them bequeathed his own share to the slave, and this having caused perplexity, a serious controversy arose among the ancients. Therefore We, having examined this bequest with great care, think that it is capable of two interpretations, for the testator either thought that the slave would become free, so far as his share, which he bequeathed to him in this way, was concerned, or if this was not the case, he was actuated by affection for his other joint-owner, in order that the slave might be acquired by him, intending that his heirs should not gain possession of the slave, so that it would be clear that he should not, by any means, be included in the property of his estate. We, however, who are partisans of freedom, after investigation have come to the conclusion that, with reference to the doubtful intention of the testator, since he desired to liberate the slave, so far as his own share was concerned, and as slaves owned in common are manumitted, We have already decided what was necessary to be done under such circumstances, and the present case shall be determined by the provisions of the aforesaid law. The slave shall therefore become free, so far as the share of the testator is concerned, in compliance with the will of the latter; and with reference to the other share, in accordance with Our ruling, the price must be paid by the heir to the other joint-owner, or owners, in obedience to the above-mentioned constitution, and if they refuse to accept it, he shall tender it, seal it up, and deposit it at their risk, as it is an attribute of Imperial Majesty to adopt the more humane course instead of the harsher one. Title 
          8. Concerning the manumission of a slave who has been given in pledge.   Although a husband, 
          who is solvent, can manumit a dotal slave, still there is no doubt that 
          if it should appear that you have been given in pledge to his wife, 
          you cannot obtain your freedom without her consent. 2. The Same 
          Emperors to Abascantus. Where freedom 
          is granted to a slave by a debtor of the Treasury, and the slave has 
          not been pledged by the terms of a special agreement but only under 
          the general privilege of the Treasury, the manumission cannot be annulled, 
          unless it is established that it was made with fraudulent intent. 3. The Same 
          Emperors to Antony. It is certain 
          that he who has pledged the property which he now has, or may hereafter 
          acquire, can grant freedom to his slaves. This rule of law does not 
          apply to slaves who have been expressly encumbered by way of pledge, 
          or delivered for that purpose. 4. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Sabinianus. If (as you allege) 
          you, together with other slaves, after having been pledged, were manumitted 
          by the debtor, with the consent of his creditor, you are entitled to 
          your freedom. Published on the 
          sixth of the Ides of May, during the Consulate of Alexander, 
          223. 5. The Same 
          Emperor to Extritatianus. If the creditors 
          have been paid, the female slaves who were pledged and manumitted by 
          the debtor will be free. If the person who manumitted them, or his heirs, 
          should, for the purpose of revoking their freedom, venture to say that 
          he had granted the manumission for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, 
          neither he nor his heirs shall be heard. 6. The Same 
          Emperor to Auctionus. If your guardian 
          manumitted slaves purchased with your money, and said slaves, together 
          with other property belonging to or purchased with the property of the 
          wards, have been pledged in accordance with the constitution of the 
          Emperors, My Parents, the said slaves shall not, on account of the indulgence 
          shown to wards, become free. 7. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Juliana. If, at the time of your marriage, whether you gave slaves by way of dowry, or whether, after the dowry was given, your husband purchased them with money forming part of your dowry, the ownership of said slaves will justly belong to you, and therefore you are vainly attempting to raise a question with reference to their status after manumission, as they can legally be manumitted by him who purchased them, or received them as dowry. Title 
          9. Concerning the manumission of slaves belonging to the state.   If, as is provided 
          by the municipal law and the Imperial Constitutions, you have been regularly 
          manumitted, when you were a public slave (with the consent of the Governor 
          of the province), you should not again be reduced to slavery on the 
          ground that you were not entitled to manumission because the slave whom 
          you gave instead of yourself took to flight. 2. The Same 
          Emperor to Hadriana. If the Governor 
          of the province approved the decree by which he with whom you afterwards 
          (as you allege) were united in marriage received his freedom, there 
          is no doubt that the child born of a marriage of this kind is a Roman 
          citizen and under the control of his father. 3. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Philadelphus. The freedman of a municipality does not become a slave where the title by which the ownership of slaves is usually established cannot be produced. If, therefore, you have been manumitted according to the law of Vectibulicius (whose authority it was held extended to the provinces under the Decree of the Senate issued during the Consulate of Jubentius Celsus, Consul for the second time, and Neratius Marcellus), you will be entitled to the rights of Roman citizenship, nor did you afterwards, while a freedman, by discharging the duties of a notary, lose the liberty which you obtained, and your act does not offer any impediment to the acceptance of your son as decurion, as he was born of parents who were free. Title 
          10. Concerning slaves manumitted by others than their masters.   It has frequently 
          been stated in rescripts that anyone who manumits slaves belonging to 
          another, as if they were his own, will be required to pay to the owners 
          of the same their value, or the amount of damages which the latter may 
          have sustained. Published during 
          the Kalends of March, during the Consulate of Antoninus and Balbinus, 
          214. 2. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Mercurialis. If Felicissima, 
          who you say purchased a slave by your order, manumitted him without 
          transferring his ownership to you, you, in vain, demand that he whom 
          you allege was manumitted should be refused his freedom, and that possession 
          of him should be delivered to you. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to Pompeius. He who sold you 
          the estate will continue to be the owner of the property until he delivers 
          it to you, and, therefore, by manumitting a slave belonging to the estate, 
          he grants him his freedom. Published on the 
          sixth of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Agricola 
          and Clement, 231. 4. The Emperors 
          Valerian and Gallienus to Zoilus. If you did not 
          give the ownership, but merely the services of the female slave referred 
          to, when granting her her freedom, the person to whom she was given 
          shall only have the use of her dependent upon your will, and your right 
          of ownership will not, in the slightest degree, be prejudiced, for no 
          one can bestow freedom upon a slave belonging to another by manumitting 
          him as if he was his own. 5. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Marcellina. Where slaves have 
          been given by way of donation, the donor has no right to manumit them. 6. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Milius and Others. If your father 
          manumitted your slave, even with your consent, and you were under the 
          age of twenty years, he could not grant him his freedom. 7. The Emperor 
          Constantine to Bassus. Where freedom 
          is granted to the slave of another than his master, and the consent 
          of judges who have a right to give it is obtained, there need be no 
          apprehension of the imposition of a penalty. If, however, it is established 
          that the act was legally performed by Our order, and it is proved that 
          the owner did not petition for authority to manumit the slave of another, 
          then he who is shown to have obtained his freedom by Our generosity 
          to a person who was not his master shall be immediately restored to 
          him to whom his ownership belongs, and he who manumitted the slave of 
          another by deceiving the Emperor shall be compelled to give two slaves 
          of the same sex, age, and occupation to the master of the one whom he 
          manumitted, and he shall also be compelled to give three of the same 
          kind to the Treasury. This penalty should not always be imposed, but should preferably 
          not be inflicted if the manumitted slave is able to plead lawful prescription 
          when a question is raised as to his status, as the owner can only blame 
          himself for his loss, if he, by his silence, confirmed the act to his 
          own disadvantage. Published during the Ides of July, during the Consulate of Constantine, Consul for the fifth time, and Licinius, 319. Title 
          11. Who cannot manumit slaves, and concerning the prevention of manumission 
          for the purpose of defrauding creditors.    It is a certain 
          rule of law established by the Lex Aelia Sentia, that grants 
          of freedom for the purpose of defrauding creditors, when made directly, 
          can only be revoked where an intention to commit fraud exists; that 
          is to say, when this is the design of the person who granted the manumission, 
          and a loss ensues as a result of the intent. It 
          was formerly decided that the beneficiaries of a trust should be classed 
          as creditors. Published on the 
          third of the Ides of November, during the Consulate of Maximian, 
          Consul for the fifth time, and Aelianus, 224. 2. The Same 
          Emperor to Natalianus. It is set forth 
          in the Imperial Mandates that my slaves cannot, by means of the interposition 
          of other persons, confer freedom on slaves who constitute part of their 
          peculium. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to Justina. The Senate, at 
          the suggestion of the Divine Marcus, provided that no one could manumit 
          his own slave, or the slave of another who was a performer in an exhibition 
          which was being given, and that, if this took place, the manumission 
          should be considered void. 4. The Same 
          Emperor to Felicissimus. If, while under 
          twenty years of age, you delivered slaves for the purpose of rendering 
          them free, it has been decided by a Decree of the Senate that your act 
          is void. 5. The Same 
          Emperor to Priscus. When it can be 
          proved that freedom was fraudulently granted by persons indebted to 
          the Treasury, the act will not be valid. If, however, he who you state 
          is your father paid the purchaser the money, and the slave, having been 
          redeemed by him, obtained his freedom, it cannot be said that the property 
          of a debtor to the Treasury has been, in any respect, diminished. 6. The Emperor 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Olympia. It is a positive 
          rule of law that a guardian cannot grant freedom to slaves under a trust 
          with which his female ward has been charged. Hence, if you were charged 
          with their manumission, and did not liberate them when you arrived at 
          the age fixed by the testator, but your guardian did so, they will still 
          remain in servitude. 7. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Zoticus. If your master, who was indebted on account of his administration of a curatorship, having been proved to be insolvent, should bequeath you your freedom under a trust, this will be of no advantage to you, as in all fiduciary grants of freedom the condition of the estate must only be considered. Title 
          12. Who cannot obtain their freedom.   As my Father, 
          the Divine Claudius, decided that persons condemned to perpetual imprisonment 
          could not be liberated by the Governors of provinces, or by other officials 
          who have authority to punish crime; and that those sentenced for a term 
          of years, who have been appointed heirs, or have received legacies or 
          bequests under a trust cannot, during their imprisonment, obtain their 
          freedom; nor can any one of those to whom such bequests have been made 
          acquire them; but if they have served out the time for which they were 
          condemned, and have been released from all restraint, and, as it were, 
          restored to their former simple condition of slavery, they will be entitled 
          to their freedom, if it was left to them by the will of a deceased person 
          during the period of their sentence, without any question being raised 
          as to the punishment which they have undergone. 2. The Emperors 
          Valerian and Gallienus to Theodore. He who has been forbidden by will to be manumitted cannot obtain his freedom. But in the case proposed, it makes a difference whether or not those whom the testator forbade to be sold or manumitted, stating that they had been brought up with his children, did so because he considered their services necessary to his household, and for the benefit of his children, or whether he imposed this restriction as a penalty for bad behavior: for, in the first instance, the slaves can obtain their liberty after the death of those whose interests were consulted, but in the second, what has been decided with reference to the punishment of slaves will remain in full force. It was decided by My Divine Parents that the provisions of wills imposing perpetual servitude upon undeserving slaves should be observed, in order that they might not obtain their freedom through a fraudulent purchaser. Title 
          13. For what reasons slaves can receive their freedom as a reward.   Since scrupulous 
          care as well as the authority of the law should be exercised for the 
          purpose of increasing and encouraging the practice of fidelity by slaves, 
          if you can establish by undoubted proof that you have strenuously exerted 
          yourself to avenge the death of your master, the freedom which was long 
          since ordered by Decrees of the Senate and Laws of the Emperors to be 
          granted to slaves who avenge the death of their masters cannot be conferred 
          upon you, even after having rendered so great a service, merely through 
          the performance of your act, but you must obtain it by appearing before 
          the tribunal of the Governor, and in consequence of his decree. Published on the 
          seventh of the Ides of December, during the Consulate of Maximus. 2. The Emperor 
          Constantine to Januarius. Slaves who publicly 
          denounce those who engage in the nefarious occupation of counterfeiting 
          money shall be given Roman citizenship, and their master shall be paid 
          their value by the Treasury. Given at Rome, 
          on the fifteenth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate 
          of Crispus. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to the People. If a slave should 
          publicly denounce someone guilty of ravishing a virgin, who has escaped 
          arrest through the connivance of the injured person, or because a compromise 
          has been effected, he shall be given his freedom. Given on the day 
          before the Kalends of April. 4. The Emperors 
          Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius to Syagrius. When a slave betrays 
          a deserter from the army, he shall be presented with his freedom. Given on the Ides of July at Rome, .... Title 
          14. Concerning the manumission of freeborn persons.   If, although you 
          have been manumitted by will, you state that you are freeborn, you should 
          bring your case before the proper court, and if you have a lawful opponent, 
          that is to say, one who alleges that he is your patron, you must remember 
          that the Senate decreed that those who, after their manumission, claimed 
          to be freeborn, must leave in the house of the person who manumitted 
          them any property which they may have acquired while there. It has been 
          decided by authorities learned in the law that whatever was bequeathed 
          or given to a freedman is included under this head. 2. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Pompeia. Neither provision 
          for support, nor the services exacted of servitude, will render a freeborn 
          woman a slave, nor will manumission render her a freedwoman. Published on the 
          fifth of the Ides of May, during the Consulate of Sabinus, Consul 
          for the second time, and Venustus, 241. 3. The Emperor 
          Philip to Felicissimus. If it is proved 
          that your grandmother, although manumitted as a slave, was afterwards 
          solemnly declared to be freeborn, and her condition was established 
          by the authority of a judicial decision, and you brought this matter 
          to the attention of persons learned in the law, you must have readily 
          ascertained that her children, even though they were born before the 
          decision was rendered, have good reason to demand their liberty, as 
          being freeborn. 4. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Agrippa. As you 
          state that one of your freeborn relatives, who was made prisoner under 
          the rule of the faction of Palmyra, and sold as a captive, the Governor 
          of the province will see that he recovers his status as a freeborn citizen. 5. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Crescens. It is extremely 
          unjust for the condition of freeborn persons to be disputed through 
          the mistake or malice of others, especially as you allege that one Governor 
          after another has been applied to by you to summon the adverse party, 
          in order that he might oppose your claim, if he thought that he had 
          a valid defence. As the result of this, it appears that the Governor 
          of the province, being influenced by your statements, rendered a decision 
          that you should not hereafter be subjected to annoyance. Therefore, 
          if the other party should still remain obstinate, the Governor, having 
          been applied to, shall take measures to have you protected from wrong. Given on the day 
          before the Nones of .... 6. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Dionysius. It is a perfectly 
          clear rule of law that a person who is free cannot become the slave 
          of one who is aware of his condition. Therefore, as you allege that 
          the father of the ward of whom you have made mention in your petition 
          kept you in his service as a freeman for a long time, he could not have 
          changed your condition without having a legal title by which the ownership 
          of property is ordinarily acquired. Ordered on the 
          seventh of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 7. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Matrona. If it is established 
          that you and your children are freeborn, the fact of your birth will 
          be a sufficient defence, for he who raises the question of slavery by 
          renouncing any claims which he may have, can, in no way, weaken the 
          evidence of freebirth, or gain any advantage by doing so. 8. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Callimorphus. Freeborn persons 
          come into the world as such. Freedmen can only be created by manumission. 
          Moreover, an agreement cannot confer the privilege of free birth upon 
          either slaves or freedmen, nor can the rights of those who have not 
          given their consent to a transaction of this kind be prejudiced in any 
          way. 9. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Patamon. It is a clear 
          and manifest rule of law that a woman born of a mother who has been 
          manumitted is born free, and therefore, as you allege that since your 
          mother was a freedwoman, and was afterwards captured by the enemy, and 
          returned home under the rule of postliminium, and that now the 
          question is raised whether or not you are a slave, you must appear before 
          the Governor of the province, who has jurisdiction of cases in which 
          freedom is involved, and he will render a decision according to law, 
          knowing that neither the status of your mother under such circumstances 
          nor the captivity which she endured will change her former condition 
          in any respect. 10. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Athenodora. Names are given 
          by public consent for the purpose of recognizing individuals, and no 
          damage results if they are changed for the purpose of concealing the 
          origin of persons who are freeborn; and the possession of anyone as 
          a slave (even though he may perform the services of one) does not render 
          him such if he was born free. 11. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Maxima. If no title establishes 
          the right to possess you as a slave, but, on the other hand, you can 
          prove that you were born free, and performed services for wages, which 
          were agreed upon, your condition is in no respect injuriously affected, 
          nor will you be forbidden to institute legal proceedings to compel the 
          fulfillment of the contract. Ordered on the 
          Nones of March, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 12. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Quieta. The commission 
          of the crime of kidnapping has no effect in changing the status of a 
          freeborn woman; but it is established that one who has been abducted 
          can, even afterwards, remain in the condition in which she was born. Ordered on the 
          third of .... 13. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Melander. Anyone who contends 
          that he is freeborn, but is unable to prove it, does not necessarily 
          lose his status as a freedman. Ordered on the seventh of the Ides 
          of December. 14. The Same fflmperors and Caesars to Aristotle. The condition 
          of a freeborn woman can, in no way, be prejudiced, merely from the fact 
          that she has been given in betrothal as a female slave. Ordered on the seventh of the Kalends of January, .... Title 
          15. General provisions with reference to manumissions.   We order that 
          if the owner of a slave, whose usufruct belongs to another, should grant 
          him his freedom, he shall not, according to the ancient rule, be deprived 
          of it, but shall be considered as having no master, so that no one can 
          be found to whom any property which may be acquired by him will belong. 
          If, however, both the owner and the usufructuary 
          should agree to liberate him, he will become free without any restriction; 
          and if he should afterwards acquire any property, it shall be his. But 
          when the owner alone sets him free, without the consent of the usufructuary, 
          he who, in this way, obtains his liberty from his owner, shall be included 
          among the freedmen of the latter; and if he should afterwards obtain 
          any property, he shall acquire it in his own name and be permitted to 
          leave it to his descendants, the right of patronage being always reserved, 
          unless his emancipator was deprived of it by the laws. The 
          freedman himself, however, shall remain with the usufructuary as a slave, 
          as long as the former lives, unless he is deprived of the usufruct in 
          a lawful manner. Where the usufruct is terminated in any way, then the 
          slave shall be permitted to reside wherever he pleases. If, however, 
          the freedman should die during the lifetime of the usufructuary, his 
          estate shall descend according to law. Where the usufructuary alone 
          grants freedom to the slave, the usufruct reverts to the owner, and 
          he will enjoy complete authority over the slave, and the latter will 
          acquire all property for him, in accordance with what has been generally 
          provided with reference to slaves and masters. If the usufructuary should 
          release the slave from the usufruct, for the purpose of doing him a 
          favor, and then present him with his freedom, the slave will remain 
          under the control of the owner, but the necessity is not imposed upon 
          slaves during the life of the usufructuary, or for the time that the 
          usufruct may exist, to obey the owner, and perform the services required 
          of a slave, but Our judge shall see that he remains unmolested. 
          After the death of the usufructuary, or where the usufruct 
          has been extinguished in any way, he shall serve the master as a slave, 
          and all property which may, in the meantime, come into his hands, he 
          will acquire for his master. This separation shall exist between masters and slaves 
          as provided by the terms of Our Constitution, and not in accordance 
          with the ancient law by which the said slaves remained without a master. (1) We make the 
          following addition to this law, namely, that the ancient distinction 
          of persons having been abolished, parents of either sex shall be permitted, 
          in the case of sons and daughters who are under their control or emancipated 
          and their descendants of every degree, to impose their commands upon 
          them by will, so far as granting freedom to slaves is concerned; whether 
          the testator desired that this should 
          be done in a church, or in any other lawful manner which he might select. 
          For, since in successions, as well as in almost all other things, no 
          distinction is made between children, this rule must be observed (and 
          above all in the present instance) in favor of freedom which is especially 
          and peculiarly Our care to cherish and protect by the Roman laws. Given on the fifteenth 
          of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Lampadius and 
          Orestes, 530. 2. The Same 
          Emperor to Julianus, Praetorian Prefect. Where anyone bestows 
          freedom upon a slave, either in a church or any other sacred edifice, 
          or in any tribunal, or before any judge who has authority under the 
          law to grant freedom, whether this be done by will, or by any final 
          disposition of property, either directly or under the terms of a trust, 
          the age of those who obtain their freedom shall, under no circumstances, 
          offer any impediment. For We do not wish that those only who have passed 
          the age of thirty shall acquire Roman citizenship, as was formerly done, 
          but, as in the case of ecclesiastical enfranchisement, no distinction 
          of age exists, so whenever freedom is granted by masters to slaves either 
          under last wills, before magistrates, or in any other legal manner, 
          We order that they shall all become Roman citizens; for We think that 
          the number of those should rather be increased than diminished. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to John, Praetorian Prefect. Where a man who 
          has no wife keeps his female slave as a concubine, and persists in this 
          practice until his death, whether he had children by her or not, We 
          order that the said female slave shall, under no circumstances, belong 
          to his heirs, and that her children, if she has any, shall not be reduced 
          to slavery; but that, after the death of her master, she, together with 
          her offspring, if she has had any by the deceased, shall obtain their 
          freedom in the manner to be explained hereafter. We 
          grant permission to the master, during his lifetime, to make use of 
          his female slaves, as well as of their offspring, in any way that he 
          may desire, and to dispose of them by his last will in accordance with 
          his wishes; that is to say, bequeath them as slaves to others, or leave 
          them by name to his heirs to remain in servitude. But 
          if he should pass them over in silence, then, after his death, they 
          shall obtain their freedom, which will date from the death of their 
          master. Neither the ancient laws nor Our own, however, permit men who 
          have wives to keep either freedwomen, or slaves as concubines. Given at Constantinople, on the Kalends of November, after the Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 531. Title 
          16. Concerning cases involving freedom.   You confess that 
          you have committed an unlawful and dishonorable act, as you state that 
          your own children, who were born free, have been sold by you; but, for 
          the reason that what you have done cannot injure your children, go before 
          a competent judge (if you desire to do so) in order that the case may 
          be decided in conformity with the law. Published on the 
          fifth of the Ides of February, .... 2. The Same 
          Emperor to Veronianus. If those who you 
          allege are your slaves are declared by others to be free, their status 
          must be determined in the ordinary way, for even where a decision has 
          been rendered with reference to their ownership, this cannot be advanced 
          in opposition to a matter involving freedom. Given at Rome 
          on the Nones of February, during the Consulate of Messala and 
          Sabinus, 215. 3. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Quirinus. If a freeman cohabits 
          with the female slave of another, he does not become the slave of her 
          master, even if he has been notified to abandon her. Published on the 
          Nones of February, during the Consulate of Fuscus and Dexter, 
          226. 4. The Same 
          Emperor to Jocundus. If he whom you 
          claim as a slave has, after proper investigation, been decided to be 
          free (although this may have been done in your absence), another opportunity 
          to claim him as a slave shall not be afforded you. If, however, after 
          you ascertained the fact, you appealed from the decision of the judge, 
          it shall be determined by the appellate court whether judgment was rendered 
          in accordance with law. 5. The Same 
          Emperor to Sabinus. The woman whom 
          you declared to be your slave is none the less entitled to demand her 
          freedom, because you purchased her from the Treasury. Nor can recourse 
          to prescription be had at the present time, because, when the sale took 
          place, the woman was more than twenty years old, as age cannot be pleaded 
          by way of prescription against Roman citizenship, unless the slave is 
          shown to have consented to become such in consideration of sharing the 
          price. The burden of proof is placed 
          upon one who, being a slave, asserts that he is free, and if he cannot 
          establish his assertion, you will obtain the undisputed right of possession. 6. The Emperors 
          Valerian and Gallienus, and the Caesar Valerian, to Versimenus. Even if you voluntarily 
          stated in writing that you were a slave, and not free, you would not, 
          by doing so, prejudice your rights in any 
          respect, and this is all the more true as you allege that you are compelled 
          to do this. 7. The Emperor 
          Aurelian to Secundus. If you have been 
          manumitted by the person whose slave you were, there is no reason for 
          you to maintain the controversy with reference to your freedom, and 
          above all, with the heir who manumitted you; for even if your freedom 
          was not legally obtained, the heir, on account of his acceptance of 
          the estate, has confirmed the will of the deceased by his consent. 8. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Verina. As you allege 
          that it was agreed between your former owner and yourself that he should, 
          upon the payment of a certain sum of money, manumit you as well as your 
          daughter, and he only liberated you, you should appear before the Governor 
          of the province and he will urge your former master to abide by his 
          agreement, all respect which freedmen are accustomed to display toward 
          their patrons being shown him. Given on the day 
          before ...., during the Consulate of Maximus, Consul for the second 
          time, and Aquilinus, 286. 9. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Proculus. As the terms of 
          your petition set forth, he against whom you filed it is the son of 
          your female slave, still as you refer to him by a name which can only 
          be borne by persons who are free, and state that he is not a slave, 
          but only bears the stigma of servitude, you are notified that your petition 
          is directed against one who is not a slave. 10. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Stratonicus. It is a positive 
          rule of law that freemen cannot become slaves, and their condition be 
          changed either by a private agreement, or by any act of administration 
          whatsoever. 11. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Faustinus. Slaves will not 
          change their status if they unlawfully and dishonorably obtain public 
          office. Wherefore, if a question arises with reference to yours, you 
          are advised that it is of no advantage to you that your father enjoyed 
          civil distinction. Hence, after all the legal formalities have been 
          complied with, your condition must be determined by the Governor of 
          the province. 12. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Proculus. If you were born 
          of a female slave, and someone purchased you, you will remain in the 
          condition in which you formerly were; but if, being the child of a female 
          slave, your natural father, who was also your master, sold you, and 
          afterwards you paid the price to the purchaser, you will not, for that 
          reason, obtain your freedom. Published on the 
          eighteenth of the Kalends of May, .... 13. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Paulus. A judicial 
          tribunal cannot concern itself principally with the status of a deceased 
          person. If, then, property is claimed, as part of the peculium belonging 
          to the estate of him whom you mention as having bequeathed it, or if 
          any question arises as to the status of his children, all these points 
          must be formally decided by the Governor of the province. Given on the fifth 
          of the Kalends of May, .... 14. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Quintianus. When proceedings 
          have been instituted with reference to one whose liberty is in dispute, 
          and he is in possession of it, he will, in the meantime, be considered 
          free. Given at Heraclea, 
          on the fourth of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of 
          the above-mentioned Emperors. 15. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Palladius. The loss of a 
          document establishing anyone's birth does not exclude other evidence 
          to prove the same, nor can a forged document of this kind affect the 
          truth. Therefore, in order to ascertain the truth every proof allowed 
          by law should be admitted, and the Governor of the province having been 
          applied to, and all requisite formalities having been observed, he will 
          decide the case between you in accordance with the legal requirements. 16. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Diogenia. If you, being 
          a free woman, have served as such, and, without your knowledge, an instrument 
          was drawn up under whose terms you were given by way of dowry as a female 
          slave, these things can, in no way, prejudice your freedom; and, above 
          all, as you state that you were a minor at the time, and it has been 
          decided that minors less than twenty years old can, under no circumstances, 
          change their status and become slaves instead of freemen, in order that 
          no one may unintentionally lose his liberty before reaching the age 
          at which others cannot confer it without authority. Published on the 
          sixth of the Ides of May, during the Consulate of Hadrian. 17. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Resinus. In numerous instances, 
          the status of brothers who are freeborn varies, on account of the commission 
          of crime, or other events which have taken place. Therefore, there is 
          nothing to prevent the question of status being raised with reference 
          to those whom you assert are your brothers, and whether they shall be 
          claimed as slaves, or maintained in servitude. Hence, other evidence 
          is necessary to establish their freedom, for it is clear that the fact 
          that your liberty has not been questioned is not sufficient proof. 18. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Zoticus. The lease made 
          to you by the person against whose heirs you have brought suit is not 
          sufficient evidence of your free origin, nor does this alone show conclusively 
          that you are a slave. Given on the Ides 
          of July, at Philippi, under the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 19. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Paulus. In Our opinion, 
          he against whom you have filed your petition, rather than you yourself, 
          has the principal interest in the case, for as you state that you have 
          given him his freedom, it is more to his interest to formally defend 
          his status, and consequently your case also is included in his; for 
          if he is declared to be a slave by the party against whom you have filed 
          your petition, he can claim his freedom on the ground of your manumission, 
          and, by proving his original servitude, and showing that he obtained 
          his freedom through your having manumitted him, your right of patronage 
          will be preserved. When, however, 
          he prefers to remain a slave, then, after having appeared before the 
          Governor of the province, you will be permitted by law to defend him 
          even against his own consent. 20. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Aeternalis. Just as when freedom 
          has once been conferred it cannot be revoked, so, where masters take 
          any steps whatever against their own slaves, without the intention of 
          manumitting them, they will sustain no loss. Ordered on the 
          sixth of the Kalends of September, during the Consulate of the 
          above-mentioned Emperors. 21. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Thrasylla. It is provided 
          by the Perpetual Edict that a woman who is found in the possession of 
          freedom fraudulently obtained occupies the same position as one who 
          is still in servitude. If, however, any controversy should arise, whether 
          she who is in slavery petitions for freedom, or whether it is clearly 
          proved that, while free, an attempt has been made to enslave her, no 
          fraud committed by a female slave should deprive her master of his rights. Ordered on the 
          Nones of October, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 22. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Pardala. It is a man's 
          parents, and not his own statements, that establish the fact of his 
          birth. Wherefore, if, having been born of a female slave, and afterwards 
          manumitted, you obtained your freedom, you can, by no means, lose it, 
          either through fraudulently or erroneously contending that you are the 
          child of another female slave, for slaves are known to be born in that 
          condition, and are not rendered such merely by their own assertions. Given on the fifth 
          of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 23. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Muscia. If freedom was 
          directly bequeathed to you by your master in his will, and his daughters 
          succeeded him as his appointed heirs, it does not follow that, either 
          according to his will, or in opposition to it, if you serve one of his 
          daughters, the others can revoke your freedom. 24. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Sebastian. A woman 
          is not excluded from demanding her freedom, if she has been interrogated 
          and has publicly acknowledged that she is a slave. 25. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Licentianus. When the instruments 
          evidencing manumission, which was legally effected, have not been drawn 
          up, this, in no way, prejudices the grant of freedom, so that, if you 
          have liberated a slave, the failure to execute such instruments cannot 
          possibly injure him. Ordered on the 
          fifth of the Ides of February, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 26. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Modestus. A patron cannot 
          revoke freedom when it has once been bestowed upon a manumitted slave; 
          and he can be compelled to produce the instrument evidencing the manumission. 27. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Austerius. If Arianus was 
          declared to be free, after the question as to his status had been raised 
          by Leonis, he cannot again be claimed as a slave by the former, after 
          he has lost his case. A co-heir having been given to you by Arianus, 
          who was in collusion with the person who raised the controversy with 
          reference to the status of the deceased, or his heirs, cannot injure 
          you in any respect, nor can admissions made by them affect the truth, 
          or change the condition of the estate of the deceased. 28. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Eurymedontus. The fact that 
          a paternal grandfather was invested with the dignity of a magistrate 
          can be of no advantage to his grandson, in proving that he is free, 
          as in a case involving freedom the status of the mother and not that 
          of the father must be considered. The civil condition of the maternal 
          grandmother is not of itself sufficient, for although she was proved 
          to be free, still, a person's status may be lost in many ways. Given on the fourth 
          of the Ides of April, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 29. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Troila. There is no doubt 
          that a daughter born of a female slave, and who was purchased by the 
          man with whom she afterwards lived in concubinage, will remain in servitude 
          if she is not manumitted. 30. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Eutychia. Freedom, when 
          once bestowed, cannot be revoked under the sole pretext that proper 
          respect has not been shown to the patron. 31. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Cassiana. If an inquiry 
          has been wrongfully instituted for the purpose of proving you to be 
          a slave, and you have brought suit for malicious prosecution, or for 
          injury committed (whichever one you may select), and it has been decided 
          that you were a slave, you can afterwards ask that judgment be rendered 
          against the adverse party, and that restitution be made of the property 
          of which you can prove that you are deprived, after a decision has been 
          given declaring you to be free. 32. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Athenais. The signature 
          of the son of the master who manumitted you does not add anything to, 
          or if it is omitted, does not detract in any way from a grant of freedom. 33. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Melitiana. Although your 
          master manumitted you after you had paid him a sum of money, still the 
          freedom which you have received cannot be revoked. Ordered on the 
          third of the Ides of November, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 34. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Eremonia. A free woman does 
          not become a slave on account of living in concubinage. Given on the Ides 
          of November, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 35. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Attatus. The fact that 
          a person is said to have administered the affairs of a minor in the 
          capacity of his guardian does not release him from defending himself, 
          when the question as to whether or not he is a slave is raised. Given on the Nones 
          of November, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 36. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Theodore. When a mistress 
          agrees with her female slave that, after having served her for a certain 
          time, she shall become free, she will, by no means, be required to observe 
          her contract. On the other hand, it is also true that a free woman can 
          not be compelled to comply with her agreement, if she is proved to have 
          promised to give you her own children as slaves. 37. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Olympius. If you sold your 
          son, who is free, to your son-in-law, who, being so closely connected 
          with you, could not pretend ignorance of his condition, you cannot accuse 
          one another of crime. 38. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Philesarphus. An action to determine 
          your status can be brought against you, in the name of the State, notwithstanding 
          the fact that no one denies that you have been created limenarch. Given at Nicomedia, 
          on the sixteenth of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate 
          of the Caesars. 39. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Potesenticus. It is settled 
          that freemen who allege that they are slaves cannot change their condition. Ordered on the 
          seventh of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of the 
          Caesars. 40. A Copy 
          of the Imperial Letters of the Above-Mentioned Emperors and Caesars 
          to Verutus. According to the 
          provisions of Our Edict, nothing will prevent a case involving freedom 
          from being heard and a decision rendered in accordance with justice, 
          notwithstanding the absence of one of the parties, whether the controversy 
          arose with reference to manumission or free birth. 41. The Emperors 
          Constantine and Licinius to Eutychius, Governor of Cappadocia. We order that 
          all the letters that the mistress of the slave Aelius wrote to him as 
          Chief Decurion shall be null and void and revoked as of no effect, and 
          that the investigation to determine the free birth of the said Aelius 
          shall proceed, nor shall the rights of the woman be prejudiced for the 
          reason that she addressed him as Chief Decurion, or that he himself 
          pretended to be a decurion or the head of that body, when his servile 
          condition has been ascertained not only by the testimony of witnesses, 
          and that of his relatives, but also by the admissions made by himself 
          in the presence of another magistrate. 42. The Emperor 
          Constantius to Maximus, Praetorian Prefect. It has been decided 
          that children born of a mother whose condition is contested shall follow 
          her after judgment has been rendered in the case. Any, however, whose 
          birth occurred before the suit was instituted, shall have their status 
          determined separately, since those alone who were born during the proceedings 
          are to be included in the decision given with reference to their mother, 
          and shall either be delivered to their lawful owners, or enjoy their 
          freedom with their parents. Given on the day before the Ides of July, .... Title 
          17. Concerning the abolition of legal, assertions that a man is free.   We order that 
          actions involving the servile condition which have been begun shall 
          be regarded with favor, as well as shortened; and direct that if anyone 
          who, up to the time, has served as a slave, should declare himself to 
          be free, or while enjoying freedom should be claimed as a slave, he 
          shall, in neither instance, be required to provide a defender, but shall 
          himself answer in his own proper person the claim of him who alleges 
          that he is his master; and if, after having been in the possession of 
          freedom, he should be reduced to slavery, he shall be forbidden to employ 
          an attorney, We absolutely forbid those who have passed from slavery 
          to freedom to defend themselves in this way, all the laws which provide 
          that cases requiring defenders shall be heard a second and a third time 
          being, for the future, repealed; for it is just that the first decision 
          should remain in full force, where no appeal is taken. If one is taken, 
          the judge shall examine the case just as he would any other which has 
          been appealed, without a second examination being required by the laws 
          enacted with reference to cases in which defenders appear, and which 
          We have rescinded. (1) We also abolish 
          the ancient rule requiring defence in actions involving the peculium 
          or other personal effects of slaves, directing that not ,only the 
          peculium of those who, while in servitude, have tak.en legal 
          steps to become free, but also any other property which is claimed shall 
          be placed in safe-keeping, by order of court. (2) Moreover, 
          all those whose freedom is in danger through their being claimed as 
          slaves shall be compelled to furnish a surety, if they wish to do so; 
          but when it is impossible for them to provide one, and this is clearly 
          proved to the judge, they shall be bound by being sworn. If, after proceedings of this kind have been instituted, 
          they purposely absent themselves, and, having been summoned to appear, 
          remain absent for more than a year; they shall, by all means, be reduced 
          to slavery, and decided beyond question to be the property of him who 
          brought suit against them. (3) Again, We 
          wish those who claim anyone as a slave to know that, if after the first 
          demand has been presented in any court, or made by virtue of an Imperial 
          Rescript, and he who is alleged to be a slave has been notified, and, 
          having been released, the parties bring another claim against him in 
          a different court, even if the reputed slave should have given occasion 
          for this to be done, the plaintiffs, although they may be his legal 
          masters, shall be deprived of their right. Given on the third 
          of the Ides of December, .... 2. The Same 
          Emperor to John, Praetorian Prefect. We think that the difficulty which may arise under Our present law, authorizing adsertores, should be disposed of by a comprehensive remedy. As the action with reference to freedom was usually conducted by them, if, while this was taking place, the principal party in interest should die, the necessity was, nevertheless, imposed upon the adsertor to conduct the case to a conclusion, so that if the purchaser should be defeated, and a decision be rendered in favor of freedom, he can have recourse against the vendor, and the latter return to him what was contained in the bill of sale, or what the nature of the contract required, on account of having sold him a person who was free. Moreover, as the empty name of adsertor is abolished by the present law, if any person whose status is the subject of litigation should die, how can the judgment be executed where only one party is left to appear in court? Therefore We decree that, in the present instance, the purchaser shall be permitted to proceed against the vendor to the extent of proving that the latter sold him a freeman as a slave, or if he cannot do this, that he should be subjected to the risk of eviction for having sold a person who was free. Title 
          18. What slaves are not permitted to declare that they are free, and concerning the property of those who are forbidden to do so.   The case of him 
          who, concealing his condition, permitted himself to be sold as a slave, 
          differs from that of him who shared in the price paid for himself; for 
          the former is not denied the right to demand his freedom, but if the 
          latter was a Roman citizen, and shared in the price, he cannot claim 
          this right. The most eminent legal authorities have decided that the 
          same rule is applicable to one who is entitled to his freedom under 
          the terms of a trust. Published on the 
          Kalends of May, during the Consulate of Gordian and Aviola, 240. 2. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Melana. Our predecessors, 
          the Emperors, decreed that freedom should be denied to the descendants 
          of the families of robbers who had been made slaves by Imperial donation, 
          or by the authority of the Treasury. 3. The Emperor 
          Constantine to Maximus, Praetorian Prefect. When anyone demands 
          his freedom, he will be entitled to any of his property which he states 
          is in the hands of his alleged master, since, if there is no question 
          as to his status, the judge must at once order it to be restored, and 
          delivered to him. When, however, there is any doubt as to the ownership 
          of property which he claims, because the master refuses to surrender 
          it, a bond shall be executed to preserve it, and the hearing of the 
          case shall be postponed. If the freedom of the reputed slave should 
          be established (as those must be protected who have entrusted him with 
          their property) an account of his administration must be rendered, and 
          everything which is due shall be paid, so that if he is proved to be 
          free, he who formerly acted as his master may acquire what was given 
          to the slave by the right of ownership, as well as whatever was derived 
          from the possession and profits of the said property, and anything obtained 
          surreptitiously from it by the alleged slave; as that could not be free 
          which the master placed in the hands of his slave as peculium. 
          Property, however, obtained either by will or donation, 
          or which was purchased or acquired with the profits of the same, shall 
          belong to the said alleged slave as being freeborn. After judgment has 
          been rendered declaring him to be free, all this property should be 
          sequestered, after having been separated from that above mentioned; 
          so that, both having been set aside and placed in full view, each of 
          the parties may claim that to which he is entitled. Given at Thessalonica, on the fifteenth of the Kalends of March, under the Consulate of Severus and Rufinus, 343. Title 
          19. Concerning the order of judicial inquiries.   As you, yourself, 
          have acknowledged that a controversy has arisen concerning your status, 
          with what reason do you demand that, before it has been established, 
          you should be granted authority to accuse him who contends that you 
          are his slave? Therefore, as you 
          allege that you are confident of success, appear before the Governor 
          of the province, who, in accordance with the general rule, will not 
          hesitate to render a proper decision with reference to the crime said 
          to have been committed, dependent, of course, upon the result of the 
          case involving your freedom, which must first be determined. Published during 
          the Ides of ... , during the Consulate of Maximus, Consul 
          for the eleventh time, and Julianus, 224. 2. The Same 
          Emperor to Gallus. Where a controversy 
          has arisen both with reference to the title to an estate and the right 
          of someone to freedom, the latter must first be heard. Where only the 
          ownership of the estate is directly concerned, any question involving 
          freedom must first be decided; but it will be sufficient for him who 
          enjoys his liberty to have succeeded, where judgment was rendered in 
          his favor in an action brought to recover the estate. Published on the 
          fifth of the Ides of August, during the Consulate of Maximus, 
          Consul for the second time, 224. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to Valerius. If an accusation 
          of crime is brought against a woman whom you say is freeborn, the Governor 
          must not take cognizance of this case before deciding the one in which 
          her liberty is involved, as, if the crime should be proved, it will 
          be necessary in the first place to ascertain whether she must be punished 
          as a woman who was free and freeborn, or as a female slave. 4. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Menedemus. If a controversy 
          has arisen with reference to your status, and a decision should be rendered 
          in your favor at the termination of the case, you will not be prevented 
          from proceeding against him who asserted that he was your master. If, 
          however, he did not claim you as his own slave, but accused you of being 
          the slave of another, no judgment should be rendered on the question 
          of freedom, and the examination of the case before the judge will show 
          whether the accusation should be heard in order to determine your condition, 
          or whether it should be rejected. Given on the tenth 
          of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of Gordian and 
          Aviola, 240. 5. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Alphenus. As you allege 
          that a controversy has arisen with reference to your status, and that 
          you desire to bring suit to collect certain debts, the ordinary practice, 
          under such circumstances, is for the case involving your freedom to 
          be decided by the Governor of the province, after the usual formalities 
          have been complied with (if the law permits this to be done) ; and if 
          you should become free, or the decision should be that you are not a 
          slave, then the magistrate will order your debts to be paid to you, 
          provided they are lawfully due; as, if the decree should set forth that 
          you are a slave, it is uncertain whether they are due to you as a freeman, 
          or to your master, and their payment cannot be exacted from your debtor. Ordered on the 
          day before the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 6. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Alexandria. If you allege 
          that your property has been stolen or carried away by those whom you 
          claim as your slaves, and they should apply to a court to grant them 
          freedom, and the case should be decided against them, actions for damages 
          and for property clandestinely removed must then be brought before the 
          Governor of the province, and if the persons in question are decided 
          to be free, or not slaves, the actions for damages and to recover whatever 
          has been removed can be tried; and, after proper evidence has been offered, 
          they shall be sentenced. If, however, the result should be otherwise, and they should 
          be found to be slaves, the suits having reference to the clandestine 
          removal of the property shall be dismissed. Given on the third 
          of the Ides of January, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 7. The Emperor 
          Constantine to Bassus, Praetorian Prefect. If, when a question as to status arises, the person alleged to be a slave is accused of having stolen something from his master, it must first be considered whether the reputed slave, being in servitude, believes that he has a right to his freedom; or whether, while in the enjoyment of his freedom, an attempt is being made to reduce him to slavery. When he who is in slavery demands his freedom, it is proper that his condition should first be decided, and afterwards the case of the theft should be investigated, if circumstances demand it. But where he who is alleged to be a slave is said to have stolen something, whatever is proved to have been taken must be returned to him, provided he furnishes proper sureties for its preservation. If, however, he should be unable to furnish them, then it is proper that all the property in dispute should be sequestrated, until the controversy is settled, but this should be done in such a way that, if the party interested has no other resources, whatever is necessary for the expenses of litigation and for the support of the said alleged slave must be reserved from the said property to the amount that the judge may decide to be reasonable. But if the question with reference to status has not been raised, but someone has stolen certain articles, and has been ordered to restore possession of them to the owner for the purpose of avoiding the execution of the sentence, he will be required to return the said property without asking for security, and then the case involving his freedom shall proceed according to law. Title 
          20. Concerning the detection of collusion.   As you state that 
          your mother's slave has not only been guilty of committing sexual intercourse 
          with her, but, in addition to this disgraceful conduct, has, in collusion 
          with her and under the pretext of false captivity, planned to have himself 
          declared freeborn by a competent judge, and your mother did not grant 
          him his freedom, but, as you assert, attempted to establish his free 
          birth by fraudulent representations, it is clear that he still remains 
          her slave; for as you say that she did not manumit him, the slave does 
          not appear to have become free, and cannot have recourse to the Rescript 
          of the Divine Pius, published with reference to captivity, nor could 
          the mere statement that you had consented confer upon him the right 
          of freedom. Published on the 
          fourteenth of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Diocletian, 
          Consul for the fourth time, and Maximian, Consul for the third time, 
          290. 2. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Milesius. It is clearly 
          stated by the Noninian Decree of the Senate that a freedman is not permitted 
          to change his status by means of a private contract, and a penalty for 
          collusion is fixed by it, and as well as a reward promised to the informer. Given on the fifth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of the Caesars. Title 
          21. The status of a deceased person cannot be brought in question after 
          the expiration of five years.   A competent judge, 
          after having been applied to, will examine the question of prescription, 
          and whether the patron of Domitia, who lived as a Roman citizen until 
          his death, can be proved to have died five years before the controversy 
          with reference to the property of the said woman arose; for her condition 
          as a freedwoman cannot be revoked on account of the alleged incapacity 
          of the person who manumitted her. 2. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Maximus. If he who appointed 
          you his heir is said to have been a slave on account of the condition 
          of his mother, and she died five years before any controversy on this 
          point aroise, there will be ground for prescription, as no inquiry can 
          be instituted with reference to his status without also investigating 
          that of his mother. This rule only 
          applies to cases where the persons concerned lived as Roman citizens, 
          without dispute, until the time of their death. Published during 
          the second Consulate of Antoninus and Geta, 206. 3. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Olympias. Although your 
          husband, concerning whose condition a controversy has arisen, is dead, 
          the case shall be continued notwithstanding his death, on account of 
          his estate, and it must be decided by the court having jurisdiction 
          over estates, or property forming part of the same. 4. The Same 
          Emperor to Martianus. If he whom you 
          allege to have been your slave, and who was manumitted by your brother, 
          and appointed his heir, lived as a Roman citizen after his manumission, 
          and you did not begin proceedings for the purpose of determining his 
          status within five years after his death, you understand that you cannot, 
          in violation of the provisions of the Decree of the Senate, raise any 
          controversy, either with reference to the heirs appointed by your brother, 
          or concerning the condition of those whom he intended to be free. 
          If, however, you instituted proceedings 
          before that period of time has elapsed, and claimed his peculium 
          in accordance with the legal formalities required, and also brought 
          suit to recover the slaves who were manumitted, you will not be prevented 
          from proceeding in accordance with the terms of the Edict. Published on the 
          fifth of the ... of June, during the Consulate of Modestus and Probus, 
          229. 5. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Severus. The rule which 
          has been established, namely, that no question can be raised with reference 
          to the condition of deceased persons after the lapse of five years, 
          does not, in any way, apply to an apparent emancipation which has not 
          been perfected by law. 6. The Emperors 
          Valerius and Gallienus to Polla. If your mother, 
          while living, was generally believed to be freeborn, and five years 
          have elapsed since her death, you can plead the well-known prescription 
          on this point against the State and the minor heirs, if they should 
          attempt to raise a question as to your condition. Moreover, a judicial inquiry must be instituted to determine 
          whether or not she passed as a freeborn woman when she died, and if 
          it was found that she was not always considered such, the general opinion 
          at the time of her decease must be taken into account. Published on the 
          sixth of the Ides of June, during the Consulate of Secularis 
          and Donatus, 261. 7. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Heliodorus. If your father 
          lived as a freeborn man until his death, and no controversy as to whether 
          he was a slave of the Treasury or not arose before the Governor of the 
          province, who is accustomed to decide questions of this kind, but the 
          matter was brought before the Imperial Procurator, who is not a competent 
          judge of such cases, and five years elapsed after your father's death, 
          your condition is protected by the prescription derived from the Decree 
          of the Senate. 8. The Same 
          Emperors to Theodora. The right to claim 
          the property composing the peculium of your slave is not barred 
          by prescription, if the said property is in possession of another under 
          an unlawful title. For the Decree of the Senate which was 
          enacted to prevent the revoking of the condition of deceased persons 
          does not apply, if the decedent, having taken to flight, died a fugitive. Given at Milan, on the tenth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of Diocletian and Maximian. Title 
          22. Concerning the prescription of long time which is pleaded in behalf 
          of and not against freedom.   The benefit of 
          prescription based on long time cannot be claimed by anyone who, for 
          an extended period, has enjoyed freedom fraudulently obtained. Therefore, 
          as you acknowledge that you fled from the person whom you mentioned, 
          you understood that you are not in possession of liberty without being 
          guilty of fraud. 2. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Carcinus. The possession 
          of freedom lawfully acquired can be resolutely maintained by prescription, 
          since the favor with which it is regarded— and good reason as well—argue 
          that prescription should benefit those who have been in possession of 
          liberty for the term of twenty years, without their right being challenged 
          by anyone seeking to disturb them, so that they may become both free, 
          and Roman citizens. Given at Antioch, 
          on the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Constantius, 
          Consul for the fourth time, and Maximus, Consul for the second time, 
          302. 3. Copy of 
          the Imperial Letter of Constantine and Licinius addressed to Dionysius, 
          Temporarily in Charge of a Prefecture. It is consistent 
          with equity that the rights of freedom should, in no way, be interfered 
          with, solely on account of lapse of time, even if the term of sixty 
          years has passed. Given on the fourth of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of Volusianus and Annianus, 314. Title 
          23. Concerning the peculium of him who has obtained his freedom.    You should not forget that a great difference exists between the cases of those who have been manumitted by persons who were living at the time, and those to whom freedom has been bequeathed by will, as, in the first instance, they are tacitly entitled to their peculium if they were not specifically deprived of it, and in the second, the heirs will have the right to it, unless it was expressly left to the manumitted slave. This rule of law is perfectly clear. Title 
          24. Concerning the abolition of the Claudian Decree of the Senate.   As We think that during oar reign (when We have exerted ourselves so greatly in favor of the liberty of Our subjects) it would be extremely wicked for certain women to be deprived of their freedom, and that from the lust of unprincipled men there should result a state of affairs which could only be caused by the ferocity of enemies in violation of natural law, We desire that the Claudian Decree of the Senate, as well as all denunciations and legal decisions having reference to the same, shall hereafter be abolished, so that any woman who is free and has been deceived, or rendered the victim of unfortunate affection, shall not, for this or any other reason, be reduced to slavery, and the liberty to which she was entitled by birth lost; and the worst dishonor tarnish the glory of her kindred, as she may, perhaps, have relatives of distinguished rank, and the master under whose control she comes may be inferior to her relatives. This rule shall also apply to freedmen, for the principles by which My reign is governed do not suffer that a person who once has obtained freedom shall, under any circumstances, be reduced to slavery for such a cause. But to prevent slaves and serfs from thinking that they can go unpunished for the commission of such acts (and this is especially provided in the case of serfs in order that their condition may not be gradually changed through their marriage with free women), We order that if anything of this kind should be perpetrated by either a slave or a serf, his master shall have full authority, either in his own person or by the Governor of the province, to administer proper punishment to the said slave or serf, and separate him from the said woman. If he should fail to do this, he is hereby notified that his own loss will be the result of his neglect. Title 
          25. Concerning the abolition of the mere civil right of Romans.   With the intention of abolishing by this law a ridiculous example of the subtlety of the ancient jurists, We shall not hereafter permit any distinction to be made between owners who hold property merely by the civil right of Romans, and those who hold it as part of their own possessions, for the reason that We do not wish this distinction to exist any longer, as the term "Ex jure Quiritium" is enigmatical, is nowhere seriously considered, and does not strictly apply to property, but is a phase void of meaning, and superfluous, and by it the minds of youths who are beginning the study of the law are bewildered, and they are compelled to learn the useless provisions of ancient enactments. Therefore, anyone who is the owner of a slave, or of any other property which belongs to him, shall become its full and lawful proprietor. Title 
          26. Concerning usucaption either in favor of the purchaser or acquired 
          by virtue of the transaction.   If your slaves 
          have been stolen by persons who did not have the right to sell them, 
          you can bring suit to recover them, for they are not susceptible of 
          usucaption by the purchasers, as theft may be committed by an illegal 
          sale. Given on the day 
          before the Ides of August, during the Consulate of Antoninus, 
          Consul for the fourth time, and Balbinus, 214. 2. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Marcellinus. If the guardians, 
          contrary to the intention of the deceased, sold the slaves which he 
          directed by his will to go to his heirs on account of their skill as 
          artisans, they cannot be acquired by usucaption. Given on the fifth 
          of the Nones of March, during the Consulate of Julianus, Consul 
          for the second time, and Crispinus, 225. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to Nepotilla. If you purchased 
          and now hold possession in good faith of the mother of him with reference 
          to whose condition you have instituted legal 
          proceedings, you can obtain by usucaption the child which she brought 
          forth afterwards while under your control, even if she herself formed 
          part of the stolen property. 4. The Same 
          Emperor to Achilles. If you establish 
          that the other party gave his consent to the sale of the female slave, 
          and then rescinded the contract which he himself had ratified, he shall 
          not be heard. If, however, he cannot produce this proof, but can show 
          that the slave was purchased in good faith from a bona fide vendor, 
          you can acquire her by usucaption on the ground of lapse of time, and 
          the attempt of the claimant to hold the property will be of no avail. 5. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Marinus. When a possessor 
          in bad faith sold a part of the property, the remainder which he still 
          retains can certainly, with all its profits, be recovered from him. 
          The portion which was sold, however, can only lawfully be demanded from 
          the possessor, where he knowingly bought what belonged to another, or 
          when, as a purchaser in good faith, he has not held it long enough to 
          acquire usucaption. Possession which has been lost by violence cannot be acquired 
          by a purchaser through usucaption, even though he bought it in good 
          faith before it had again come under the control of the owner. 6. The Emperor 
          Philip to Caelius. If it is proved 
          that the property was pledged and afterwards sold by the debtor, it 
          is clear that, being, as it were, stolen, it cannot be acquired by usucaption. Without date or 
          designation of Consulate. 7. The Same 
          Emperor and Caesar to Compedius. He who knowingly 
          sells the slave of another without the consent of the owner commits 
          a theft, and this defect of title does not permit usucaption to take 
          place before the property is returned to the possession of the owner, 
          even though possession was obtained in good faith. Given on the fifth 
          of the Ides of February, during the Consulate of the Caesars, 
          248. 8. The Same 
          Emperor and Caesar to Sevens. Those who have 
          a legal right to possession growing out of a compromise can acquire 
          property by usucaption. 9. The Same 
          Emperor and Caesar to Gaius. No kind of prescription 
          will protect one who has purchased property sold by a ward without the 
          authority of his guardian, but if the ward is found to have been benefited 
          by the money of the purchaser, he will be barred by an exception on 
          the ground of bad faith if, after having arrived at puberty, he attempts 
          to rescind the contract by law on the ground that it is unjust. Given during the Consulate of the Caesars. Title 
          27. Concerning the usucaption of property which has been donated.   Whether the owner 
          himself gave you the lands with reference to which you have filed your 
          petition, or whether you received them as a donation in good faith from 
          a person who was not their owner, you have acquired the right to them 
          by usucaption, and you cannot be deprived of what you have legally obtained. Published on the 
          fifth of the Ides of March, .... 2. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian to Capitonius. There is no doubt 
          that, in law, the rights of the master are not affected by the donation 
          of a female slave belonging to another, for a theft is committed by 
          the disposal of property without the consent of the owner, and usucaption 
          of such property cannot be acquired. Ordered on the 
          fifth of the Ides of April, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 3. The Same 
          Emperors and the Caesars to Rhodanus. No one is permitted to revoke a donation which has been lawfully made, but it is also true that a mistake cannot be defended on the ground of good faith. This rule applies where ownership is claimed on the ground of usucaption. Title 
          28. Concerning usucaption in the case of a dowry.   When movable property is given by way of dowry, even though none of it belongs to another, if there is no defect in the title, and it is accepted in good faith, it can be acquired by usucaption as part of the dowry. Title 
          29. Concerning usucaption with reference to an heir.   As usucaption, 
          in this instance, does not apply to the heir, you are advised that neither 
          your mother, whose heir you are, nor you, yourself, can acquire the 
          slaves referred to, by usucaption. Published at Rome, 
          on the seventh of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of 
          Laetus and Cerealis. 2. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Maurina. It has been established 
          that nothing can be acquired through usucaption by some one acting as 
          heir, when there are any proper heirs. 3. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Diodorus. The possession 
          of the property of an absent person by anyone acting in the capacity 
          of heir will not authorize usucaption, if the report of the death of 
          the said person is false. 4. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Serapion. Usucaption cannot 
          be claimed except under a lawful title, nor can it be taken advantage 
          of, nor can it avail the possessor or the heir, nor will the right of 
          the owner be affected by lapse of time, even if property belonging to 
          another is claimed under the pretext of its having formed part of an 
          estate. Given on the seventh of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of the Caesars. Title 
          30. General rules with reference to usucaption.   Anyone who holds 
          property under a lease, although he holds it corporeally, is not considered 
          to possess it in person, but for the owner, as prescription based on 
          long possession cannot be acquired by either a tenant or a lessee. Published on the 
          seventh of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Alexander, 
          Consul for the fifth time, and Marcellus, 227. 2. The Same 
          Emperor to Onesima. You say that sometime 
          ago you purchased the slave with reference to whom you petition, but, 
          if you reflect, you will remember that property belonging to My Treasury 
          cannot be acquired by usucaption, and you are hereby notified that you 
          will be compelled to answer in any actions brought by My Treasury, nor 
          can the owership of the slave in question be acquired by you through 
          usucaption, unless he was not born of a female slave belonging to the 
          Treasury. Published during 
          the Nones of March, during the Consulate of Pompeianus and Pelignus. 3. The Emperor 
          Philip and the Caesar to Pantinus. If Antiochus knowingly held your slave in bad faith, he cannot be acquired by usucaption by his successor, even though he may possess him in good faith, because of the original defect in the title. Title 
          31. Concerning the transfer of the right of usucaption and the abolition 
          of the distinction of res mancipi and res nec mancipi.   As We, by Our 
          care, have disposed of the name and substance of acquisitions ex 
          jure Quiritium, and have provided that ordinary prescription shall 
          be valid everywhere, whether it arises from possession for ten, twenty, 
          or thirty years, or even for a much longer time, it would be useless 
          to admit the right of usucaption only with reference to property situated 
          in Italy, and to exclude it from application to that situated in the 
          provinces. Where, however, anyone has had in his possession in good 
          faith, for the term of two years, property belonging to another, which 
          is situated in Italy, the unfortunate owner of the same shall lose his 
          right to it, and shall be entitled to no recourse with reference to 
          said property, which was lost without the knowledge of the said owner, 
          for which reason there is nothing more unjust than for him, who is ignorant 
          of the fact, to be deprived of his possession in so short a time. 
          Therefore, We order by the present law, 
          that where property situated in Italy is either immovable, or is understood 
          to be such, the term of usucaption shall be extended (like that for 
          a year), so that it will now run with those of ten, twenty, or thirty 
          years, and others of still longer duration, and that the present limited 
          period shall be abolished. Moreover, 
          as the ancients fixed the time for the acquisition of movable property, 
          or that which was capable of moving itself, or which was, in any way 
          retained (of course when held in good faith), whether situated in Italy 
          or anywhere else in the world, and allowed ownership to vest after possession 
          for a year, We consider that this should be amended, so that where anyone 
          has had possession in good faith of any movable property, or of any 
          which was capable of moving itself, either in Italy, or in any of the 
          provinces, for the continuous term of three years, he can acquire a 
          legal title to the same, just as if it had been acquired by usucaption, 
          it being only observed that in all such cases he must, in the first 
          place, obtain it in good faith, just as is required by a prescription 
          of long time, and that the possession acquired by any preceding lawful 
          possessor shall be included in the term of ten, twenty, or thirty years. 
          We decree that, in the case of movable 
          property, the legal retention of the preceding holder under a just right 
          of possession, which he exercised over the said property, shall not 
          be interrupted by the fact that the subsequent holder may have been 
          aware that the property belonged to another, even though it was obtained 
          under a lucrative title. The time has been extended by this law with 
          reference to the usucaption of property which is the subject of the 
          same, and We have limited that of usucaption, productive of such loss 
          and injury to owners, and abolished the ancient practice of dividing 
          property into mancipi, and nee 
          mancipi, which is only in conformity with reason, so that a similar 
          rule may apply to all property and all localities, and useless ambiguities 
          and differences be finally disposed of. Given at Constantinople, on the fifteenth of the Kalends of November, after the Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 531. Title 
          32. Concerning the acquisition and retention of possession.   It is established 
          by the principles of public convenience, as well as by those of law, 
          that possession can be acquired by anyone without his knowledge, through 
          another who is free; and that usucaption will begin to run as soon as 
          he becomes aware of the fact. Published on the 
          sixth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of Fuscus 
          and Dexter, 226. 2. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Maurus. He who has caused 
          you anxiety is not well informed when he asserts that you did not obtain 
          possession of the property which you purchased through an agent, as 
          you yourself allege that you have been in possession of the same for 
          a long time, and have, as the owner, transacted all the business relating 
          to it; for although transfer of the property whose possession has been 
          delivered to you was not mentioned in the instrument, you, nevertheless, 
          in fact acquired it if the vendor knew that you were in possession. 3. The Emperor 
          Decius to Rufinus. The possession 
          of property donated by anyone to an infant is actually acquired, for 
          although the opinions of legal authorities differ on this point, still 
          it is more proper to hold that, in the meantime, possession is acquired 
          by delivery, although the infant is not capable of giving his full consent 
          to the transaction. For otherwise, in accordance with the opinion of 
          the most learned jurist Papinian, possession could not be acquired by 
          the infant through his guardian. Published on the 
          fifth of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Decius, 
          Consul for the fifth time, and Gratus, 251. 4. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian to Nepotianus. Although possession 
          cannot be acquired by mere intention, still it can be retained in this 
          way. Therefore, if you have failed to cultivate your land for a certain 
          time, not with the intention of relinquishing possession, but only because 
          of fear, your rights cannot be prejudiced on account of the time which 
          has elapsed. Published during 
          the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Diocletian, Consul 
          for the fourth time, and Maximian, Consul for the third time, 290. 5. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Menno. As no one can 
          change his own title to possession, and you allege that the tenant, 
          without any external cause arising, allowed the farm which he unjustly 
          occupied to be sold, the Governor of the province, after having ascertained 
          the truth, will not permit you to be deprived of your right of ownership. 6. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Valerius. If the Governor 
          of the province should ascertain that your field or your vineyard has 
          been seized without good reason by the person whom you mentioned, and 
          that your claim is not barred by any prescription, he will not hesitate 
          to restore to you possession of the land with all its appurtenances. Ordered during 
          the Ides of April, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 7. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Asyncritus. Unjust possession 
          does not confer a valid title upon the possessor. Wherefore it is certain 
          that anyone who takes possession of the land of another, without the 
          consent of the owner, or of his agent who has authority to transfer 
          it, cannot obtain legal ground for possession of the same. Published on the 
          fifth of the Ides of December, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 8. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Cyrillus. It has been decided 
          on the ground of the public welfare that the ownership, as well as the 
          possession of property, can be acquired through an agent, as the two 
          cannot be separated. Published on the 
          eighteenth of the Kalends of March, during the Consulate of the 
          Caesars. 9. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Sergius. A purchaser cannot 
          legally hold possession of property which he occupied on his own responsibility 
          by virtue of a genuine sale, and much less does he who, falsely representing 
          himself as the purchaser, for the reason that he lent money without 
          the obligation of a pledge and seized the land of another, have just 
          cause to retain it. Published on the 
          third of the Nones of April, .... 10. The Emperor 
          Constantine to Maternus. No one can entertain 
          any doubt that there are two grounds of possession, one based on the 
          law, and the other on the fact; and both of them are legal when they 
          are confirmed by the silence and want of opposition of all adversaries. 
          Where, however, a controversy arises, he cannot be considered the possessor 
          who, although he may have actual possession of the property, still his 
          right to occupy it having been questioned, a contest has been begun, 
          and the case brought into court. Published on the 
          eleventh of the Kalends of February, under the Consulate of Volusianus 
          and Annianus, 314. 11. The Emperors 
          Arcadius and Honorius to Petroneus, Lieutenant of the Spains. Previous defects 
          of possession are transferred by former owners, and the imperfection 
          of the original proprietor passes to his successor. Given on the fifth 
          of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of Caesarius 
          and Atticus, 397. 12. The Emperor 
          Justinian to John, Praetorian Prefect. We, intending to dispose of the question which has been brought to Our attention by the works of the Sabinians, hereby order that, if either a slave, an agent, a tenant, a lessee, or anyone else through whom we are permitted to hold possession has, either through negligence or fraud, abandoned or delivered to another the actual occupation of any property which he held, so that the said third party may have ground for obtaining possession of the same, no prejudice whatever can result to the owner, nor can any injury be inflicted upon him by the malignity of his representative, but the latter, if he is free, will be liable to suitable actions at law, and all loss must be made good by him to the owner of said property, or to him with reference to whom he has acted negligently or fraudulently. But where possession has not yet been acquired by the said agent, tenant, lessee, or slave, but the latter, through negligence or fraud, has failed to secure it, then the person himself who appointed him shall suffer the damage resulting from his bad selection of the individual directed to take possession of the property, and attributable either to the evil design or negligence of the latter. We also order that the owner shall only be entitled to redress when he has sustained any injury through the agency of him whom he appointed, but not when he has failed to reap any benefit through his acts, as the ancient rule of law which states that the condition of a master can, under no circumstances, be made worse through the conduct of his slave, only applies when he suffers actual loss, and not when he unsuccessfully attempts to obtain some advantage for himself by means of his slave. In this instance, all legal rights of action are reserved for the owner of the property, or for him who appointed any of the above-mentioned persons to hold possession, as against the latter, if he is entitled to the same under the law. Title 
          33. Concerning the prescription of long time based upon occupancy for 
          ten or twenty years.   If, after the 
          question of possession has been disposed of, the ownership of the property 
          passes in good faith to another, and remains in 
          his possession without any interruption for the term of twenty years, 
          the party then in possession should not be disturbed, but if the latter 
          does not take advantage of the occupancy of the former owner, there 
          is nothing to prevent him from being disturbed by a dispute as to the 
          title. If, however, the right of the former possessor was disputed, 
          even though he remained in possession for a long time without interruption, 
          he will, nevertheless, not be able to avail himself of prescription 
          based on long time. This rule also 
          must be observed with reference to property belonging to the State. 2. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars. The prescription 
          of long time can usually only benefit those who, after having obtained 
          possession of property in good faith, have enjoyed it continuously, 
          without its being interrupted by legal proceedings. Published on the 
          fifth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of Maximus, 
          Consul for the second time, and Aquilinus, 286. 3. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Antoninus. If the vineyard 
          which your mother gave to your step-father by way of dowry belonged 
          to you, and no prescription has arisen oh account of lapse of time, 
          the Governor of the province must cause it to be restored to you. 4. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Hermogenes. Long-continued 
          possession which has been acquired only by the right of succession, 
          and without any legal title can, for this reason alone, be of no advantage 
          in claiming prescription. Given on the fourth 
          of the Ides of April, during the Consulate of the Emperors. 5. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Sotericus. It is a perfectly 
          clear rule of law that anyone who claims ownership from one who is indebted 
          to some mistake alone for his possession of certain 
          property to which he holds a legal title cannot be excluded by prescription 
          of long time. Ordered on the 
          eleventh of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of the Emperors. 6. Extract 
          from a Letter of the Same Emperors and Caesars to Primosus, Governor 
          of Syria. If the sale was 
          fraudulently and deceitfully made, even though the parties were over 
          twenty-five years of age, the time which has elapsed cannot confirm 
          it, as the prescription of long time does not apply to contracts entered 
          into in bad faith. 7. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Anthea. The loss of documents 
          does not legally prejudice the right of persons whose title is protected 
          by long possession, nor can the evil designs of another disturb security 
          acquired by long-continued possession. Given on the day 
          before the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 8. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Celsus. If he against 
          whom you petitioned alleges that the slaves of your late mother belonged 
          to him as her adopted son, the fact of an illegal adoption is not alone 
          sufficient to enable him to acquire the ownership of the property, for 
          which reason you will not be prevented from claiming the slaves, without 
          being under any apprehension that prescription can be successfully pleaded 
          against you, if he, against whom you have filed your petition, only 
          obtained possession of the said slaves under the title above mentioned. 9. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Demosthenes. A purchaser in 
          good faith, who pleaded an exception against the prescription of ten 
          years advanced by the other party who was present during that time, 
          from the beginning of the controversy, and who proved this after the 
          plaintiff had disclosed his claim, has shown that he has a right to 
          legal possession, and very properly asks to be released from liability. 10. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Rheginus. The prescription 
          of long time cannot benefit those who have obtained possession in good 
          faith, after being in default in joining issue, because the time should 
          be reckoned after legal proceedings have been instituted. 11. The Emperor 
          Justinian to Menna, Praetorian Prefect. We directly order 
          that, with reference to prescription of long time, and which is based 
          upon occupancy for either ten or twenty years, that where anyone is 
          proved to have held possession of property for either ten or twenty 
          years, which property has been acquired by donation, 
          or by any other lucrative title, and the time it was occupied by the 
          former possessor is added to that during which he held it, he will undoubtedly 
          be entitled to the above-mentioned prescription of long time, nor can 
          he be excluded on the ground that he acquired the property by a lucrative 
          title. Given during the 
          Kalends of June, under the Consulate of Our Lord Justinian, 528. 12. The Same 
          Emperor to John, Praetorian Prefect. Three difficulties arose among the ancient authorities concerning prescription based upon long time: the first, with reference to where the property was situated; the second, relating to the persons, whether the presence of one or of both should be required; and the third, whether the claimant as well as the possessor should be in the same province, or even in the same city where the property was in dispute; and We shall include all these matters in the present law, so that no doubt may remain on the subject. Therefore We decree that, in cases of this kind, the domicile of the claimant as well as that of the possessor shall be taken into account, so that he who raised the question of the ownership or of the hypothecation of the property, as well as he who is in possession, must reside in the same place, that is to say, in the same province. For We think that We should decide in favor of considering the province rather than the city as the domicile of the parties, and if both of them have their domicile in the same province, the case will be considered as having arisen between them while present, and any longer prescription than that of ten years will be excluded. Moreover, with reference to the doubt arising concerning the property, there shall be no distinction whether it is situated in the same province, or in a neighboring one, or whether it is situated beyond seas or even in a far distant country. If, however, both parties should not reside in the same province, but one should have his domicile in one province, and the other in another, then the case will be one as between absent parties, and the prescription of twenty years shall apply, for there is nothing to prevent the action with reference to the property, whether it is situated in one province or in another, from being brought in a provincial court, and still less to prevent this being done in this Most Flourishing City. For what advantage would it be for possession to be held in one province or another, as the right to claim property is incorporeal, and wherever it is situated, the ownership of the same can revert to the owner or the creditor? Hence our ancestors, with great shrewdness, and with a species of divine inspiration, established the rule that rights of action existed wherever the claims or the property itself could be situated. Therefore, after the promulgation of this law, let no one doubt what should be decided, whether the parties are present or absent; for if the occupant acquired possession in good faith in the beginning, and the domicile of both parties is ascertained, then let the question be determined, no matter where the property may be situated, without taking into consideration either knowledge or ignorance, in order that no other embarrassing occasion for doubt may arise. The same rule must be observed if the property is not attached to the soil, but is incorporeal and consists merely of rights, as, for instance, usufructs and other servitudes. Title 
          34. To what cases prescription of long time does not apply.   If he to whom 
          you have given your land for the purpose of cultivation afterwards, 
          through the agency of your step-mother, secretly removed the documents 
          by which it could be proved that the ownership of the land belonged 
          to you, he cannot defend himself on the ground of long possession alone. 2. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Dionysius. It is superfluous 
          to have recourse to the prescription of long time in matters relating 
          to the ownership of slaves. 3. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Apollinarus. One of two joint-owners, 
          who has possession of all the common undivided property, cannot plead 
          prescription of long time to prevent the other joint-owner from claiming 
          his share of the property, or for bringing suit in partition; as neither 
          the action in partition, nor that brought for the division of property 
          owned in common, is barred by the prescription of long time. Given on the third 
          of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 4. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Libroa. The prescription 
          of long time does not injure those who are claiming an estate. None 
          of the provisions of this law, however, shall prejudice the rights of 
          those who do not hold possession of property which belongs, or has belonged 
          to an estate, either as heirs or possessors, but have obtained it by 
          purchase, gift, or some other title, as the succession cannot be demanded 
          by them. Given on the third 
          of the Ides of September .... 5. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Hosimus. If you have cared for a boy slave who had not been abandoned, but had been wounded by the enemy, and you did this at your own expense (as you assert) believing him to be free, you cannot legally plead the prescription of long time to prevent his master from recovering him, provided he tenders you the amount which you have legitimately expended in his behalf. Title 
          35. In what cases prescription of long time cannot be pleaded.   The time passed 
          in an expedition cannot be included in pleading prescription against 
          a claim for land, if it can be legally established. Given on the sixth 
          of the Nones of July, under the Consulate of Julian and Crispus, 
          225. 2. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian and the Caesars to Aurelius, Chief Physician. As you assert 
          that, during your absence, those of whom you complain seized your property, 
          and it is clear that you could not leave Our retinue on account of your 
          profession as a physician, Our Praetorian Prefect, after summoning all 
          the parties interested, will decide between you. It is not necessary 
          for you to request that prescription based on lapse of time shall not 
          be pleaded against you, since the fact that you were lawfully absent, 
          and engaged in the public service, will protect you from damage in this 
          respect. Published at Nicea, 
          on the fifteenth of the Kalends of March, during the Consulate 
          of Maximus, Consul for the fifth time, and Aquilinus, 286. 3. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Numidius, Governor of Italy. It is well known 
          that time passed in minority cannot be included in prescription, for 
          the latter only begins to run when the owner of the property attains 
          his majority. Published on the 
          fourth of the Ides of September, during the Consulate of Diocletian, 
          Consul for the fourth time, and Maximian, Consul for the third time, 
          290. 4. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Crispinus. If uninterrupted 
          possession has continued without dispute, you have a right to plead 
          prescription. We, however, decree that it shall never be valid against 
          persons who are absent on business for the State, and especially where 
          this takes place unexpectedly. Published on the 
          sixth of the Kalends of March, during the Consulate of Ambalianus 
          and Asclepiodotus, 292. 5. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Januarius. It is a positive 
          rule of law that prescription cannot be pleaded in suits growing out 
          of loans for consumption, or for use, or deposits, legacies, trusts, 
          guardianships, or in any other personal action. Ordered on the 
          Kalends of February, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned 
          Emperors. 6. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Dulcius. Having been taken 
          captive by the enemy, and returned under the right of postliminium, 
          you have no reason to apprehend that the possession of your adversary 
          based upon long time can be legally pleaded in a direct action in 
          rem, or in any other which you may bring for the purpose of recovering 
          your ownership of the property, as an act of this kind is of no avail 
          against those who, for any reason, have the right to invoke the aid 
          of restitution. 7. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Cassander. Possessors of 
          property in good faith are protected by prescription against those who 
          have been present for ten years, or have been absent for twenty. If 
          the relief of restitution is demanded by anyone with reference to a 
          share of the plaintiffs, as much of the time should be deducted as would 
          usually be counted in case anything had been done, and the remainder 
          should be computed, which is reasonable. 8. The Emperor 
          Justinian to Menna, Praetorian Prefect. We order that, 
          exclusively in the case of soldiers who are engaged in expeditions only, 
          that time which has elapsed during the expedition shall be pleaded in 
          opposition to prescription, but this privilege shall not be enjoyed 
          by them, so far as the time which they may have passed either at home, 
          or in other places, while they were not in active service, is concerned. Given at Constantinople, on the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Decius, 529. Title 
          36. Where prescription is pleaded against a creditor.   Unbroken silence 
          is strengthened by the prescription of long time, and renders an action 
          brought by creditors for the recovery of a pledge of no effect, when 
          the debtors, or those who have succeeded to their rights, have possession 
          of the property pledged. When, however, prescription of long time is 
          pleaded by a possessor against his creditor, a personal action will 
          lie in favor of the latter against the debtor. 2. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Marcella. If you were not the heir of a debtor, but obtained the property as a donation, and have had lawful possession of the same for the term of twenty years, the rule of law does not permit a personal action to be brought against you (for the reason that you did not succeed the debtor), nor can you be deprived of land given in pledge after the necessary time has elapsed, even when prescription based upon ten years occupancy can be pleaded against creditors, who have been present, a principle which has not only been established by Our Rescripts but also by those of the Emperors, Our predecessors. Title 
          37. Concerning the prescription of forty years.   It is well known 
          that no question can be raised by the Treasury with reference to property 
          which has no owner, after continuous occupancy of the same for the term 
          of forty years. 2. The Emperor Zeno to Aeneas, Count of Private Affairs. We order that 
          when persons who have purchased any property, whether it be movable, 
          immovable, or capable of moving itself, or which consists of rights 
          of action, or of any other rights whatsoever, from Our Most Sacred Treasury, 
          or, where any movable or immovable property, or any capable of moving 
          itself, or any rights of action, or any other rights whatsover, have 
          been given to them by the munificence of the Emperor, they shall be 
          entitled to all the privileges to be obtained from the divine laws of 
          the Emperor Leo, of illustrious memory, and from Our own, as well, with 
          reference to certain estates, in preference to purchasers, and that 
          all of them shall enjoy benefits or privileges of this description, 
          just as if they had already been, or may hereafter be granted, in the 
          case of individual property or inheritances. Nor 
          can any suits for the ownership of property, or on account of its hypothecation, 
          or any civil, praetorian, or personal action based upon laws or Imperial 
          Constitutions, or any other statutory provisions whatsoever (even though 
          they may not be expressly enumerated in the present law), be brought 
          against the purchasers of the property aforesaid, whether they already 
          are, or may subsequently become such, or against those who, in the case 
          of property of this kind, have been the recipients of Our generosity, 
          or who may become such hereafter. Permission is, however, given to those 
          who desire to do so, to institute proceedings against Our Treasury within 
          the term of forty years, but after the said term has elapsed, they are 
          advised that they will not be allowed to bring any actions whatsoever 
          against it. (1) With a view 
          to the consideration of the rights of purchasers of property from the 
          Treasury, We decree that whenever a person competent to sell such property 
          states in writing that he has received the price of the same, purchasers 
          who have paid money shall not, under such circumstances, be molested 
          on the ground of non-payment, nor shall the said purchasers be required 
          to prove that the price was paid, even though they may not have obtained 
          the security of a receipt for the same. But, as it is in the power of 
          him who receives the price not to give a receipt at a time when it was 
          not paid, so it is proper that purchasers should enjoy perfect security 
          by the payment of the price in this manner, and not be obliged to furnish 
          other proof, as has already been stated. 3. The Emperor Justinian to Florus, Count of Private Affairs. It was very properly 
          provided by the Emperor Zeno, of Divine Memory, in the case of fiscal 
          alienations, that persons who obtain property 
          from Our Treasury by way of donation, purchase, or any other kind of 
          alienation—if anything should arise to impugn the validity of the contract, 
          either on the ground of eviction, or to produce any other annoyance 
          with reference to the ownership or hypothecation of the property—shall 
          not suffer any loss; and that no suits can be brought against the purchasers, 
          or those who have received the property by way of donation, or who have 
          possession of the same under any other title; but they can only be brought 
          against the Treasury within the term of four years, which, having elapsed, 
          no action will lie against the Treasury. We know that this rule is constantly observed in fiscal 
          alienations, but that it is not observed in the case of property acquired 
          from private resources of the Emperor, and not from the funds of the 
          Treasury. This is unreasonable, for why should such a difference be 
          established when everything is understood to belong to the Emperor, 
          and what is alienated is derived from his private property, or from 
          that belonging to the Treasury? In 
          like manner, when anything is alienated by the Empress, why should it 
          not enjoy the same privilege? Our stewards, by whom We are accustomed 
          to administer Our estates when anything is sold, are required to attach 
          to the bills of sale agreements with reference to eviction, and others 
          having a view to private convenience, and to acknowledge obligations 
          of this kind in instruments relating to alienations, as well as those 
          concerning changes or compromises, where such transactions take place. 
          This also refers to those who do not acknowledge the Imperial Majesty, 
          nor realize what a distance exists between private fortune and Imperial 
          rank, but attempt to injure and cause loss to Our stewards, by whom 
          the affairs of the Imperial household are conducted. For 
          the purpose of correcting all these things, We order by this general 
          rule, which shall be valid for all time, that every alienation proceeding 
          from the Imperial Palace, whether it is made by Us or by Her August 
          Majesty the Empress, or by those who may hereafter be worthy of the 
          Imperial Name—whether the property has already been alienated, or may 
          be alienated hereafter—shall remain irrevocable; whether the transfer 
          has been made by Us in person, or by Our agents in pursuance of Our 
          authority. And let no one be so bold as to bring suit against those 
          who acquire such property under any title whatsoever, whether the said 
          property be movable, immovable, or capable of moving itself, or whether 
          it consists of incorporeal rights or civil privileges, or think that 
          there is any way open for him to molest them, but every avenue shall 
          be closed, and every method of procedure, and every hope of the tolerance 
          of such malignancy, shall be excluded. They shall, however, have the right to bring actions in 
          rem or hypothecary actions against Us within the term of four years, 
          as they can do against the Treasury, if they think that they are entitled 
          to such actions; and such a cause shall proceed by Our order and be 
          decided in the proper manner. When, however, the said term of four 
          years has elapsed, no one will be entitled 
          to bring any suit whatsoever against Us. Therefore, because We know 
          that not only We, Ourselves, but also Our Illustrious Consort, the Empress, 
          has already given, sold, and alienated much property in other ways, 
          and that Our liberality, as well as that of Our Illustrious Consort, 
          the Empress, has been, above all, displayed with reference to churches, 
          hospitals, poorhouses, as well as bishops, monks, and innumerable other 
          persons, We order that they also shall hold by an indisputable title 
          what they have acquired, and that no proceeding shall be instituted 
          against them, and that, within the term of four years from the present 
          time, they shall all have a right to bring suit against Us to recover 
          said property; but they are hereby notified that, after the said term 
          of four years has expired, they shall be entitled to no recourse against 
          Us. For as Imperial rank is entitled to many privileges, all Imperial 
          donations shall be irrevocable, without being recorded, and the title 
          to any property which the Illustrious Emperor may have given to his 
          August Consort temporarily, or during marriage, or which he himself 
          may have received from his Illustrious Consort, the Empress, as a donation, 
          shall immediately become complete, without being subject to confirmation 
          by time, and this shall be considered an Imperial privilege. For why 
          should those who, giving their advice and their efforts, toil day and 
          night for the benefit of the entire world, not enjoy privileges becoming 
          their rank? Therefore, Your Excellency, 
          as well as all Our other judges, shall cause these provisions to be 
          observed which We have promulgated for the honor of the Imperial Name, 
          and for the security of those who have experienced Our bounty, and which 
          shall be valid from the time when, by the Divine Will, We assumed the 
          Imperial insignia. Given at Constantinople, on the fifth of the Kalends of December, after the fifth Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 581. Title 
          38. The claim to property belonging to the crown, or to that belonging to the temples, shall not be barred by prescription.   It has repeatedly 
          been ordered that freedmen and serfs attached to the Imperial domain, 
          as well as their offspring and other descendants, who have left Our 
          land and engaged in other different occupations, shall be restored to 
          Our estates and stripped of any dignity which they may have fraudulently 
          obtained, and shall not be permitted to avail themselves of any prescription. 2. The Emperors 
          Valentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius to Dexter, Count of Private Affairs. We order that 
          all lands held by tenants or under emphyteusis, and which are the property 
          of the State or the Emperor, or belong to 
          the sacred temples, or have been sold in any province, or alienated 
          in pursuance of any other contract, by persons who had possession of 
          them wrongfully and contrary to law, shall be restored; and that no 
          prescription can be pleaded against their restoration, so that those 
          who have purchased them legally cannot demand the repayment of the price 
          of the same. Given at Constantinople, 
          on the fifth of the Nones of July, during the Consulate of Valentinian, 
          Consul for the fourth time, and Eutropius, 387. 3. The Emperors 
          Arcadius and Honorius to Paulus, Count of the Imperial Domain. If anyone should 
          have the boldness to take possession of land forming part of the Imperial 
          Domain, its rights shall be recovered in accordance with the provisions 
          of the ancient census. Therefore Your Highness should not pay any more 
          attention to rescripts which have been fraudulently obtained than to 
          prescription of long time, or to the new census; and hence you must 
          restore everything which has been taken away to its proper place, for 
          temporary possession or a new return cannot abolish the privilege enjoyed 
          by Our property. Given on the fifth of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Arcadius, Consul for the fifth time, and Honorius, Consul for the third time, 396. Title 
          39. Concerning the prescription of thirty and forty years.   As you allege 
          that, during your absence, certain persons who coveted your lands purposely 
          caused them to be sold at a low price, by the Governor of the province, 
          under the pretext of the collection of taxes, if the lawful time from 
          the day of the sale within which you can claim said land has passed, 
          the Governor of the province shall take cognizance of your case, and 
          shall decide whatever the law directs. If, 
          however, the time prescribed by law from the day of the public sale 
          has not yet elapsed, the judge, having examined your allegations, shall 
          decide what the nature of the case requires, being aware that if he 
          should ascertain the sale to be unjust, the price paid under a fraudulent 
          contract of this kind must be returned to the purchaser, in accordance 
          with the tenor of the Imperial Constitutions. 2. The Emperor 
          Valens and Valentinian to Volusianus, Praetorian Prefect. Improper action 
          is taken with reference to the owners of land when such a precarious 
          title is granted to possessors that they cannot be molested for any 
          cause after the lapse of forty years, as the law of Constantine provides that no other title whatever shall 
          be required by possessors who have held property for themselves but 
          not for others. It is established that those shall not be designated 
          possessors who occupy property on the condition of the payment of a 
          certain fixed sum as rent. Therefore, no one who has obtained possession 
          as a lessee, by retaining the property of another for a long time, can 
          obtain the ownership of the same for himself; for otherwise, the owners 
          might lose the land which they have leased, or be obliged to exclude 
          valuable tenants, or to publicly proclaim their ownership every year. 
          Given on the eighth of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate 
          of Valens and Valentinian, 365. 3. The Emperors 
          Arcadius and Honorius to Asclepiodotus, Praetorian Prefect. The right to bring 
          special actions in rem, or general personal actions, cannot be 
          extended beyond the term of thirty years. When any property or right 
          is claimed, or anyone has a suit or a prosecution of any kind brought 
          against him, the prescription of thirty years can be pleaded against 
          the plaintiff. The same law is applicable 
          in the case of a person who endeavors to recover property which has 
          been pledged or hypothecated, not from his debtor, but from another 
          who has had it in his possession for a long time; therefore, where actions 
          have not been brought within thirty year's from the time in which this 
          could be done, they cannot longer be prosecuted. Nor will it be sufficient 
          to obtain a special and favorable answer, even though this be secured 
          by personal application and petition to the Emperor, or even to state 
          this in court, unless, after the Imperial Rescript has been mentioned, 
          or the demand formally made, an agreement has been effected through 
          a bailiff, nor can a defence based on infirmity of sex, or on absence, 
          or service in the army, be set up in opposition to this law, but only 
          on the ground of the minority of the defendant, even though he may be 
          represented by his guardian. For, after persons who have been subject to the care of 
          a curator become of age, their rights, as well as those of others, must 
          necessarily be dependent upon possession for the term of thirty years. 
          Rights of action, considered perpetual, are extinguished by the prescription 
          cf thirty continuous years, but not those which were limited in former 
          times to a certain term. We decree 
          that, after this period has elapsed, no one shall have the power to 
          proceed, even if he should attempt to excuse himself by professing ignorance 
          of the law. Given at Constantinople, 
          on the Kalends of September, during the Consulate of Victor. 4. The Emperor 
          Anastasius to Matronianus, Praetorian Prefect. We, desiring to 
          permanently dispose of every opportunity to cause injury, do decree 
          that all prescriptions having reference to time, which are derived from 
          the ancient laws or from Imperial decrees, shall endure in full force, just as if they had been specifically 
          and definitely enumerated in this law; and those who now have a right 
          to avail themselves of them, or may in the future acquire such a right, 
          shall, in accordance with their tenor, be able to do so for all time 
          hereafter. And wishing to supplement what may have been omitted, either 
          in words or meaning in prescriptions formerly in force, We order, by 
          this law (which shall be valid for all time) that if there should be 
          any contract or action which has not been expressly provided for by 
          the rules governing the prescriptions above mentioned which, by means 
          of either an accidental or an intentional interpretation, appears to 
          afford means to evade the restrictions imposed by the prescriptions 
          aforesaid, it shall be included in this Our most salutary law, and it 
          shall, unquestionably, be extinguished after the lapse of forty years, 
          and no private or public action relating to any cause or person which 
          has been extinguished by the silence of the aforesaid forty years shall 
          be brought. Anyone, however, who, 
          under some title which has been undisputed during the above-mentioned 
          period, has had possession of property without any judicial controversy 
          having been raised with reference to it, still holds the same, shall 
          remain secure in its ownership; and any slave who, after the expiration 
          of said term, without having his case submitted to judicial investigation, 
          has obtained an advantage of this kind, shall become free under the 
          provisions of this most salutary law. Given at Constantinople, 
          on the third of the Kalends of ... , during the Consulate of 
          Olybrius. 5. The Same 
          Emperor to Thomas, Praetorian Prefect of Illyria. We do not permit 
          the prescription of forty years to be pleaded by those who are called 
          to the office of decurion, but We order that they shall always be-compelled 
          to remain in the civil condition in which they were born. For the law 
          which We have promulgated applies to other conditions, and former constitutions 
          are not repealed by the said new law, which plainly directs that decurions 
          and their children shall be returned to their former status without 
          reference to any prescription whatsoever. 6. The Same 
          Emperor to Leo, Praetorian Prefect. We, having ascertained 
          that certain persons have attempted to apply the Imperial Constitutions 
          which treats of the prescription of forty years to the prejudice of 
          the payment of public contributions, alleging that if anyone had failed 
          to pay anything for that time or longer, or had paid less than he should, 
          he would be released from liability for taxes, and that they cannot 
          be collected or he be compelled to pay them, as an attempt of this kind 
          is well known to be contrary to both the spirit and the letter of Our 
          law, We, therefore, order that those who have had possession of any 
          property continuously for the term of forty years, without any lawful 
          interruption, shall not, in any way, be deprived of the possession or 
          ownership of the said property, but that they can be compelled to pay 
          any public tax imposed upon them 
          by the civil law, and that no prescription of any time can be pleaded 
          in a case of this description. 7. The Emperor 
          Justin to Archelaus, Praetorian Prefect. As it is a well-known 
          rule of law that an hypothecary action is extinguished after the lapse 
          of thirty years, so far as foreign possessors of the encumbered property 
          are concerned, if the silence is not interrupted as provided by law, 
          that is to say, by an agreement, or where the incapacity of one of the 
          parties who has not arrived at the age of puberty is demonstrated, he 
          will have recourse against the debtors or heirs of the possessors, either 
          immediate or remote, who will not be entitled to take advantage of any 
          prescription. We have taken occasion 
          to amend this law, to prevent possessors of this kind from being subject 
          to constant apprehension. (1) Therefore, 
          We order that the right to bring the hypothecary action on the ground 
          of property remaining in the hands of debtors or their heirs shall not 
          be extended beyond the term of forty years within which said action 
          can be brought, unless some agreement has been made, or the minority 
          of the party enjoying the right is involved (as has already been stated), 
          so that the difference existing between the actions brought against 
          the debtor or his heir, and against strangers, for the recovery of the 
          property, shall only consist in the number of years, but that the two 
          shall be similar in all other respects. With reference to personal actions, those rules shall be 
          observed which have been prescribed by former constitutions. (2) But as the 
          question frequently arose in judicial controversies as to whether a 
          creditor claiming prior rights could, after the lapse of thirty years, 
          molest a subsequent creditor, who had possession of the land under hypothecation, 
          the latter being the representative of the debtor, and holding possession 
          like him, We have considered it necessary to dispose of it. Hence, We 
          order that while a common debtor is living, the prescription of thirty 
          years cannot be pleaded against a prior creditor, but that there will 
          be ground for the prescription of forty years, because, while the debtor 
          is living, the prior creditor should reasonably think that the subsequent 
          creditor holds possession of the property for and in the name of the 
          common debtor. And therefore, if the debtor should die, the subsequent 
          creditor having possession in his name can, with good reason, plead 
          prescription of thirty years. In accordance with this distinction, the computation of 
          time should be made in such a way that the prescription of the subsequent 
          creditor will date from the death of the debtor. If, however, he should 
          wish to add the time during which he had possession after the death 
          of the debtor to that which he had during the lifetime of the latter, 
          or while the common debtor himself had possession, then the rights conferred 
          by prescription of forty years must be considered, and the subsequent 
          creditor must show that he had possession for a term sufficient to complete 
          the period of forty years, by which the debtor himself would have been 
          able to exclude him, in his turn. (3) The same rule 
          must be observed in the computation of time, where the subsequent creditor 
          is ready to tender payment of the debt to the prior creditor, and the 
          latter attempts to bar him by pleading the prescription of long possession. (4) It is more 
          than manifest that, in all contracts in which either promises or agreements 
          are entered into subject to any condition, depending upon a fixed, or 
          indefinite time, after the condition has been fulfilled, or the certain 
          or uncertain time has elapsed, the prescription of thirty or forty years, 
          which is pleaded in personal or hypothecary actions, begins to run. 
          The result of this is that in marriages, in which the restitution 
          of the dowry is provided for, or in the case of ante-nuptial donations, 
          in which it is customary to specify the indefinite date of death or 
          divorce, after the dissolution of marriage, the prescription which can 
          be pleaded in personal as well as in hypothecary actions, begins to 
          run. (5) Moreover, 
          there is no doubt that if any one of those to whom something is due 
          holds property which has been hypothecated to him without the employment 
          of violence, an interruption of prescription takes place by means of 
          this possession, if less than thirty or forty years has passed; and 
          much more is this the case, if the interruption was caused by an agreement, 
          as such possession bears a resemblance to the joinder of issue. 
          If one of the debtors should give his creditor 
          additional security for the purpose of securing his obligation, the 
          time of the abovementioned prescription will be considered as having 
          been interrupted, so far as the original security is concerned, and 
          the prescription in both personal and hypothecary actions will run from 
          the date of the novation; for it would be dishonorable for the debtor 
          to dispute this, in order to avoid his liability to his creditor, after 
          having given him a second security for the former debt. (6) With reference 
          to promises, legacies, and other obligations which require the giving 
          or payment of something every year, or every month, or at any other 
          prescribed date, it is clear that the times of the above-mentioned prescription 
          should not be computed from the date of such an obligation, but from 
          the beginning of each year, or each month, or from any other time which 
          may be specified. Moreover, permission 
          should not be given to anyone who has held any property under emphyteutical 
          right, for the term of forty, or any other number of years, who alleges 
          that he is entitled to ownership of the said property, to acquire the 
          same on account of the time which has elapsed; as what is granted under 
          emphyteutical right must always remain in the same condition, since 
          the lessee, or the agent who has charge of the business of another, 
          is obliged to restore the said property to the owner, if he wishes him 
          to do so, even though he may allege that he is not obliged to surrender 
          it, and is entitled to possession of the same by prescription, after 
          the expiration of a certain time. Given during the 
          Kalends of December, .... 8. The Emperor 
          Justinian to Menna, Praetorian Prefect. When anyone has 
          held possession of any property which was obtained in good faith by 
          purchase, agreement, donation, or any other contract, for ten or twenty 
          years, and has acquired for himself the right of prescription based 
          on long time, against the owners of said property, or creditors who 
          claim that they are entitled to it through hypothecation, and he afterwards 
          loses possession of said property by accident, We order that he shall 
          be entitled to an action to recover the same. If anyone carefully examines 
          the ancient laws, he will ascertain that they authorize this. (1) If, however, 
          anyone should cease to hold possession of property, where the owner 
          or someone who has a lien on it has been barred by prescription of thirty 
          or forty years, We direct that the abovementioned relief shall be afforded 
          him, not indiscriminately, but in moderation; and if anyone should, 
          in the beginning, have held the said property in good faith, he can 
          avail himself of the same advantage. But 
          where he acquired it in bad faith, he shall, for this reason, be considered 
          unworthy, so that he who was the original owner of the property, or 
          held it under a pledge and was barred by the effect of the above-mentioned 
          prescription, can acquire the benefit of possession for himself, in 
          the capacity of a new possessor. If, 
          however, he had no right to such property at any time, then the original 
          owner, or the creditor who had possession of it under hypothecation, 
          shall, with their heirs, be permitted to recover it from the unlawful 
          possessor, notwithstanding that the former possessor has already excluded 
          him by means of the prescription of thirty or forty years, unless the 
          illegal possessor himself is protected by the prescription of thirty 
          or forty years, to be computed from the time when the former possessor, 
          who evicted him, lost possession of said property. (2) We, however, 
          decree that these rules shall only apply to possessors who have obtained 
          control of the property without violence, for if anyone should forcibly 
          remove it, the former possessor shall, by all means, be entitled to 
          it without any opposition. (3) If, anyone, 
          however, should obtain the property, not by violence, but by a judicial 
          decision, he shall only be responsible for the time when the former 
          possessor was absent, and was summoned to court, and he, like others 
          entitled to the ownership of the property, shall be permitted, within 
          a year, to take the said property if he presents himself, and offers 
          security for the conduct of the case, and to obey the decision with 
          reference to the matter in litigation. (4) We decree 
          that the prescription of thirty or forty years shall, in the case of 
          contracts in which interest is promised, begin to run from the time 
          when the debtor has failed to pay it. Given at Constantinople, 
          on the third of the Ides of December, during the Consulate of 
          our Lord the Emperor Justinian. 9. The Same to Demosthenes, Praetorian Prefect. Certain persons frequently call their opponents into court, and in the prosecution of judicial proceedings are not able to bring their cases to a definite conclusion, and as the conditions of life are subject to constant variation, they, in the meantime, having preserved silence either on account of the superior power of their adversaries, or their own weakness, or for innumerable other reasons which can neither be mentioned nor enumerated, appear to have forfeited their rights, because, after the last trial of the case, the term of thirty years has elapsed, and having been opposed by a prescription of this kind see their property transferred to others, which in former times caused them much sorrow and with good reason, as they had no remedy. We, desiring to correct this, do not permit such a prescription based upon the lapse of thirty years to be pleaded in a case of this kind, but even though a personal action was brought in the first place, We authorize it to be extended to the fortieth year, as he who is in the beginning absolutely silent as to his rights does not resemble him who filed his complaint, came into court, and went to trial, but for some cause or other was prevented from finishing his case. And, although the plaintiff himself may have died, We decree that he can leave the conduct of his action to his posterity, and that his heirs or successors shall be permitted to conduct it to a conclusion, and not be in any way barred by the prescription of thirty years. The period available (that is to say, the term of forty years), We decree shall be computed from the time when the last judicial investigation took place, after both parties failed to proceed. Title 
          40. Concerning the abolition of the prescription of a year affecting contracts made in    With reference 
          to the exception of a year which is applicable to contracts made in 
          Italy, such an enormous mass of controversies has arisen in all the 
          tribunals that it is difficult to enumerate and impossible to explain 
          them; for, in the first place, it has been attended with so many technicalities 
          and difficulties that it is necessary for many things to agree in order 
          for it to take effect. Then some authorities have interpreted the said 
          period in such a liberal way that it can be extended as long as ten 
          years; others have held that it should be limited to five, and in Our 
          time, different constructions have been made by judges with reference 
          to this computation; hence this exception does not readily produce any 
          effect upon litigation. Therefore, 
          as other exceptions of time or prescriptions appear to Us to be sufficient, 
          We are not willing for the subjects of Our Empire to 
          be embarrassed by difficulties of this kind, and therefore the abovementioned 
          exception of a year having been absolutely abolished, all other lawful 
          exceptions and prescriptions shall have full force in the courts, whether 
          they depend upon the lapse of ten, twenty, thirty, or forty years, or 
          whether they run for a shorter time. (1) As nothing 
          prevents matters which are in any way doubtful from being explained 
          by clearer or more comprehensive laws, We direct that all personal actions 
          which any voluminous interpretation has attempted to extend beyond the 
          limit of thirty years shall be terminated by the said period of thirty 
          years, unless the lawful method, which was mentioned by the ancient 
          laws as well as ours, introduced an interruption of the time, and that 
          the hypothecary action alone shall be extinguished after the expiration 
          of forty years. Hence, let no one 
          venture to decide that a suit in partition, or for the division of property 
          owned in common, or for the establishment of boundaries, or of partnership, 
          or of theft, or of property seized with violence, or any other personal 
          action, can be brought after a longer time than thirty years. But where 
          a suit could properly be brought in the beginning, and, having once 
          been instituted, was not renewed by repeated false allegations (as was 
          stated in the action of theft) it may be terminated after the above-mentioned 
          time has expired. All actions which 
          have been brought in the courts, even though they are personal ones, 
          and have been argued, and afterwards abandoned, are hereby excepted; 
          for, in the case of these, Our former law provided that not thirty, 
          but forty years must elapse from the time when the litigants last became 
          silent with reference to their claims. (2) In order that 
          this law may not appear to be imperfect, since provision has already 
          been made for prescription to run against the sons of a family with 
          reference to their mother's estate, from the time when they were released 
          from paternal control, but nothing was especially provided with reference 
          to other property which cannot be acquired, We order, by this clearly 
          stated law, that no prescription can be pleaded against the sons of 
          a family in all cases in which property is not acquired for their parents, 
          except from the time when they could have brought suit, that is to say, 
          after they had been released from the control of their father, or of 
          him in whose power they were; for who could blame them for not doing 
          this, even if they were willing, when they could not act on account 
          of the opposition of the law? Given at Constantinople, 
          on the fifteenth of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate 
          of Lampadius and Orestes, 530. 2. The Same 
          Emperor to John, Praetorian Prefect. In order that 
          We may protect the interests of all persons in a more thorough manner, 
          and that neither absence, superior authority, nor the infamy of an adversary 
          may injure anyone, but that a distinction may be made between the negligent 
          and the vigilant, We decree that if he who has possession of property 
          belonging to another, or which is 
          pledged to a creditor, should be absent, and the owner of the said property 
          or the creditor, desires to exercise his right of action, he shall not 
          be permitted to do so in the absence of his adversary, who has possession 
          of the property, or who labors under the disadvantage of either infancy 
          or insanity, and has no guardian or curator to represent him, or is 
          subject to superior power, and that the owner or creditor aforesaid 
          cannot seize the property by his own authority; but permission is hereby 
          given him to appear before the Governor of the province, or to send 
          him a statement in writing, and file his complaint within the time prescribed 
          by law, and, by so doing, interrupt the prescription, and this shall 
          be amply sufficient for the purpose. If, however, he should be unable 
          to appear before the Governor, he can apply to the bishop of the diocese, 
          or the Defender of the City, and state his wishes in writing without 
          delay. When the Governor, the bishop, or the Defender of the City is 
          absent, he shall be permitted to publish his intention in the place 
          where the possessor has his domicile, by means of a statement signed 
          by a notary, or if there are no notaries in the city, by one signed 
          by three witnesses, and this shall be sufficient for the interruption 
          of any prescription, whether it be of three years, or for a longer time, 
          or even for thirty or forty years. All 
          other prescriptions of long time, whether they are of thirty or forty 
          years, which have been established either by ancient legislators or 
          by Ourselves, shall remain in full force. Given at Constantinople, 
          during the Kalends of October, after the Consulate of Lampadius 
          and Orestes, 531. 3. The Same 
          to John, Praetorian Prefect. Where one person is indebted to another on account of several different claims, and, having brought suit, did not include in his petition the separate amount of each, but only stated the entire indebtedness, a doubt arose among the ancient authorities whether all of the debts had been brought into court, or whether the proceedings only related to the oldest one, or whether the act of the creditor was void, as his intention appeared to be uncertain. We have found disputes of this kind in many cases which have been brought in the courts, and, above all, with reference to the interruption of prescription. If, for instance, a personal action had been brought, and no mention of an hypothecary action was made, certain authorities held that the personal action was affected by the interruption of prescription, but that the hypothecary action was extinguished on account of its not having been referred to. And if someone had alleged in general terms that another was indebted to him, additional doubts arose whether all competent actions should be considered to be included in a mere statement of this kind, or whether, as they were passed over in silence, they were barred by prescription, as they acquired no support from the uncertain wording of the petition. Therefore, We order that no doubt of this kind shall be entertained hereafter in cases in court, but anyone who has instituted proceedings against his debtor, and has produced the document evidencing his agreement, whether it only refers to his indebtedness in a general way, or specifically mentions a single obligation, the plaintiff shall be considered to have brought all his claims into court, and his petition shall be held to include all personal as well as hypothecary causes of action; and the course of prescription will be interrupted, as prescriptions pleaded against persons who are negligent and careless of their own rights are odious. Title 
          41. Concerning alluvion, marshes, and pastures brought into another 
          condition.   Although it is 
          not lawful to divert the natural course of a stream to another place 
          by artificial means, still it is not forbidden to protect a bank against 
          a rapid current. But where a river, having left its former channel, 
          makes another for itself, the land which it surrounds remains the property 
          of the former owner. If, however, it does this by degrees, and carries 
          soil elsewhere, this is acquired under the right of alluvion by the 
          person to whose land it is added. 2. The Emperors 
          Arcadius, Honorius, and Theodosius to Caesarius, Praetorian Prefect. Persons whom the 
          inundations of the River Nile enrich are required to pay taxes in proportion 
          to the lands which they hold. Those, however, who deplore the loss of 
          their estates from this cause are, on the other hand, released from 
          the burden of taxation. The new proprietors protected by Our generosity 
          should remain content with the possession of what they hold, and gratefully 
          pay the taxes assessed upon them. 3. The Emperors 
          Valentinian and Theodosius to Cyrus, Praetorian Prefect. Land acquired by the possessors by virtue of the right of alluvion either in Egypt on account of the inundations of the Nile, or in other provinces through the overflow of different rivers, can neither be sold by the Treasury, claimed by anyone, assessed separately, nor be the subject of additional taxation, and this We decree by this law, which shall remain forever valid, lest We may appear to ignore the defects of alluvial titles, or render the property injurious to the possessors of the same. In like manner, We do not permit lands which, in former times, were either marshes or devoted to pasture, and are now rendered fertile at the expense of the possessors of the same, to be sold, claimed, or assessed separately as capable of cultivation and subject to increased taxation, lest those who are diligent may not regret that their labors have been dedicated to the culture of the soil, and may realize that their industry did not result in their injury. We decree that violators of this law shall be punished by a fine of fifty pounds of gold, and Your Highness will also be included, if you should make any other construction of this law, in order to countenance the claims of those who may demand it. Title 
          42. Concerning the decisions of Praetorian Prefects.   We grant the right 
          of petition to litigants against whom a decision has been rendered by 
          the Praetorian Prefecture, if they allege that they have been injured 
          contrary to law, but We do not concede them the right of appeal, even 
          though the decision was said to have been rendered with reference to 
          a curia, or for some other object of general utility, or for 
          any other reason, as it is not conducive to the public welfare to deny 
          to individuals the assistance of a law; and hence the right of petition 
          against decisions of the Praetorian Prefecture is given them only within 
          the term of two years after the judge who decided the case has retired 
          from office. Given at Constantinople, on the third of the Ides of August, during the Consulate of Theodosius, Consul for the thirteenth time, and Festus, Consul for the fifth time, 439. Title 
          43. How and when a judge should render a decision in the presence of both parties, or in the absence of one of them.   You will not always 
          be obliged to decide against an absent party under the Rescript of My 
          Father, by which it was provided that decisions could even be rendered 
          against those who are absent, for by this it is meant that you can decide 
          against one who is not present, but not that it is absolutely necessary 
          for you to do so. 2. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Severus. It is certain 
          that although judgment has not been rendered under the terms of the 
          Peremptory Edict, a decision can be given by the judge against those 
          who, having been notified, have refused to appear in court. Given on the fourth 
          of the Kalends of April, under the Consulate of Gordian and Pontianus, 
          139. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to Antistius. You cannot avoid 
          complying with the judgment on the ground that it was rendered during 
          your absence, and without your knowledge, and as you allege, no defence 
          was made, if, when you first learned of it, you did not immediately 
          file a complaint; for the decision which has been rendered will not 
          be valid if you did not consent to it. Published on the 
          fourth of the Ides of June, during the Consulate of Gordian and 
          Aviola, 240. 4. The Emperor 
          Philip to Domitian. If, as you state, 
          the adverse party obtained a judgment against you on the ground of contumacy, 
          on a holiday when you were absent, or while you were ignorant that it 
          had been rendered by the judge, the Governor will, not without reason, 
          assign the case to another judge to be settled by his decision. Published on the 
          fifth of the Ides of October, during the Consulate of Peregrinus 
          and Aelianus, 245. 5. The Same 
          Emperor and the Caesar Philip to Longinus. If (as you allege) 
          the Governor of the province, after having appointed a certain place 
          for hearing the case, fraudulently decided it against you elsewhere 
          during your absence, whatever was done shall have no effect whatever 
          in law. 6. The Emperors 
          Valerian and Gallienus to Domitius. If the Governor 
          refused to admit the appeal made by the guardian of your wards at the 
          time when they, having become adults, had no curator, he will be required 
          to hear the case again; for any decision rendered at that time should 
          not prejudice the rights of said minors, they having been deprived of 
          a just defence and the assistance of a curator. 7. The Emperor 
          Diocletian and Maximian to Marinus. It is certain 
          that judgments rendered against absent parties not guilty of contumacy, 
          and who have not been notified in the usual way, cannot be considered 
          as res judicata. Published on the 
          third of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Diocletian, 
          Consul for the fifth time, and Maximian, Consul for the fourth time, 
          293. 8. The Same 
          Emperors to Claudia. It is in conformity 
          with law that the Governor of the province, after having observed all 
          the legal formalities and notified the adverse party three times by 
          means of letters, or once for all by a peremptory edict to appear as 
          is required, if the latter perseveres in his obstinacy, to hear the 
          allegations of the party who is present, or take care that his successor 
          shall do so. Wherefore, if the other party has been summoned three times 
          and still obstinately refuses to appear, it will 
          not be unreasonable for the judge to either compel him to do so, or 
          transfer the possession of the property in dispute to you, and make 
          your adversary the plaintiff, or, having heard your defence, render 
          his decision as the law may require. Published on the 
          third of the Kalends of October, .... 9. The Same 
          Emperors to Leontius. It has very properly 
          been provided that three summonses have all the force of a peremptory 
          edict against persons guilty of contumacy. Published on the 
          eleventh of the Kalends of November, during the Consulate of 
          Diocletian, Consul for the fourth time, and Maximian, Consul for the 
          third time. 10. The Same 
          Emperors to Blesius. As you went on 
          a journey, not of your own free will, but through necessity, the law 
          will not permit any judgment to be rendered against you so as to injure 
          you in any way, when your absence was the result of necessity. Published on the 
          third of the Ides of May, during the Consulate of Tiberanus and 
          Dio, 291. 11. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Valerius. As you state that the suit was begun when all the parties were present, and that afterwards judgment was rendered against you, although you were absent, and you did not appeal within the time prescribed by law, many Imperial Constitutions oppose your demand to have the judgment rendered against you set aside. Title 
          44. Concerning opinions rendered with reference to statements made in 
          a written petition.   The decision of 
          an arbiter is void if he himself did not deliver it to the parties litigant, 
          even though he may have notified them in writing. Therefore, if what 
          you allege is true, your case can be heard again by the Governor of 
          the province, without taking into account the fact that you did not 
          appeal. 2. The Emperors 
          Valens, Valentinian, and Gratian to Probus, Praetorian Prefect. We think that 
          it should be perpetually established by this law that judges who are 
          required to hear and determine cases should not arrive at sudden conclusions, 
          but should render their decisions after careful consideration and reflection; 
          and, after having revised them, and reduced them to writing with the 
          greatest accuracy, they ought to deliver them in this form to the parties 
          interested, and not afterwards be permitted to correct or change them, 
          with the exception of the Illustrious Praetorian Prefect and others 
          who administer important offices, and eminent judges to whom permission 
          is granted to read their final decisions, or have this done by their 
          attendants and the other officers in their service. Given on the eleventh 
          of the Kalends of February, during the Consulate of Gratian, 
          Consul for the second time, and Probus, 371. 3. The Same 
          Emperors to Probus, Praetorian Prefect. We order by Our 
          general laws that all judges whom We have invested with the power of 
          dispensing justice in the various provinces, after having heard the 
          cases, shall render their final decision in writing. We add to this 
          law that any judgment rendered without having been reduced to writing 
          shall not be worthy of the name, and the formality of an appeal shall 
          not be required for the annulment of such a wrongful decree. Given on the third of the Nones of December, under the Consulate of Gratian, Consul for the fourth time, and Equitius, 374. Title 
          45. Concerning the final and interlocutory decisions of all judges.  
            The decision of 
          your predecessor does not appear to Us to be legal, as he, in rendering 
          it between the plaintiff and the defendant's attorney, did not decide 
          against the latter but the client represented by him, who did not appear 
          personally in court. You can, therefore, hear the cause again, just 
          as if it had never been tried. Given on the fourth 
          of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Antoninus, Consul 
          for the third time, and Geta, 209. 2. The Emperor 
          Antoninus to Sextilius. If the arbiter 
          appointed by the magistrate was in possession of his freedom when he 
          rendered his award, even though he was subsequently reduced to slavery, 
          the award rendered by him will, nevertheless, have the authority of 
          res judicata. 3. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Vectius. The Governor of 
          the province is aware of the fact that a final decision, which does 
          not include either condemnation or acquittal, is not considered legal. Published during 
          the Kalends of October. 4. The Same 
          Emperor to Severus. It is certain 
          that a decision rendered by a Governor contrary to the usual formalities 
          required in judgments does not obtain the authority of res judicata. Published on the 
          fifteenth of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of 
          Alexander and Dio, 230. 5. The Emperor 
          Philip and the Caesar Philip to Montanus. If the Attorney 
          of the Treasury ordered the property of those indebted to it to be delivered 
          to their sureties, under the condition that they should indemnify the 
          Treasury, no appeal will lie from his decision, and it consequently 
          must be obeyed as rendered. 6. The Emperors 
          Cams, Carinus, and Numerianus to Zoilus. As you allege 
          that the decision of the Governor is void for the reason that he did 
          not render it in public, but in a secret place, and without the presence 
          of his attendant, no injury can result to you from anything that he 
          decided. Published on the 
          fifth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of Carus 
          and Carinus, 283. 7. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Isidora. The Governor of 
          the province, by persuading you to compromise with your relatives in 
          the action on stipulation which you brought against 
          them, does not extinguish the verbal obligation, which can only be annulled 
          in a way provided by law, for the mere act of a judge has not the force 
          of a judicial decision, as his authority is confined within certain 
          limits, as has been frequently established. Wherefore, if, having heard 
          the case, the Governor did not decide in accordance with the rules of 
          law, his words persuading you to permanently dispose of the action (if 
          you had one) could not produce this effect. 8. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Licinius. If Theodora, whom 
          you allege was liberated either on account of a purchase or because 
          of her delivery to a creditor in discharge of a debt, has been decided 
          to be free, the judgment cannot be set aside without having recourse 
          to an appeal. But if suit was brought, and a decision rendered after 
          he who is said to be the owner of the woman was notified, you will not 
          be prevented from recovering the amount of your interest in the purchase, 
          if you bought her, or to recover the debt, if she was given in payment 
          for one. 9. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Domnus. After final judgment 
          in a case, anything decided by the magistrate who rendered it, or his 
          successor, with reference to the question already disposed of, does 
          not obtain the force of res judicata, nor do decisions involving 
          possession in any way prejudice the ownership of the property, and interlocutory 
          decrees do not, for the most part, terminate an action. Ordered on the 
          Nones of April, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 10. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Menodorus. Anyone invested 
          with judicial authority is not allowed to forbid a person to remain 
          in his own country. Given on the third of the Nones .... 11. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Lucian. When the judge, 
          by a final decision, merely orders that an oath shall be tendered, without 
          adding what shall be done if the oath is taken, or refused, it is clear 
          that his decision will be of no force or effect. 12. The Emperors 
          Arcadius and Honorius to Julian, Proconsul of Asia. Judges can render 
          their decisions in the Latin as well as in the Greek language. 13. The Emperor 
          Justinian to Demosthenes, Praetorian Prefect. Let no judge or arbiter think that he is compelled to abide by any of the results of Imperial consultations which he does not consider to have been stated properly and in accordance with law, and this applies with still greater force to the decisions of the Illustrious Prefects and other dignitaries, for if any matters have not been properly disposed of, this defect should not be extended to the decrees of other judges, as the decisions of courts should not be founded upon the examples set by others, but upon the laws. The final decisions of the Prefecture, or the court of any other supreme magistrate, are not binding if not legal, and We order all Our judges to conform to the truth, and to follow the principles of law and justice. Given on the third 
          of the Kalends of November .... 14. The Same 
          Emperor to Demosthenes, Praetorian Prefect. As that distinguished 
          man, Papinian, very properly stated in his book of Questions, that a 
          judge could not only discharge the defendant from liability, but could 
          render a decision against the plaintiff himself, if, on the other hand, 
          he should find that he was indebted to the defendant, We also order 
          this rule to be extended so that the judge may be permitted to render 
          a decision against the plaintiff, and require him to either pay or do 
          something without allowing any exception to be pleaded against him on 
          the ground that he is not a competent judge of the plaintiff, for he 
          should not object to have the same judge whom he had accepted in the 
          beginning of the case decide against him at the end. Given on the fifteenth 
          of the Kalends of December, during the fifth Consulate of Lampadius 
          and Orestes, 530. 15. A Law which 
          is not Authentic. 16. The Same 
          Emperor to Julian, Praetorian Prefect. As it is customary for magistrates to render interlocutory decrees setting forth that the parties shall not be permitted to have recourse to an appeal, or to call their jurisdiction in question before a final decision has been given, certain authorities held that before issue has been joined, a judge cannot be objected to, nor can an appeal be taken from his interlocutory decree. For as the same terms are applicable to an appeal as to an objection to jurisdiction, and an appeal cannot be taken before issue has been joined, they thought that no one would be permitted to refuse a judge before issue had been joined, which is by no means prohibited. Hence judges must be careful to use terms of this kind together, and without making any distinction between them. Title 
          46. Concerning decisions which are rendered without stating the exact 
          amount to be paid.   It is clear that 
          the judge did not render his decision against the rule of law in providing, 
          as you allege, that interest must be paid until the amount mentioned 
          in the judgment has been settled. 2. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Marcellinus. Although the sum 
          of money due is not stated in the decision of the Curator of the State, 
          his decision, nevertheless, is valid, since he ordered the State to 
          be indemnified. 3. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Aemylius. The following 
          decision, namely, "Pay the entire amount due with legal interest," 
          does not comply with the requirements of the action to enforce judgment, 
          as a judicial decision which does not specify a certain sum only obtains 
          the authority of res judicata when the amount has been mentioned 
          in some other part of the documents belonging to the case. 4. The Same 
          Emperor to Saturnina. The following decision, namely, "Pay what you have received in good faith," as it is uncertain how much the debtor received, and how much is demanded of him — and especially when the judge who promulgated the decision out of the regular order has rendered an interlocutory decree that the dowry which had been given and which was claimed had not been paid — does not obtain the authority of judgment. Therefore, if another judge should afterwards render a judgment and decide against you, and you do not appeal from his decision, you will confirm it by your own act. Title 
          47. Concerning decisions rendered for damages.   As an infinite 
          number of doubts with reference to damages arose among the ancients, 
          it seems best to Us, as far as is possible, to reduce this prolixity 
          into more narrow limits. Hence We order that, whenever the amount or 
          the nature of the property is certain, as in the case of sales, leases, 
          and all other contracts, the damages shall not exceed double the value 
          of the property. In other instances, however, where the value seems 
          to be uncertain, the judges having jurisdiction shall carefully ascertain 
          the actual amount of the loss, and damages to that amount shall be granted, 
          and it shall not be reduced by any machinations and immoderate perversions 
          of values leading to inextricable confusion, lest, when the calculation 
          is indefinitely reduced, it may become impossible of application; as 
          We know that it is in conformity with Nature that those penalties alone 
          should be exacted which can be imposed with a proper degree of moderation, 
          or are definitely prescribed by the laws. Our Constitution not only applies where loss, but also 
          to where profit is involved, for the reason that the ancient authorities 
          held that damages could be collected from him who did not obtain any 
          profit, when he could have done so. Let 
          the promulgation of this Constitution put an end to verbosity in all 
          cases, in accordance with what has been already stated. Given at Constantinople on the Kalends of September, after the fifth Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 530. Title 
          48. Where a decision has been rendered by a judge who is said not to 
          be competent.   When a judge has 
          been appointed to decide a certain matter, and renders an opinion with 
          reference to others which have no connection with it, he performs an 
          act which is void in law. Given on the third 
          of the Nones of ... , during the Consulate of Maximus, Consul 
          for the second time, and Aelianus, 224. 2. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Licinia. If a military 
          judge, who was not appointed by one who had authority to do so, should 
          hear a case which ought to have been determined by means of a civil 
          proceeding, his act will not have the authority of a legal decision, 
          and an appeal need not be taken. 3. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Phileta. If a judge appointed 
          to determine the right of ownership did not render judgment against 
          you on this point, the Governor of the province, after having been applied 
          to, shall take cognizance of your case, and decide it, and the right 
          of ownership will, by no means, be prejudiced because it is established 
          that a decision has been rendered with reference to possession. Ordered at Herculaneum, 
          on the Nones of November, during the Consulate of the Caesars, 
          297. 4. The Emperors 
          Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius to Potitus, Vicegerent. This rule also 
          applies to the cases of private persons, namely, that a decision rendered 
          by a judge without authority does not bind any of the litigants. Given on the tenth of the Kalends of October .... Title 
          49. Concerning the penalty to which a judge is liable who has rendered 
          an improper decision, and the punishment which may be inflicted upon 
          anyone who attempts to corrupt a judge, or his adversary.   It is established 
          that, where in any case, either public or private, or in which the Treasury 
          is interested, money is paid by anyone, whether to the judge or to the 
          adversary of the former, he who, doubtful of the justice of his cause, 
          placed a corrupt hope of success in the payment of money, will lose 
          his action. Given on the seventh 
          of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of the two Aspers, 
          213. 2. The Emperor 
          Constantine to Felix. He who has been 
          corrupted by money, or who, through partiality, has rendered a wrongful 
          decision, shall be required to indemnify the party 
          whom he injured, not only for the costs of the suit, but also to assume 
          the risk of the same. Given at Constantinople, on the eighth of the Kalends of November, during the Consulate of Constantine, Consul for the fifth time, and Licinius, 319. Title 
          50. A decision when once rendered cannot be revoked.   There is no doubt 
          that anyone cannot revoke either his own decision or that of his predecessor, 
          and it is a well-known rule of law that it is not necessary to take 
          an appeal from a decision of this kind. Published during 
          the Kalends of March, .... 2. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Alexander. The Perpetual 
          Edict clearly states that peremptory exceptions which have been omitted 
          in the beginning can be pleaded subsequently before judgment is rendered. 
          If this has not previously been done, complete restitution will be permitted; 
          for where judgment has been rendered against persons over the age of 
          twenty-five years, on the ground that prescription was not contested, 
          it cannot be annulled without having recourse to the remedy of appeal. Given at Nicomedia, 
          on the seventh of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate 
          of the Caesars. 3. The Emperor 
          Constantine to Proculus. It has been decided 
          that rescripts which have been granted shall not have authority when 
          the cases to which they relate have once been terminated by a judicial 
          decision which admitted of no appeal, but those who have obtained rescripts 
          of this kind should also be excluded from making use of them in court. Given at Constantinople, on the sixth of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of the Emperor .... Title 
          51. Concerning the profits and the expenses of litigation.   The term "profits" 
          only includes what remains after the deduction of the legitimate expenses. Given on the third 
          of the Nones of April, during the Consulate of the 
          Caesars. 2. The Emperor 
          Valentinian to Olybrius, Praetorian Prefect. The defeated party 
          litigant is not only required to restore the property, but also to pay 
          over the profits which he himself has obtained, as well as those which 
          he could have acquired, and he must pay them from the time that he knew 
          that he was a possessor in bad faith, as established by the action brought 
          in court. This rule shall also apply 
          to an heir whose property is held by the same defective title. Given on the third 
          of the Kalends of March, .... 3. The Emperors 
          Honorius and Theodosius to Asclepiodotus, Praetorian Prefect. After a matter 
          has been terminated and settled by compromise, no action, even if based 
          upon a rescript, will be granted for the purpose of recovering the expenses, 
          unless, all the parties being present, the judge who rendered an opinion 
          in the first matter stated in his decision that the expenses of the 
          case should be paid to the successful party, or that he had a right 
          to resort to legal proceedings to collect them, for where anyone has 
          been released from future liability when the case was decided, it would 
          be infamous to authorize another action to be brought with reference 
          to what had been settled by the first one. Given at Constantinople, 
          on the third of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of 
          Asclepiodotus and Marinianus, 423. 4. The Emperors 
          Valentinian. Theodosius, and Arcadius, Edict to the People. He by whose demand 
          someone has been summoned in accordance with the legal formalities to 
          a place far from his residence, and the hearing of his case protracted, 
          is hereby notified that, if by his fault the trial was deferred, or 
          if he should not himself be present, or should be unable to prove his 
          allegations, he must pay the penalty prescribed by the laws for malicious 
          litigations; and if the expenses were incurred in a pecuniary case, 
          the value of the property claimed, as well as the time consumed in the 
          journey, having been considered, the judge shall render a decision in 
          accordance with his estimate of the damages sustained. Given at Constantinople, 
          on the fifth of the Ides of October, during the Consulate of 
          Valentinian, Consul for the seventh time, and Avienus, 450. 5. A Law which 
          is not Authentic. 6. The Emperor 
          Anastasius to Stephen, General of the Army. As certain persons allege that they enjoy privileges, some of them under the laws and Imperial constitutions, and others through special favors which have been granted them, as well as with reference to the payment of taxes by agreement for which they are only liable to a specified amount, and are not required to pay the costs of litigation at all, or only a small part of the same, We decree by this law that whoever enjoys a privilege of this kind, or may hereafter obtain it in any way, is hereby notified that those against whom he has instituted any civil or criminal proceeding will also enjoy the same right; as it would be intolerable for those who are entitled to the privileges aforesaid to be permitted to collect, as plaintiffs, anything more from their adversaries than they themselves, as defendants, if beaten, would be compelled to surrender to them, in turn; so, in order that this rule may be observed in every instance involving privileges granted through liberality, or generally attaching to certain offices, classes, or dignities, or which have been specially bestowed upon certain persons, or which may hereafter be conferred, whether this has been expressly stated in the Imperial grants or Rescripts or whether it has been omitted, We order it to be enforced. Title 
          52. Concerning res judicata.   A judicial decision 
          must be adhered to, but if you can prove that the party in whose favor 
          judgment was rendered against you has received what he appeared to have 
          lost by theft, you can defend yourself by an exception on the ground 
          of fraud, if he attempts to carry the judgment into execution. Given on the twelfth 
          of the Kalends of March, during the Consulate of Antoninus, Consul 
          for the fourth time, and Balbinus. 2. The Same 
          Emperor to Pacatianus. If a case which 
          has been decided could be revived under the pretext of a mistake in 
          calculation, litigation would never end. Published at Rome, 
          on the day before the Nones of ... , during the Consulate of 
          Lsetus and Cerealis, 216. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to Demetrius and Others. If it should appear 
          that you have collected money by means of fraudulent accounts, and you 
          have been ordered to refund it with a penalty, and you did not appeal 
          from the decision of the Governor, you will be obliged to pay the entire 
          amount of the judgment. 4. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Antoninus. It is a bad precedent to revive a case which has been decided, under the pretext of the discovery of new documents. Given on the eighth 
          of the Ides of March. 5. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Valentine. It is clearly 
          proved that the party demanding a delay for payment acquiesced in the 
          decision, and he is in the same position as one who in any other way 
          has agreed to it; for a case which has been terminated should not be 
          suffered to be revived. 6. The Emperors 
          Honorius and Theodosius to Julian, Proconsul of Africa. We desire that 
          matters which have been transacted by public authority shall remain 
          forever valid, as the public faith should not pass away with the death 
          of the official having jurisdiction. Given on the third of the Kalends of September, during the Consulate of Constans, 414. Title 
          53. Concerning the execution of judgment.   The court was 
          too hasty in ordering the pledges of Marcella to be taken in execution 
          and sold, for in order that the procedure prescribed by law may be observed, 
          you must first bring suit against your adversary, and the case having 
          been heard, have judgment rendered in your favor. Published on the 
          third of the Kalends of February, during the Consulate of Albinus 
          and jEmilianus, 207. 2. The Same 
          Emperors to Agrippa. If you have not 
          changed the judgment by novation, the Governor of the province, after 
          the pledges have been taken in execution and sold, shall order the proceeds 
          to be disposed of for your benefit. If, however, the case has been altered 
          by novation, an action on stipulation will lie in your favor, and a 
          competent judge having been appointed, you can proceed in accordance 
          with the legal formalities. 3. The Same 
          Emperors to Agrippa. The nature of 
          the transaction and the delay in payment which has resulted demand a 
          more speedy remedy; therefore, if you appear before the Governor of 
          the province, whose duty it is to see that the judgment is executed, 
          and state that although the land given in pledge has, in accordance 
          with the contract, for a long time been offered at public sale, it has 
          not yet found a purchaser on account of the intrigues of the adverse 
          party, he will place you in possession of the said land, in order that 
          by this means the execution which has been so long delayed may be issued. Given on the eleventh 
          of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Messala and Sabinus, 
          215. 4. The Same 
          Emperors to the Soldier Marcellus. The Governor of 
          the province will not permit your pay to be withheld for the purpose 
          of satisfying the judgment which has been rendered against you, since 
          this can be accomplished by having recourse to other measures. Published on the 
          third of the Nones .... 5. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Amandus. It is well known 
          that the claims of a debtor can be taken in execution where judgment 
          has been rendered against him. Published on the 
          third of the Ides of October, during the Consulate of Atticus 
          and Praetextus, 243. 6. The Emperor 
          Philip and the Caesar to Titian. If (as you allege) 
          the court officer appointed to execute the judgment assumed judicial 
          duties, and thought that a decision should be rendered contrary to what 
          had previously been determined with reference to your case, the opinion 
          given by him can never obtain the torce of a judgment. 7. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian to Theodorus. If the restoration 
          to which you were entitled has been delayed by the protracted and unconcealed 
          efforts of the adverse party, and the slaves who were the subject of 
          controversy have died, their value should be paid to you by him who 
          prevented you from receiving them. The animals, also, together with 
          their offspring, shall be delivered to you by the intervention of the 
          Governor. 8. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Nicomachus. It is clear that 
          the official whose duty it is to see that the judgment is executed after 
          it has been rendered, and the case has been heard and argued by the 
          parties, is the only person who can give force and effect to the decision. Without date or 
          designation of Consulate. 9. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Glyco. Bring suit before 
          the Governor of the province against those whom you allege to be your 
          debtors, whether they acknowledge the obligation or deny it, and having 
          had judgment rendered against them, if they do not satisfy it by payment 
          within the time prescribed by law, the Governor, observing the legal 
          formalities shall, after the pledges have been seized and sold, see 
          that execution takes place in the manner repeatedly mentioned in the 
          Imperial constitutions. Ordered on the Nones of November, during the Consulate of the Caesars. Title 
          54. Concerning interest on a judgment.   He who proceeds 
          against the property of a defeated party litigant in accordance with 
          the judgment rendered shall, in addition to the principal, be entitled 
          to interest at twelve per cent for the time which elapsed during which 
          he refused to obey the judgment. 2. The Emperor 
          Justinian to Menna, Praetorian Prefect. Those who have 
          been ordered to pay a certain sum of money, and have failed to do so 
          for more than four months from the date of the judgment, or, if an appeal 
          was taken, have failed to satisfy it from the day of its confirmation, 
          We decree shall be required to pay interest at twelve per cent; and 
          what has been prescribed by former laws which imposed upon them interest 
          at twenty-four per cent, or by Our law which fixed the rate at six per 
          cent, shall not apply to the cases of such persons. Given at Constantinople, 
          on the seventh of the Ides of April, during the Consulate of 
          Decius, 529. 3. The Same Emperor to John, Praetorian Prefect. We decree that 
          if anyone should have judgment rendered against him, and a further delay 
          of four months has been granted by Us, he shall, after that time has 
          expired, be compelled to pay interest at the rate of twelve per cent 
          in accordance with the terms of the judgment; but this shall only be 
          on the principal and not on the interest which was originally included 
          in the judgment, for We have already decided that the collection of 
          interest on interest shall be abolished, and have left no case in which 
          this can be done. For if this was left without correction, something 
          absurd and awkward must necessarily result, as interest arising from 
          contracts is legally payable, and is very frequently fixed by Our laws 
          at a lower rate than twelve per cent; and compound interest would necessarily 
          be imposed at a higher rate than simple interest. If interest ran at 
          twelve per cent at all times on a judgment, this would rarely happen 
          under the provisions of contracts, and if, by certain articles of Our 
          law exceptions have, in some instances, been made, the necessities of 
          the case were responsible for the apparent injustice. Hence, 
          We, desiring to correct this by means of a proper remedy, do hereby 
          order that interest only on the principal to the amount of twelve per 
          cent shall be collected on a judgment, and that interest on interest, 
          no matter at what rate, shall not be exacted; since if the original 
          contract was changed by the judgment, interest should not be collected 
          on the contract after the judgment was rendered, for otherwise, it would 
          only be payable on the principal as a result of the judgment ; and because 
          both principal and interest were included in a single sum, it should 
          not be concluded that interest on the entire amount could be collected, 
          but only on the principal. (1) As the ancients, by an exceedingly pernicious regulation under which, in the satisfaction of a judgment, indulgence was granted for two months to persons who had lost their cases, their sureties, however, were not permitted to enjoy this privilege, as the successful parties (the principals who had judgment rendered against them being left for the time on account of the provisions of the law) were authorized to collect the money or take the property which was the object of the judgment from the sureties or mandators of the former, We, desiring to abolish this injustice, do hereby order that the delay of four months which We granted to the principals in the case shall also be extended to their sureties and mandators, in order that the law may not be evaded, for when anyone who volunteers to defend a case is compelled to make payment, and he, in his turn, forces the defendant involuntarily to satisfy him, the defeated party does not experience the benefit of Our indulgence, because, through his surety, he was compelled to pay the money which he owes. Title 
          55. Where judgment is rendered against several persons at once.   If you and your 
          colleagues have not had judgment in full rendered against you severally, 
          but only jointly for a single and specified sum, and it is not stated 
          in the judgment that what cannot be collected from one shall be made 
          up by the other, the effect of the decision is that each party shall 
          be liable for an equal portion. Therefore, if, in obedience to the judgment, 
          you have paid your share, you cannot be compelled to pay that of the 
          other party if he should fail to do so. 2. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Annianus. Whenever judgment is rendered against two guardians, each of whom had employed an attorney to defend him, liability for the amount of the judgment is considered to have been divided between them, hence it is a well-established rule of law that what cannot be collected from one cannot be recovered from the other. Title 
          56. Who are not injured by a judgment.   If you did not 
          commit the defence of your property to your brother, and did not ratify 
          his acts, the exception of res judicata will not affect you, 
          and therefore you will not be prevented from conducting your case without 
          prejudice on account of the judgment. Published during 
          the Nones of May, under the Consulate of Alexander, 223. 2. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Athenius. Where judgment 
          has been rendered between certain parties, those who did not appear 
          in the case will experience neither benefit nor injury, and therefore 
          your granddaughter cannot be prejudiced where a judgment has been rendered 
          against her co-heirs, if nothing was decided against her. 3. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Honoratus. It is a perfectly 
          clear rule of law that, even in criminal cases, those who did not appear 
          in court will not be affected, if, perchance, they should seem to have 
          sustained any injury. 4. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Soterianus. It has frequently 
          been held that where a case has been decided between certain parties, 
          the rights of one who is absent, and equally interested, will not be 
          prejudiced. Given on the sixth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of the Caesars. Title 
          57. Notices, letters, proclamations, and signatures do not possess the 
          authority of judgments.   Notification by 
          a judge who directs certain interest to be paid by persons who failed 
          to discharge a debt within a specified time does not have the force 
          of a stipulation. Given on the day 
          before the Ides of January, during the Consulate of Antoninus, 
          Consul for the fourth time, and Balbinus, 214. 2. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Maximus. The fact that 
          the Governor of the province, by a letter, ordered you to pay a certain 
          sum of money to the State, does not have the effect of a judicial decision. Given on the fourth 
          of the Ides of March, during the Consulate of Maximus, Consul 
          for the second time, and Julianus, 234. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to Zoticus. It has frequently 
          been stated in Rescripts that a decision rendered after the trial of 
          a case cannot be revoked by the signature of the Emperor. Published on the 
          sixth of the Ides of September, during the Consulate of Albinus 
          and Maximus, 228. 4. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Asclepiodotus. The interlocutory 
          decree of a Governor, which has been duly recorded, ordering the party 
          sued to obey it by making payment of a debt or be liable to double or 
          quadruple damages, is rather the act of one who gives warning than the 
          decision of a magistrate, as the rule of law declares that an act of 
          this kind does not obtain the force of a judgment. 5. The Same 
          Emperor to Jucundus. The judge who 
          admitted the controversy should have heard and examined the allegations 
          of both parties, for there is no doubt that the note 
          which he appended to the petition, and by which he placed one of the 
          parties in possession of the land, cannot be considered to take the 
          place of a judgment. 6. The Emperor 
          Philip and the Caesar Philip to Cassianus. It is clear that 
          a proclamation published by the Governor of a province cannot have the 
          force of a judgment any more than a summons. 7. The Emperor 
          Constantine to Bassus, Praetorian Prefect. It is not proper 
          or customary for a judgment rendered after a prolonged contest to be 
          stated in a few written phrases. Given on the fifteenth of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Constantine, Consul for the sixth time, and Maximus, 306. Title 
          58. Where a judgment is based on forged documents or false evidence.   If you desire 
          to declare a will to be forged, in accordance with the terms of which 
          the illustrious Proconsul has rendered a judgment, he will grant you 
          a hearing, notwithstanding this is barred by the judgment, because the 
          question as to the forgery of the will has not yet been decided. 2. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Optatus. Those who did 
          not appeal when they were able to prove that they had lost their case 
          by reason of forged documents should be heard just as if the suit was 
          begun for the first time, as they are giving information with reference 
          to a crime. Published on the 
          sixth of the Kalends of October, during the Consulate of Julian, 
          Consul for the second time, and Crispinus. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to Clement. You will not be 
          prevented from proving in the ordinary way that the evidence which the 
          adverse party produced against you in court is (as you allege) false. 
          The judgment, however, shall not be set aside unless you can show that 
          he who rendered it decided against you, because he relied upon the genuineness 
          of an instrument which is proved to have been forged. Published on the 
          seventh of the Kalends of September, .... 4. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Herennius. The execution 
          of a judgment is usually suspended, and recovery of what has been paid 
          granted, if it can be shown by positive evidence that the judge was 
          deceived by a forged instrument, the commission of the crime 
          having afterwards been established. Published on the fifth of the Ides of September, .... Title 
          59. Concerning 
          confessions.   It has been decided 
          that confessions made in court have the effect of judgments, therefore 
          you have no right to revoke your confession, as you will be compelled 
          to make payment. Adopted on the third of the Kalends of October, during the Consulate of Gentian and Bassus, 212. Title 
          60. Acts performed or judgments rendered between some persons cannot 
          prejudice the rights of others.   It has frequently 
          been decided that matters transacted by certain persons cannot prejudice 
          the rights of others. Wherefore, although you state that some of the 
          heirs of him whom you allege to have been your debtor have paid you, 
          the others should not be pressed for settlement unless the indebtedness 
          is proved to be due. Given at Byzantium, 
          on the fifth of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of 
          the above-mentioned Emperors. 2. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Epicrates. It is a well-known 
          rule of law that a compromise made between certain parties cannot prejudice 
          the rights of another who is absent. Therefore, having appeared before 
          the Governor of the province, prove that your grandmother gave you the 
          slave in question, and if the Governor should find that he legally belongs 
          to you for this reason, he will cause him to be restored to you, for 
          if the others divided the slave during your absence, they could not 
          deprive you of any of your rights. 3. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Fortunata. If you, along 
          with your brother, succeeded to your mother, and your brother entered 
          into a compromise with the creditors of the estate with reference to 
          your share of the same, and did so without your consent, he could not 
          extinguish the right acquired by you to your share of said estate. Given on the fifth of the Ides of October, during the Consulate of the above-mentioned Emperors. Title 
          61. Concerning references to the Emperor.   When a judge thinks 
          that the case should be referred to Us, and does 
          not decide between the parties, but concludes that the point upon 
          which he is in doubt ought to be left to 
          Our wisdom, or if he has rendered a judgment, he must not prevent the 
          litigants from afterwards appealing from it, for fear that it may be 
          reversed, being well aware that if he does so, an appeal can, nevertheless, 
          legally be taken. Nothing should be sent to Us which needs a complete 
          examination. Whenever the judge believes that a case should be referred 
          to Us, he must immediately order all the litigants to be notified that 
          a consultation is about to take place, and if the point referred is 
          not sufficiently explicit, or appears to be contrary to law, the judge 
          shall, without any unnecessary delay, be required to place the petition 
          upon record. Given at Sirmium, 
          on the fourth of the Kalends of February, during the Consulate 
          of Constantine, Consul for the fifth time, and Licinius, 312. 2. The Emperors 
          Valentinian and Valens to Viventius, Praetorian Prefect. The Governors 
          of provinces must not think that criminal cases originating in their 
          jurisdiction should be referred to Us unless they have previously notified 
          the parties that this is to be done, for only the truth will be established 
          when the matters are referred, whether their allegations are refuted 
          or confirmed by their consent. Given on the twenty-third 
          of the Kalends of January, during the Consulship of Valentinian 
          and Valens, 365. 3. The Same 
          Emperors and Gratian to Apodemius. If when either 
          reason or necessity requires Our decision in any instance, and an opinion 
          is expected, the submission of the reference must include the whole 
          case, so that, having been read, it will not be necessary for all the 
          documents to be reviewed; still, all of them should accompany the application. Given on the sixth of the Ides of May, during the Consulate of Our Noble Prince Valentinian, and Victor, 369. Title 
          62. Concerning appeals and Imperial decisions.   The Governor of 
          the province must first determine the question of possession, and then 
          inquire into the crime of violence, and if he should not do so, there 
          will be good ground to appeal from his decision. 2. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Plautianus. What you demand 
          is not new, hence you must not be denied the right to appeal, even though 
          one of My Rescripts is pleaded against you. 3. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Victor. It has frequently 
          been established that, where an appeal was taken, although it may have 
          been rejected by the court, nothing took place to prejudice the decision, 
          and that everything remains in the same condition that it was when judgment 
          was rendered. Published on the 
          fourth .... 4. The Emperor 
          Philip and the Caesar Philip to Probus. If, having been 
          appointed to the office of clerk, you did not appeal, the laws cannot 
          be violated by your refusal. 5. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Valens and Others. If the Governor 
          of the province, to whom you have appealed, should decide that you were 
          not to blame because you did not file your petition within the time 
          prescribed by law, but that this resulted from the death of the person 
          who had been charged with presenting it, he will grant you relief in 
          accordance with the terms of the Perpetual Edict. 6. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars decree: It is proper for 
          those who have jurisdiction of appeals, and hear them, to dispose of 
          them in such a way that it may be understood that the appeal was filed 
          after a decision was rendered by the court below, as it is not right 
          that, under any pretext whatever, the case should be sent back to the 
          trial judge, but in every instance it must be ended by its own decision; 
          as the salutary law enacted with reference to this provides that, after 
          the appellate judge has passed upon the appeal, recourse cannot be had 
          to the magistrate from whose decision the appeal was taken. Wherefore, 
          judges are hereby notified that, under no pretext whatever, can litigants 
          be sent back to their own provinces, as appellate judges in every instance 
          are only permitted to determine whether the appeal was properly taken 
          or not. (1) If one of 
          the litigants should think that he has failed to make use of some good 
          defence in his allegations before the lower court, he can avail himself 
          of it before the judge who has cognizance of the appeal, as it is Our 
          desire that judges should only decide in conformity with justice, and 
          that no important evidence which may have been omitted should be excluded. (2) When anyone, 
          after having taken an appeal, thinks that the presence of certain persons 
          is necessary for him to establish the truth before the judge who has 
          jurisdiction of the appeal, because he believes that it was concealed, 
          and the judge decides that this ought to be done, the appellant should 
          pay the said witnesses their travelling expenses, 
          for justice demands that he who thinks that he is interested in having 
          them summoned should do this. (3) However, with 
          reference to those who, accused of capital offences, have appealed from 
          the sentences passed upon them, neither they themselves nor those who 
          appeal in their behalf, can do so until the case has been fully heard 
          and argued and judgment has been rendered, and We order that this rule 
          shall be observed, in order that if the defendant is unable to obtain 
          a solvent surety he may be kept in custody, and that the judges shall 
          send their decisions as well as copies of the documents filed by the 
          appellants, together with the replies made to them, to the court of 
          appeal, so that the condition of the case may be made clear to the appellate 
          judge, and its merits having been considered, judgment be rendered in 
          accordance with the rights of each of the parties. (4) In order that 
          the power to appeal may not be rashly and indiscriminately granted, 
          We decree that he who has failed to establish his case on appeal shall 
          be compelled by a competent judge to pay a reasonable penalty. (5) Where, however, 
          anyone having conducted his own case in court, and having been defeated, 
          desires to appeal, he must file his petition on the same day, or on 
          the next after judgment has been rendered. He who is transacting the 
          business of another must, under the same circumstances, appeal within 
          three days. (6) The judge shall, without delay, notify the other party that an appeal has been taken, even when the appellant does not request it, but the former is by no means required to furnish security to conduct his side of the appeal. Without date or 
          designation of Consulate. 7. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Nero. If those who have 
          been appointed to civil offices, to the decurionate, or to any other 
          honors, even though they may have been released from the discharge of 
          their duties by the Emperor, do not avail themselves of the aid of an 
          appeal, they will be considered to have confirmed their appointments 
          by their own consent. Therefore, as you have been appointed to a public 
          office, and have appealed, prove before the Governor of the province 
          that you have done so for a good reason. 8. The Same Emperors and Caesars to Opimiamus. Where a decision 
          has been rendered against someone who is more than twenty-five years 
          of age, and an appeal was not taken within the 
          time prescribed by law, and the Governor of the province ascertains 
          that the matter was not settled by compromise while the appeal was pending, 
          he shall see that the judgment is executed. 9. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Our Dear Haberad. The principal 
          party in the case can himself prosecute an appeal which his attorney 
          has taken in the course of the proceedings, even during the absence 
          of the latter. 10. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Titian. If an attorney 
          appointed by a curator should lose the case, he himself as well as the 
          curator can invoke the aid of appeal, or the curator alone can exercise 
          that right. If, however, the minor should, in the meantime, claim the 
          indulgence due to his age, or attain his majority, he can, in his own 
          name, conduct the appeal. Ordered on the 
          day before the Kalends of October, during the Consulate of the 
          Caesars. 11. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Antoninus. Citizens, and 
          the inhabitants of towns who have good excuses and did not appeal after 
          having legally been appointed to office, will not be permitted to establish 
          the trust of their allegations. 12. The Emperor 
          Constantine to Catulinus. Where an appeal 
          has been filed in a civil case it is, under no circumstances, allowed 
          for the appellant to be kept in prison, or subjected to any kind of 
          injury whatsoever, or be tortured or even exposed to insult. It is, 
          however, otherwise in criminal prosecutions, for in these, even if an 
          appeal can be taken, the defendant must be kept in custody until the 
          case has been decided after the appeal, if he is not able to furnish 
          a surety who is solvent. Adopted on the 
          fifteenth of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of Volusianus 
          and Annianus, 314. 13. The Same 
          Emperor to Petronius Probianus, Greeting. From the time 
          when proceedings in civil cases were instituted between private individuals, 
          and you determined to consult or refer them to Us, or you admitted the 
          appeal, and complied with the requisite legal formalities, nothing afterwards 
          should be permitted or performed by you in any way, even if any evidence 
          of Our favor should be produced, but you must, in obedience to former 
          laws, do all that is required and see that the case is sent to the Imperial 
          Court. Published during 
          the Ides of October, during the Consulate of Sabinus and Rufinus, 
          316. 14. The Same 
          Emperor to Bassus, Prefect of the City. Litigants have 
          a right to immediately appeal orally, without doing so in writing, if 
          the circumstances of the judgment demand it, and this applies to civil 
          as well as to criminal cases. Given at Sirmium, 
          on the eighth of the Ides of June, during the Consulate of Gallicanus 
          and Bassus, 317. 15. The Same 
          Emperor to Severus Vicegerent. In order that 
          it may not be necessary for cases which have been brought before Us 
          on appeal to be sent back to the lower court, We order that all necessary 
          information be inserted in the papers. We are compelled to be lenient 
          in rendering Our Decrees, as there is reason to apprehend that where 
          a case has not been thoroughly investigated the opportunity for further 
          examination may be lost. Therefore, a judge shall be liable to perpetual 
          infamy if all the matters stated by the litigants in the examination 
          and the evidence are not inserted, and cannot be found in the documents 
          accompanying the appeal. Given at Aquileia, 
          on the tenth of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of 
          Constantine, Consul for the fifth time, and Licinius, 319. 16. The Same 
          Emperor to Maximus. Those also are 
          entitled to the benefit of an appeal against whom judgment has been 
          rendered by a Deputy appointed by the Emperor. Given at Sirmium, 
          on the day before the Ides of January, during the Second Consulate 
          of Crispus and Constantine, 321. 17. The Same 
          Emperor to Julian, Prefect of the City. When, after a 
          case has been heard by any of the Praetors, an appeal is taken by either 
          party, the appellant must obey the judgment of the Prefect of the City. Given at Heraclea 
          on the third of the Nones of August, during the Consulate of 
          Constantine, Consul for the seventh time, and the Caesar Constantius, 
          Consul for the third time, 326. 18. The Same 
          Emperor to Victor, Collector of Taxes of the City of Rome. As some debtors 
          of the Treasury, when ordered to pay certain sums of money, are accustomed 
          to evade execution by having recourse to an appeal, which they do not 
          afterwards attempt to prosecute, it has been decided that if they do 
          not comply with all the formalities prescribed by law within the proper 
          time, the appeal shall be held to have been abandoned, and the amount 
          due shall immediately be collected. Given on the day 
          before the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Constantius 
          and Maximus, 327. 19. The Same 
          Emperor to All the Inhabitants of the Provinces. We permit appeals 
          to be taken from the decisions of Proconsuls, counts, and those who 
          preside in the place of prefects, whether the decisions have been made 
          on appeal, after delegation, or under ordinary jurisdiction, but the 
          judge must give a copy of the decision to the appellant, as well as 
          send to Us all the pleadings of the parties, together with the arguments 
          on both sides, as well as his own decision. We 
          do not permit an appeal to be taken from the decisions of Praetorian 
          Prefects. If the defeated party can show that he applied for an appeal, 
          but that the judge refused to entertain it, he can go before the Prefect 
          and begin the case again just as if an appeal had been taken. If the 
          appellant is shown not to have appealed on proper grounds, and loses 
          his case, he shall be. branded with infamy. If, however, he should succeed, 
          the judge who refused to receive his appeal must be prosecuted before 
          Us, in order that he may be properly punished. Given at Constantinople 
          on the Kalends of September, during the Consulate of Bassus and 
          Ablavius, 331. 20. The Same 
          Emperor to Albinus. The power of appeal 
          is granted in cases of great as well as minor importance, and the judge 
          should not think that he has sustained any injury because the litigant 
          has had recourse to an appeal. Given on the seventh 
          of the Ides of April, during the Consulate of Marcellinus and 
          Probinus. 21. The Emperors 
          Constantius and Constans to Lollianus, Praetorian Prefect. As ordinary judges 
          frequently hold that appeals should be rejected, it is hereby decreed 
          that if any judge should refuse to permit an appeal to be taken, which 
          is not against the execution of the judgment but against the judgment 
          itself, which has been finally rendered, he shall be compelled to pay 
          thirty pounds of gold to the Treasury of Our Largesses, and his officer 
          shall also be required to pay the same amount, unless he can show that 
          he obstinately resisted, and opposed, in writing, the decision rendered 
          by the judge. Given on the eighth 
          of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Arbitio and 
          Lollianus, 355. 22. The Same 
          Emperor to Volusianus, Praetorian Prefect. Where a judgment 
          has been rendered with reference to property which has no owner, or 
          that of which persons have been deprived by law as being unworthy to 
          hold it, and anyone thinks that an appeal should be taken, his right 
          to do so shall be admitted. Given on the third 
          of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Arbitio and 
          Lollianus, 355. 23. The Same 
          Emperor to the Senate. When an appeal 
          is taken from judgments rendered in Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Lydia, the 
          Islands of the Hellespont, Phrygia, Europe, Rodope, and Mount Hemus, 
          the appellant must comply with the decision of the Prefect of this City. 24. The Emperor 
          Valentinian and Valens to the Council of the City of Carthage, Greeting. The necessity 
          is imposed upon judges not only to permit an appeal to be taken, but 
          also to remember that the term of only thirty days is granted 
          from the date of the judgment within which the parties litigant are 
          to be notified that an appeal has been granted. The judge and his officer 
          shall be liable to a fine if they fail to observe these rules in 
          every particular. Given at Milan, 
          on the day before the Nones of February, during the Consulate 
          of the Divine Jovian and Varonianus, 364. 25. The Emperors 
          Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius to Syagrius, Praetorian Prefect. We order that 
          appeals from judgments imposing fines shall be permitted. Given on the fourteenth 
          of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Gratian, Consul 
          for the fifth time, and Theodosius, 380. 26. The Same 
          Emperors to Pelagius, Count of Private Affairs. Let an appeal 
          to Your Excellency be taken from the decision of the Imperial Procurator, 
          so that if the trifling value of the property involved, or the distance, 
          does not permit the litigants to appear in your court, refer the matter 
          to the Governor of the province for his decision, if you should approve 
          of this being done. Given at Milan, 
          on the fifteenth of the Kalends of March, during the Consulate 
          of Arcadius and Bauto, 385. 27. The Emperors 
          Theodosius, Arcadius, and Honorius to Evodius, Proconsul of Africa. Appointments made 
          by notices or edicts without public authority are not valid, and if 
          the proper formalities have not been complied with, it is not necessary 
          to appeal from them. Given at Milan, 
          on the seventeenth of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate 
          of Olybrius and Probinus, 395. 28. The Same Emperors to Neridius, Proconsul of Asia. Anyone who has 
          taken an appeal is hereby notified that he has a right to change his 
          mind, and withdraw his petition, in order that the opportunity for just 
          repentance may not be lost. Given at Constantinople, 
          on the eleventh of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate 
          of Arcadius, Consul for the fourth time, and Honorius, Consul for the 
          third time, 396. 29. The Same Emperors to Eutychianus, Praetorian Prefect. It shall not be 
          lawful for persons sentenced to punishment, after having been condemned 
          for the enormity of their crimes, to be arbitrarily removed and held 
          by force, and from humane considerations, We do not refuse to persons 
          of this kind the power to appeal in criminal cases, provided this is 
          done within the time prescribed by law; so that a more careful examination 
          may take place, where injustice is thought to have been committed, and 
          the safety of a man endangered through the error or prejudice of the 
          court. However, if a Proconsul, 
          the Count of the East, the Augustal Prefect, or any of the Imperial 
          Deputies were among the judges, it is hereby 
          decreed that an appeal cannot be taken to Us, but they shall have the 
          most ample power to execute sentence; for We desire them to have full 
          authority to punish those who are condemned in the manner prescribed 
          by law, if circumstances and the crime demand it. Given on the sixth 
          of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Honorius, Consul 
          for the fourth time, and Eutychianus, 393. 30. The Same 
          Emperors to Theodore, Praetorian Prefect. When anyone appeals 
          for the reason that he wishes to avoid the judgment rendered against 
          him by a judge whom he regards as suspicious, he shall have full power 
          to do so; nor need he be apprehensive of the undue severity of judges, 
          as he can easily appeal from any injurious decision which they may render, 
          and especially as the Praetorian Prefect is the only one from whom he 
          is not permitted to appeal without losing his case. Therefore, all persons 
          are informed that the right of appeal is granted to them from the unjust 
          decisions of judges, and from the rulings of those who are suspected, 
          in capital cases, as well in those involving the loss of their fortunes. Given at Milan, 
          on the seventh of the Ides of June, during the Consulate of Theodore, 
          Consul for the fifth time, 399. 31. The Emperors 
          Theodosius and Honorius to Asclepiodotus, Praetorian Prefect. If the judge of 
          the lower court refuses to permit an appeal to be taken against his 
          decision, to the tribunal of Your Highness, or to the Prefecture of 
          the City, or if the appeal having been admitted, he should refuse to 
          notify the parties, the appellant shall, according to the ancient law, 
          be entitled to the term of a year from the date of the decision to file 
          a complaint on account of this injustice, as well as to prosecute the 
          judge; or where an appeal of this kind was not allowed after having 
          been requested of the judge of the lower court, the appellant will be 
          entitled to six months for the purpose of doing these things. 
          If, however, the judge should refuse to grant the appeal, 
          or to refer the case to the proper magistrate, four months shall be 
          granted, so that those acts which We have prescribed having been performed, 
          the appellant may proceed during the time known to have been fixed by 
          law for the prosecution of appeals. Given at Constantinople, 
          on the third of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of 
          Asclepiodotus and Marinianus, 423. 32. The Emperors 
          Theodosius and Valentinian to Cyrus, Praetorian Prefect. We order that 
          hereafter there shall be no recourse to Us by appeal from the decisions 
          of judges of distinguished rank, lest the rights of others may seem 
          to be infringed if We are called upon to consider them, and are called 
          away from the occupations which We are pursuing for the general welfare. 
          If, however, a case should be appealed from the decision of any of the 
          Proconsuls, or the Augustal Prefect, or from that 
          of the Count of the East, or of any of the Vicegerents of the Emperor, 
          We order that the illustrious Praetorian Prefect, who is a member of 
          Our retinue, as well as the illustrious Quaestor of Our Palace, shall 
          take cognizance of the appeal in the same order, and with the observation 
          of the same formalities, and at the same times as other actions taken 
          up in one appeal are decided in the Imperial Council; and this shall 
          be done, even though some of the eminent magistrates aforesaid have 
          the right, as judges, to hear appeals. (1) When an appeal 
          is taken from a decision of a duke who is at the same time a Governor, 
          the Prefect shall be required to hear and determine the same, in accordance 
          with the ordinary rules of his tribunal. (2) In all the 
          different judicial proceedings which We have introduced instead of references 
          to Us, or the notices or other matters connected with the same, where 
          an appeal is taken from the decision of a judge, the above-mentioned 
          distinguished magistrates must hear the appellants and take cognizance 
          of their demands, and We order Our secretaries to obtain the papers 
          and record them, and notify the parties litigant, and the officials 
          associated with the illustrious Quaestor shall execute the judgments. (3) These rules 
          shall apply where an appeal was taken from the decision of a judge who 
          did not hear the case by virtue of a special appointment, for when the 
          time of the execution of a judgment is extended by an appeal from the 
          decision of a judge who was specially designated for that purpose, it 
          will be necessary for the magistrate who appointed him to ascertain 
          whether or not there is good ground for an appeal. (4) We think that 
          it is eminently proper to add to this most salutary law that if the 
          Emperor, after having been applied to, should assign the case to a private 
          individual, or to one or more persons who are not of illustrious rank, 
          to be heard (as is customary), and an appeal should be taken from the 
          decision of the person thus appointed, the illustrious Praetorian Prefect, 
          who is one of Our retinue, shall hear and decide the case along with 
          the illustrious Qusestor, at the proper time. Our 
          secretaries shall receive and record all matters heard and decided by 
          Our arbiters, and notify the litigants in writing, and they shall also 
          receive and examine any appeals taken from the awards of arbiters especially 
          appointed by Us (even though they be of illustrious rank) provided the 
          cases are referred to the Council of the Empire. (5) But when an 
          appeal is taken from the decision of the illustrious and distinguished 
          judges who do not belong to the court of last resort, We order that 
          it shall be heard by Us, even though it may have been taken from the 
          decision of someone who was appointed by Us to decide it, and who was 
          not originally of illustrious rank, but was afterwards raised to the 
          dignity of a noble. The same rule 
          shall also be observed when another arbiter also not of noble birth 
          is associated with him. (6) Moreover, 
          anything which has not been expressly stated in this law shall be understood 
          to remain subject to the rules of the ancient laws and constitutions. 33. The Same 
          Emperors to Cyrus, Praetorian Prefect. In a case in which 
          the attendant of an officer of the rank of general, with reference to 
          whose status a controversy arises in a province on the ground that he 
          is a decurion, or is a member of the retinue of the Governor, and is 
          detained in the province for the reason that he has not paid his taxes, 
          or discharged his official duties, and the decision of the Governor 
          of the province is not executed, for the reason that an appeal has been 
          taken from the same, We order that the case shall be decided by Your 
          Highness, along with the distinguished general, according to its merits, 
          even though the general may have appointed the Governor of the province 
          to hear it. 34. The Emperor 
          Justinian to Demosthenes, Praetorian Prefect. We decree that 
          when any judge of superior or inferior rank suggests that a matter which 
          We appointed him to decide, or which he should determine as belonging 
          to his jurisdiction, should be referred to Us, the case which has been 
          appealed shall be decided by Us in Council, whether his opinion accompanied 
          the reference or not (provided he did not state it to the parties) ; 
          or if nothing of this kind was added, but he simply requested a reply 
          from Our Majesty, the case should not be determined until Our order, 
          two illustrious men who are either of patrician, consular, or prefectorian 
          rank, and whom We have selected for that purpose, are ordered to be 
          joined with the illustrious Quaestor of Our Palace, and with him examine 
          the appeal (whether they do so in the presence or the absence of the 
          parties to the suit), and give their opinion concerning the case; and 
          the decision made by these most eminent magistrates shall be considered 
          as final; and permission shall not be given to appeal from it, or to 
          raise any doubt whatever concerning the same. We 
          decree that this rule shall not only apply where a single judge has 
          referred a case of this kind to Us, but where two or more judges were 
          appointed and none of them agreed, but each one submitted a different 
          opinion for Our consideration; or where they all consulted Us as to 
          what disposition should be made of the case. 35 and 36. 
          Laws which are not Authentic. 37. The Emperor 
          Justinian to Menna, Praetorian Prefect. We think that 
          the following should be added where appeals are taken by which it is 
          customary to bring matters for final determination to the Imperial Palace, 
          namely, when the amount in dispute does not exceed ten pounds of gold, 
          one judge alone, and not two (as was formerly the practice) shall be 
          appointed to decide it. If, however, the value of the property exceeds 
          that amount but is not more than twenty pounds of gold, the matter shall 
          be submitted to two illustrious judges, who will take cognizance of 
          the question involved, which must be reduced to writing by the clerks, so that if they differ, 
          they may call in the illustrious Quaestor, and the doubt be disposed 
          of by his decision. In 
          actions, however, where the property involved exceeds in value the sum 
          of twenty pounds of gold, they should be brought before the distinguished 
          nobles who compose the Council of State of Our Sacred Palace, so that, 
          in accordance with what has already been established, not only the defeated 
          party but also the one who is successful may have the case referred 
          to one or two judges, but this must be done within the term of two years, 
          as, after that time has elapsed, We refuse to authorize it. Any decisions 
          made by one or more of these judges shall, under no circumstances, be 
          subject to appeal. We, however, permit new allegations to be made by 
          the litigants before the said judge or judges, just as in the case of 
          a reference to the Council of Our Sacred Palace. Given at Constantinople, 
          on the eighth of the Ides of April, during the 
          Consulate of Decius, 329. 38. The Same 
          Emperor to Demosthenes, Praetorian Prefect. Where an appeal 
          was taken from the decision of a duke, whether under his regular jurisdiction, 
          or whether he was especially appointed to hear the case by the Emperor, 
          or whether he himself was included among the eminent magistrates, or 
          was of illustrious rank, or even if he was of higher position (as military 
          men as well as those of consular rank often discharge duties of this 
          kind when required to do so by the public welfare), no distinction being 
          made on this account, but only the ducal dignity being considered, the 
          appeal having been taken from the decision of any duke whomsoever, shall 
          not, as was formerly the case, be disposed of by the judges, but We 
          order that it shall be referred to and decided by the most sublime Master 
          of the Offices, and the most excellent Qusestor of Our Palace, who shall 
          hear it together, as is done in Our Council of State, and that it shall 
          be recorded by Our Imperial Secretaries, and that none of the provisions 
          of the ancient law with reference to such cases shall be observed, but 
          it shall only be brought before the said most eminent magistrates. 39. The Same 
          Emperor to Julian, Praetorian Prefect. We, having greater 
          consideration for Our subjects than they themselves would perhaps display, 
          do hereby amend an ancient rule, that is to say, in cases of appeal, 
          he alone who had recourse to such a proceeding is entitled to have the 
          decision of the judge corrected, but the other party who failed to do 
          this is compelled to obey the decision, no matter what it may be. 
          Hence We order that if the appellant should come into court, 
          and state the grounds for appeal, and his adversary wishes to contest 
          the judgment, and is prepared, he can do so, if his position is worthy 
          of the attention of the court. But when he is absent the judge must, 
          nevertheless, use his authority to protect his rights. (1) Moreover, 
          with reference to the legal documents required for the appeal, which, 
          by all means, must be read before the distinguished and 
          learned men composing the Imperial Council, the parties litigant, as 
          well as those who draw up said documents, must be careful not to use 
          too many words, and not to repeat statements which have already been 
          made therein, but they must only insert those things which set forth 
          the causes for the appeal, expressed in concise language, and must see 
          that they do not contain any new matter, or make additions to supply 
          what was omitted, for they are hereby notified that if this is not done, 
          those who drew up the papers will be liable to the just indignation 
          of the judges of the court of appeal, for a succinct statement of the 
          facts and an abridgment of the opinions of the eminent magistrates who 
          originally heard the case will be amply sufficient. (2) We remember 
          that, by a law which We recently promulgated, We order that one judge 
          should be appointed to hear cases in which a sum up to the value of 
          ten pounds of gold is involved, and that two should be appointed when 
          the value was twenty pounds of gold, in accordance with the custom observed 
          in cases brought before the Imperial Council. But 
          as, at first sight, the amount might not appear to be so large, and 
          in the final decision the judge or judges concluded that a greater one 
          should be considered, and since it was not possible for them to exceed 
          the limits by which they were bound, We grant them full power in cases 
          of this kind to adopt a larger sum than that above mentioned, if the 
          value of the property was more than originally estimated by them, and 
          they shall be permitted to render their decision in conformity to the 
          truth, and not in accordance with the first appraisement, in order that 
          magistrates may not be impeded in the discharge of their duties, but 
          may strictly enforce observance of the laws, and in every respect exert 
          their judicial authority. Given at Constantinople, on the sixth of the Kalends of April, during the fifth Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 530. Title 
          63. Concerning delays, and the amendments of appeals or references to 
          the Emperor.   If anyone, having 
          been appointed duumvir, or honored with any other office, or invested 
          with any public charge during his absence, should invoke the aid of 
          appeal, he will only be entitled to the term of two months in which 
          to file his application, to be computed from the time when he can show 
          that he was first notified of his appointment; but if he was present, 
          the said term of two months must be computed from the very day when 
          his appointment was made. Given on the eighth 
          of the Ides of July, during the Consulate of Constantine, Consul 
          for the sixth time, and the Caesar Constantius, 820. 2. The Emperors 
          Theodosius and Valentinian to Cyrus, Praetorian Prefect. We think that 
          it will be to the advantage of Our reign for the provisions of the laws 
          having reference to time granted to litigants to be amended, and that 
          pretexts for delay should, under all circumstances, be abolished. We 
          order that, after an appeal has been granted, the time allowed for the 
          prosecution of the same, whether this has been done by the illustrious 
          Governor of the province, or by an eminent judge, shall, in the first 
          place, be six months. If the appellant permits this time to go by, We 
          grant him an additional term of thirty-one days. If he should let this 
          pass, We allow him, in like manner, a third term of the same number 
          of days. If the third term should also expire, We decree that he shall 
          be entitled to a fourth and final term of thirty-one days. If the appellant 
          should also let this fourth term elapse, We decree that he shall be 
          granted the term of three months longer, to petition Us to have his 
          right to appeal restored. This application having been made, We decree 
          that it will not be necessary to notify his adversary or to mention 
          the time which has expired, in his petition, but We direct that the 
          term of three months shall be computed from the date of the expiration 
          of the fourth and last term, even though restoration of his right of 
          appeal was granted one day before, or the judgment was not rendered 
          by one of the illustrious Prefects. These 
          rules shall not prejudice the adverse party, as the expiration of the 
          time is not uncertain, but is well known to all persons, and they apply 
          to appeals from the decisions of the illustrious Governors of provinces, 
          as well as from those of eminent judges. Where an appeal is taken from 
          the decision of an arbiter in a province, who has been specially appointed 
          by the Emperor, We authorize three similar terms, after the first one 
          has expired (as above stated) to which the appellant shall be entitled, 
          but he shall have no restoration of his right to appeal granted by Us, 
          so that, after the ninety-three days shall have elapsed, the execution 
          of the judgment must be ordered. If, 
          however, the arbiter was specially appointed in this Most Holy City, 
          by the Praetorian Prefect,, the Master of the Offices, or any other 
          official of exalted rank, and the appeal should be taken against either 
          the ruling or decision rendered by the lower court, the first term within 
          which it can be brought shall consist of two months, but the other three 
          shall be computed as above set forth. Anyone who takes an appeal from 
          the decision of an arbiter, who has been specially appointed by the 
          Governor of a province, or an eminent judge, shall be entitled to two 
          months in which to file it, and also for three other terms as above 
          enumerated. With reference to the 
          observance of the terms aforesaid, We order that if they should happen 
          to occur during holidays, those which precede them may be counted by 
          the litigants as available. If anyone, without observing the provisions of the law, 
          should permit the time to elapse, he can be opposed in the first instance 
          by his adversary, or by the judge if the appellant alone is present 
          in court, and the latter shall be considered as having accepted 
          the decision without having been subjected to any restraint. Given on the twelfth 
          of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of Valentinian, Consul 
          for the fifth time, and Anatolius, 440. 3. The Emperor Justinian to Appio, Praetorian Prefect. Let no one think 
          that, in the future, he will be permitted to appeal to the members of 
          the Imperial Council after the legally established terms 
          have expired, either by means of a petition, or through a Rescript of 
          the Emperor granting him restitution of his right, nor in any other 
          way whatsoever; but all persons shall be required to use due diligence 
          for the purpose of taking advantage of appeals within the time fixed 
          by law, and a statement of what has taken place in the lower court and 
          has been made the basis of appeal shall not be filed in the office of 
          the Imperial Secretary near the expiration of the term, lest, by evil 
          schemes, the termination of the case may be interfered with, but this 
          shall be done immediately after the appeal has been taken, or at least 
          before half of the prescribed period has elapsed, in order that the 
          party who has appealed may not lose his right on account of the little 
          time that remains. 4. The Same 
          Emperor to Tatianus, Master of the Offices. We decree by this 
          Imperial lav; that where appeals are taken to the Emperor permission 
          shall be given to the appellant, as well as the adverse party, to make 
          use of new allegations or exceptions which may, indeed, not be applicable 
          to the new proceeding, but arise from and are connected with questions 
          known to have been brought up before the lower court. If, 
          however, it should be shown that any allegation was made, or any document 
          introduced before the lower court, proof of which the party employing 
          it was not able to present at that time, but which can now be done without 
          delay before the members of the Imperial Council, they should admit 
          it, in order that, by doing so, more light may be thrown upon the matters 
          in dispute. 5. The Same 
          Emperor to Tribonian, Quaestor of the Imperial Palace. As by former laws, 
          in case of appeals, provision was not made for the time occupied by 
          parties residing at a distance from Our Most Sacred Court, it appears 
          to Us to be necessary to establish a proper scale for these distances. 
          Therefore, We order that when any case is appealed from the frontier 
          of Egypt, or Lydia, or from the Orient, or from both Cilicias, or from 
          the Armenians, as well as from all Illyria, the term of six months shall 
          be granted, as by the ancient law, and this shall neither be diminished 
          or increased. When, however, a case is appealed from any other portion 
          of Our Empire, as, for instance, from the Departments of Asia, Pontus, 
          or Thrace, to this Royal City, We order that, instead of the term of 
          six months above mentioned, only that of three shall be conceded, and 
          the other three terms which follow shall consist of three months, that 
          is to say ninety-three days, whether the first term of six months or 
          the other one of three is allowed, according to the enumeration of the 
          places which We have just made; but the other period of three months, 
          which is usually granted by the Council for the purpose of reinstating 
          the party in his right of appeal, shall remain unaltered, and shall 
          be added to those previously designated, so that, in one instance, the 
          term allowed shall consist of a year, and in the other of nine months. (1) As, in former 
          times, one day was granted by the ancient legislators at the end of 
          each term, which was designated "The Fatal Day," 
          and it often happened (as mortals are exposed to many accidents) when 
          appeals were taken, that either from illness, length of time, or other 
          causes (which would not be easy to remember or enumerate), the said 
          fatal day passed without the parties taking advantage of it, and the 
          time for appealing expired, and the estates of men were thereby endangered, 
          We, for the purpose of disposing of these injurious vicissitudes of 
          fortune, do order that hereafter not merely one fatal day shall be reckoned, 
          but if the appellant shall have appeared at any time within four days 
          preceding the fatal day, or within five days after that time, and shall 
          bring his action before a competent judge, the law shall be considered 
          to have been complied with. He should not be expected to deplore the 
          loss of his case, but he ought to rejoice in the privilege We bestow 
          upon him, as We are aware that suits are frequently endangered through 
          an error in calculation as to the time within which the judge should 
          act, which it is to be hoped will not occur hereafter, because of the 
          remedy afforded under the present law. This 
          privilege is applicable to all delays, whether they have been granted 
          by specially appointed judges or by others, and which the laws have 
          mentioned as being required to be kept or observed, so that ten fatal 
          days, instead of only one, shall everywhere be established. (2) In those instances, 
          however, with reference to which the term of two years has been prescribed, 
          whenever cases are heard in this Imperial City by the assembled Council 
          of the Nobles of Our Sacred Palace, We limit the time to one instead 
          of two years, so that within that period the papers in the case may 
          be collected, and delivered to Our devoted Secretaries, and the arguments 
          in opposition be made, if this should be desirable, and the litigants 
          be compelled to bring the case before Our Imperial Council. A successful 
          party shall, in accordance with what has already been decided, be permitted 
          to present his case there at once, without waiting for the expiration 
          of a year, if he should wish to do so. (3) When, however, 
          proceedings have been begun in Our Imperial Council, and have not been 
          concluded on the same day, We permit them to be continued, as it would 
          be unjust for men to lose their cases for the reason that the Imperial 
          Council was occupied with matters brought before it by the Emperor. (4) We think that 
          it is reasonable for what follows to be added to this law, namely: that 
          if anyone should have taken his case before an appellate judge, prior 
          to the expiration of the time prescribed by law (whether one or both 
          parties were present), and, having formulated his appeal, should afterwards 
          depart and abandon it, and the remainder of the time should pass in 
          inactivity, and the term of a year elapse after the case was begun, 
          the successful party not being able to have the judgment executed on 
          account of the case being still incomplete, and not having the power 
          to bring it to a conclusion, as the absence of the appellant, did not, 
          of itself, cause it to be terminated, We, for the purpose of removing 
          this injustice (as the adverse party can, even in the absence of the 
          appellant, proceed with the case, for the 
          reason that the special privilege enjoyed by the magistrate having jurisdiction 
          of an appeal authorizes him to dispose of it when only one party is 
          present), do hereby order that if the said appellant does not attend 
          to the case, and conduct it to the end, when he was to blame because 
          the trial did not proceed, he will forfeit his right of appeal, and 
          the judgment rendered against him shall remain in full force and effect, 
          just as if an appeal had not been taken in the first place, unless the 
          said appellant can establish by perfectly clear evidence that he intended 
          to use every effort to have the case heard, but was unable to do so, 
          either through the fault of the judge, or for some other cause over 
          which he had no control. For, under such circumstances, We grant him 
          another term of a year, and if this should elapse, and the case not 
          be terminated within that time, We decree that he shall be deprived 
          of the benefit of an appeal, because he had full power to appear before 
          Us, and complain of the delay of the judge, and profit by Our indulgence. (5) In conformity 
          with the above, the same rule shall apply to appeals from the decisions 
          of Our distinguished Prefects brought before Our Imperial Council, on 
          the application of one or both parties, not only because of the absence 
          of one of them, but also on account of the expiration of the terms prescribed 
          by law. (6) Moreover, 
          if the parties came to the conclusion that their dispute should be settled 
          by means of a written agreement, neither of them shall have the right 
          to invoke the aid of an appeal, or take advantage of the lapse of time, 
          and We decree that a compromise of this kind shall stand, for under 
          such circumstances, We desire the harshness of the laws to be mitigated 
          by the agreement of the litigants. Given at Chalcedon, on the fifteenth of the Kalends of December, during the fifth Consulate of Decius, 526. Title 
          64. When it is necessary to appeal.   You allege that 
          the sentence has no force, as it was pronounced in opposition to a judgment 
          from which no appeal was taken. If you can prove this readily, without 
          having recourse to an appeal, what has been decided will not have the 
          authority of a judicial decision. Published on the 
          eighth of the Kalends of April, during the Consulate of Alexander, 
          223. 2. The Same 
          Emperor to Capilaneis. When a question 
          with reference to the succession of the deceased arose between you and 
          your grandmother, and a judge appointed by the Governor of the province 
          decided that the deceased, although under the age of fourteen years, 
          could make a will, and by this means you obtained the advantage over 
          your grandmother, it is evident that the decision having been rendered 
          in violation of a plain rule of law can have 
          no force; therefore, in this instance, it will not be necessary to have 
          recourse to an appeal. If, however, an inquiry was made as to the age 
          of the deceased, and it was ascertained that he had completed his fourteenth 
          year, and the judge decided that for this reason he could make a will, 
          and you did not appeal, or you failed to prosecute the appeal after 
          it was taken, you cannot again bring up a matter which has been decided. 3. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Ingenuus. If (as you allege) 
          you were appointed to the duumvirate, and your previous designation 
          as decurion was suspended on account of the appeal which you made to 
          the eminent judges against your selection for the latter office, it 
          is clear that your appointment to the duumvirate will not be prejudiced 
          before your appeal has been disposed of by the above-mentioned judges. 4. The Emperors 
          Valerian and Gallienus, and the Caesar Valerian to Julianus. As you state that 
          several magistrates have been appointed judges in your case, and that 
          only one of them has rendered a decision, there does not seem to be 
          any necessity to appeal, as the decision is not valid in law. 5. The Emperors 
          Cams, Carimis, and Numerianus to Domitian. Governors can 
          impose fines within certain limits. If the Governor of the province 
          should exceed his authority, and fine you more than the amount prescribed 
          by law, there is no doubt that what appears to have been done illegally 
          is void, and can be set aside without appeal. Published during 
          the Ides of January, during the Consulate of Carus and Carinus, 
          283. 6. The Same 
          Emperors to Germanus. If the judge appointed 
          by the Governor of the province to hear the case is said not to have 
          rendered his decision on the day that the Governor appointed, but a 
          considerable time afterwards, in order to avoid the introduction of 
          technicalities and the delay which will result from a fruitless appeal, 
          the Governor of the province must decide the entire case, without it 
          being necessary to have recourse to an appeal. 7. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian to Nicagora. It has already 
          been decreed by our Imperial Predecessors that decisions rendered by 
          corrupt judges for the sake of reward are void in law, even if no appeal 
          should be taken. 8. The Same 
          Emperors to Constantine. If your father 
          did not give his consent to your appointment as decurion, and you were 
          still in the fifteenth year of your age, and the Governor of the province, 
          having been applied to, should find that you are not eligible to the 
          said office of decurion, he will revoke the unjust appointment as being void on account of your age, even 
          if no appeal was taken. 9. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Rufina. We grant to veterans 
          who, after service in the legions or under the standards for twenty 
          years, have obtained an honorable and regular discharge, the privilege 
          of being exempt from onerous public duties. Moreover, desiring to remunerate 
          the faithful devotion of Our soldiers by this mark of Our indulgence, 
          We hereby release them from the necessity of appealing, when judgments 
          are rendered against them. 10. The Emperor 
          Justinian to Menna, Praetorian Prefect. For the sake of 
          maintaining unimpaired the honor of judges, where one of the parties, 
          considering himself injured by their final decision, takes an appeal, 
          We forbid the other party, who was successful, to appeal from the same 
          judgment on the ground that he did not receive anything as costs and 
          damages in the case, or received less than he ought to have done, as 
          he himself admits that the decision was justly rendered. The judges, 
          however, or the nobles of Our Imperial Palace, when the amount involved 
          in the case is not of great value, and they think that the successful 
          party is entitled to his expenses, have power to grant him a reasonable 
          sum for that purpose, without rendering it necessary for him to appeal. 
          And as he is permitted by former laws to apply for this relief, if his 
          adversary should fail to appeal to Our Council, We nevertheless authorize 
          this to be done, but We forbid any imputation to be cast upon the court 
          by taking an appeal when it is unnecessary. Given on the eighth of the Ides of April, .... Title 
          65. Whose appeals should not be received.   The appeal of 
          a party who, being absent through obstinacy, has had judgment rendered 
          against him after having been regularly summoned to conduct his case, 
          cannot be received, if the matter has previously been summarily examined. Published on the 
          Nones of July, during the Consulate of Antoninus, Consul for 
          the fourth time, and Balbinus, 214. 2. The Emperors 
          Constantius and Constans to Hierocles, Consular of Syria. You will be careful 
          to note that no homicide, poisoner, malefactor, adulterer, or any person 
          who has been guilty of manifest violence, who has been convicted by 
          witnesses, or with his own mouth has confessed that he is guilty of 
          vices and crimes, shall be heard, if he takes an appeal. We, however, wish it to be observed that justice requires 
          that where witnesses have been called, instruments produced, and other 
          evidence offered, and a judgment has been rendered against the culprit, 
          and the latter does not confess his guilt, or, terrified by the fear 
          of torture, states anything against himself, he shall not be denied 
          the right of appeal. Given on the fifth 
          of the Ides of December, during the Consulate of Leontius and 
          Sallust, 344. 3. The Emperors 
          Valentinian and Valens to Modestus, Praetorian Prefect. An appeal from 
          the decision of his own judge is not permitted to any official, except 
          solely where, in a civil proceeding, he has brought suit before his 
          own judge with reference to an estate, but any official can, under other 
          circumstances, appeal from the sentence of the said judge, and the right 
          is granted him by law to appear by an attorney. Given on the fourth 
          of the Ides of June, during the Consulate of Valentinian and 
          Valens, 365. 4. The Emperors 
          Valentinian, Valens, and Gratian to Olybrius, Prefect of the City. We order that 
          no appeal shall be taken where satisfaction of a claim is demanded by 
          the Treasury, or where the payment of public taxes is in question, or 
          the recovery of a debt, either public or private is involved (provided 
          that the indebtedness has been clearly proved), so that judicial authority 
          may be severely exercised against the delinquent if guilty of contumacy. Published at Rome, 
          on the fifteenth of the Kalends of September, during the second 
          Consulate of Valentinian and Valens, 368. 5. The Emperors 
          Valens, Gratian, and Valentinian to Thalassius, Proconsul of Africa. It has been thoroughly 
          established by the laws and Imperial Constitutions that an appeal cannot 
          be taken from an execution, unless the officer charged with it has exceeded 
          the terms of the judgment. When an appeal of this kind is taken, We 
          think that it should be held that the execution is suspended, and if 
          the property, which the officer charged with the execution attempted 
          to return, is movable, it should be taken from the possessor and sequestered 
          after the appeal, to be restored eventually to the party whom the judge 
          may decide is entitled to it. Where, however, execution was issued with reference to 
          either the possession or the ownership of property, and it is suspended 
          by an appeal, all the profits acquired therefrom during the time of 
          the appeal, or subsequently obtained, shall be placed on deposit, and 
          the land left temporarily in the hands of the appellant. Litigants, 
          however, are notified that, if they appeal either from the execution 
          of the judgment, or from the judgment itself, and it should appear that 
          they have done so wrongfully, they shall be fined the sum of fifty pounds 
          of gold. Given on the third 
          of the Kalends of February, during the Consulate of Valens, Consul 
          for the sixth time, and Valentinian, Consul for the second time, 378. 6. The Emperors 
          Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius to Hypatius, Prefect of the City. Anyone who has 
          ventured to appeal against the opening of the will of a deceased person, 
          or to prevent those who, it is evident, have been appointed heirs, from 
          being placed in possession of the estate, if the judge having jurisdiction 
          should hold that the appeal which has been interposed in such a matter 
          ought to be received, he who appealed so improperly shall pay a fine 
          of twenty pounds of silver, and the judge who connived at such a base 
          proceeding shall be fined an equal sum. Given on the Nones 
          of April, during the Consulate of Ausonius, Consul for the tenth 
          time, and Olybrius, 379. 7. The Same 
          Emperors and Arcadius to Pelagius, Count of Private Affairs. No appeal shall 
          be permitted either from interlocutory decrees or from other judicial 
          acts, before a final decision has been rendered in its proper order. 8. The Emperors 
          Arcadius and Honorius to Apollodorus, Count of Private Affairs. The interest of 
          the public as well as that of Our Private Treasury requires that claims 
          due to Our Household should not be deferred by the cunning arts of debtors. 
          Wherefore, We decree that the following rule shall be obeyed, namely: 
          that those who have been openly and manifestly ascertained to be public 
          debtors shall be denied the privilege of appeal, and their application 
          for the same shall be rejected. Given at Milan, on the third of the Ides of August, during the Consulate of Arcadius, Consul for the fourth time, and Honorius, Consul for the third time, 396. Title 
          66. Where the appellant dies while the appeal is pending.   Even after the 
          death of the party who appealed, his heirs are required either to continue 
          the case on appeal, or to acquiesce in the original 
          decision. Published on the 
          third of the Nones of December, during the Consulate of Alexander, 
          223. 2. The Same 
          to Marcellina. My Parents ordered 
          that the property of him who, having been accused of a capital crime, 
          did not appear, and died before the case was heard, should belong to 
          his heirs. Published on the 
          third of the Nones of December, during the Consulate of Alexander, 
          223. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to Ulpius. If anyone sentenced 
          to exile with confiscation of his property should appeal, and should 
          die while the appeal is pending, although the crime vanished with his 
          death, still the case involving his property must proceed. For it makes 
          a great difference whether a capital penalty which deprives the accused 
          of his property has been imposed (in which case the crime, having been 
          extinguished by his death, no question with reference to it can survive), 
          or whether the property is taken, not as the result of condemnation 
          for the crime, but by a special decision of the Governor, for the defendant 
          being dead, the question of the crime alone is removed, but that of 
          the disposition of the property remains. Published during 
          the Ides of March, during the Consulate of Modestus and Probus, 
          279. 4. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Alexander. If your father, 
          having been appointed to the decurionate and appealed, died while the 
          appeal was pending, the question of the appointment is terminated by 
          his death. 5. The Same 
          Emperor to Felix. Although the female 
          slave, with reference to whose ownership a controversy arose and a decision 
          was rendered against you by the Governor of the province, died, still, 
          as an appeal was taken in the case, and as you allege that it was pending 
          along with other cases, this appeal should be heard and decided in its 
          regular order, so far as the disposal of the peculium of said 
          slave is concerned. 6. The Emperor 
          Constantine to Bassus, Prefect of the City. If one of the 
          litigants should die while the appeal is still pending, his heirs will 
          be entitled not only to the remaining time which remained to the deceased, 
          but also to four months in addition. Where, however, a certain time 
          was granted to the heirs for deliberation, after this has expired, the 
          term of four months more shall be granted them, in order that they, 
          being ignorant of business, or having doubts as to whether they should 
          accept the estate or not, may not suffer loss before acquiring any benefit. Published at Sirmium, on the twelfth of the Kalends of June, during the second Consulate of the Caesars Crispus and Constantine, 331. Title 
          67. Concerning those who do not appeal through fear of the judge.   If a judicial 
          decision was rendered against you and you did not invoke the aid of 
          an appeal, you understand that you must abide by the decision, 
          for you need fear nothing in the presence of the Imperial Council. Given on the fifteenth 
          of the Kalends of June, .... 2. The Emperor 
          Julian to Geminianus. The privilege 
          of having the right to appeal restored to them is denied to those who 
          did not apply within the time prescribed by law. Therefore, all who, 
          under the pretext of fear, fail to appeal from the decisions of Prefects 
          of the City, Masters of the Offices, Generals of the Army, Proconsuls, 
          Counts, Prefects of the East, Augustal Vicegerents, or any other magistrates 
          whomsoever, shall be excluded from reviving their cases. But persons 
          who have suffered violence, and make a public statement of the facts 
          within the lawful time during which they have a right to appeal, or 
          show by their statements that they intended to do so, shall, by reason 
          of this fact, have the support of equity, just as if an appeal had been 
          taken. Published on the fifteenth of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Mamertinus and Nevitta, 362. Title 
          68. Where one or more of the parties appeal.   If it is proved 
          to the court that the same judgment was rendered against you as against 
          the party whose appeal was decided to be just, and that there was no 
          separation on account of any difference of facts in the case, he will 
          not fail to see that you also, who did not appeal, shall profit by the 
          success of the other party, in accordance with what has frequently been 
          decided. Published on the 
          fourteenth of the Kalends of September, .... 2. The Same 
          Emperor to Serenus. When one of several parties in the same case appeals and his appeal is decided to be just, it will also benefit those who did not appeal. Where, however, one of them obtained restitution in opposition to the judgment, on the ground of his age, this will be of no advantage to another who is older, but did not appeal in his own name. Title 
          69. Where an appeal is taken against temporary possession.   Where proceedings 
          have been instituted with reference to temporary possession, even though 
          an appeal may have been taken, the judgment rendered will, nevertheless, 
          be effective, as the question of possession must be decided, in order that that of ownership 
          may remain intact. Given at Milan, on the fourteenth of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of our Prince Honorius, and Evodius, 386. Title 
          70. No one shall be permitted to appeal for the third time in one and 
          the same case, or to refuse to obey the judgment of a court which has 
          been rendered twice and confirmed by the decision of a Prefect.   When a party has appealed a second time in a case, he shall not be permitted to do so again with reference to the same matters, in the same suit, or to refuse to comply with the judgment of the distinguished Praetorian Prefect. Permission, however, is granted to litigants for whom an arbiter has been appointed to question the jurisdiction of the judge who appointed him, before issue had been joined, for a proceeding of this kind has by no means the effect of an appeal. Title 
          71. Who can make an assignment of their property.   When the creditors 
          of those who make an assignment of their property are not paid in full, 
          the latter are not released from liability, for the only advantage they 
          derive from doing so is that, if judgment should be rendered against 
          them, they cannot be placed in prison. Given on the tenth 
          of the ... of December, during the Consulate of Maximus, Consul for 
          the second time, and Aelianus, 224. 2. The Emperor Philip and the Caesar Philip to Abascantus. If you are prepared 
          to pay what you owe, after judgment has been rendered against you in 
          favor of the State, because you have hastily consented 
          to assign your property, you need have no apprehension that you will 
          be deprived of your right to the same, if it has not yet been sold. Published on the 
          thirteenth of the Kalends of February, during the Consulate of 
          the Emperor Philip, and Retianus, 246. 3. The Emperors 
          Valerian and Gallienus to Julianus. If your father 
          made an assignment of his property on account of civil liabilities which 
          he had incurred, an inquiry should be made as to his means, and the 
          estate which you allege you acquired after your emancipation should 
          not be interfered with. In order that this may be accomplished, you 
          should invoke the justice of the Governor. 4. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Chilo. It is a well-known 
          fact that the benefit of the Lex Julia, having reference to the 
          assignment of property for the benefit of creditors, was extended by 
          the Constitutions of Our Divine Predecessors to the Provinces, so that 
          such assignments may take place there, but creditors are not allowed 
          to divide the said property on their own authority, and hold it by the 
          right of ownership, but they are obliged to sell it, and can then indemnify 
          themselves as far as the proceeds permit this to be done. Therefore, 
          you, having the possession of the property of him who assigned it to 
          you on the sole ground that you are his creditor, against the rule of 
          law, it is clear that the claimant will not be barred by the prescription 
          of long time, but if it is shown that he did not assign the property, 
          but gave it to you in payment of his debt, the Governor of the province 
          will grant you a hearing with reference to your ownership of the same. 5. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Myro. The assignment 
          of property by anyone on account of his being unable to meet some indebtedness 
          incurred on account of municipal offices or duties, can, by no means, 
          be admitted, but those who are liable must discharge their obligations 
          in proportion to the pecuniary resources of each. 6. The Emperor 
          Theodosius. In every assignment 
          of property, no matter for what cause it is made, the statement of the 
          assignor alone should be required, and the precise formalities introduced 
          by former laws are hereby abolished. (1) The same Emperor 
          said: "In every assignment of property the sole statement of the 
          intention of the party who makes it is sufficient." Given on the Kalends 
          of May, during the Consulate of Our Prince Honorius, and Evodius, 
          386. 7. The Emperor Justinian to Julian, Praetorian Prefect. As sons under 
          paternal control can hold property which is forbidden to be acquired 
          by their fathers, as well as peculium, not only castrense, 
          but also what they can obtain with the consent of the former, •why 
          should the power to assign their property be refused them? The reason 
          for this is that those who are under paternal control are understood 
          to possess nothing in their own right, still, in order that they may 
          not suffer injury, they should be allowed to make an assignment, for 
          if the head of a family is permitted to have the weak aid of assignment 
          on account of the fear of some injury to which he may be subjected, 
          why should We deny this right to children of either sex who are under 
          paternal control? For it is a perfectly clear rule of law that, where 
          those who are under the control of others, subsequently, as heads of 
          families, acquire anything, this can legally be seized by creditors 
          to the amount of the indebtedness. Given at Constantinople, 
          on the tenth of the Kalends of March, after the fifth Consulate 
          of Lampadius and Orestes, 531. 8. The Same Emperor to John, Praetorian Prefect. When, as is customary, a petition is presented to Us to allow someone to have recourse to the wretched expedient of making an assignment of his property, and his creditors are given the choice to grant him five years for payment of their claims, or to accept the assignment, that by so doing his reputation may be preserved, and the prospect of all bodily suffering be removed, where some of the creditors are willing to allow the term of five years, but others insist that an immediate assignment be made, it was constantly doubted which of them should be heard. Where a doubt of this kind exists, We think that Our opinion should be readily accepted by everyone, that is to say, We choose and authorize the more humane, instead of the harsher course, and decree that the case shall be decided either by the amount of the indebtedness, or according to the number of the creditors. Where, however, there is one creditor whose claim is found to be greater than all the others, that is to say, if all of them were united into one, and the entire indebtedness computed, it would be greater in amount than the rest combined, this decision shall prevail, whether the creditor is willing to grant the time above mentioned or to accept an assignment of the property. But if there are several creditors who have different claims, the one who has the largest should be preferred to the others, whether the creditors are equal or unequal in number, as the case should be decided, not in accordance with the number of creditors, but by the amount of the indebtedness. If the claims are found to be equal in amount, but the number of the creditors is unequal, then the majority of the creditors shall obtain the preference, and the decision shall be made in compliance with their wishes. When, however, the debts, as well as the number of creditors are equal, then those shall be preferred who incline to the more humane course, and do not require an assignment of the property, but are willing to grant the time, and, with reference to this choice, no difference shall be observed between hypothecary and other creditors. When an assignment is made, the judge shall exercise his authority by dividing the property among the individual creditors, as prescribed by law, and no prejudice shall result to any creditor from the delay of five years, so far as prescription is concerned. Title 
          72. Concerning the seizure and sale of property by authority of court, 
          and the separation of the same.   With reference 
          to the estate of a deceased person it is clear that the case of legatees 
          is preferable to that of those to whom his heir has bequeathed property, 
          since they can sue them, as they could have done his heir, for the first 
          bequest can be collected as a debt, and what has been left by the deceased 
          will only be available after the failure to pay it. 2. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Aristo. It is part of 
          the jurisdiction of the Praetor under the Edict, after it has been established 
          that the creditors of an estate are entitled to indemnity, that they 
          shall be granted a separation of the property, whenever they demand 
          it, and proper cause is shown. Therefore, you will obtain what you desire, 
          if you can prove that you did not proceed against the heir as representing 
          the estate, but that you were compelled by necessity to bring him into 
          court. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to Claudiana. The suit which 
          you have brought against your debtor on the contract which preceded 
          the assignment of his property is contrary to the rule of law, as equity 
          furnishes him with the relief of an exception. You can, however, again 
          bring suit against him, if he has subsequently acquired other property, 
          and the Governor of the province should authorize you to do so. 4. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Clariana. The demand which 
          you make, namely, that one of the creditors who has a written claim 
          against the debtor, and has seized the property of the latter, is obliged 
          to satisfy all the other creditors, is contrary to law. 5. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Acyndinus. If it is 
          established that the property of your debtor is unoccupied, and it has 
          not been seized by the Treasury, you can lawfully demand to be placed 
          in possession by a competent judge. Given on the seventeenth 
          of the Kalends of January, under the Consulate of .... 6. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Agathomarus. Creditors cannot 
          legally demand that the property of their debtor be transferred to them 
          in satisfaction of their claims. Therefore, if the other creditors of 
          your debtor have received property by way of pledge, there is no doubt 
          that their claims will be preferred to yours, as you have only a written 
          obligation. If, however, it should be proved that the property of your 
          creditor is not encumbered to anyone either specially or generally, 
          and the common debtor himself, or his heir, died without leaving any 
          successor, the interest of all the creditors will be protected, not 
          by asserting their right to the ownership of the property, but by obtaining 
          possession of and selling the same, and each one should receive a share 
          of the proceeds in proportion to the amount of nis claim. 7. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Domnus. If your wife has 
          been appointed heir by her uncle, who was her debtor for the third part 
          of his estate, she will not be prevented from collecting the debt from 
          his co-heirs in proportion to their two-thirds, as the right of action 
          is not merged, except so far as the share of the estate to which she 
          succeeded is concerned. If, however, the co-heirs should be insolvent, 
          and a separation of property is demanded, she will not be allowed to 
          suffer any loss. Given on the Kalends 
          of December, during the Consulate of the Caesars. 8. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Elida. The wife of the 
          deceased, or other creditors who have been placed in possession of the 
          property of the estate for the purpose of preserving it can, by no means, 
          be considered to have acquired the ownership of the same for this reason. 9. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Teruncius. As you allege 
          that he of whom you complain is indebted to you on account of the administration 
          of your business, having appeared before the Governor of the province, 
          you can legally bring suit against him. If it is established that he 
          is your debtor, and that in an attempt to defraud you of your rights, 
          he has concealed himself, and does not make any defence, you can, by 
          virtue of the Edict, obtain possession of his property, and the time 
          prescribed by law having expired, you will not be forbidden by a competent 
          judge to sell the same. Given on the fourteenth 
          of the Kalends of December, during the Consulate of Diocletian 
          and Maximian. 10. The Emperor 
          Justinian to John, Praetorian Prefect. In cases where 
          money was due, and property which belonged to the debtor had not been 
          hypothecated to secure payment, and he, fearing the harshness of his 
          creditors, concealed himself, and they, having instituted proceedings 
          with reference to said property, demand that possession of the same 
          should be transferred to them, We find that the question 
          arose among the ancient authorities whether other creditors, to whom 
          he was also indebted, could share in the possession of the property, 
          and desiring to remove this doubt, do order by this general Imperial 
          Constitution that, where not all the creditors, having claims of this 
          kind, but only certain ones, are placed in possession of the property 
          under a judicial decree, not only they, but all others having such claims 
          shall enjoy the same privilege, and have a common interest with those 
          who first obtained possession, and in whose favor a decree was rendered, 
          as above stated; for what could be more just than that all those who 
          are admitted to the possession of the property of the debtor should 
          share an advantage of this description? But, 
          in order that the negligence of the others may not be a source of perpetual 
          annoyance to those creditors who are shown to have been more diligent 
          in the collection of their claims, it seems to Us to be equitable to 
          direct that the other creditors who are not known, to have exerted such 
          diligence shall share in the possession of said property, and that they 
          shall be entitled to the term of two years if they are present and live 
          in the same province in which those who have possession of it reside, 
          and in case of their absence shall have the term of four years in which 
          to prove their claims to the creditors in possession and pay the expenses 
          pro rata to those who obtained the judgments. Those who incurred 
          such expenses in order to obtain possession of the property, must prove 
          the amount of the same under oath, because it is an established rule 
          that they shall be reimbursed in proportion to the amount of their claims. 
          After the time above mentioned has expired, however, the creditors who 
          have obtained possession as aforesaid shall not be molested or subjected 
          to loss, and they can bring any actions against their debtors to which 
          they think that they are entitled under the laws. (1) But if those 
          creditors who hold possession should sell the property, either by virtue 
          of a judicial decree or for any other lawful reason, or if they should 
          transfer every right which they are known to have in said property to 
          other persons, after the time which has been prescribed by Us, and receive 
          a certain sum of money in payment for the same, anything which is found 
          to be in excess of what is due to them, they will, by all means, be 
          required to seal up in the presence of notaries, and deposit in the 
          strong box of the Holy Church of the town in which the said transaction 
          took place, after a statement has been drawn up by the notaries aforesaid, 
          in the presence of the person who sold the property or transferred it 
          to other persons, in which not only the amount of money which was paid 
          for the sale or transfer of said property, as well as that of the surplus 
          which remained after the discharge of the debt, shall be set forth, 
          so that if any creditor should subsequently appear and produce evidence 
          of a debt, he can be paid out of said surplus. If another creditor should appear, the Governor of the 
          province shall make an examination of his claim without any charge, 
          and if he should not admit it, the reverend Stewards or Treasurers of 
          the Holy Church in which the money is deposited shall not be subjected 
          to any loss or expense, but the creditor shall be entitled to receive 
          the amount of his debt, pro rata,, 
          out of the money deposited under the decree of the Governor. To 
          prevent the creditors from practicing any fraud, machination, or evasion 
          in the sale or transfer of said property, We order that the statement 
          drawn up with reference to the transaction shall, with all the customary 
          formalities, be recorded in the office of the Defender of the City, 
          whether the amount of the price was equal to that of the debt, or whether 
          it was more, or less; and this should take place, not only in the presence 
          of notaries, as aforesaid, but also in that of the most reverend Treasurer 
          of the Church in whose hands the excess of the money, if there was any, 
          was deposited under seal. The vendor, or the person who transferred the property, 
          shall be required to make oath on the Holy Scriptures that this was 
          not done to favor either the purchaser or him to whom the property was 
          delivered, and that he did not fraudulently receive a lower price for 
          the same than it was worth, but the highest one in fact which, after 
          every effort, it was possible for him to obtain. Given at Constantinople, on the fifteenth of the Kalends of November, after the fifth Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 532. Title 
          73. Concerning the privilege of the Treasury.   If the property 
          of your husband was seized by the Treasury for the payment of claims 
          incurred during his administration as Chief Centurion of the Triarii, 
          any of it that you can prove beyond question to be yours shall be separated 
          from the rest, and returned to you. 2. The Same 
          Emperor to Valeriana. Although your 
          former husband may have had judgment rendered against him on account 
          of your dowry, still, if he made a contract with the Treasury before 
          his property was encumbered to you, the claim of the Treasury will be 
          preferred to yours. If, however, he became liable to the Treasury after 
          you had obtained a lien on his property, the claim of the Treasury to 
          said property will not take precedence of yours. Published on the 
          fourteenth of the Kalends of November, during the Consulate of 
          Antoninus, Consul for the fourth time, and Balbinus, 214. 3. The Same 
          Emperor to Juliana. If, when you paid 
          money for your husband, you did not have the claim of the Treasury transferred 
          to you, and did not receive a house or any other property from him by 
          way of security, you will be entitled to a personal action, but your 
          claim by which you allege that the taxes have again been farmed out 
          to him cannot be preferred to that of the Treasury, as, under the terms 
          of that contract, whatever property he has or did have at the time the 
          agreement was entered into, is encumbered to the Treasury by the right 
          of pledge. Therefore, with the exception of the indemnity to which the 
          Treasury is entitled, you will not 
          be prevented from suing your debtor, in the ordinary way, for the sum 
          which you have paid in his behalf to the Treasury. Published on the 
          third of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of Antoninus, 
          Consul for the fourth time, and Balbinus, 214. 4. The Same 
          Emperor to Quintus. If the debtor, 
          to whom you state that the land in question belonged, sold it before 
          he owed anything to the Treasury, My attorney will see that you are 
          not subjected to annoyance on this account, for even though he afterwards 
          became the debtor of the Treasury, still, any property which did not 
          belong to him at that time cannot, for this reason, be encumbered to 
          the Treasury by the right of pledge. Published on the 
          third of the Kalends of July, during the Consulate of Lsetus, 
          Consul for the second time, and Cerealis, 216. 5. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Menna. If the money which 
          a creditor received from his debtor should afterwards be decided to 
          justly belong to the Treasury, it will be due without interest, because 
          it was acquired, not under a contract for interest, but as being the 
          property of the Treasury by special privilege. Published on the 
          fifteenth of the Kalends of June, during the Consulate of Fuscus 
          and Dexter, 226. 6. The Emperor 
          Gordian to Severiana. As you yourself 
          state that your father was a debtor of the Treasury, and you allege 
          that, at the time of your marriage, he gave you possession of certain 
          property, you understand that the Attorney of the Treasury can institute 
          proceedings to revoke said gift, on the ground that said property was 
          pledged to the Treasury. Published on the 
          Nones of June, during the Consulate of Sabinus and Venustus, 
          241. 7. The Emperors 
          Valerian and Gallienus, and the Caesar Valerian, to Diodorus. If, after you 
          have paid for a debtor to the Treasury the balance which he owed, and 
          a competent judge has assigned to you the right of the Treasury, and 
          deprived the creditors (to whom the Treasury had a preferred claim) 
          of the property in your favor, they cannot molest you for the reason 
          that you hold it by this title. Published on the fifteenth of the Kalends of June, during the Consulate of Aemilianus and Bassus, 260. Title 
          74. Concerning the privilege of dowry.   You should know 
          that the dotal privilege which women avail themselves of in an action 
          of dowry does not pass to their heirs. Published on the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of Pompeianus and Avitus, 210. Title 
          75. Concerning the revocation of contracts by which property has been alienated for the purpose of defrauding creditors.   An heir who, after 
          having entered upon the estate, transfers it to another, remains liable 
          to the creditors of the estate. Therefore, if he did this for the purpose 
          of defrauding you, and you have seized and sold his property in the 
          ordinary way, you can revoke the contract by which it is proved that 
          the property was fraudulently alienated. Published on the 
          second of the Ides of October, during the Consulate of Antoninus, 
          Consul for the fourth time, and Balbinus, 214. 2. The Emperor 
          Alexander to Symphoriana. If you did not 
          accept the estate of your father, his creditors cannot proceed against 
          you on account of the property which was given to you by way of dowry, 
          when it is not shown that the said property was previously pledged to 
          them, unless, after the estate of the deceased was found to be insufficient 
          to pay his debts, it should be proved that the dowry had been constituted 
          for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. 3. The Emperors 
          Diocletian and Maximian, and the Caesars, to Acindynus. If you refused 
          to accept the estate of your father, and none of the property of the 
          same was transferred to you as a donation for the purpose of defrauding 
          creditors, the Governor of the province will not permit you to be sued 
          by the private creditors of your father. 4. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Epagathus. It is a well-known 
          rule of law that the sons of a debtor have no power to revoke contracts 
          made by their father for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. Published on the 
          tenth of the Kalends of May, during the Consulate of 
          the above-mentioned Emperors. 5. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Crescentius. It is a well-recognized 
          legal principle that the interests of creditors shall be protected against 
          a person who, after judgment has been rendered against him, does not 
          satisfy it within the time prescribed; and no defence is made by bringing 
          an action in factum against the purchaser, where property has 
          been sold after the remaining assets have been found to be insufficient, 
          and the purchaser knowingly and fraudulently bought the property, or 
          against him who has possession under a lucrative title, whether he was 
          aware of the fraud or not. Ordered on the 
          tenth of the Kalends of November, during the Consulate of the 
          above-mentioned Emperors. 6. The Same 
          Emperors and Caesars to Menandra. If you have formally 
          released an obligation, you are advised that the right to sue is only 
          granted by the Perpetual Edict against the party guilty of fraud, within 
          the year during which he could be compelled to make payment, or committed 
          a fraudulent act by which he became unable to do so. |